Proceedings of The Ninth Pacific Trade and Development Conference : Mineral Resources in the Pacific Area by Pacific Trade and Development Conference
/-lcJ flll 
Cc ~be.< r"C. I C, 7 c, 
Proceedings of 
NINTH PACIFIC TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE 
MINERAL RESOURCES 
IN THE 
PACIFIC AREA 
Published by 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
1978 
Production editing by Barbar a Barry and Karen Rusk . Manuscript 
preparation by Carl Merritt , Kevin Conduff and Ann Stutzman . 
For copies of this and other Federal Reserve publications , write or 
phone the Public Information Section , Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco, P. O. Box 7702 . San Francisco, California 94120 . Phone 
(415) 544- 2184 . 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Dedication to Harry G. Johnson. 1 
FOREWORD ••• 4 
Opening Address, by John J. Balles, President,. 6 
Federal Reserve Bank o f San Franci:o;co 
Greetings by Edmund G. Brown, Jr. , Governor •••••••••• 9 
State of California (delivered by Thomas Gay): 
"California's Place in Mineral Resources Development Among the 
Pacific Basin Countries" 
1. In troduc ti on. 
Law:cence B. Krause 
18 
;,** I. THE ECONC.1ICS AND POLITICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES *;'* 
2. The Raw Material Product Cycle •• • •• 
Stephen P . Magee and ·1Jorman I . Rob ins 
Discussants : Danny Leipziger ••• 
Narongchai Akrasanee. 
General Discussion 
3. Mineral Trade and Investment Patterns in the Pacific Area 
N. M. Switucha 
Discussants: Sirman Widiatmo 
Francis K. Chan • 
General Discussion 
4 . Resource Trade and the Development Process in Developing 
Countries • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Ross Garnaut 
30 
57 
62 
65 
69 
122 
127 
131 
• •• 135 
Discussants: Kuo-shu Liang • • 
Anthony D. Scott• 
• • • • 166 
• 169 
General Discussion 174 
5 . 
6 . 
Ocean Mining in the Pacific Basin: Stimulus and 
Response • • • • • ••••••• 
Michael Gorham 
Discussants: Leslie V. Castle •••• 
David V. Hudson, Jr .• 
General Discussion 
• • • • • • • 177 
• 234 
• • • 237 
• 241 
i<** II. NATIONAL CASE STUDIES IN NATURAL RESOURCE PROBLEMS *** 
Australia's Minerals Production and Trade : 
of a Resource-Rich Developed Country. • • • 
Ben Smith 
Dis cussants: H. Edward English • 
Hang-Sheng Cheng 
General Discussion. • • • • 
Case Study 
• • • • 245 
• • 305 
• 309 
• • • • 314 
7. Options for a Resource-Poor Developed Country -- Japan ••••• 316 
Yasuhiro Murata 
8. 
Discussants : Hugh Patrick •• • • 
Laurence L. C. Chau • 
General Discussion 
Issues in the Development of Resource-Rich LDCs: 
in Chile. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Ernesto Tironi 
Discussants : Romeo Bautista 
Danny Leipziger 
General Discussion 
Copper 
9 . Natural Resource Problens in a Resource-Poor Developing 
• 354 
• 359 
• • • 363 
• • • 366 
• • • • 414 
418 
• 420 
Country : The Korean Case ••••••••••••••••••• 423 
Wontack Hong 
Discussants: Francis K. Chan 
Yashichi Ohata. 
General Discussion 
• 446 
• 450 
• 453 
*HIII. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MINERAL RESOURCES : POLICY ALTERNATIVES*** 
10 . Commodity Trade from a North-South Perspective •••••••• 457 
Jose Pinera 
11. 
Discussants : Seiji Naya ••••• 
Norman I . Robins 
General Discussion • • • • • • • • 
Japan's Resource Security and Foreign Investment in the 
Pacific : A Case Study of Bilateral Devices between 
498 
• • • 500 
503 
Advanced Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • • 506 
Kiyoshi Koj ima 
Discussants : Michael Keran 
Kuo-shu Liang 
General Discussion • 
12 . The Wider Context of Bilateral Resource Exploitation 
• • 522 
529 
• 532 
Arrangements between the LDCs and the DCs • • • • • • • • • • 535 
Miguel Wionczek 
Discussants : Romeo Bautista ••• 
H. Edward English 
General Discussion • • • • • • • 
13 . International Commodity Control: The Tin Experience _,. 
Mohamed K. M. Arif f 
• 560 
•• 564 
• 569 
571 
• • • 598 
602 
Discussants : Laurence L . C. Chau. • • 
Kenj i Takeuchi • • • • • • 
Sirman Widiatmo • • • • • • • • • • • 606 
General Discussion • • • • • • • • fi09 
14 . An Organization for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development: 
Regional Arrangements and the Resource Trade • • • • • • • • • 611 
Peter Drysdale 
Discussants : Saburo Okita. 
Seiji Naya • • 
Hugh Patrick • 
General Discussion • 
STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
N. M. Switucha 
649 
• • 651 
• • 654 
• 660 
662 
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ••••• • •••• • ••••••••• • •• 704 
HARRY G. JOHNSON* 
1923- 1977 
It is my privilege to present to you a memoriam to Harry Gordon 
Johnson, our colleague and friend . In announcing the death , the 
Chairman of the Department of Economics of the University of Chicago, 
Arnold Harberger stated that " the name of Harry G. Johnson will long 
stand in the history of economic science . " I fully agree and would add 
that he will be greatly missed, especially by this assemblage, because 
Harry was one of the founding fathers of the Pacific Trade and 
Development Conference . His intellectual support legitimized the 
endeavor for all of North America . He helped launch the experiment in 
Tokyo in January 1968 and attended all but one of the subsequent seven 
meetings . As you know , he was one of the four members of the American 
Steering Committee for this meeting, to which he contributed until his 
death . 
Harry will be remembered for his teaching, for his writing and for 
his conference participation . As a teacher , Harry had a reputation for 
requiring the most exacting scientific content in his courses while 
insisting on its relevance to the real world . He was demanding upon 
his students , but with equal vigor he defended their legitimate rights 
with school administrators and fought against the formalities and 
other complications which Deans devise to bedevil student life . 
Harry ' s rewar~ for helping so many students was a never- ending stream 
of communications which he somehow found time to answer . Competition 
for his teaching became so intense that he could clear the market only 
by accepting appointments two at a time - - to the profit of students 
and international airlines alike . 
His writings cover the full spectrum of economics and he made 
major contributions to monetary and international trade theory . I 
*Delivered at the Ninth Pacific Trade and Development Conference 
August 22- 26, 1977 in San Francisco . 
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observed at first hand his research capabilities in the summer of 1965, 
when he wrote the entire manuscript subsequently published by the 
Brookings Institution as Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Coun-
tries (January 1967) . I marveled at his ability to assimilate theory 
and empirical findings and draw policy implications therefrom; and at a 
speed unknown at Brookings before or since . My reward for diligently 
criticizing drafts of chapters cascading from his pen was to have my 
secretary stolen away by him and spirited off to England. Upon my 
chiding him for his ingratitude, Harry responded in characteristically 
matter-of-fact fashion that Suzy was the only secretary he ever had who 
could read and type his scribblings as fast as he could write . 
But it was as a conference participant that many of us knew him 
best . Harry Johnson almost single- handedly made international confer-
ences not only intellectually respectable, but the preferred approach 
to organizing, assembling and transmit ting research findings. The 
conference form permits international participation and inter- disci-
plinary approaches, and gives immediate circulation to ideas for which 
time is frequently a critical dimension . Harry perfected the art of 
the instant summary at the close of a conference , which helps fix main 
ideas in the minds of those present . There was no corner of the world 
to which Harry would not travel for conferences, despite the demands 
they were making on his physical well being . 
Let me add a more personal note . Because of common interests and 
alphabetical logic which frequently placed Johnson and Krause side- by-
side , I came to expect and somewhat enjoy the sight of wood chips from 
Harry's whittling inundating my notes, trousers and shoes . I further 
remember a particular conference at a beautiful but isolated spot at 
the top of a mountain in Switzerland . While admirably suited to keep 
the attention of the participants firmly concentrated on the problems 
of the Bretton Woods monetary system, it lacked easy access to a grog 
shop required to circumvent the outrageous prices demanded by the Swiss 
innkeeper . For Harry found the cocktail hour before dinner an admir-
able time to educate and be educated by the commercial bankers who were 
attending . In his room, on a one- to- one basis, the fears of flexible 
exchange rates were exorcised , myths dispelled , and real problems 
appreciated . Such an educative process required lubrication. To my 
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surprise, I discovered that my wife , Sallye , had become chief engineer 
of a gin and vodka underground express between Lucerne and the Burgen-
stock via streetcar , lake steamer and funicular railway . Harry never 
tired of teaching , and he did not consider bankers -- even central 
bankers -- hopeless students ; i ndeed they might even be taught the 
relationship between monetary aggregates, economic activity , balance 
of payments and inflation , if properly prepared for the lesson . 
As you know , Harry ' s fi r st stroke was very debilitating , but he 
did not let that stop him from attending all the meetings to which he 
was invited ; and there were many . Yet it t ook its toll . His mind was 
s t ill as critical and his tongue as sharp , particularly in the face of 
pomposity and self- deception , yet the criticisms became less relieved 
and seemingly less positive in their focus . 
All of Harry ' s work was mar ked by intellectual brilliance , 
honesty and courage . Yet with all of that , Harr y was very human with 
human failings . I recall the first time he was a guest in our house . 
Sallye had prepared dinner in usual abundance because, in her words , if 
an army should stop by , there should be something to eat , only to 
discover that two of our dinner guests had cancelled at the last 
minute . Once the dinner began , however , her concerns of excess supply 
turned to fears of unsatisfied demand for when it came to eating and 
drinking , Harry was an army . 
And in May of this year , the excesses of his earlier life- style 
finally prevailed . At the age of 54 , Harry succumbed to liver failur e . 
As I think of Harry , I do so without sadness but with the pleasure 
of knowing we have been touched by one of the giants of our age . 
We may do our work secure in the knowledge that an international 
conference on this subject is the most fitting memorial to Harry 
Johnson : we are paying the most appropriate tribute to him . So let 
the conference begin . 
Lawrence B. Krause 
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FOREWORD 
The Ninth Pacific Trade and Development Conference , held at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco on August 22- 26, 1978 , was 
directed to the theme of development and trade in mineral resources 
among the nations in the Pacific region . Some 40 policy- oriented 
academic and business economists , and government and central bank 
officials acting in their private capacities , participated in the 
conference . They came from a number of resource- rich and resource-
poor Pacific Basin countries -- including North America , Latin 
Amer ica , Oceania , Southeast Asia , and Northeast Asia --and 
represented a wide range of expertise and viewpoints . 
This conference is the ninth in a series begun in January 1968 
to examine important issues of economic policy for the Pacific 
region . Previous conferences were held in Japan , the United States , 
Australia , Canada , Mexico , New Zealand , and Thailand . These 
conferences have been organized by an informal group of academic 
economists in order to enhance understanding of the economic 
importance of the Pacific region and to promote objective analysis 
and evaluation of relevant policy issues by government policy makers 
and business leaders as well as policy- oriented scholars . The 
Pacific Trade and Development Conference series is administered by 
an International Steering Committee chaired by Professor Kiyoshi 
Kojima (Hitotsubashi University , Japan), and its executive 
committee , consisting of Professor Kojima , Dr. Peter Drysdale 
(Australian National University , Australia) and Professor Hugh 
Patrick (Yale University , U. S. A. ) . 
Each conference has been devoted to a specific t heme of policy 
importance . The proceedings of each conference -- papers, comment s 
of assigned discussants , and a summary of the general discussion --
have been published as follows : 
1 . Kiyoshi Kojima , ed . Pacific Trade and Development (Tokyo : 
Japan Economic Research Center , 1968) . 
2 . Kojima, ed . Pacific Trade and Development II (Tokyo : Japan 
Economic Research Center , 1969) . 
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3. Peter Drysdale, ed ., Direct Foreign Investment in Asia and 
the Pacific (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 
1972) . 
4. H.E . English and Keith A.J. Hay, eds . , Obstacles to Trade in 
the Pacific Area (Ottawa : School of International Affairs, 
Carleton University, 1972). 
5 . Kiyoshi Kojima, ed ., Structural Adjustments in Asian-Pacific 
Trade (Tokyo : Japan Economic Research Center, 1973), two 
volumes . 
6. Kiyoshi Kojima and Miguel Wionczek, eds . Technology Transfer 
in Pacific Economic Development (Tokyo: Japan Economic 
Research Center, 1975) . 
7. Leslie V. Castle and Sir Frank Holmes, eds ., Co- operation and 
Development in the Asia/Pacific Region -- Relations Between 
Large and Small Countries (Japan Economic Research Ctr . , 
1976) . 
8. Narongchai Akrasanee, Seiji Naya, and Vinyu Vichit-Vadakan, 
eds . Trade and Employment in Asia and the Pacific (Honolulu: 
University Press of Hawaii, 1977) . 
Because of the small and simple administrative arrangements of 
the conference series, organization of each conference is a sub-
stantial undertaking. We therefore appreciate the efforts of those who 
made possible the Ninth Conference and the publication of these 
Proceedings . Special thanks are due to the Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco, which served as sponsor and host, in particular to Kent 
Sims, Michael Keran (our co-organizer of the Conference), Hang- Sheng 
Cheng, William Burke, and the indefatigable Elizabeth Prettyman . Es-
sential financial support was provided by the Asia Foundation, the Ford 
Foundation, the Foundation for Research in Economics and Education, 
and the International Institute for Economic Research, and Standard 
Oil Company of California, Bank of America, Bechtel Corporation, Crown 
Zellerbach Company, Exxon, and Utah International . The rapporteurs, 
Michael Riordan and Larry Meissner, prepared the general discussion 
summaries and rendered other editorial assistance . To all who made 
this effort successful we give our thanks. 
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OPENING ADDRESS 
John J . Balles, President 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
(Ninth PAFTAD Conference, August 22, 1977) 
Speaking as the President of the host institution, I am happy to 
welcome you to the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco . To quote 
Confucius, "Happy is he who has friends visiting from afar . " We see 
gathered here distinguished scholars from 15 Pacific Basin countries, 
and we even have visitors from such exotic places as Berkeley across 
the San Francisco Bay and Stanford down the Peninsula . To all of you , 
I extend a warm welcome on behalf of our Bank . 
In addition , I wish to compliment the organizers of the PAFTAD 
Conference series . I understand that Professor Kiyoshi Kojima of Japan 
was the guiding spirit behind the first of these conferences back in 
1968 . Other members of the original International Steering Committee 
included Sir John Crawford and Dr . Peter Drysdale of Australia , 
Professor Edward English of Canada, Dr . Saburo Okita of Japan , and 
Professors Harry Johnson and Hugh Patrick of the United States . I'm 
happy to see that several of them are with us today . 
The success of this series of meetings is reflected in its 
durability through the years . This shows that the conferences have 
been addressing important issues , and that the peoples and the govern-
ments of Pacific Basin countries are interested in what you have to say 
on these issues . It takes a great deal of foresight , persistence, and 
plain hard work to set us these conferences and keep them going year 
after year . I congratulate the International Steering Committee for 
thier leadership, and the U. S. Commit tee -- Dr . Lawrence Krause , 
Professor Hugh Patrick , and Dr . Michael Keran -- for putting together 
this year ' s conference . 
As in the past , it addresses a major economic issue natural 
resources in an age of apparent scarcity . One of the factors 
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underlying the rapid economic growth of the Pacific Basin during the 
last two decades has been its vast natural-resource base. This 
conference deals with a number of unresolved issues which have gen-
erated conflict between nations, and between private and public sec-
tors in this area. By analyzing the issues, proposing solutions, and 
publishing the results of your deliberations, you will be able to help 
policymakers and the general public make better-informed judgments 
about natural-resource problems. 
As many of you know, the area served by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of San Francisco covers the western third of the United States, 
extending from the Rocky Mountains in the east all the way to Alaska, 
Hawaii, and Samoa in the west . We are indeed very much a part of the 
Pacific Basin . We are highly conscious of the strong economic, 
financial, and cultural ties that bind us together for our mutual 
benefit. In 1974 and again in 1976, I visited many of your countries. 
to meet with your finance ministers , central bank governors, bankers 
and businessmen . In return, I have received many Pacific Basin leaders 
here . In fact, I am expecting to see Mr . Michael Wong, the Managing 
Director of the Singapore Monetary Authority, later this week . 
Within the Federal Reserve System, our Bank has the responsi-
bility of developing a special expertise on the economic issues of the 
Pacific Basin region . In the last two years, we have established an 
International and Pacific Basin Section in the Research Department to 
carry out that responsibility . We have conducted studies on inflation 
and monetary policy, econometric modeling, and foreign borrowing in 
Pacific Basin countries . In addition, we have taken the leadership in 
promoting research cooperation among the central banks in the region . 
Two years ago , we hosted at this Bank the First Pacific Basin Central 
Bank Conference on Econometric Modeling . It generated so much interest 
among the participating central banks that a Second Conference was held 
last year in Korea, and a Third Conference will be held in New Zealand 
this November . 
We have also established a Clearinghouse for Pacific Basin Cen-
tral Bank Economic Research , in order to facilitate exchange of 
information on the research activities being conducted at these 
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various institutions . Lastly, we have begun publishing a quarterly 
statistical bulletin, Pacific Basin Economic Indicators , and in our 
Research Library we have set aside a special room for a Pacific Basin 
collection. 
I say all this in order to emphasize our continuing efforts at 
this Bank to expand our knowledge of Pacific Basin countries . Indeed, 
as scholars in this area , we all share a common interest in promoting 
understanding of the economic issues that confront our region . I 
invite you to call on us whenever you come to the United States , and to 
send us any papers you write on Pacific Basi n economic subjects . A 
steady interchange, I am sure , will work to the advantage of all of us . 
With that said , I wish you a successful conference and a pleasant stay 
in San Francisco . 
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CALIFORNIA'S PLACE IN MINERAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 
AMONG THE PACIFIC BASIN COUNTRIES 
Thomas E. Gay, Jr. 
State Geologist 
I am sorry that Governor Brown cannot be here . His schedule had 
conflicts that couldn't be resolved . 
He asked me to convey his strong conviction that mutual good will 
among the countries of the Pacific Basin is essential, in the important 
business of natural- resource raw materials development . 
From the fact that this series of Conferences has been convened 
for the past 8 years, and the very impressive portfolio of participants 
here today it is clear that this meeting is a significant step in 
producing just the type of good will and mutual understanding that are 
fundamental to promoting development and trade of natural resources 
among the nations of the Pacific Basin. 
As California ' s State Geologist , I repr esent a little different 
slant from most of you here . The main thrust of my concern , and my 
agency's function as California ' s geological survey , is in the techni-
cal and environmental aspects of finding and extracting one of the key 
types of natural resource raw materials : mineral resources . (And in 
the term "mineral resources" I include both metallic and nonmetallic --
so called "industrial minerals" -- and the energy hydrocarbons petrol-
eum, gas , and coal . ) 
In the United States ' economic- social system , State government 
technical agencies like mine have the function of producing regional or 
statewide maps and reports . These give the basic background data 
useful to private industry firms that conduct actual exploration , 
development , extraction , and processing of mineral materials . For 
example , we produce the Geologic Map of California , the Gravity Map of 
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California , and bulletin reports on such commodity studies as Salt in 
California, Manganese in California, or Tungsten in California , etc . 
These maps and reports are produced largely by compilation of field 
data released to us by private industry firms - - the work of petroleum 
and mining company exploration geologists -- as well as Federal (U . S . 
Geological Survey, and U.S. Bureau of Mines) and University research 
geologists . Also, there ' s considerable original contribution from 
field investigation by our own staff geologists, geochemists, and 
geophysicists . These regional and statewide reports give the setting 
of a mineral province, and bring out broad structural trends , or unique 
regional patterns of mineralization , or subtle relationships between 
widely separated mineralized areas . Using them, individual companies 
can recognize possible targets for localized, intensive exploration to 
locate and define individual ore bodies , petroleum sands, etc . , that 
they then test out, mine, and put into the stream of economic commerce 
including international markets . 
That is one way a government can foster international trade in 
nature resources - - by helping domestic resource- exploration firms . 
And I hasten to add that the Federal government agencies I mentioned --
U. S. Geological Survey, and U. S. Bureau of Mines, among others --
perform similar industry- assistance regional projects, as do the com-
parable agencies in many of our 50 states . ) 
Another way that the California State geological survey contri-
butes, is to have those same maps and reports available to the 
increasing number of foreign investment firms who are seeking oppor-
tunities in California -- some in minerals and petroleum extraction 
possibilities -- but more seeking a wide range of possible industrial 
investments . Our basic geologic information on potential landslide , 
fault , and earthquake hazard conditions (hazards which do exist in some 
parts of California) can be useful in decisions to invest or develop , 
or not to , in certain localities - - and to prepare necessary reports 
considering environmental impacts of proposed developments . 
Recognizing· from the Conference agenda the wide range of resource 
development conditions in the various nations of the Pacific Basin, I 
would like to try to identify California ' s place, as relates to 
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"resource- rich" or "- poor", and "developed/underdeveloped economy ." I 
think a brief description might illustrate some of the consequences of 
"development . " 
As a State -- a unique political subuni t, and reasonably unique 
geographical region within the United States -- California is both 
resource- rich and well- developed . Discovery in the mid- 1840 ' s of 
placer gold in the Sierra Nevada foothills about 100 miles east of San 
Francisco , was the main impetus to early colonization of the State . 
Agriculture proved profitable, especially as water resources were 
developed , and then petroleum was discovered in the early 1900 ' s and 
became the essential source of cheap energy during the first half of 
this century while industrialization and development were proceeding 
in a westward- rushing tide in America . Recent years, on the other 
hand , have brought to California evidence of a slowing or perhaps 
turning of that tide . The population explosion continues, and pro-
liferation of cultural amenities, but -- at least in the realm of the 
mineral resources kingdom -- we are clearly seeing disquieting evi-
dence that the growth of raw- material extraction could not forever 
indefinitely keep pace with the population growth rate . 
Nearly all the rich early discovered mines in California were long 
since worked out, and the combination of lower grade ore , and inflated 
mining costs had severely hit metal mining in the State . Further , the 
urbanization process of "population explosion" threatened to spread 
homes and commercial developments over the major unworked deposits of 
aggregates , preventing their extraction, and losing them as surely as 
if they had been worked out . 
A second turning point was the emergence over the past decade , at 
an organized , politically focussed level , of serious concern for air , 
water, and land- surface environmental health of our State . 
In the historical cycle of emergence and development of an 
"underdeveloped" nation into a "developed" one, California represents 
that stage of maturity where the future availability of sufficient 
supplies of raw resources requires another kind of industr i al and 
political process than "Dig it out fast and cheap -- then move to the 
next highgrade deposit ." 
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"Digging it out fast and cheap" has always been the hallmark of 
success in minerals production in the United States, and in California . 
It was our good fortune that a wide variety of mineral materials could 
be found here in excellent quantity and quality, including petroleum --
the key to the energy resources required to mine , process, refine, and 
manufacture consumer products from any and all of the other mineral 
materials present . Abundance is seductive, however, in disguising the 
fact that mineral raw materials, as a non- renewable resource , do indeed 
have a finite supply . And that finite - ness shows up gradually for 
certain materials before others, including gradual dropping in grade 
of ore, that tends to be compensated for in improved processing, and 
price rises . The gradually increasing cost of supplying certain low-
cost, near- source commodities (such as sand and gravel for concrete 
aggregate) to certain localities also tends to be subtle, so that 
general public awareness of the nonrenewable nature of the raw material 
consumed is slow to crystallize in form to be grasped and made part of 
a nation's public policy, or of its total economic way of life . 
One other great truth of the impetuous process of development of a 
country, or a State , into a "developed nation," namely a finite limit 
to the elasticity of the environment, is also catching up with Califor-
nia, and presenting a "due" bill we are struggling with . The threat to 
California's environment arrived more through impacts of more and more 
people, and more and more energy- intensive (and consequence- blind) 
activities, than through minerals-related activities . But air qual-
ity, water quality, and degradation of the land surface itself, as to 
visual quality and as to necessary agricultural capacity -- all have 
become serious public concerns in California over the past decade . 
One backlash of this public concern -- the imposition of restric-
tions on "polluting" industry - - has developed into a very serious 
threat to some segments of our minerals industry , in effect threatening 
to make inaccessible major portions of known reserves of many vital 
minerals . A series of tough laws, at both national and state levels, 
were enacted in the past decade, to protect water, air , and landsurface 
quality. These new laws have had powerful effects on the exploration 
for, and the mining of, mineral raw materials . Also there have been 
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crippling effects on the industrial processes required to refine and 
manufacture the mineral raw materials into saleable consumer products . 
Oil refineries , iron and steel mills , and cement companies - - both old 
and new - - have been faced with mounting pressures to incorporate 
expensive "cleanup" systems in order to operate within California's 
econcern for its environment . 
My purpose in dwelling on the impact of environmental concern on 
mineral natural resources (and these or similar types of environmental 
impacts face other natural resource areas as well) , is not to suggest 
the impact is fatal to raw materials incustries . On the contrary , 
human ingenuity once convinced that the problem is important and 
unavoidable , is providing satisfactory answers to the environmental 
problems I ' ve mentioned . But the costs of doing so are significant . 
And those costs have to be accepted as part of the unavoidable costs of 
doing business , by the mineral resources (and other natural resources) 
industries . They must raise prices; and the consuming sector must get 
used to paying them. 
I am offering this experience of California ' s to the Conference as 
a reminder that , although there is a period of grace when an emerging 
nation may industrialize without unacceptable damage to its environ-
ment , it may well face serious questions at a more advanced stage of 
its industrial development . In California, in hindsight, the lesson is 
clear : we should have started much earlier to internalize the environ-
mental costs of natural resources development ; al though identified 
industry costs - - and product prices -- would have been increased 
earlier, the competitive inequities and other industrial and political 
problems would have been worked on seriously , and be much closer to 
solution today than we presently find them. Our environmental problems 
are compounded in the present era , when social problems , inflationary 
pressures, and energy problems are leaving but little political 
patience for the very real problems of natural resource development . 
And besides the exampl e of belated necessity , I can offer the 
comfort that current experience here is producing technological equip-
ment and systems that can be installed from the first in developing 
natural resources industries in new localities , so they can avoid some 
14 
of the environmental impact from the outset . 
A special area deserving consideration at any Conference on 
natural resources in the Pacific Basin is that of potential recovery of 
minerals from the sea floor . I see that the Conference will discuss 
this later today or tomorrow. The potential for near-shore recovery of 
sand and gravel , phosporite , and heavy minerals from placers -- not to 
mention sea- water minerals like salt and magnesia -- is left to those 
nati ons that own the segments of the continental shelf where these 
shallow- water deposits occur . They face the relatively purely econom-
ic problems of preparing near- and on- shore facilities, extracting the 
minerals , and marketing them . But the major new frontier of deep 
seafloor recovery of manganese- nickel- copper- cobalt nodules will sure-
ly require international negotiations and agreements , with both legal 
and economic problems to be solved . At the present time, technology to 
locate and evalute these deposits -- let alone to recover and process 
them into saleable products -- is still in a developmental stage , and 
moving slowly because of the t remendous costs inherent in anything man 
tries to do in the deep ocean enviornment . 
The generally dispersed habit of the ore nodules, like small 
potatoes scattered on the deep ocean floor, still poses a question 
whether mi nable concentrations can be found i n the tremendous total 
tonnages needed to warrant the major investment necessary to start 
mining . But technical research and sampli ng is proceeding , including 
the exciting reports of unusual mineral concentrations in localities 
of seafloor hot- water springs near the Galapagos Islands . Meantime , 
the Law- of- the- Sea conferences , and efforts to assemble required deep 
sea venture capital, must proceed so that when the technological 
questions are answered, the legal, political , and economic framework 
will be ready , too , to permit deep sea mining in real earnest . 
Governor Brown emphasized "good will among the Pacific Basin 
nations" in his greeting that I bring to this Conference . Let me say a 
few words in support of the importance of "good will relationships" in 
the area of mineral raw materials . Since mineral resources can be 
extracted only where they happen to occur , and since they happen to 
occur quite capriciously with respect to political boundaries, it 
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turns out inevitably that some nations have certain minerals and are 
potential exporters, but that most nations lack certain minerals, and 
must depend upon imports. Indeed, the raw materials trade thereby 
necessitated is a basic topic of this Conference. 
That is the kind of good will we mean: nations recognizing their 
mutual interdependence for fundamental raw mineral materials, and 
setting out to conduct trade on as mutually favorable basis as can be 
found. 
It is a brave goal of some nations to become self-sufficient in 
all materials. The United States has expressed such a national goal 
for energy supplies . I won't say that such a goal is impossible . But 
it is obviously many years in the future . And if a goal of self-
sufficiency is to be extended to all essential mineral materials, it 
will be reached only through unexpected mineral discoveries; through 
unexpected technological breakthroughs (to recover usuable mineral 
from low- grade ores, at an affordable cost in energy and dollars); 
through increase in recovery costs; or through reduction in tonnages 
consumed (perhaps by modified consumption practices, substitution, 
reutilization of scrap, etc . ) . 
In the near term -- the next decade or so - - the trend is clearly 
not to count on miraculous self-sufficiency, but to work toward 
continued (and increased) reliance on international trade in mineral 
raw materials. Only thus can we maintain and improve standards of 
industrial development, as desired by virtually all the world's 
nations -- particularly those represented in this Conference . So good 
will -- and I would hope that "good will" could be considered 
practically synonymous with "good trade" -- is an essential climate for 
this Conference, and among the Pacific Basin nations here represented . 
As a brief example of mutual interdependence, I would cite the 
United States' position in domestic vs. imported mineral raw 
materials, as reported annually by the U.S . Bureau of Mines and U. S. 
Geological Survey . These figures include metals, nonmetallic 
minerals, and mineral fuels . 
In 1975 the United States imported $21 billion of mineral raw 
materials, while producing $62 million domestically (we imported about 
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one fourth of our total needs) • In 1976 the U. S. imported about 
$31 billion worth, while producing $68 billion (imports had increased 
nearly 50 percent , up from 25 percent to 31 percent of the total U. S. 
consumption) . A major part of this was in petroleum , of course, fo r 
which both the tonnage and the ratio of import to U. S. domestic 
production have been going steadily up . 
In the hard minerals , the significance of the import figures lies 
less in the ratios than in the strategic and fundamental importance of 
many of the particular metals imported -- metals which the U. S. mus t 
have for its industrialized economy : for example, about 96 percent of 
our aluminum is imported ; 18 percent of our copper ; 86 percent of our 
rutile (to make metallic titanium) ; 52 percent of our zinc ; 61 percent 
of our gold ; 26 percent of our lead ; 99 percent of our platinum; 
100 percent of our tin ; 44 percent of our silver ; 28 percent of our 
iron ore ; 74 percent of our nickel; 95 percent of our manganese ; 
44 percent of our tungsten ; 98 percent of our cobalt ; 100 percent of 
our chromium; and 32 percent of our vanadium. 
To rely on these kinds of percentages of imports for the principal 
metals needed for survival of its heavily industrial economy , a nation 
had better foster good will among its suppliers ! And just as surely , 
it had better develop and maintain trade relationships that emphasize 
the high reciprocal values that it gives in exchange to the supplying 
nations : there is no question the U. S. has such values to exchange , as 
you at this Conference will be discussing . This example of mutual 
interdependence happens to be drawn on the United States because I have 
those figures -- but I ' m sure it applies to most of the countr ies 
represented here . 
To close, I have given you a few impressions that strike me , as 
director of a technical bureau of St ate government . My level of 
concern is the technological and environmental problems of locati ng 
and extracting and trading the mineral raw materials needed for the 
continued development and economic health of the State of California as 
one of the United States -- and the nations of the Pacific Basin a r ea 
here represented . The necessity for international good will, which 
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Governor Brown sends as his message to this Conference , is nowhere more 
apparent than in this area of mutual interdependence in natural 
r esource development . 
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INTRODUCTION 
Lawrence B. Krause 
The discovery , development, processing , and trade in mineral 
resources is a matter of vital importance for the countries of the 
Pacific region, as elsewhere in the world . Many among the nations of 
the Pacific are inextricably intertwined through direct mineral devel-
opment and trade relationships . Some developing countries in the 
region rely heavily on minerals exports , a few substantially on 
minerals imports . Among the developed countries, Australia and Canada 
are major minerals exporters, Japan (probably the economy in the world 
most dependent on imported raw materials) a major importer, and the 
United States exporter of some minerals and importer of others . Trade 
is conducted primarily through private markets, and multinational 
resource firms are a major factor in mineral mining projects throughout 
the region . Host governments in all countries perceive minerals 
development and trade to be of major policy significance . 
The purpose of the Ninth Pacific Trade and Development Conference 
was to explore and analyze objectively a wide range of issues involving 
the political economy of mineral resources in the Pacific area . At the 
conference 13 papers were presented and discussed , organized around 
the following three broad topics : the economics and politics of 
natural resources, national case studies in natural resource problems, 
and the political economy of mineral resources (policy alternatives) . 
Each of the papers is included in this volume with remarks prepared by 
the discussants and a summary of the general discussion . A Statistical 
Appendix by Nicholas M. Swi tucha of relevance to all the papers is 
included at the end of the volume. This introduction briefly describes 
the main features of the papers and discussion , and draws together some 
of the broad conclusions which emerged during the conference . 1 
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The Economics and Politics of Natural Resources 
This topic included four papers, ranging from quite theoretical 
to purely empirical . 
"The Raw Material Product Cycle" by Stephen P. Magee and Norman L. 
Robins (Chapter 2), presents an interesting extension of the dynamic 
theory of international trade. Their theory envisions a raw material 
cycle similar in spirit to Raymond Vernon's product cycle for manufact-
urers . In their theory, increasing demand for a natural resource 
causes a rising relative price . The rising cost first triggers 
conservation in use and expansion of supply sources, and then leads to 
development of lower cost synthetic substitutes for the natural re-
source . This kind of model with endogenous technical change implies 
that concern over eventual exhaustion of raw materials is misplaced. 
Discussion focused on a number of considerations not included in the 
theory, such as short- run price instability and factor requirements 
and availabilities . Such shortcomings are common to any new theory, 
and the paper has opened up many new avenues for future economic 
research. 
"Mineral Trade and Investment Patterns in the Pacific Area" by 
N.M. Switucha (Chapter 3), summarizes useful information concerning 
mineral industries in many countries and deals with the characteris-
tics common to recent mineral development. A major point emerging from 
the paper is the increasing involvement or interference of national 
governments in mineral development -- both as producers and consumers . 
Discussion indicated a general agreement that governments ought to be 
involved in mineral development, but that establishment of legitimate 
roles does not by any means imply that actual government involvement 
fulfills those roles . Complex technical and economic factors involved 
in mineral processing also invalidate the naive view held by some 
governments that producing countries gain by increasing mineral value 
added before export . 
"Resource Trade and the Development Process in Developing Coun-
tries" by Ross Garnaut (Chapter 4), investigates the general process 
of natural resource- based economic development, of particular rele-
vance to less developed Southeast Asian countries with sizable natural 
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resource endowments . He concentrates mostly on the important indirect 
linkages between mineral development and the rest of the economy 
provided by larger incomes and economic rent . Much of the paper 
discusses the issue of economic rent : how it can be identified , 
measured, increased, taxed , and used in a growth promoting fashion . 
The discussion emphasized some problems inherent in this type of 
economic development , including excessive export orientation in the 
economy to the detriment of manufacturing, difficulties stemming from 
the ultimate exhaustion of resource endowments, and instability in 
mineral markets . 
"Ocean Mining in the Pacific Basin : Stimulus and Response" by 
Michael Gorham (Chapter 5) , discusses the technical, economic, and 
political factors involved in the development of seabed mining . Some 
of the principal technical features include the composition of nod-
ules, the high ratio of fixed- to-variable costs , and the reproducible 
nature of nodules . Economic problems such as closure of uncompetitive 
land- based mines could be anticipated and adjustment costs minimized . 
Political questions are of great importance now, as seabed mining is 
holding up agreement at the Law-of-the- Sea Conference , but Gorham 
suggests that a sharing arrangement for economic rents could bring 
sufficient support for an international regime . Some of the discussion 
indicated that this paper may be overly sanguine about the prospects 
for seabed mining given the many uncertainties and adjustment prob-
lems . Discussants disagreed on whether taxation should be used to 
distribute the economic rent from mining to all consumers and whether 
taxation would discourage investment and development of seabed mining . 
National Case Studies in Natural Resource Problems 
The four papers in this section of the conference covered four 
very di fferent countries from the standpoint of mineral resource 
endowment and economic development : Australia, Japan, Chile, and 
Korea . 
"Australia's Minerals Production and Trade : Case Study of a 
Resource- Rich Developed Country" by Ben Smith (Chapter 6), highlights 
the many problems that arose from the rapid development of Australia ' s 
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mineral resources beginning about 1960. Some of these problems 
included effects on income distribution, degree and form of foreign 
involvement, participation in producer cartels, barriers to trade in 
processed miner als , environmental and resource conservation questions, 
and issues of State and Commonwealth relationships . Much of the 
discussion concerning this paper revolved around the question of 
solutions for the problem of rapid mineral export growth leading to a 
chronic balance of payments surplus . Some solutions , such as currency 
revaluation or monetary expans i on , tend to hurt manufacturing and are 
thereby unacceptable , but encouragement of capital outflow or further 
liberalization are more beneficial. Others criticized the relevance 
of economics to questions that involve large discontinuities rather 
than marginal change . 
"Option for a Resource-Poor Developed Country -- Japan" by 
Yasuhiro Murota (Chapter 7) , takes a broad view of Japan ' s resource 
acquisition alternatives . He defines three polar options, which are : 
buying natural resour ces on the (relatively free) world market , exer-
cising political and military power to obtain resources, or adopting a 
no- growth or negative growth strategy to limit foreign resource needs, 
combined with a reassertion of traditional Japanese culture. Japan 
chose the second option during the 1930 ' s with disastrous results , and 
the first option with great success during the postwar period . This 
choice has now created probl ems of dependence on external sources and 
excessive emphasis on economic growth to the detriment of culture and 
quality of life , leading Murota to advocate consideration of option 
three . All discussahts were less than eager to see option three 
implemented, a r guing that i t would hurt LDCs exporting to Japan, create 
social strife in Japan , and destroy the ambitions of the lower middle 
class . 
"Issues in the Development of Resource- Rich LDCs : Copper in 
Chile" by Ernes to Tironi (Chapter 8) , deals with Chile ' s attempts to 
use natural resources to promote economic growth . The main problem of 
resource-based devel opment is the tendency to create an unstable and 
structurally unbalanced economy . Short- run instability of natural 
resource prices in world marke t s has serious destabilizing effects for 
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a country such as Chile where a high proportion of export receipts 
(which finance needed capital good imports) come f r om natural re-
sources. Tironi discussed various ways in which a government can 
counteract this type of instability . The discussants also were worried 
about instability problems , but were not convinced that Tironi' s 
variable tariff proposal would increase stability . Di scussion also 
stressed that the linkages between mineral development and general 
economic growth need to be more fully considered . While the tone of 
much of the discussion on natural resource- led growth was pessimistic , 
discussants believed Chile ' s future may be more optimistic as addi -
tional resources other than copper are developed . 
"Natural Resource Problems in a Resource- Poor Developing Country : 
The Korean Case" by Wontack Hong (Chapter 9) , takes an optimistic view. 
Korea, like Japan , has had an export- oriented high growth rate . No 
problems were encountered in obtaining rapidly expanding mineral re-
source needs on world markets , and even the oil crisis was overcome by 
rapid expansion of exports . Hong foresees no future problems so long 
as Korea has access to markets on a non-discriminatory basis and 
protectionism or resource nationalism does not become serious . The 
discussants felt this view was overly optimistic : difficulties could 
arise as external resource dependence rises and Korea ' s relative size 
in natural resource markets increases . Since Korea seems to show 
similarities to Japan ' s earlier experience , discussants felt Korea 
should avoid some of Japan ' s mistakes or could learn from Japanese 
problems of export- oriented growth and protection of mineral process-
ing industries . 
Political Economy of Mineral Resources : Policy Alternatives 
The final of the three divisions of the conference included five 
papers . These dealt with vari ous aspects of international trade in 
mineral resources and what kinds of institutional arrangements failed , 
or have been successful and ought to be implemented to improve resource 
market functionings . 
"Commodity Trade from a North- South Perspective" by Jose Pinera 
(Chapter 10) , examines four different trading regimes : free markets , 
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price raising, cartels, and commodity agreements . Lack of competition 
and unfair distribution of gains undermine free markets . Price raising 
works only if pushed to the competitive equilibrium level . Cartels 
involve efficiency costs and may redistribute income from poor to rich . 
Commodity agreements, however, are a reasonable solution if price 
stabilization goals are separated from income redistribution goals . 
Pinera argues that direct aid transfers are the best method of inter-
national income redistribution . Much of the discussion focused on 
whether natural resource price instability was a serious problem for 
LDCs, the impact of the instability on long- term prices, and its 
distortionary impact on mineral development investment . The discus-
sants agreed that commodity stabilization agreements might be an 
efficient way to accommodate the politicization of commodity markets -
- an element which economists frequently ignore . 
"Japan's Resource Security and Foreign Investment in the Pacific : 
A Case Study of Bilateral Devices Between Advanced Countries" by 
Kiyoshi Kojima (Chapter 11), focuses on different forms of developing 
natural resources and arrangements for resource production and sale 
(also discussed by Smith in Chapter 6) . Kojima strongly favors long-
term contracts as a basis for mineral development . While these 
agreements generally include more or less fixed quantities and prices 
for a number of years, they actually are a flexible arrangement, only 
guaranteeing the buyer and seller to continue to do business on 
mutually satisfactory terms . This type of assurance of markets reduces 
risk for companies involved in mineral development, fostering invest-
ment in natural resources on a scale to· capture efficiency gains due to 
large scale development . They also permitted Japanese access without 
the necessity of equity participation, and stabilized prices for Japan 
as the dominant purchaser . Discussants were somewhat less convinced 
about the fairness of long- term contracts, noting the importance of 
bilateral bargaining strength in capturing gains . Others defended the 
multinational corporation approach to mineral development. 
"The Wider Context of Bilateral Resource Exploitation Arrange-
ments Between the LDCs and the DCs," by Miguel Wionczek (Chapter 12), 
adopts a favorable view towards natural resource availability and 
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trade between these two groups of countries. Even the multinational 
corporation dominance of technology is declining as technology is 
becoming more standardized and widely availab le. He sees no basic 
conflicts emerging, but stresses that because income instability in 
LDCs stemming from mineral price fluctuations can cause political 
instability, establishment of stabilization agreements is most impor-
tant. The discussion of the paper did not bring any serious objection 
to Wionczek's basic optimism, though some ques tioned his view of LDC-
multinational corporation relations and suggested that LDCs may be 
better off leaving exploration and exploitation investment to the 
multinationals . 
"International Commodity Control : The Tin Experience" by Mohamed 
Ariff (Chapter 13), evaluates the eight i nternational tin agreements 
which have operated since the 1930s . Al though the agreements all 
included both floor and ceiling prices , they were ineffective in 
maintaining the ceilings, but more successful i n defending floors . 
This bias favored producers, understandab l e since important consumer 
nations refused to cooperate until recently. The agreements also 
failed to reduce significantly price fluctuations, or stabilize export 
earnings, and may have biased investment i n a way to increase short-run 
price instability and encourage substitutes to tin. The discussants 
were less negative in their assessment of t he tin agreements . They 
argued that devices to defend a ceiling price are difficult (without 
the use of the U. S. stockpile), that a long- run equilibrium price is 
difficult to define in any case, and that higher prices may have 
benefitted the LDCs. 
"An Organization for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development: Region-
al Arrangements for the Resource Trade" by Peter Drysdale 
(Chapter 14), traces the development of the OPTAD concept. Arising out 
of interest in the spectacular growth of trade among the Pacific 
countries, OPTAD is conceived of as a loose, unbureaucratized organi-
zation, including both developed and developing countries, which could 
do much to reduce the uncertainties involved in resource security. 
Drysdale also proposes a regional Pacific Resource Bank to provide 
funds for resource development, helping to overcome the present seg-
mentation of capital markets providing concessionary loans. Discussion 
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indicated general support for the OPTAD concept, but some discussants 
saw potential problems in implementation due to the conflict between 
global and regional concerns in such major countries as Japan and the 
United States . Questi ons also remain as to how much power the 
organization should be given ; enough power to generate regional 
interest might also frighten away members because of possible un-
desired obligations . Drysdale's paper is an important contribution to 
finding a pragmatic middle ground . 
Policy Conclusions 
During the course of the conference a degree of agreement clearly 
emerged among the participants concerning a number of policy issues . 
The conclusions reached here on these issues are particularly relevant 
to policy makers in the Paci fic Basin countries. 
The participants almost unanimously supported the view that the 
world does not face a shortage of raw materials . Expanding development 
of natural resources and technologically inspired synthetics should 
provide adequately for the world's needs . Nevertheless, many coun-
tries are deeply concerned about security of energy supplies . Any 
threats to existing energy supplies or barriers to new energy sources, 
such as nuclear energy, are likely to cause stronger than expected 
pessimistic reactions in the economies of energy dependent countries. 
Officials involved in designing energy policy must keep this reality in 
mind . 
Resource producing and exporting countries also are seriously and 
increas ingly affected by the instability of natural resource markets . 
Price and volume fluctuations in countries where resource exports are a 
significant part of trade, cause serious economic and political prob-
lems . Countr ies attempt to deal with these problems through domestic 
policies , but either they fail, or they succeed only by exporting the 
instability to others . 
rhe best way to solve the problems of resource market instability 
is through international stabilization commodity agreements. Support 
of these agreements by the participants was not based on any belief 
that they are easy to negotiate or operate . Quite to the contrary, 
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such agreements are very difficult to design properly, as indicated by 
the history of the tin agreements . Rather, support was motivated by 
the importance of achieving greater stability in natural resource 
markets, and by the knowledge that all countries would benefit from a 
successful agreement . 
A related point is that international commodity agreements should 
not attempt to redistribute income from developed to developing 
countries. Income redistribution is a legitimate goal, but it cannot 
be achieved by raising commodity prices . Direct aid transfer payments 
remain the best method of redistribution . 
Countries dependent on imports of natural resources have a 
legitimate interest in obtaining stable and reasonable prices as well 
as assured access to supply. Natural resource producers also need 
assurance of markets and reasonable prices in order to undertake large-
scale development of mineral deposits . The development contract 
combined with a long-term sales contract has proven to be a useful 
device to reduce risks for both large natural resource exporters such 
as Australia and large buyers such as Japan . However, the interests of 
small importing developing countries must also be recognized so that 
they can obtain access on a non- discriminatory basis . Policies of the 
advanced countries of the Pacific region should provide this assur-
ance . 
All countries were cautioned against relying excessively on 
export- led growth, regardless of whether it is based on natural 
resources or manufactured products . Domestic economic structures can 
become distorted and cause instability if proper development of domes-
tic markets is overlooked, resulting in large fluctuations in invest-
ment and income . This instability can cause domestic political 
problems, and problems for trading partners as well . 
Many countries have turned towards protectionism to forestall 
needed, albeit painful, structural economic adjustments . Countries 
need to be reminded that adjustments are especially beneficial to a 
country when growth rates are low. Special adjustment assistance 
policies may be required, but all countries should understand that the 
best aid to adjustment is adequate aggregate demand . 
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Participants urged countries to take a more relaxed view towards 
demands for a New International Economic Order . Views of developing 
countries in different regions vary considerably , and truly radical 
ideas that would destroy efficient markets are unlikely to gain 
widespread support . Furthermore, the relationship between developed 
and developing countries has been changing over the last twenty years , 
and with reasonable effort further changes can be accommodated without 
serious disruption . In general , no one foresaw any sources of serious 
conflict or problems of access to natural resources emerging in the 
near future for the Pacific Area countries . 
Governments of both producing and consuming countries have in-
creasingly participated or interfered in a variety of ways in the 
development and trade of natural resources . Intervention is justified 
because of the failure of free markets to operate efficiently on their 
own . But no country should assume that this justification constitutes 
approval of its specific government policies, as clearly indicated by 
the problems and failures of many past government poli cies analyzed at 
the conference . Domestic and inter- governmental policies and agree-
ments must be designed with great care to bring true improvement over 
non-intervention results -- a point extremely important to the de-
velopment of OPTAD plans . 
Finally, policy makers in Pacific Basin countries should not be 
blind to economic developments in the region . Many so- called "high 
politics" issues must be addressed by governments , but attention only 
to those issues will be a serious mistake . The economic reality is 
that the Pacific Basin is the fastest growing area of the world and the 
eocnomic interests of the region ' s countries are growing closer 
together . Economic policy on a regional basis deserves close atten-
tion , and if properly handled can provide substantial and mutual 
benefits for all countries . 
These various points and policy recommendations were suppor ted by 
conference participants who came from widely differing developed and 
developing countries in the Pacific Basin . That people of such 
economically and socially varied countries found agreement on these 
points lends considerabl e force to the validity of the conclusions , and 
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they should be given serious consideration by policy makers in all 
Pacific Basin countries . 
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THE RAW MATERIAL PRODUCT CYCLE 
Stephen P. Magee and Norman I . Robins 1 
This paper is an hi storical exami nat i on of the markets for three 
raw materials, two of which are important in the Pacific trade . The 
histor ies of these markets exhibit some interesting regularities whi ch 
permit us to describe a raw material product cycle which parallels 
Vernon ' s cycle for manufactur ed goods . The r aw material product cycle 
consists of thr ee stages : 
I . Derived Demand Boom 
II . Substi tution in Demand and i n Supply Sources 
III . Synthetic and/or R & D Incursion 
In this paper we will refer to these stages as the "boom stage ," the 
"substitution stage , " and the "R&D stage ." In stage I, there is a 
large increase in the demand for a product which uses the raw material 
in its production . This derived demand leads to a substantial increase 
in the relat i ve price of the r aw mate r ial . In stage II , the r elative 
price increase is slowed or the relative price actually falls as 
alternative world sources of supply for the raw material are opened up 
and users of the product replace it wi t h cheaper alternatives . In 
stage III , research and development goi ng on in the first two stages 
finally yields a synthetic alternative to the raw material or develops 
an important way to economize on the use of the raw material . In this 
paper , the cycle will be illustrated with references to three raw 
mater ials of ve r y di fferent types (one renewable and two non-
renewable) : a non- food agricultural product, rubber ; a nonferrous 
metal , t:Ln ; and a nonmetallic mineral , industrial diamonds . We 
emphasize that the cycles described her e are long- term (30 to 60 years) 
and may not apply to a number of raw materials . If no major surge in 
demand has occurred or if the price elasticity of supply is high, the 
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product is not a candidate for this analysis . 
The histor ical examination of long cycles in these products 
yields seven implicati.ons. First, the eventual economic exhaustion of 
world supplies fo r a raw material does not imply exhaustion of the raw 
mater ial. In addition to recycling, reclamation, and subst .' .tution 
away from a raw material whose price is rising, research and develop-
ment provides two ways of extending the use of an important raw 
material: economies in use (e.g., the electrolytic process for making 
tin cans) and synthetics based on a more plentiful raw material (e . g., 
synthetic pet:~oleum made from coal) . 
Second, the cycle provides a guide to the economics of shortages. 
Many current writers have extrapolated the implications of the energy 
shortage to long-run shortages in many raw materials . In each of the 
raw materials markets considered here, there was a "shortage" only 
during the derived demand boom. The raw material cycle illustrates the 
long-run microeconomic adjustment process following such a period and 
provides a useful framework for thinking about the future of petroleum . 
We are also less pessi mistic than Club of Rome writers about future 
supplies of raw materials: shortages are short- run and not long- run 
phenomena . 
Third, technological change i s an important r eason for the rise in 
the terms of trade of raw materials supplying countries in the boom 
period, and for decline in their terms of trade in the substitution and 
the R & D stages . A major technological breakthrough is the key to the 
beginning of the raw materials cycle : for rubber it was automobiles; 
for tin it was the j_nven ti on of automatic canning machines ; for 
industrial diamonds it was the development of cemented carbide metal 
cutting tools . In the second stage , the t r aditional supplier's terms 
of trade generally fall while the terms of trade of new marginal world 
suppliers may improve. In the third stage there is downward pressure 
on the terms of trade of the countries supplying the primary raw 
mate r ial as R and D economizes on the use of the raw material or 
provides a synthetic. An implication of this point is that increases 
or decreases in the terms of trade of any particular developing country 
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are related to the stages into whi ch its raw materials fall . The post-
war deterirora tion of several developing countries ' te r ms of trade 
(cf. the Prebisch cont,0 ove r sy) has coincided with the R and D stage fo r 
seve r al r aw materials . 
Fourth, the long- run terms of t r ade have been constant for many 
raw materi als for the first two-thirds of this century. The price of 
these products relative to the U. S. wholesale price index was virtually 
unchanged from 1900 to 1968. The third point above explains part of 
this phenomenon : increases in prices in the derived demand stage have 
been of fset by decr eases in the subst i tuUon and the R and D stages . 
Evidence from the product cycle suggests that endogenous R and D is an 
important force at wor k . A pr iori reasoning suggests that when the 
relative price of a raw material rises dramatically, research and 
development is undertaken to economize on i t . When its r elative price 
falls, less research and development i s done on this raw material since 
the expected rate of return on this R and D falls along wi th the price . 
As a result, there is depreciation in the stock of basic knowledge 
about the r aw material wh i ch exerts a minor but per sistent upwar d 
pressure on its relative price . While we do not have the data to 
estabHsh this proposition dir ectly , we do have indirect evidence 
establishing the following point . 
Fifth, technological advance i s a substitute for i nter national 
trade in raw mater ials . This proposit i on is based on the economic 
behavior we observe in developed countries during wartime . During 
wars, international trade i n raw materials is disrupted and the shadow 
price in import i ng countries rises dramatically . The existence of war 
also gener ates an i ncrease in the demand for raw materials i n the 
belligerent developed countries . Both of these considerations gene-
rate a shortage of r aw materials . In the international trade litera-
ture , this would be called "war- induced economic autarky . 11 The 
developed countries respond by marshall i ng (usually by fiat) all of the 
economic forces described i n the three stages of the product cycle to 
alleviate the shortage . They force subst i tution away from the raw 
material i n civilian use and economize in military use ; they seek 
33 
marginal sources of world supply held by their poEti.cal allies; and 
they invest lar ge amounts i n research and development to conser ve or 
synthesize the r aw mate r ial . If the synthetic does not use as much in 
imported raw materials , R & D is thus anti- trade biased : it substi -
tutes for trade. This phenomenon was important in Pacific trade during 
World War II. Japanese capture of the Far Easter n rubber and tin 
supplier s caused shortages of these raw materials in the West. 
Sixth , for the raw material cycle , the locus of world production 
is the r everse of Vernon ' s manufactured goods cycle . For raw mater-
ials, production exists in the low- cost world sources (including a 
preponderance of developing countries) i n stage L spreads to both 
developed and other developing countries in stage II, and ends with 
i ncreas i ng proportions of syntheti c production in the developed coun·· 
tries in stage III . This impl i es that the pattern of trade i s also the 
reverse of Vernon ' s cycle : for raw mater ials , developing countries are 
the main exporters in stages I and II and may become net importers in 
stage III . 
Finally , emergence of a syntheti c i n stage III swi tches demand 
from the raw material being replaced to the raw mater ial used inten-
sively in production of the synthetic. This sets two new cycles in 
motion: production of the manufactured synthetic good starts through a 
Vernon-Hufbauer- type cycle (with production moving from developed to 
developing countries) while a new raw material cycle star ts for the raw 
material used i n producing the syntheti c. For example , Conoco has 
synthesized a lubricant derived from dibasic acid esters which is 
superior to crude oil- based lubricants in cold cl i mates . This shifts 
demand away from crude oil (a nonrenewable resource) and toward or ganic 
ac i ds (vegetable fats) . 
In section 1 we develop the raw mate r ial cycle , using rubber, t i n 
and industrial diamonds as histori c examples . In section 2 we di scuss 
the implications of the cycle for the economics of exhaustible 
resources . In section 3 we consider the long- run constancy in the 
relative pr i ce of raw materi als . Section 4 develops the hypothesis 
that r esearch and development is a substitute for internat i onal trade 
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in raw materials (via synthetics) • Wars prov~. de histor•ical studies of 
the three stages of the raw material cycle compressed into a very short 
period of time. This is also instructive for a study of the economics 
of shortages since the stages of the raw material cycle are compressed 
into a short time period. 
1. The Raw Material Cycle 
Before describing the hypothesis, a word of caution is in order. 
Product cycles and stage theories are misunderstood and misused, both 
by thei r proponents and their opponents. Since stage theories ar e a 
form of inductive reasoning, they are tautologies when applied to the 
products on which they are built . By definition, stage I in our 
hypothesis begins when demand increases for the raw material; stage II 
begins with the increased geographical dispersion of world supply 
sources as marginal suppliers enter; and stage III begins with the 
commercialization of a syntheti c or an economizing technological 
breakthrough . However, to the extent that our hypotheses are correct 
about the economic determinants of the stages, we have a meaningful 
behavioral model of the long- run dynamics of raw material markets . We 
turn now to a detailed examination of the cycle for rubber, tin, and 
industrial diamonds. 2 
Stage I: Deri ved Demand Boom 
This stage begins when the market for a raw material is disturbed 
by an increase in the demand for a product which uses the raw material 
intensively . This change is usually a technological breakthrough, 
such as the development of a new product, or it may be a prolonged 
increase in demand . We define stage I to cover approximately the 
following periods for the three products : 
rubber 
industrial diamonds 
tin 
1895 - 1910 
1930 - 1940 
1895 - 1910 
There are three distinguishing characteristics of stage I . 
35 
1. Stage I is defined by a technological breakthrough leading to a 
surge in the demand for final product . For rubber, the derived 
demand came from the incr ease in the demand fo r automobiles . 
Rubber was a candidate for automobile tires because of two earlier 
developments : Charles Goodyear 's discovery in 1839 of vulcaniza-
tion (combining heat and sulfur to produce a desired shape in 
rubber) and J . B. Dunlop ' s development i n 1888 of the pneumatic 
tire . For industrial diamonds , there was growth in the 1930 ' s and 
in the early 1940 ' s i n the demand fo r cemented (sintered) carbide 
metal cutting tools : from 1936 to 1942 the use of these tools 
increas ed by more than 50 fold (primarily due to World War II) 
For tin, demand was stimulated by the invention in 1895 of automa-
tic can- making machinery . Because of the high price of tin 
r elative to steel, cans are 98 percent iron or steel and less than 
2 percent tin . Tin is used as the coating since it does not rust 
l i ke the fer r ous meta ls (both iron and steel are highly corrosi ve) 
2 . The increased der ived demand leads to an i ncr ease in the relative 
price of the raw material. This i s attributable to the large 
increase i n demand and to short- term inelasticity j n the supply of 
the raw material . The absolute price of rubber rose 78 percent 
from 1900 to 1910 ; tin prices rose by 144 percent from 1895 to 
1910 ; diamond prices do not fit the cycle in this stage . There 
we r e conti nuous decreas es in diamond prices i n the 1930 s 
following the high prices and speculative hoarding of precious 
stones i n the late 1920's and the opening of mines in the 1930 ' s 
stimulated by these prices (prices fell from $61.42 in 1929 to 
$2 , 90 a carat in 1940) . 
3 . World trade patterns change in stage I : There is a surge in raw 
material expor t s from tradit i onal world suppliers, the terms of 
trade of these countries increase and rents are created for the 
holders of raw materials supplies . 
Firms may invest in R & D for syntheti c or raw-mate r ial- saving 
alternatives in stage I but we have been unable to gather evidence of 
this historically . Befo r e the present age of massive R & D, innovators 
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would probably attach large r isks to R & D investments since markets 
had not yet exploited alternative supply sources and economies in use, 
both of which make a synthetic alternative less profitable . 
Stage II : Substitution in Demand and Supply Sources 
In this stage we observe the microeconomic effects following the 
increase in the price of any good : there are economies in usage and 
increases in nontraditional sources of supply, both of whj_ch exert 
downward pressure on the price of the raw material. Both of these 
forces have been at work during s·tage I but it takes until early stage 
II for supplies to catch up with the growth in demand . The substitu-
tion stage covers roughly the following intervals for the three 
products cons i dered : 
rubber 
industrial diamonds 
tin 
1910 - 1940 
1940 - 1960 
1910 - 1945 
There are four distinguishing characteristics of product market beha-
vior in stage II. 
1. This stage is characterized by the development of alternative 
supply sources and major changes in the patterns of world trade . 
By this we mean that the world regions which were the traditional 
suppliers (pre- stage I) and which obtained large rents in stage I 
begin to decline as a percentage of the total world supply for the 
raw material . This is not a tautological result based on the 
inevitable mathematical decline of a traditional country ' s share 
of world trade when new suppliers enter . For example , if the 
medium-run elasticity of supply of the raw material at the tradi·· 
tional sources is sufficiently high so that the price does not rise 
to the break- even point for the marginal world suppliers, then the 
traditional suppliers would remain the sole world suppliers of the 
raw material . However, for the products investigated so far 1 this 
has never proved to be the case . For example, in 1910, Brazil and 
Africa supplied over 61 percent of world rubber production . How-
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ever, by 1930, Malaya, Ceylon, and Indonesi a , which were all 
marginal suppliers initially, had captured 92 percent of the world 
rubber market . For tin the tradi t :i_onal suppliers were Indonesia , 
Malaysia/Singapore, and the United Kingdom : before 1895 , these 
three sources supplied 95 percent of world t i n production . In 
stage I, the share of these three regions fell to 70 percent of 
world production , and by 1936 , the middle of stage II , their share 
fell to 36 percent . The important new suppliers of tin were 
Bolivia , Thailand , and Australia . 
2 . Another characteristic of stage II is continued economies i n the 
use of the raw material because of the increased price in stage I . 
For rubber, aver age tire life was increased : i niUally , tire life 
averaged only about 10 , 000 miles, but improved tire construction 
increased tire life to 20 , 000 miles . Also, the propor tion of raw 
rubber required per passenger mile was reduced s i gnificantly by 
adding oil , us i ng reclaimed rubber and by recapping . For indus-
trial diamonds, users subst i tuted toward alternative hard cutting 
materi als . For tin , there was increased secondar y recovery of t i n 
scrap : U. S. secondary tin consumption rose from 18 to 33 percent 
of total consumption from 1936 to 1945 . There was also increased 
use of glass and paper containers (in stage III , tin- free steel , 
aluminum and plasti cs also emerged) . 
3. There is evidence in stage II of research and development leading 
to i mperfect alternatives to the raw material or secondary 
recovery (recycling) . For rubber, R & D breakthr oughs in stage III 
(construction of radial- ply tires) made 50 , 000 -mile tire l ife 
possible . For diamonds , General Electric was able to synthesize 
boron nitrate , which provided a grinding surface nearly as hard as 
that of an industrial diamond . Another alternative was the 
development of ultrasonic abrasive grinding . Secondary recovery 
was made possible by the development of elecrostatic separation 
processes which permitted fi r ms to recover the diamonds from old 
grinders (this procedure has permitted as many as two million 
carats a year to be r ecovered s i nce 1962) . All three of these 
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factors gener ated important savings in the use of diamonds. 
4 . In the substitution stage subst:Ltution and supply growth adjusts to 
demand growth (so that the relative price is constant) or these 
forces may place downward pressure on the raw material's relative 
price . The relative price of tin was virtually unchanged from 1910 
to the 1940's while world consumption of primary t i n increased from 
117 to 149 thousand metric tons. The relative price of rubber fell 
substantially from 1910 to 1940 while primary rubber consumption 
rose from 103 to 1128 thousand metric tons. 
5 , As a result of the four points above, demand can continue to grow 
for a long period with pressure on either constant or declining 
relative prices of the raw material. This erodes the rents of both 
traditional and new marginal suppliers. Suppliers may engage in 
collusive action in stages II and III to limit supplies and drive 
up prices (there may be rational reasons for not doing this in 
stage I) . In 1917 the rubber plantation companies in Malaya cut 
back output to 75 percent of capacity because of inadequate 
We 
shipping facilities caused by the War. In 1922 a compulsory 
restriction scheme was adopted in Malaya and Ceylon . By November 
of 1925, the British rubber restriction scheme had succeeded in 
raising the price from 8d to 4s a pound . However, by 1929, the 
relative price of rubber had fallen below its level in the early 
1920's . In 1929 and 1930, many of the commodity agreements of the 
1920's collapsed. However, they began to re-emerge in the early 
1930 ' s. In chronological order, the new schemes were initiated as 
follows : 
February 1931 Tin 
May 1931 Sugar 
April 1933 Tea 
August 1933 Wheat 
June 1934 Rubber 
January 1936 Copper 
turn now to stage III, in which an important R & D breakthrough 
appears . 
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Stage III : Syntheti c and/or R & D Incursion 
This stage begins whenever research and development leads to 
either a highly substitutible alternative to the raw material (such as 
a synthetic) or an important raw .. material- saving technological change 
(to be distinguished with the minor R & D developments in stage II) . 
There is an increase in total use of the product since the synthetic 
lowers the price . In the case of synthetics , there is an increase in 
the share of the synthetic and a decrease in the shar e of the original 
raw material itself . Most importantly, in stage III the new synthetic 
starts through a Vernon- type product life cycle of its own . Stage III 
covers the following periods for the three commodities considered : 
rubber 1940 - present 
industrial diamonds 
tin 
1960 - present 
1945 - present 
We turn now to five characteristics of economic behavior in stage III. 
1. As noted, this stage begins when some alternative to the raw 
material appears either as a synthetic or as a raw material-
saving production process. We have known since the 1870 ' s how 
to synthesize rubber . However, it was not until the 1940's 
that this process became profitable . The lar gest encroachment 
of synthetic rubber into the rubber market began in 1955 when 
the United States government released its synthetic rubber 
works to the private sector . Since then there has been a 
dramatic decrease in the price of rubber due to synthetic 
incursion . For industrial diamonds, the big breakthrough 
occur red in 1955 when General Electric succeeded in synthe-
sizing diamonds . The successful process was the application 
of massive temperatures and pressure to pur e carbon . At 
present, G. E. has plants for synthesizing diamonds in a number 
of countries (South Africa , Ireland, Japan, and Sweden) and 
the Soviet Union has a synthetic diamond operation . For tin, 
the big breakthrough was not a syntheti c alternative but a raw-· 
material- saving technological change . It permitted a switch 
f r om attaching t i n to iron or steel cans via hot- dip plating to 
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the electrolytic process . With hot-dip plating, tin is 1.5 
percent of can weight ; with electrolytic plating tin weight 
falls to only . 25 percent, a substantial saving . A close but 
imperfect synthetic alternative to tin, introduced in 1965, is 
low corrosive tin-free steel . This has permitted cans to be 
made out of steel itself and requires no tin plating . Aluminum 
i s also used now in place of tin-plated cans . These develop-
ments partly helped economize on tin, whose price rose drama-
tically in the mid- 1960's because of the Vietnam War . 
2. A second characterist.ic of stage III is a decrease in the share 
of the original raw material for synthetic breakthroughs or a 
decrease in absolute consumption of it for economies in use . 
For rubber, the synthetic share of total rubber consumption 
was 20 percent in the 1940's; by 1962 its share was up to 50 
percent and it had risen to 65 percent by 1970. For diamond, 
we have no direct evidence on the proportion of synthetic 
versus natural diamonds , but data only on total world consump-
tion of all industrial . diamonds . The indirect evidence is the 
surge of the quantity of world consumption of diamonds, pro-
bably caused by synthetization: world consumption of both 
types of industrial diamonds inm'eased from 22 million carats 
in 1960 to 30 million carats in 1964. World consumption then 
remained constant over the next four years at the 1964 level . 
From 1955 to 1968, the price of diamonds was virtually constant 
($4 . 39 to $4.41), meaning that their relative price fell. For 
tin, the electrolytic process developed in the ea~ly 1940 ' s 
contributed to a decline in the world consumption of tin from 
nearly 149,000 (long) tons in 1940 to below 100 , 000 tons in 
1945 . 
3. The decline in the price of the raw material leads suppliers to 
engage in collusive behavior . Although there have been impor-
tant international agreements for wheat, sugar, and coffee in 
the post-World War II period, we only have evidence for one of 
the three commodi t .ies studied here, tin . There have been three 
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International Tin Agreements , each of which i nvolved 20 or 
more countries : the first was in 1956, the second in 1961 and 
t he third was in 1966 . 
4 . The most i mportant aspect of stage III is that the new synthe-
tic material begins a life cycle of its own . It parallels the 
Vernon (1966) product cycle for manufactured products . Huf--
bauer (1966) has described and tested alternative hypotheses 
about the patterns of production and trade for synthetics . 
While his results are not presented in stages as were Vernon's , 
they certainly support a life cycle approach to synthetics . 
The most important implication of Vernon's cycles is that 
production moves from the innovating country to other 
developed countri es and finally to low- wage developing coun-
tries as the synthetic ages . Hufbauer (1966, Appendix Table C·-
3, pp . 131-134) has tabulated the first date when each country 
begins producing 56 synthetics . His data for synthetic rubber 
(and many others) is consistent with a syntheti c cycle : 
Table 1 
Date of Fi rst Production by Country for Styrene Rubber 
1941 United States 
1943 Canada 
1953 Germany* 
1956 France 
1957 Italy 
1958 United Kingdom 
1960 Japan 
1960 Netherlands 
1960 Brazil 
1961 Australia 
1965? Mexico 
*Germany produced synthetic rubber before and during WW II but 
lost those plants to Russia at the end of the War . 
Year 
1924 
1938 
1950 
1960 
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Addit i onal evidence for the predominance of developed 
countries in the production and export of synthetics is 
presented in Table 2 . 
Table 2 
Production and Export of Synthetic Materials 
as a Percent of World Total 
Production EXJ:>Orts 
Developed Developed 
USA Germany Countries USA Germany CountrieEt'< 
32 27 93 3 22 75 
21 29 95 9 20 87 
60 7 88 22 8 65 
44 13 86 34 18 82 
*U.S., Germany, U.K., France, Italy, and Japan . 
Source : Hufbauer (1966, p . 42). 
The cycle here differs from Vernon ' s manufactured pro-
ducts cycle in that the raw materials are of greater importance 
for synthetics. But this is a virtue empirically, since it 
speeds the movement of production to the developing countries. 
In Vernon's cycle, low wages lure production to developing 
countries . For the synthetic cycle, both low wages and cheaper 
raw mater ials are an inducement . 
In fact, a puzzle is why production does not move to the 
raw material source more rapidly. Hufbauer ( 1966, p. 15) 
provides several examples . Canada was not a major exporter of 
viscose rayon in the 1960's despite its large supply of pulp 
wood . In the 19th century, Formosa and Japan were major world 
suppliers of camphor, but Formosa never produced celluloid 
(the first plastic discovered, whose production requires large 
amounts of camphor), and Japan did not begin production until 
1968, forty years after the United States . Kuwait did not 
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build a polyvinyl chloride plasti cs plant until 1963 (32 years 
after Germany), or a styrene rubber plant until 1965 (24 years 
after the United States) . Both of these syntheti cs are 
petroleum based . We must presume that economic factors 
enumerated by Vernon cause developed countr y production to 
dominate (the skilled labor intensity of new pr oduction, 
i mportance of close i nteraction of producers wi th users , 
etc . ) . 
Hufbauer pr ovides two other reasons . First, ther e may be 
economies of scale in production so that large producers would 
have a cost advantage over smaller produce r s . In a world of 
tariff and transport cost barriers to international trade, 
large economies like the Uni ted States and Germany can produce 
more efficiently than small economies . Hufbauer (1966, chp . 
5) found stati sti cal support for the scale economies theory of 
synthetic trade : The size of home markets was the best 
variable explaining five-year export share changes for all 
types of synthetic trade ( 1952 to 1956 and 1957 to 1962) . 
Since the correlation between the degree of development and 
the size of economies is positively correlated , the results in 
Table 2 are explained. 
Second, trade in Table 2 can be explai ned by an imitation 
lag theory . This explanation is consistent with a synthetic 
cycle while the economies of scale approach is not . Econo-
mically advanced countries are more likely to innovate because 
of their superior endowments of human capital . Imitation is 
easiest for other economies with large endowments of skilled 
labor (other developed countries) and hardest for countries 
with small endowments (developing countries) . This r esults in 
synthetic production moving to the developing countries last . 
This , however, is a short- run theory of trade determination . 
In the long- run all countries will know the production process 
and costs will determine the location of production (Hufbauer 
calls this "low- wage t r ade" ) . Hufbauer (1966, chp . 6) also 
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confir med these hypotheses : the United States specializes in 
exporting newer synthetics and, for world trade, the propor-
tion of low- wage trade increases with the age of the synthetic . 
5. Finally, the new raw material which i s used intensively in 
production of the synthetic can begin a raw material cycle of 
its own : initial shor tage , spreading economies in use and 
diversification of world supply, and ultimately an R & D 
breakthrough providing an economy for this raw mater ial , a 
substitute for it , or a synthetic . 
2 . Shortages and Exhaustible Resources 
The raw material cycle emphasizes that the linkages between raw 
materials and their ultimate uses in final products constantly change 
through time . When a raw material shortage develops, there are many 
links which can adjust between raw material suppliers and final 
consumers : people cut back on their consumpti on of final products ; 
suppliers can look for more sources of the raw material ; new ways can 
be discovered to economize on the raw material inputs; changes are 
induced in the production functions relating raw materials inputs and 
outputs; and synthetics are developed . Because of these many links 
between inputs and outputs, and the complex relationship between them 
as explored in the raw materials cycle , we are more optimistic than the 
Club of Rome . Consider the following quotation from the Second Report 
to the Club of Rome : 
Is there any reason to believe that the crises of our 
era will not be resolved as successfully as the crises of the 
past were resolved? Is there any reason why we should not go 
about our business as usual, confident that the precedents 
of the past will apply to the future, and that all our crises 
will be taken care of in due time? 
The answer to these questions is yes, there is ample 
reason to believe that the problems of our time will not be 
solved in the routine course of events. For one thing, the 
numerous crises of the present exist simultaneously and with 
a strongly woven interrelationship between them. We do not 
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have the luxury of dealing with one cr1s1s at a time. 
Furthermore, the scale and global character of the present 
crises differ from the nature and scale of most past crises • 
• • To reduce human labor by exploiting the non-human energy 
sources in Nature, for example, was a goal no one quarreled 
with but it led to the present energy crises . Mesarovic and 
Pestel (1974; pp. 10-11) 
Our view is that the long- run relationship between the stocks of all 
natural resources which might fulfill a given end and the endogenous 
market-directed nature of the technology relating them to outputs is a 
more important focus for investigation than emphasis on the absolute 
physical limit of each resource on the planet. Known reserves are not 
fixed: they depend on prices and technology, both of which are 
continually changing. The elasticity of supply of known reserves is 
discussed in the report of the Paley Commission in 1951. The Commis-
sion estimated that recoverable coal reserves amounted to some thirty 
billion tons . They estimated that at prices fifty percent higher, 
reserves which were worth recovering were no less than twenty times 
greater than the thirty billion ton estimate. 4 Regar dless of whether 
the number is 5, 20, or 50 for coal, the point is that the relevant 
consideration is the long-run elasticity of supply of all raw 
materials , with both prices and technology endogenous. The raw 
materials product cycle emphasizes that technology is endogenous and 
an important mar ket-clearing variable for natural resources. 
It is ironic that the question of the long-run exhaustion of 
energy and natural resources which is widely discussed today is the 
very problem which technology and markets have been addr essing for the 
last one hundred years . Our energy crisis started more than a century 
ago: in 1850, wood supplied more than 90 percent of fuel - based energy 
and mineral fuels; in 1915, coal supplied 75 percent of energy require-
ments ; in 1970, petroleum and natural gas supplied over 80 percent . 5 
Rosenberg documents how the iron and steel industry grew to economize 
on the shortage of wood in the 19th century. Our view is that the 
current energy flap is just the beginning of another change in the 
energy cycle, with the Arabs playing a temporary catalytic role. 
We have the same view on the broader question of all resources . 
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The finiteness of supply has been a continuing feature of modern 
economic history . In fact, per qapi ta consumption of resources, 
including agriculture and timber along with minerals , has increased 
only 55 percent in the past 100 years . Consumption increased from $174 
per capita in 1870 to $221 in 1900 and to $270 in 1954 (all in 1954 
dollars) . Our consumption of resources has also been continually 
declining as a share of output : output of resources as a percent of 
GNP has fallen from 36 percent in 1870 to 27 percent in 1900 to 12 
. 6 
percent in 1954 . 
The point is not that history impHes no future problems . Rather, 
it is that the rising prices for raw materials, even several at once, 
does not necessarily signal a "discontinuity in history" or the 
beginning of the age of Mal thus . Our feeling is that if relative 
prices stay high, this will stimulate investments in new technology for 
several raw materials . In the next section, we investigate the 
constant long-run terms of trade of several raw materials" Section 4 
shows how raw material shortages have been addressed in wartime . 
3. A Constant Long-Run Terms of Trade? 
Through the raw material cycle, there is a sequence starting with 
pro- trade biased growth in stage I and ending with anti - trade biased 
growth in stage III . The locus of world production shifts from the 
traditional (usually developing) countries ' suppliers in stage I to 
these traditional suppliers plus other marginal sources (both 
developing and developed countries) in stage II to an increasing 
proportion of developed country production early in stage III. As 
noted in section 1, the developed countries dominate production and 
export of synthetics . However, this is only early in stage III since 
the synthetic goes through a Vernon- type cycle of its own . What 
happens over the raw materials cycle to the terms of trade of the 
developing countries? 
In stage I the raw materials terms of trade (the ratio of the raw 
materials price to the price of all other goods) increases because of 
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the expanded demand in the developed countries for the raw material . 
In stage II, they will level off or decline from the high point reached 
i n stage I (although their level is still higher than at the beginning 
of stage I). In stage III the terms of trade fall precipitously 
because of the introduction of the synthetic . The relative price of 
the raw material at this point may be even lower than before the cycle 
began . The ter ms of trade of developing countries throughout stage III 
ar e hard to describe because the synthetic material itself starts 
t hrough a cycle of Hs own. While we know that the terms of trade of 
the original primary raw material continue to fall, the price of the 
raw material used intensely in the production of the synthetic begins 
to rise as in stage I . Thus , the cycle begins again with a different 
se t of producing countries benefitting. 
The terms of trade for rubber and tin are shown in figures 1 and 
2, respectively . Zero denotes the average for the relative price index 
for the entire period from 1900 to 1970 . Notice that for rubber , the 
price was high for the first 16 years of the century and remained 
relatively constant from 1920 until 1970 . For tin , the shortages of 
the late 19th century were not in evidence . The relative price of tin 
shows an amazingly trendless rate from 1900 until the mid- 1960's , when 
it began to rise . 
We investigated the long-term constancy of the terms of trade of 
seven raw materials , including tin . These are shown in Table 3 . 
Notice that four of the raw materials have a lower price in 1976 than 
they had in 1900 , while three of the seven have a higher relative 
price . For only one of the products , aluminum , does it appear that the 
relative price is significantly lower in 1976 than it was in 1900 . 
Generally, it appears that only one other product has a significantly 
higher price in 1976 than in 1900 (tin) . Aluminum is one of the most 
abundant sources of metal in the earth ' s crust, replacing iron and 
steel in many applications, such as canning . Tin is currently regu-
lated by the Inter national Tin Counci l , the world's longest standing 
i nternational commodity agreement . However , there are some diffi-
culties since Bolivia, the world ' s second largest tin- producing 
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Aluminum 
1900 100 
1910 54 
1920 36 
1930 47 
1940 41 
1950 19 
1960 24 
1970 23 
1976 22 
mean 43 
standard- 27 
deviation 
50 
Table 3 
The Price of Seven Raw Materials Relative 
to the Price of All Other Goods 
(1900 = 100) 
Copper 
100 
63 
39 
52 
50 
46 
60 
94 
68 
61 
19 
Lead 
100 
81 
67 
83 
85 
108 
84 
95 
84 
91 
17 
Mercury 
100 
73 
58 
146 
246 
56 
125 
214 
38 
124 
62 
Silver 
100 
69 
60 
40 
41 
43 
45 
76 
117* 
62 
20 
*1975 was the last year reported. 
Tin 
100 
90 
58 
68 
118 
112 
103 
152 
187* 
110 
31 
Zinc 
100 
99 
64 
68 
104 
113 
91 
95 
136 
98 
27 
Each index is the price of the mineral in the New York relative to the U.S . 
wholesale price index. The mean and standard deviations are based on 77 
anuual observations from 1900 - 1976 (76 for silver and tin). 
Sources: The annual prices for the minerals from 1900 - 1968 are from Metals 
Week (1970); prices from 1969 - 1976 are from American Metal Market (1977) . 
The wholesale prices for 1900 - 1970 are from Bureau of Census (1976) and 
1971 - -1976 are from Council of Economic Advisers (1977). 
The year .1900 was chosen as a base because it was the earliest year for which 
comparable data was readily available for several products. We have no informa-
tion on how "normal" or "abnormal" it is, relative to previous years. 
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country, refused to ratify the 1976 agreement. Despite recent supply 
shortages, there is little concern that tin might be in short supply 
over the long term . 7 
We advance the hypothesis here that when any major r elative price 
change occurs, research and development will be reallocated from areas 
formerly in short supply to areas currently exhibiUng shortages . Our 
impression from the qualitative evidence is that R & D and technical 
change are important variables equilibrating raw materials markets in 
the long-run. This makes forecasts of the Club of Rome variety 
difficult since the technology leading to stage III is not always 
contemplated in stage I . We do not have hard evidence, but we suspect 
that in stage I, tin markets were not aware of electrolytic plating and 
that diamond markets did not anticipate synthetic boron nitrate, 
ultrasonic abrasive grinding and electrostatic separation processes . 
Rubber is a bit of an exception since some processes for synthesizing 
rnbber have been around since the 1870' s, but they were not commer-
cially feasible. The important point is that the markets cannot know 
in advance which specific technical breakthroughs will occur; but they 
can probably predict better than most econometric models or futuristic 
simulations based on historically developed feedback rules that some 
breakthrough is likely. The current price of raw materials will 
incorporate the probability and the expected timing of some break-
through as well as its probable economic importance . 
4. Resear ch and Development as a Substitute for Trade 
One of the more interesting experiments in a study of the econo-· 
mies of shortages is to observe what happens to raw materials during 
wartime . Wartime is a massive acceleration in the speed with which 
items move in the cycle, except that they are applied to a single 
country. In Table 4, we list sever al important raw materials which 
were developed during wartime or were war related. These include not 
only synthetic rubber but cotton substitutes, liquid fuels from coal, 
and some plastic fibers . A number of difficulties which the Germans 
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Table 4 
War Related Synthetics 
Methyl Butadiene 
(first synthetic rubber) 
Viscose Rayon Staple 
(cotton substitute) 
Glass Filament Fibers 
(substitute for asbestos) 
. Liquid fuels from coal 
(hydrogenation and methanol 
synthesis) 
Styrene and Nitrile 
(synthetic rubbers) 
Polyurethane 
(rubber) 
Silicone and Nylon (1941) 
Polyester (1942) 
Fluoroethylene (1943) } 
Germany, WW I 
(to counteract the blockade) 
Germany, 1920's,(in response to 
fuel shortages in WW I); used 
:-. extensively in WW II 
Germany, 1934 (extension of research 
on WW I rubber synthetics by 
T . G. Farben) 
U. S. and Canada, WW II (opened large 
styrene rubber plants) 
Germany, WW II 
U.S ., WW II 
(specialty plastics) 
First Production Date During Wartime 
(degree of war relatedness unknown) 
Cellophane (cellulosic plastic) 
Epoxy (thermoset plastic) 
Polyvinylidene Chloride 
(thermoplastic plastic) 
Saran (fibre) 
Butyl (rubber) 
Acrylic (fibre) 
France, 1917 
Switzerland, 1944 
U.S., 1940 
u.s., 1942 
U.S., 1943 
First Produced in Germany in the 1930's 
(degree of war relatedness unknown) 
Cellulose Acetate Butyrate 
Ethyl Cellulose 
NethyJ. Cellulose 
Melamine Formaldehyde 
Polyvinyl Chloride 
Polystyrene 
Polymethyl Methacrylate 
High Tenacity Viscose Rayon Filaments 
Acetate Staple 
1935 
1932*' 
1932* 
1935* 
1931* 
1930* 
1930* 
1935* 
1932 
*Germany was also the first country in the world to produce these synthetics 
Source: Hufbauer (1966, pp . 1_31 - 132) 
53 
experienced in Wor ld War I were not repeated for World War II. They 
spent a lot of research and development on both synthetic fuels and 
rubber and other synthetics. In fact, you could almost bet the German 
war machine developed in the 1930 ' s on their successful exploitation of 
resear ch and development as a supplement to their own raw mater ial 
base . On September 1 of 1939, 38 percent of German fuels were 
synthes ized : 32 percent by hydrogenation . and 6 percent by the 
Fischer- Tropshe process for extracting liquid fuel from coal . An 
untested hypothesis is whether the German reparations payments in the 
1920' s cut back on raw material imports sufficiently to explain the R 
& D which led to the German synthetic discover ies in the 1930 ' s (see 
Table 4) . 
Either wartime or reparations- induced cutoffs of raw mater ials 
impose economic autarky upon mar kets previously served by a combina·-
tion of imports and domestic production. Inter national trade theory 
has not explicitly accounted for R & D investments which change the 
production function and develop synthetics when autarky is imposed . 
The implication is that the gains from trade are lower (or the loss 
fr om a cutoff in trade less) in countries with a relative abundance of 
human capital . 
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FOOTNOTES 
1The authors are Professor of Finance , the University of Texas at 
Austin and Brokerage Supervisor, Unionmutual, Oakland, California. 
They are indebted to Ken Bishop, Ann Winters and Carol Nackenoff for 
research assistance and to Hugh Patrick for comments. This paper 
builds upon earlier work: Robins (1971) and Magee and Robins (1977) . 
2For tin statistics in this section see International Tin Council 
(1970); for rubber see International Rubber Study group; for indus -
trial diamonds see U. S. Bureau of Mines. 
3world consumption of primary tin stayed below 1940 consumption 
levels unti l 1960 (with the exception of one year.) 
4 Rosenberg (1973) . 
5Rosenberg (1973) and Council of Economic Advisors (1974). 
6 Rosenberg (1973). 
7American Metal Market (1977, p. 233). 
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THE RAW MATERIAL PRODUCT CYCLE 
A COMMENT 
Danny Le i pz iger* 
The Magee and Robins paper i s what I would call a paper aimed at 
reporting what is and offering some explanations as to why . It does a 
credible job within these confines but it does not venture into the 
interesting policy issues fac i ng a developi ng country producing a 
commodity whose price may face short-run instability and secular 
decline . If the raw materials product cycle theory i s correct , then 
producers will experience declines in price due first to the increased 
competition of additional supply and second to the development of 
syntheti c substitutes. 
Parts 1 and 3 of the paper address the role of a product cycle 
theory applied to the cases of natural rubber, tin and industrial 
diamonds, hypothesiz i ng that secular pri.ces fell i n harmony with 
theory. Parts 2 and 4 digress into a largely speculative discussion of 
global resour ce supply over time and a largely extraneous discussion of 
World War-induced innovations . I will address myself to the basic 
premise of the paper ·-·- that the raw materials product cycle can 
explain price movements in resource industries . 
In applying the Product Cycle Theory of international trade 
1 popularized by Vernon and others , it seems to me that the authors do 
not take into account some of the underlying structural differences 
between advanced countries (DCs) and developing countries (LDCs) that 
enriched the Product Cycle Theory . What rendered that concept so 
*The opinions expressed by the author do not necessari ly r eflect 
those of AID . 
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applicable to inter national trade was the incorporation of differences 
in product, skill requirements, and demand facto r s over time . No such 
subtleties are incorporated in the Magee-Robins paper . 
As an example of what might conceivably be added, let me propose 
that Stage II -- the phase of increasing competition in supply which 
tends to depress pri ces in the absence of similar growth in demand --
is the crucial phase for suppliers and a phase in which DCs respond 
quite differently from LDCs due to structural factors in their econo-
mies and internationally . More advanced countries can respond to 
depressed pr i ces by di versifying production -- diverting resources 
into alternative industries -- and by engaging in downstream pro-
cessing . During Stage II , the response to a downward price trend 
forces some producers to adjust ; others cannot . To treat all commodity 
producers equally is to reduce unnecessarily the applicability of the 
model . Figure 1 depicts this situation graphically. 
Figure I 
Raw Materials Product Cycle 
II I II 
,. - - - -'> DC 
... 
' 
, __ 
' 
' - -~LDC 
Boom Static Substitution Dynamic Substitution 
T I M E 
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Empirical studies clearly show a greater concentration in primary 
commodity production in the world's poorer nations, those lacking the 
capital and expertise to diversify their productive base . UNCTAD data 
reveals the degree of LDC concentration in primary commodities , as 
shown in the attached table . 
Quite often the lack of diversification is a vestige of a colonial 
past . In recent years, however, it results more from a lack of 
domestic capital and a mistrust of foreign investment in raw materials 
production . For this reason, new forms of cooperative investments in 
raw materials need to be found . 2 
With respect to the ability to engage in downstream processing , a 
recent report prepared for UNCTAD analyzed a set of obstacles to such 
processing in four representative raw materials -- iron ore, copper, 
timber/wood products , and hides and skins . 3 The major obstacles in the 
iron ore industry were deemed to be the capital requirements, the 
technology and labor skill , energy, and supply of complementary 
mate r ials . 
With respect to copper, the obstacles of greatest consequence to 
LDCs were low value - - added to lack of proximity to consumers and 
capital requirements . With respect to processed wood production , the 
factors were tariffs and non- tariff measures , capital requirements, 
and product and marketing differences . Finally , in the case of hides 
and skins, the major obstacles were trade barriers (tariff and non-
tariff) and transport costs . 
What emerges from the study is the fact that downstream processing 
presents several major generalized obstacles to LDCs including inade-
quate capital and technology and barriers to developed country mar-
kets. Studies showing that effective rates of protection are higher as 
the degree of processing increases reinforce the views that LDCs face 
difficulties in diversifying into processed products whose prices are 
less volatile in the short- run and whose long- run projects (based on 
larger income elasticities of demand) are more favorable . 4 Thus , the 
ability of a developing country to adjust to secular price declines 
within a product cycle framework is far less than for a more advanced 
country . 
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In measuring the secular pattern of terms of trade for producers, 
it might be interesting to use an alternative price deflater (if 
available) to the U.S. wholesale price index which is weighted heavily 
towards the U. S. production bundle of goods rather than towards the 
producers import bundle of goods . The second point with respect to 
measurement is that it might be quite interesting to look at the terms 
of t r ade unadjusted for normal variation to gauge the short- term 
volatility of prices . It is to some degree the instability in earnings 
from raw materials that may hinder the LDCs' ability to undertake the 
investments necessary to either diversify its output or process it. 
The issue of short-term price stabilization has r eceived con-
siderable attention i n the literature and also in practical terms . 5 
Short- term price instability, often associated with business cycle 
fluctuations, may be of considerably more policy relevance than long-
term price trends. Current UNCTAD discussions on common funding 
arrangements for some buffer stocks would attempt to ameliorate some 
price problems . Alternatives to these arrangements have been sug-
gested, such as long-term supply contracts . 6 
The objective of any of these arrangements is to add certainty to 
prices in stages II and III . I would assume that most LDC producers 
now find themselves in either stage II or stage III of the cycle and 
the prime issue is what their policies and the international com-
munity's policies should be. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1R. Vernon, "International Investment and Inter national Trade in 
the Product Cycle," Quarterly Journal of Economics (May 1966). 
2In this respect, mention can be made of the aborti ve Inter na-
tional Resources Bank, increased World Bank lending in minerals and 
energy, and new forms of joint investment as noted by D. Smith and L. 
Wells, Negotiating Third World Mineral Agreements (Ballinger, 1976) . 
3uNCTAD, "The Degree and Scope for Increased Processi ng of Pri-
mary Commodities in Developing Countries," unpublished 1976 . 
4see work of Balassa . 
5see for example, C. P. Brown, "Buffer Stocks, Buffer Funds, and 
Export Quotas" in Primary Commodity Control (1975) pp . 118- 65; R. J . 
McKinnon, "Futures Markets, Buffer Stocks, and Income Stability for 
Primary Producers," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 75, No. 6 
(1967), pp . 849- 861 . T. Morrison and L. Perez, "Analysis of Compensa-
tory Finance Schemes for Export Earnings Fluctuations in Developing 
Countries," World Development, Vol. 8 , No . 4 0976), pp. 687- 694; C. 
Fred Bergsten, "Commodity Agreements, Common Funding, Stabilization of 
Export Earnings, and Investment in Commodity Productions: The Policy 
of the Carter Administration Toward International Commodity Issues," 
Address to the Tenth Washington Conference for Corporate Executives, 
Council of the Americas (June 27, 1977) ; and C. Michalopoulos and L. 
Perez, "Commodity Trade Policy Initiatives and Issues," paper pre-
sented to the Ford Foundation Conference on Stabilizing World Com-
modity Markets: Analysis, Practice and Policy, Air lie, Virginia 
(March 1977). 
6D. Lessard, "Internati onal Risk for Commodity Producing Coun-
tries: Alternatives to Direct Foreign Investment," O. A.S . /Central 
Bank Conference on External Financial Policy, Santi ago, Chile 
(March 1977). 
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THE RAW MATERIAL PRODUCT CYCLE 
A COMMENT 
Narongchai Akrasanee 
It is the tradi tion of the Pacific Trade and Development Confer-
ence to start off the program with a paper which provides a framework 
for the discussion of the entire program. If we consider this paper as 
the guideline , I think that we are going to have a very enjoyable 
conference . This is because , according to the authors , the problems of 
raw materials as we know of them today either do not exist, or if they 
exist they are not that serious , or they are not the real problems . 
What are the problems which are talked about most these days? 
(1) The world is going to run out of certain raw materials . 
(2) Worsening terms of trade of raw materials . 
The authors developed a very ingenious theory of the product cycle 
which basically denies the existence of these two problems . In my 
comment I will first discuss the product- cycle theory of raw materials , 
and then I would like to comment on some of the implications of the 
analysis . 
On the whole, I think it is extremely useful to have a simpl e 
theory to explain an important phenomenon, and the authors should be 
congratulated on their contribution . The periods and the incidents 
cited to explain the cycle are well substantiated . However , before a 
cycle theory is accepted one has to be sure that a series of events are 
going to repeat themselves in other cases . The events are ( 1) the 
invention of a certain product which requires the use of a raw 
material, (2) the increase in price which leads to new supply and 
substitution of a particular raw material and (3) the R & D which leads 
to the use of a synthetic substitute . 
These events are to take place because of economic reasons . Event 
number 1 is necessary as the starting point . It is event numbers 2 and 
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3 which I think may not always be in that order . Research and 
development take place continuously, and could lead first to substitu-
tion or to the invention of synthetics, although logically the order of 
occurrence should be as the authors suggested . Perhaps more case 
studies are needed here, and a statistical test which can be performed 
to prove the order of occurrences . 
Furthermore, in terms of methodology, I do not think the authors 
have provided enough statistical tests to substantiate their claim, 
especially in Stage III, when R & D is said to lead to invention of a 
synthetic -- or a major raw material saving device (i . e . , At what price 
will this take place? Is it random?, etc . ) . 
Let me come now to the implications of the theory and other 
aspects of the paper . The theory implies, among many other things, 
that whatever happens we will not run out of raw materials . On first 
appearance this is a comforting thought . But is this more because a 
synthetic will always be produced, or because a technology will be 
developed to save on the use of raw materials? Is there a bias in the R 
& D system towards the synthetic? Any visitor to America certainly 
feels that way . 
For developing countries, the cycle theory does not offer an 
encouraging sign . As net exporters of raw materials, the theory simply 
says that the price will go up and down, and up again if they are 
fortunate, or up and down and up and down, which is even more 
unfortunate . The point is that those changes are generally not under 
the control of the exporters . Later on in the cycle , when developing 
countries became net importers of synthetics, they were again at the 
mercy of the corporations which produced those synthetics . 
On the aspect of the long- run constant terms of trade , the 
implication of the theory is that they would be constant . This is 
because the increase in price will shift from one raw material to 
another. So in total, the terms of trade average out about the same . 
For net exporters of raw materials, this conclusion is supposed to be 
better than the worsening terms of trade thesis . I think, however , it 
would be an important addition if the authors would include an analysis 
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of the short- run terms of trade of the product- cycle theory . As the 
evidence in their Table 3 shows , the variation in prices of raw 
materials from decade to decade relati ve to all prices has been very 
high . It is this short- run , commodity- to- commodity change which 
worries developing countries the most . It would be interesting to 
learn how the product cycle theory predicts the short- run changes . I 
think , according to the theory , we would have in Stage I a shift in 
demand . The effect on price would depend on the elasticity of supply , 
which varies from commodi ty to commodity . Then in Stage II , the supply 
curve would shift to the right , and demand to the left . Finally in 
Stage III, demand shifts to the left again . The effect on price 
fluctuation depends, therefore , on the elasticity of both demand and 
supply withln the range of the previous equilibrium. The understanding 
of this mechanism has a very important implication for the stabiliza-
tion program. As is being discussed at various places at the moment , 
in certain cases price stabilization could lead to a stabilization or a 
destabilization of income , depending upon the elasticity of demand and 
supply . I think the pr oduct- cycle theory could provide some insight on 
this problem . 
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THE RAW MATERIAL PRODUCT CYCLE 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The authors acknowledged that their paper did not deal with the 
policy problem of adjustment to a secular decline in the terms of 
trade, since this was outside its scope . They noted, however , that a 
major implication of the paper was that a raw mate r ials export boom, 
and an accompanying rise in the terms of trade, was strictly a short-
term phenomena , and that for the long run resource exporting countries 
should seek to diversify their economies. The problem facing developed 
countries was probably less severe since they had more opportunities 
for diversification and downstream processing . 
Participants generally agreed that the author usefully modelled 
broad historical developments in raw materials markets . However, 
several - - in addition to Narongchai Akrasanee -- thought that the 
particular selection of stages of the raw materials cycle was arbi-
trary . For some commodit i es , such as wood , there might be a stage 
prior to the "boom stage" in which raw materials were exploited 
domestically by industrial countries before being imported . In this 
case , the raw material cycle is in phase with Vernon ' s cycle f or 
manufactured products . For other commodities, such as rubber, substi-
tution in stages II and III may be i ncomplete, and t he cycle less 
pronounced . There may also be a Stage IV -- a new burst in derived 
demand following an expansion of per- capita income of LDC ' s . Finally, 
there may be cycles within cycles . For example, the development of 
thin- plated t i n to economize on the usage of this raw material resulted 
in a new derived demand for the plate . Also, hi gher energy prices 
could be a disincenti ve for using synthetics , which are energy-
intensi ve , and result in a new rightward sh i ft in the demand curve for 
raw materials . The authors rebutted that they wer e less i nterested in 
identifying and naming stages , than in explaining t he fundamental 
economic forces at work . They commented that an analysis of a possible 
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Stage IV was difficult in view of the uncertain rate of change in the 
structure of world demand and in technology . 
Other participants doubted the universality of the cycle, and 
wondered if the selection of commodities for analysis was arbitrary . 
How many commodities did not fit the cycle theory? Someone remarked 
that objective indicators were required to identify the stages of the 
cycle for individual commodities . Movements in relative prices seemed 
reasonable indicators , but the three commodities analyzed in the paper 
revealed three different patterns of relative price changes: The 
relative price of rubber rose in Stage I and fell in Stage II; that for 
tin rose in Stage I but remained constant in Stage II ; and that for 
industrial diamonds actually dropped in Stage I . The authors argued 
that relative prices were an appropriate indicator for tin and rubber , 
but that industrial diamonds were a special case in which early new 
explorations of diamonds in South Africa depressed world prices, which 
may in itself have initiated the cycle. The authors stated there were 
several other commodities which fitted the cycle theory well, but that 
it was difficult to find many such commodities because of extensive 
government interference in markets . They planned in the future to 
analyze the case of petroleum . Another participant echoed the authors' 
warning on the misuse of stage theory, and further warned that the 
existence of a contradictory case does not invalidate the application 
of the theory to cases which do seem to fit well . 
Another participant seconded Leipziger's cirticism that the 
authors ' terms- of- trade measure was inappropriate for measuring wel-
fare effects or for indicating changes in market conditions . It would 
be more appropriate to analyze export unit values and in particular, 
the stability and secular behavior of both the domestic and foreign 
components of these . A useful distinction for this purpose is the 
distinction between the "return to value terms of trade , " which 
measures the component of export unit value returned domestically, and 
the "net barter terms of trade ." 
Higher relative prices of a raw material induce substitution in 
both production and consumption, and also R and D in economizing 
technology and/or synthetic substitutes . Two participants thought 
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that short- run price volatility , which increases costs of investment, 
may be an equally important stimulus to R and D. Thus , schemes to 
stabilize prices may slow the transition to Stage III of the cycle and 
may also achieve a long- run balance between supply and demand . 
Several part i cipants wondered what deter mines the speed of the 
cycle . In general , the speed of adjustment depends on elasticities of 
demand and supply , and the elasticity of technological change . These 
parameters differ across commodities . Changes in market prices may 
affect multinational corporations differently than producers who are 
less integrated . In particular, multinationals may make internal 
adjustments to minimize the impacts of price volat U ity , and this may 
slow the R and D response . Stage II may be speeded by a fear of 
interrupted supply . In Stage III, higher energy prices might make 
synthetic substitutes , which are typically energy intensive, less 
attractive and slow the transition to Stage III . 
Many participants thought that the paper did not adequately 
address short- run adjustment problems . The model implies that supply 
shortages are not a problem in the long run , but this may not be true in 
the short or intermediate run . An example is the lead time needed for 
a transition from crude oil to synthetic l i quid energy . There is 
likely to be a severe shortage of crude oil in the 1980s and it is 
unlikely that market response alone would be sufficient . Thus some 
government intervention may be necessary to speed up the cycle . The 
authors replied that speeding up of the cycle is not always efficient 
(for example, war is a very inefficient method of speeding this cycle), 
and a case must be made on an individual basis to do so . Another 
participant argued that government intervention might actually frus-
trate market responses; for example, controls in the U. S. oil industry 
which raise prices for consumers but which do not correspondingly raise 
the retur n to producers . 
A participant differed with Leipziger ' s comment that the discus-
sion of wartime technological change was extraneous , since it sup .. 
ported the important conclusi on that scarcity under any conditions 
leads to R and D. Another thought the argument that countries 
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relatively abundant in human capital will suffer lower losses from a 
cutoff in trade was fallacious, since the human capital may be more 
efficiently allocated to other products than those which substitute 
for traded resources . One participant doubted that the implication of 
a constant long- run terms of trade fitted the facts, as opposed to a 
secular decline . Another thought that it did fit the facts, but that a 
more important question was whether the theory can really explain long-
run movements in terms of trade without an explanation of factor price 
determination, in particular an analysis of markets for human and 
physical capital . The authors agreed this was important . 
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MINERAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT PATTERNS IN THE PACIFIC AREA 
N. M. Switucha* 
Intr oduct i on 
This paper analyzes the changing mineral production and trade 
patter ns in the Pacific Area over the two decades ending in 1975 . 
First it highlights the rapid postwar mineral production growth and 
trade expansion stimulated by rising demand for industrial raw 
mater.ials in major industrialized countries . Second , it surveys 
significant developments in specific major mineral and metal commodi · 
ties in the Pacific Rim countries and explores some of the issues and 
problems that have important implications on the future outlook for all 
major mineral commodities 
The focus of the present paper is on the Pacific countries of 
Japan, Korea , the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singa-
pore, Papua New Guinea, Australia and New Zealand . On the American 
continent Canada, United States, Mexico, Peru, and Chile are important 
Pacific Rim producers and consumers of major metal and mineral commodi -
ties, although a significant part of their mineral trade is directed 
elsewhere. Since the role of other countries in mineral production and 
trade is marginal, they are mentioned only as required . Study of the 
signi ficance of the Soc i alist Block countries of Asia i n the Pacific 
Area mineral trade is outside the scope of the present paper . Never-
theless , brief r eferences to the USSR and China will be found in the 
text as necessary . 
* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance provided by the staff 
of the Mineral Development Sector , Department of Energy , Mines and 
Resources, Government of Canada, in assembling some statistical data . 
Views and opinions expressed d'o not necessarily represent the posi-
tion of the Department and should be attributed only to the author . 
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Discussion will be limited to fifteen metals and minerals pro-
duced and traded in the Pacific Rim that are of major economic 
significance. These include the main non-ferrous metals of aluminum, 
copper, lead, zinc, nickel, titanium and tin, as well as iron ore , 
steel and coal Other minerals and metals, such as rutile, zircon, 
tungsten, chromium, and their ferroalloys, are covered together at the 
end . Detailed data on production and trade in the major minerals are 
provided in the Statistical Appendix in these Proceedings, and refer-
ences are made to them here as appropriate . 
1 . Minerals in the Economies of the Pacific Rim 
World mineral production has more than trebled in volume in the 
past twenty years and a strong trend towards greater international 
trade in minerals brought about a growing interdependence between 
countries endowed with substantial mineral domain and the resource-
deficient nations . A major share of this growth in mineral production 
and trade took place in the Pacific Rim, including both resource- rich 
and resource- poor countries . 
This i nterdependence has become stronger owing to several pecu-
liar characteristics of the mineral industry : the need for increas-
ingly large capital expenditures in exploration and exploitation of 
mineral resources; increasing dependence on complex and advanced tech-
nology in discovering , mining, processing and transport i ng minerals ; 
and the growing necessity of combining advanced management, techno-
logical and marketing skills in all stages of mineral exploration, 
development and trade. 
Some countries, such as Canada, the United States and Australia 
have been characterized by a relatively abundant supply of a variety of 
mineral resources . In others, economic development depended to a large 
degree on the production and export of one or a few mineral commodi-
ties . Still others, such as Japan , less fortunate in terms of mineral 
endowment, succeeded in making major strides in economic growth based 
on the processing of minerals and metals into exportable industrial and 
consumer products . 
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Japan 
Japanese demand for mineral r esources in the postwar period 
increased at the highest annual rate in the world . During the decade 
between 1960-70 , Japan's crude steel product.ion grew 15 . 5 percent 
annually, while steel exports expanded at a 23 . 1- percent annual rate . 
Japan ' s demand for copper rose 11 percent annually , nickel consumption 
15 . 7 percent annually and aluminum production 18 . 5 percent annually 
. th .d(l) during e same per10 • 
The aver age rate of i ncrease i n the demand for most resources 
exceeded the average growth rate of real GNP for 1960- 1970 . The share 
of mineral resources in Japan's annual i.mports increased from 38 . 7 
percent in 1960 to 44 . 3 per cent in 1970 . In specific metal commodities 
the degree of dependence increased r apidly between 1960 and 1970 , 
rising from 36 percent to 78 . 5 percent in coking coal, from 68 to 88 
percent in iron ore and from 50 to 75 . 6 pe~cent in copper . (2 ) Most of 
these rose to over 90 percent by 1975 . Import dependence in aluminum 
(including bauxite and aluminum metal) , nickel , t i n, and most other 
metals and minerals has always been 100 percent . 
Processing raw material imports in Japan provided a base for high 
economic growth and for re- export of higher processed products . Direct 
export of metals in 1960 accounted for 14 percent of Japan ' s total 
exports , increasing to 22 . 5 percent by 1975 . Indirect exports , in the 
form of finished industrial and consumer products were, of course , 
considerably higher . 
Growing concern over energy conse r vation , industrial pollution 
and increasing opposition to land and water resource use for heavy 
industry in the early 1970 ' s br ought pressure for a shift in industrial 
structure (discussed in the paper in these Proceedings by Murata) . 
Implementation of new policies , however , has been slow to evolve . The 
Japanese economy is likely to continue to require the importation of 
huge quant i ties of raw materials in crude form, and any change in this 
pattern will be a gradual process . 
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United States 
Although the degree of mineral self-sufficiency in the United 
States has been relatively high, on average, various economic and 
social factors dictated substantial dependence on imports, especially 
for such important commodities as nickel, cobalt , bauxite, zinc , 
chromium, manganese and others . The degree of dependence on imports, 
while relatively modest by comparison with the EEC and Japan, has 
reached a substantial percentage of U. S. apparent consumption and has 
become a subject of increasing concern in both economic and strategic 
terms . 
Between 1960 and 1974, the degree of the United States import 
dependence rose from 88 to 92 percent for nickel, 66 to 99 percent for 
cobalt , 75 to 98 percent for rutile, 89 to 98 percent for manganese and 
46 to 60 percent for zinc . However, excluding mineral fuels, some 85 
percent of the dollar value of raw and processed mineral origin 
materials consumed in the U. S. in 1976 originated from U. S. domestic 
sources . 
The U. S. mining and minerals policy, as expressed in the Mining 
and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, defines the goal as availability of 
desired mineral materials at the lowest possible private and social 
cost, including environmental considerations . Minimizing government 
intervention in the market place, even at the cost of greater import 
dependence, is regarded as a desirable objective provided that 
security of supply considerations are not involved . Strategic 
security of supply was at the root of the U. S. decision to establish 
and maintain a minerals and metals stockpile to support military 
requirements and to insure reasonable functioning of the national 
economy in the event of extended conflict . The present value of all 
materials in the U. S. stockpile is estimated at $7 . 5 billion . 
The threat of producer cartels disrupting mineral supply and 
interfering with market forces encouraged the U. S. government to 
consider the implementation of an additional economic stockpile pro-
gram. Implications of such policy for the free functioning of the 
marketplace and for the producing countries require very careful 
consideration of all aspects before a decision can be reached . 
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Canada 
Canada's role as one of the world ' s leading mineral producers 
expanded rapidly in the 1960 ' s . The mining production index (1971 
=100) stood at ll8 . 2 in 1974, more than double the level in 1961 
(54 . 7) . The value of mineral production, exclusive of fuels , rose from 
$1 . 9 billion i n 1960 to $6 . 5 billion in 1974 . Crude and fabricated 
minerals accounted for 35 . 6 percent of the total 1974 export value of 
$31.4 billion, up from 32 . 6 percent of the much lower 1965 export value 
of $8 . 5 billion . 
The pattern of Canadian mineral trade has remained relatively 
stable . In 1966 the U.S. took 60 percent of all Canadian mineral 
exports and Japan 4 . 6 percent . In 1974 the U. S. share increased to 68 
percent of the total , and Japan's share to 9 . 1 percent . 
In recent years, Canadian mineral policy has gradually shifted 
away from the wide open natural resource development and export policy 
generally followed in the past . Minerals are increasingly viewed as 
the key to enhance diversification and growth of the national and 
regional economies by increasing the degree of mineral processing and 
mineral- based manufacturi.ng prior to export . 
Australia 
Although mining had been associated with Australian economic 
development since early colonial days, its full potential was not 
realized until the 1950 ' s when discoveri es of bauxite, nickel, rutile , 
iron ore and coal opened up a new era . 
In 1974, the index of mineral production in Australia ( 1969 
= 100) stood at 197 . 7 , almost a five- fold increase from the level of 
40 . 5 in 1960 . The index of primary mineral products exports (1969 
= 100) , measured in constant prices, recorded an even more impressive 
rise from 17 . 9 in 1960 to 209.1 in 1974 . <4) The share of Australian 
mineral and metal exports in the country's total exports rose from 8 
percent in 1964 to over 37 percent in 1974 . The growing role of 
minerals in the Australian economy and the various policy issues 
involved are set forth in the paper by Ben Smith in these Proceedings . 
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Developing Countries 
Most developing countries considered in this paper have experi-
enced political independence for more than a quarter century, long 
enough to experiment wi th a variety of economic policies designed to 
obtain maximum benefit from their mineral wealth . Some of them have 
expressed their disillusionment with continuous economic dependence on 
the industrialized countries in the form of takeover or nationaliza-
tion of primary mineral industries . Others have gradually introduced 
tighter controls on mineral exploration and development designed to 
foster increased local or state ownership . 
Such policies, and particular ly the terms under which acquisi -
tions of mining company assets have been made in some countries , have 
been a principal deterrent to new investment in mineral exploration and 
production . An estimated 80 percent of the world- wide exploration 
expenditures i n the 1970 ' s have been made in the developed resource-
rich countries -- Australia, Canada, the United States, and South 
Africa - - rather than in the developing countries . 
The ambitions of the developing countries to increase domestic 
benefits associated with mineral production and trade also have been 
reflected in the formation of intergovernmental mineral producers' 
groups attempting to influence market decisions . The only mineral 
producing developing countries in the Pacific Rim that have not become 
members of some mineral producers ' group are South Korea and Taiwan . 
Southeast As i a 
The f i ve ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia have diverse economies 
and (except for Singapore) certain similarities in terms of mineral 
endowment . Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia are important producers 
of tin ; the Philippines and Indonesia are growing producers of copper 
and nickel . Malaysia and Indonesia share interests in the mining of 
bauxite . 
The contribution of the mining sector to the Malays i an economy is 
small and in recent years has declined due to lower output of tin , 
bauxite and iron ore . Mining accounted for 4 . 0 percent of GDP in 1975 , 
down from 5 . 7 percent in 1970 . The export value of tin , $1 . 2 billion 
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in 1975, amounted to 13 . 4 percent of total export receipts . 
Non-fuel minerals in Indones i an economic development have always 
been overshadowed by the importance of oil and natural gas, exports of 
which provided 73 percent of gross foreign exchange earnings in f i scal 
year 1975 . However, oil exploration and production activities also led 
to discovery of other valuable mineral resources including tin , baux-
ite, nickel , and copper as well as other less significant deposits of 
other minerals . 
Most minerals in Indonesia are designated as either "strategic" 
or "vital" and their mining and processing can only be undertaken by 
the state or on behalf of the government . The government usually 
permits foreign private capital participation only under contract 
limiting the life of a mining company ' s investment permit , requiring 
maximum possible domestic processing before export and a gradual 
transfer of a portion of equity to Indonesians . Desiring to obtain the 
maximum possible return from mineral exports, the Indonesian govern-
ment also has joined the International Tin Agr eement (ITA), CIPEC and 
the International Bauxite Association (IBA) . 
In the Philippines, extensive reserves of copper ores have played 
a major role in recent economic development, but the Philippines are 
also an important producer of manganese, chromite, mercury and a 
growing producer of nickel. Mining of gold , silver , iron ore , lead and 
various non- metallic minerals takes place on a lesser scale . 
Foreign investment in the Philippines, although closely con-
trolled through foreign exchange and other regulations and constitu-
tional limitations, has played an important role in sti mulating 
mineral development and trade . A notable feature is the fact that the 
bulk of the country ' s minerals is still exported in an unprocessed 
state . Stimulated by various recent government measures , the 
prevailing trade pattern ought to shift increasingly towards mineral 
exports in more advanced stages of processing . 
South Pacifi c 
Although the mineral endowment of the newly independent Papua New 
Guinea is not yet well known , this mountainous country of some 600 
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islands is already a sj_gnificant Pacific producer of copper, with gold 
and silver as by- products. Developed by Rio Tinto Zinc through the 
original agreement with Australia, the Bougainville island mine was 
largely responsible for Papua New Guinea's vital mineral export 
revenue . The original agreement was renegotiated in 1976 to provide 
higher government revenue, setting a pattern that is likely to be 
followed in negotiations on the future development of copper reserves 
on other islands . 
New Caledonia's important nickel deposits have been at the root of 
the French government's reluctance to allow it a greater measure of 
self-rule, with the control of mining and taxation policies remaining 
in Paris. Some 25 percent of the world's land- based nickel reserves 
are located in New Caledonia, and it is the second largest nickel 
producer . New legislation, approved in 1975, provides for 51 percent 
New Caledonian ownership of new mining projects, but removes some of 
the obstacles to participation by foreign corporations . 
New Zealand has never been a significant mineral producer, but it 
is an exporter of iron sands, coal and gold and minor amounts of some 
metallic ores. Its present policies are unlikely to stimulate explora-
tion and development of mineral resources except to the extent neces-
sary to make the country less dependent on foreign imports . 
Latin America 
All major mineral producing Latin American countries considered 
in this study underwent major changes in their policies toward mineral 
development in the past 10-15 years, affecting foreign investment and 
control of mining and mineral processing operations. Some of these 
changes were accompanied by drastic curtailment of long-established 
investment by multinational corporations, precipitating major struc-
tural dislocations within the industry and affecting regional trade 
patterns . 
In Mexico, the process of acquisition of majority (51 percent) 
ownership, in accordance with the Mining Law of 1961, was accelerated 
by granting tax concessions to mining enterprises employing Mexican 
capital and by direct participation of the state in mining ventures . 
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For certain minerals, such as coal, iron ore and sulphur, local capital 
participation must be 66 percent . The Mexican government has consis-
tently followed a policy of encouraging further processing of mineral 
resources before export to provide increased employment opportunities 
for the labor force . 
Peru has strongly favored state involvement in all significant 
mining and processing ventures since 1968. All major mining conces-
sions that were controlled by foreign (mainly United States) capital 
reverted back to the government and the state assumed exclusive rights 
to intervene directly in the minerals market . Joint ventures with 
foreign mining companies are discouraged, although such ventures may 
be approved by the Ministry of Energy and Mines i f foreign partners 
contribute technology not otherwise available in the country . 
Peru, together with Chile, Zaire and Zambia, is a founding member 
of the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC) 
and more recently has become a member of the Association of Iron Ore 
Exporting Countries (AIEC), the Primary Tungsten Association (PTA) and 
Association of Silver Exporting Countries . 
In Chile, significant structural changes have taken place since 
1966 which substantially increased the degree of governmental control 
and ownership of the mining industry . These developments and their 
implications are covered in the paper by Ernesto Tironi included in 
these Proceedings . Copper is the dominant mineral, but Chile also 
produces and exports significant quantities of molybdenum, found as a 
by-product of copper mining . Of some ten million tons of iron ore 
mined annually about 90 percent is exported to Japan and Europe . 
2 . Copper in the Pacific Rim 
Pacific Rim countries are important producers of copper : their 
share in world mine production of copper was 50 percent in 1975 (56 
percent in 1955) while their share of refined copper production was 
about 44 percent in 1975 (55 percent in 1955) . The Pacific Rim 
includes some of the world's largest producers of copper in various 
forms : Canada, the United States , Chile, Peru, Australia, Japan and 
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the Philippines . Smaller producers are Korea, Indonesia, and Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) . 
In most cases copper has assumed significant or even critical 
importance in the economies of these countries . In the case of Chile , 
for example , the value of copper exports in 1974 accounted for 66 
percent of total exports while in the case of Peru , 1974 copper exports 
were about 23 percent of the total . (5) Copper concentrate exports from 
British Columbia in recent years represented the largest single export 
item in Canada ' s trade with Japan and in the case of Papua New Guinea , 
copper produced on Bougainville Island provides a very substantial 
proportion of government revenues . 
Reserves and Resources 
Pacific Rim countries are presently estimated to have some 57 
percent of known world reserves (460 million tons* )(6 ) although proba-
ble and hypothetical deposits are believed to be at least four times 
larger than known reserves . Canada and the United States account for 
25 percent of the total, Chile and Peru for about an equal percentage . 
At least 25 million tons are in the Philippines , Papua New Guinea and 
Indonesia, while Australia is estimated to have at least 7 . 6 million 
tons . 
Mine Production 
Over the 20- year period 1955- 75 , world copper mine production 
increased at an average annual rate of 4 . 3 percent as shown in 
Statistical Appendix Table A- 1 . Some Pacific countries experienced 
substantially higher growth rates, averaging 13 percent in the Philip-
pines and 7 percent in Australia and Peru . Canadian output rose at 4 
percent annually , while that of the United States at only 2 percent . 
Papua New Guinea and Indonesia entered the supply picture only in the 
1970's . 
A significant feature of world copper mine production over the 
past 20 years has been a decline in the relative importance of the 
developed countries from 46 percent of the total in 1955 to 36 percent 
in 1975 and a rise of the relative share of the socialist countries of 
79 
Eastern Europe . The share of the developing countries has remained 
almost constant at about 41 percent . (Statistical Appendix Table A-1 . ) 
In 1955 only 6 . 3 percent of the total 3. 1- million tons mined were 
exported as ores and concentrates, while by 1974 this figure became 
15 . 7 percent of a 7 . 65- million total . In 1975 four major concentrate 
exporting countries -- Canada, Chile , Philippines and Papua New Guinea 
__ accounted for 72 percent of the total tonnage traded as concen-
trates . Statical Appendix Tables A- 2 and A- 3 present copper ore and 
concentrate trade statistics for 1965 and 1975 respectively . 
The most significant market for copper concentrates in 1955 was 
the United States, but by 1965 Japan imported 60 percent of all copper 
traded as concentrates , and by 1975 Japan ' s imports had risen to 70 
percent of the total tonnage traded . Canada and the Philippines 
accounted for 58 . 4 percent of Japan's concentrate imports , with most of 
the balance from Papua New Guinea, Indonesia , Chile and Australia. 
Pacific Rim countries such as Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and 
Chile shipped modest tonnages of copper concentrates to EEC countries 
in 1975, while Philippine producers and the Western Canadian mines were 
largely dependent on the Japanese market . The extent of the British 
Columbia producers ' dependency on the Japanese smelters is evident 
from Statistical Appendix Table A- 4 . 
The ability of established Japanese smelters to offer competitive 
smelting charges and to compete aggressively for long- term supplies 
from new mine sources effectively discouraged smelter construction in 
other Pacific Rim copper-producing countries . Long- term concentrate 
sales agreements often provided to new mining ventures advantages of 
reduced risk and assured access to markets . While freight charges are 
an important consideration , concentrates have been transported in bulk 
from South America to Europe or from Papua New Guinea and British 
Columbia to Japan with costs per ton of metal content that are 
economically competitive with refined metal shipments . 
International trade in copper concentrates was also encouraged by 
prevailing tariff structures which imposed an unacceptable penalty on 
blister and refined copper entering international trade . Other 
factors inhibiting local smelting and refining relate to limited local 
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market demand, environmental considerations and the need to dispose of 
sulphur produced as a by-product in flash-smelting . 
Motivated by their desire for increased domestic investment, 
other Pacific Rim countries such as South Korea, Indonesia and P. N. G. 
may also move into copper smelting and refining as a step towards 
production of copper wire, cable and brass mill products. Considering 
current high capital investment costs and low copper prices, the 
economic success of such ventures is questionable without reasonably 
assured markets for blister and refined metal in the developed coun-
tries. 
Refined Copper Production 
While world-wide refined copper production grew at an average 
annual rate of 4 . 0 percent between 1955 and 1975 the annual growth 
rate in Japan averaged 10 . 4 percent (Statistical Appendix Table A- 5). 
Japan became the third largest producer of refined copper in the world 
after the U. S. A. and the U. S. S. R. Among the Pacific Rim countries, 
only Australia's copper refining industry had a consistently high 
growth rate, averaging 8 . 3 percent annually , but in absolute terms 
Australia's production remains low. 
In the U. S. and Canada, refined copper production increased over 
the 20-year period at lower rates than the world average . This 
reflects a more advanced level of economic maturity, a recognition by 
the industry of the relatively low profitability of smelting and 
refining, and the growing competition from "custom" smelters in Japan 
and in Europe . Another important factor was competition from aluminum , 
especially in the electrical conductor markets . 
However, the most significant factor inhibiting increased refined 
metal production in Western Canada and Australia was the Japanese 
tariff system under which concentrate imports were allowed duty free 
while copper metal and semi- fabricated products were subject to 
escalating tariff rates . This situation was reinforced by the Japanese 
General System of Preferences (GSP) which provides for duty- free entry 
of metal from developing countries, such as Chile and Peru, but not 
from Canada or Australia. Also, the Japanese "sliding scale" tariff 
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system, related inversely to the current market demand for copper, 
provided effective protection for domestic producers when copper metal 
prices were low and re.lieved copper consumers of the tariff barriers 
when metal prices were high . 
Escalating energy costs and increasingly stringent domestic 
environmental regulations may lead Japan to be more favorably inclined 
towards importing refined copper . Japanese industrial policy shows 
signs of becoming more sensitive to the aspirations of resource-
exporting countries, a trend that is likely to encourage Japanese 
participation in joint venture projects in copper smelting and 
refining in copper- producing Pacific Rim countries . 
Consumption Patterns 
Statistical Appendix Table A- 6 summarizes copper consumption 
patterns over the decade from 1965 to 1975 in the five major consuming 
countries or regions -- the EEC, United States, Canada, Japan, and 
Australia. It highlights the significant role of secondary refined 
copper in ~h_e _ industrial economies and shows a substantial change in 
Japan's import dependence . Japan's high industrial growth rate was 
instrumental in sustaining the world copper market in the last decade . 
But even in Japan, copper consumption growth lagged behind industrial 
production growth. There is also a significant difference in the 
Japanese copper consumption pattern in secondary manufacturing with 
over 55 percent of copper used in the wire and cable industry and only 
12 percent in the manufacture of flat - rolled products (plate, sheet, 
strip) and pipe and tubes. The corresponding ratios were 53.4 percent 
and 34 percent respectively for Canada, and 47 percent and 20 . 4 percent 
for the United States. 
As world- wide industrial activity slowed in 1974- 75, copper con-
sumption fell rapidly and refined copper inventories reached unprece-
dented levels . Consumption of refined copper in the developed coun-
tries fell from a peak of 6 . 43 million tons in 1973 to an estimated 4 . 9 
million tons in 1975 . <7 ) The influence of high copper stocks has kept 
prices at unrealistically low levels, threatening the economic 
viability of copper mining ventures on the one hand and of the smelting 
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and refining firms on the other . Unexpected shortfalls in export 
earnings of such countries as Chile, Peru, and P. N. G. have had impor-
tant implications for their balance of payments and economic well-
being . Custom smelters in the developed countries were also under 
severe pressure to maintain imports of copper concentrates on the level 
contracted for under long-term agreements. 
International Consultations 
Motivated by common concerns over their high dependence on 
exports of copper, four developing countries formed an organization of 
copper- exporting countries in 1967 in an attempt to coordinate 
policies in world markets . CIPEC* strives for greater stability of 
copper demand and for stabilized copper prices. It now includes Chile , 
Peru, Indonesia , Zaire and Zambia , as well as Australia and P. N. G. as 
associate members . 
CIPEC ' s concern with copper has now been taken up within a broader 
framework of the UNCTAD IV resolution on an Integrated Pr ogram fo r 
Commodities . This resolution included copper among 18 commodities 
that were to be subject to an integrated program , including the 
establishment of a common fund to help in financing internationally 
coordinated national stocks or a common buffer stock . No agreement has 
been reached yet on the modalities of the program or on a common fund 
concept mainly because of substantially different interests among the 
developed and the developing countries . 
Future Outlook 
The short- term outlook for copper is conditioned by high world-
wide inventories , low prices and overcapacity both at the mining and at 
the smelting and refining stages . However, the risk of long- term 
oversupply is minimal as low copper prices have already deterred 
significant planned copper developments . Inflation has doubled the 
cost of installing new copper capacity in the last four years . Sub-
stantially higher copper prices will be necessary to attract invest-
*Conseil Intergouvernemental des Pays Exportateurs de Cuivre 
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ment capital to some of the lower grade deposits found in British 
Columbia , Austral i a and the Phi l i ppines . 
World copper consumption will continue to grow with expandi ng 
industrialization and population growth . Developing Asian countries 
and the South American count r ies are likely to exper ience above average 
gr owth rates in copper consumption . Industrially developed countries , 
while exper iencing lower growth rates, will continue to be by far the 
most important consumers of copper . 
Major additions to smelting and refi ning capacity in the 1980 ' s 
are likely to take place in the Philippines, P.N. G., and British 
Columbia, rather than in Japan or other importing count r ies . Interna-
tional trade in copper concentrates appears to have peaked and will 
gradually diminish in favor of trade in refined me t al . However , the 
life expectancy of existing custom smelter s in Japan and in Europe 
provides assured requirements for concentrate feed for the balance of 
this century . 
As the pace of worldwide industrial acUvity gathers momentum, 
copper prices are likely to rise in r eal terms to the levels necessary 
to sustain and increase mine and smelter output and to provide a 
competitive return on investment . Pacific Rim countries are likely to 
attract a large proportion of future investments because of their 
attractive resource base and the i r economic and political stability 
relative to other copper- producing regions such as the count r ies of 
central Afr ica. Centrally planned economies will play a growing role 
in copper trade in Europe but are unlikely to shape the trading 
patterns in the Pacific Rim . 
3. Lead and Zinc in the Pacifi c Rim 
Six of the Pacific countries have been important world producers 
of both lead and zinc for many years and are likely to retain this role 
for the balance of this century . The United States, Canada , Mexico, 
Peru, Japan and Australia accounted for 68 percent of western world 
lead mine production in 1974 and for 52 percent of refined lead 
production . The corresponding figures for zinc were 68 percent of mine 
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production and 51 . 5 percent of refined zinc . 
Four of the six countries -- Canada, Mexico , Peru and Australia --
are also major exporters of lead and zinc concentrates and refined 
metal . The United States and Japan supplement their domes tic mine 
production with imports of ores , concentrates, and refined metal . 
The most recent estimates of economically recoverable lead and 
zinc reserves( 6 ) in the five Pacific Rim countries are as follows : 
Lead Zinc 
(millions of tons) 
United States 53 , 5 27 . 2 
Australia 16 . 3 11.8 
Canada 11.8 33 . 6 
Mexico 4 . 5 3. 1 
Peru 3. 6 8 . 6 
World Total 145 158 . 7 
Estimated additional lead and zinc resources worldwide are at 
least 1 . 5 billion tons of lead and 2 billion tons of zinc, of which at 
least one half is located in the five countries listed . 
Production 
As illustrated in Statistical Appendix Tables A- 7 and A- 8, lead 
mine output in the resource surplus countries has always exceeded 
refined metal production , while in the U. S. and Japan the reverse 
situation prevailed . In Canada , Australia and Peru, mine output has 
not only exceeded refi nery output , but the percentage of output refined 
has been declining . On the other hand, in Japan the r atio of refined 
lead production to mine production increased drastically from 2 : 1 in 
1965 to 3 . 8 :1 in 1975 . The corresponding figures for the U. S. were 
1.5 : 1 and 1 3 : 1 
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In the case of zinc, as illustrated by comparing Statistical 
Appendix Tables A- 9 and A-10, Canadian smelter production accounted 
for 64 percent of the mined tonnage in 1960 and only 35 . 7 percent in 
1975 . Australia increased its share of zinc smelted from 37 percent in 
1960 to 62 percent in 1974 . The corresponding figures for Peru were 20 
percent in 1960, and 16 . 6 percent in 1975 . 
At the same time , United States slab zinc production was twice its 
mine production in 1960, but only 0 . 95 times in 1975 . While mine 
production declined somewhat since 1965 , smelter production fell from 
a peak of one million tons in 1969 to less than 450,000 tons in 1975. 
The j_ ndust ry became more dependent on imports of refined zinc metal and 
on increased secondary zinc recovery 
The pattern in Japan was distinctly different . The ratio of slab 
zinc to mine production rose rapidly from 1 . 1 :1 in 1960 to 3 . 5:1 in 
1974. A decline to 2 . 7:1 in 1975 was due to a low smelter operating 
rate while domestic mines continued to operate at full capacity . 
Trade in Zinc 
Canada, Australia, Mexico Peru and Japan are significant 
exporters of slab zinc as illustrated in Statistical Appendix Table A-
ll. Canadian exports are by far the largest, followed by Australia . 
Japan's exports are subject to substantial fluctuations depending on 
the domestic demand . By destination, Japanese slab zinc exports , as 
shown in Statistical Appendix Table A-12, have favored the U. S., South 
Korea and India . At the same time, Japanese slab zinc imports from 
Canada and Australia were replaced by North Korea . 
Australian slab zinc is sold mostly in other Pacific Rim coun-
tries, including the U.S . A., New Zealand, Thailand, Taiwan and as far 
as India, with exports to U.K accounting for 15- 20 percent of the 
total . In Canada's case, as shown in Statistical Appendix Table A-13, 
the United States and U. K. are by far the largest customers for slab 
zinc, while Japan takes about 20- 25 percent of concentrate exports . 
The pattern of Japanese zinc concentrate imports favors maximum 
possible diversification of supply sources with Peru and Canada 
competing for the first place and Australia, Mexico, South Korea and 
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Iran following . The Canadian share of the Japanese market has tended 
to rise somewhat in the 1970's reaching 39 percent in 1975, with Peru 
at 27 percent and Australia well behind at 14 percent. 
Declining smelter production in the United States combined with 
growing consumption gave rise to a steady growth of zinc metal imports . 
In 1975 slab zinc imports accounted for 41 percent of appar ent consump-
tion . Canada was by far the largest supplier at 47 . 8 percent of the 
total, with Australia, Mexico and Peru contributing only 5-7 percent 
each and other countries sharing the balance . 
Trade in Lead 
A major feature of the lead trade pattern in the 1960 ' s was the 
steadily growing volume of lead concentrate imports by Japan, largely 
from Canada (65 percent), Peru (15 percent) and Australia (10 percent) . 
U.S. imports of lead concentrates also originated in Canada (17 . 6 
percent), Peru (23 percent), and Australia (21 percent). 
Another significant feature in the 1960 ' s and early 1970's was the 
production of Australian lead bullion for export to Europe with the 
U. K. taking about 84 percent of the total . In recent years the volume 
of Australian lead bullion exported exceeded that of refined metal 
(Stat i stical Appendix Tables A-14 and A- 15), and both were much larger 
than lead concentrates. 
By comparison, Canada exports substantially more lead in concen-
trates than as refined metal, with the disparity increasing rapidly in 
recent years (Statistical Appendix Table A- 14) . Canadian lead concen-
trates are shipped generally to markets that are different from those 
taking Canadian refined lead (Statistical Appendix Table A- 15) . 
A comparison of lead exports by the major Pacific Rim producers 
suggests that over the past 15 years there has been little, if any, 
growth in the volume of lead metal traded . Canadian refined lead 
exports actually peaked in 1970, Australian in 1962, Peruvian in 1964 
and Mexican in 1961 . The United States and Western Europe remain the 
largest markets for refined lead, while Japan dominates the market for 
concentrates. 
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Future Outlook 
The capacity of traditional producers of lead and zinc to meet 
future demand is generally regarded as very good, with Canada, Aust~a­
lia and the United States having large undeveloped reserves that are 
waiting .to be brought into production when economic conditions war-
rant. Increased environmental and land use concerns in Japan appear to 
impose serious constraints on any future expansion of domestic 
smelting and refining capacity and are likely to encourage joint 
ventures elsewhere to secure access to needed supplies . 
In Canada , future mining developments are l i kely to center in 
British Columbia and the Yukon Territory where large lead- zinc depo-
sits are located . The establishment of a lead and zinc smelter and 
refinery in Western Canada in the early 1980 ' s is a distinct possi-
bility , but the present flow of concentrates to Japan will cont i nue as 
long as the existing Japanese smelters remain operational . 
In Aust ralia , several new attractive lead and zinc deposits are 
either being developed or are in the feasibility assessment stage . 
Some of them average as high as 34.5 to 41 . 8 percent zinc, (8 ) offer ing 
an attractive economic incentive for early development . 
4. Aluminum in the Pacific Rim 
The dominant features of the aluminum indust · y i n the Pacific a - e 
the concentration of bauxite production in Australia , a rapidly 
growing traffic in alumina derived fr om Australian bauxite and the 
importance of the U. S. , Japan and Canada as producers of primary 
aluminum metaL Another important characteristic is the degree of 
vertical integration , with major transnational corporations playing a 
~ey r ole i n the min i ng of bauxite, product i on of alumi na . smelting of 
primary metal, provision of electric power and , to a certain degree , in 
the fab~icat i on and distribution of aluminum product~ This factor i s 
less pronounced i n Japan than in North America and Australia . 
Large capital costs i n the aluminum smelt i ng process were a major 
factor in the location of the industry in developed countries , but this 
will change gradually as the availab ~ lity of low cost hydroelectric 
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power becomes a major consideration. However, because of long lead 
times required to build new facilities on greenfield sites and the need 
for major capital investments, the pace of change will be relatively 
slow and gradual . 
Bauxite Mining 
World bauxite reserves, while varying wi dely in quality, size and 
accessibility, have been estimated in 1976 at some 24 billion tons . (6 l 
almost four times the 1965 estimate of 6 billion tons and almost eight 
times the estimate of 3 billion tons that was generally accepted in 
1955. Australia i s est i.mated to have at least 25 percent of world 
bauxite reserves, with Guinea having about an equal proportion . Carib-
bean and South American countries, mainly Jamaica, Surinam, Guyana and 
Brazil account for another one-fourth. Limited reserves are also 
located in other Pacifi c Rim countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia . 
Australia has experi.enced a dramatic growth in bauxite production 
since 1966 to become, in about four years, the world's largest producer 
at 25 percent of world output . As i llustrated in Statistical Appendix 
Table A- 16, Australian bauxite production more than doubled between 
1966 and 1968 and almost doubled again between 1968 and 1970. By 1974 
it reached over 20 million tons of bauxite, or some 10.5 million tons 
of contained alumina <4 ) 
Japanese and U. S. demand in the late 1960 ' s and early 1970 s 
stimulated a rapid rise in Australian alumina production, reaching 4 . 9 
million tons by 1974. Domesti c production of primar y aluminum 
experienced only a modest rise, as shown in Statistical Appendix Table 
A-16, despi te a doubling of Austral i an per capita consumption (Statis-
tical Appendix Table A-19) . Nevertheless, Australian exports of 
primary aluminum almost quad ~upled between 1965 and 1972 "'eaching 
99,400 tons . 
Bauxite product i on tn other Pacific Rim countri es, while far 
lower than that of Australia, is of some economic significance, mainly 
in Indones i a and Malaysia. Their production levels and the rapidly 
rising world total, are shown in Statistical Appendix Table A-17. 
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Announced capacity addit i ons i n Aus tral i a are l ikely to double 
present volume by 1985 . Other production expansions are likely to take 
place i n Indonesia and of course outside the Paci f i c area i n the 
Caribbean and South America . 
In Indonesia , P. T. Alcoa Mine ~ ·· als , a subsidiary of the Aluminum 
co . of Amer ica, identified significant bauxite reserves in West KaH -
mantan and has proposed an alumina refinery to process over 2 million 
tons of bauxite annually for a target output of 800, 000 tons of 
alumi na . 
While Australia is a member of the International Bauxite Associa-
tion (IBA) , it is capable of exercising a moderating influence on other 
smaller members because of its market power as the largest bauxite 
producer and exporter . Australia, as well as most bauxite producing 
nations, i s interested in increas i ng the proport i on of bauxite pro-
cessed to alumina before exports and in maximum utilization of the 
already installed alumina capacity . The operating rate of the Austra-
lian alumina refining plants had been rather low in recent years , 
averaging about two- th i rds of capacjty versus about 90 percent in the 
U.S . and over 80 percent in Japan . 
Aust r alia's futur e pol i cies are likely to favour holding down 
bauxite price increases to avoid potential competition from alterna-
tive r aw materials while encour agi ng investment in alumina refin i ng at 
the mine site . 
Primary Aluminum 
Duri ng the decade of 1965- 1975, wor ld primary aluminum production 
increased over 90 percent , from 6 . 3 million tons in 1965 to 12 . 7 mil-
lion tons in 1975 (Statistical Appendix Table A-20) . Production peaked 
i n 1974 at 13. 81 mill i on tons of which the United States and Canada 
together accounted for 5 . 47 million or 41.5 percent of the total 
Japan contributed 8 . 5 percent while Austral i a and New Zealand together 
were responsible for 2 . 4 percent . 
Japanese product ion almost quadrupled during 1965- 1974 (Statisti-
cal Appendix Table A- 18) , reflecting a very rapid r i se in domestic per 
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capita consumpti on from only 8 . 7 lbs i n 1965 to 37 . 7 lbs i n the peak 
consumption year of 1973 (Statistical Appendix Table A- 19) . Primar y 
aluminum product i on could not keep up wi th the ris i ng demand , neces-
sitating a 1, 131 percent increase in i mports of primary metal over 
1965-1974 . While Japan expor ted some aluminum as ingot and additional 
quantities as mill products (Statistical Appendix A- 18) such expor ts 
have never reached major proporti.ons . 
A relatively high ratio of primary metal imports relative to 
domestic consumption is a direct result of the structure of the 
Japanese aluminum industl"'y and of the degree of foreign capital 
participation and control . It i s esti mated that about one half of 
annual ingot imports reflect foreign producers ' "Alcan of Canada and 
Alcoa of U. S. A. ) shipments to their subsidiaries and affUi ates i n 
Japan and the balance represents direct imports by independent fabri-
cators and secondar y aluminum producers " 
The Japanese aluminum i ndustry has always been characterized by a 
relatively high ingot cost , mainly because of unfavorable power costs 
Since only very few domest5.c producers have the advantage of power 
supply from low- cost hydroelectric facilities, the industry was badly 
shaken by the quadrupHng of oi.l prices in 1973-1974 . Reflecting 
substantially decreased domestic demand and rapidly rising inven-
tories , the average oper ati ng rate of Japanese aluminum smelters fell 
to as low as 64 percent of i nstalled capacity by the end of 1975 •. 
(Stat i stical Appendix Table A- 21) . 
In searchi ng for ways to deal with this new situation, the 
Japanese industry has focused on corporate restructuring and closer 
integration of smelt i ng , refi ning, rolling and processing operat:i. ons . 
Increased emphasis i s being placed on off- shore joint ventures in 
countries with undeveloped hydroelectric power resources where 
electric power costs are likely to r emain relat i vely stable . 
Future Outlook 
To enhance the conti nui ty and securi ty of future primar y aluminum 
supply , Japanese industry (with strong government encouragement) 
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r ecently entered into joint venture agreements in several count r ies to 
build aluminum smelters or to expand existing facilities, including 
projects in Canada, Venezuela, New Zealand , Indonesia, and Brazil. The 
Asahan project in Indonesia, scheduled for completion in 1982- 84 and 
go-percent f i nanced by Japanese public and private funds, includes 
construction of hydroelectric power facilities and a 250 000-ton capa-
city smelter . Japan wi ll i mpor t at least two-thirds of the smelter's 
output. 
Another major aluminum smelting project being developed with 
Japanese financial and technical assistance is a joint venture with 
Brazil fo the Amazon River delta which when completed in 1979··80, is 
scheduled to produce 320,000 tons of primary metal . The potential is 
excellent over the longe r term for Brazil to become a major supplier of 
primary aluminum to Japan because the nation has large undeveloped 
bauxite reserves combined with large undeveloped hydroelectric poten-
tial near the main sources of bauxite. In the early 1980 ' s, Brazil 
will become a s i gnifi cant exporter of primary aluminum (Statist ical 
Appendix Table A- 22) and , assuming further development of bauxite 
reserves, a supplier of bauxite and/or alumina to Japan and other 
countries . 
Another potential source of pri mary aluminum for the Paciftc Rim 
in the 1980 's will be the Soviet Union, based on its huge under-
developed hydroelectric powe~ potential in Central and Easter n 
Siberia . Construction of the new Bykal-Amur railway will facilitate 
both shipments of bauxite or a lumina westward from the Pacifi c coast 
ports and eventual export of aluminum metal to the Pacific Rim coun-
tries . 
In summary, the outlook for the 1980's is for further growth of 
Australian bauxite product i on and of bauxite and/or alumina exports to 
the industrialized countries . This pattern will be supplemented 
increasingly by growing trade i n pri mar y aluminum as var ious projects 
now under construction or in the planning stages in the developing 
countries mature and reach the product i on stage . The important con-
sideration in the future location of primary aluminum plants will be 
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the availability of uncommitted hydroelectric power capacity ."ather 
than proximity to raw materials or to the consuming markets . 
5 . Nickel in the Pacific Rim 
As the world's largest producer of nickel for most of this 
century, Canada has played a dominant role in the nickel industry of 
the Paci fic Rim for many years. However, the development of New 
Caledonia deposits in the 1950's and 1960's, the discovery and exploi-
tation of Australian reserves i n the late 1960's and the growing 
economic importance of nickel mining and processing industries in 
Indonesia and the Philippines have all tended to shift the focus of 
activity away from Canada . 
Nevertheless, Canada ' s mine production of nickel in 1974 still 
accounted for 44 . 3 percent of the 607,000 tons of contained nickel 
mined i n the western world (Statist~ cal Appendix Table A-23) , although 
this represents a significant decline from 69 . 5 percent in 1960 . By 
comparison, New Caledonia accounted for 19.1 percent in 1960 and 22 . 2 
percent in 1975. Australia, which started producing nickel only in 
1967, accounted for 10 percent of western world production in 1975 . 
World nickel reserves, estimated at some 55 mill i on tons of 
contained nickel( 6 ) , are mostly in later ite deposits, rather than in 
the sulfides found in Canada. New Caledonian reserves account for 
about 25 percent of the world total, while Canada's share is estimated 
at 16 percent . Economically mineable reserves in other Pacific Ri.m 
countries, while considerable, are not yet accurately known and active 
exploration is continuing in Australia, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Nickel Smelting and Refining 
A large proportion of Canadian concentrates (Statistical Appendix 
Table A-24) is smelted by Inco Ltd. or Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. 
Inco exports nickel matte to its refinery in the United Kingdom while 
Falconbridge supplies its refinery in Norway. Also , Inco has equity 
interest in Shimura Kako , a Japanese producer of ferronickel and 
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r efined nickel, and in Tokyo Nickel Co ., a producer of nickel oxide. 
Shipments to these subsidiaries and affiliates explain the export 
patterns shown in Statistical Appendix Table A-25 . The third Canadian 
nickel producer, Sherritt Gordon Mines, has a 10-percent interest in 
Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp . i n the Philippines and an 11-
percent interest in P. T. Pacific Nikkel i n Indonesia ., 
The beginning of nickel smelt i ng and refining in Austral i a dates 
only to the early 1970 ' s. Western Mining Corp., the operator of 
several mines and of a concentrator in Wester n Austr alia, is now 
operating a 65,000- ton- a- year capacity smelter and a 20,000- ton-a-year 
nickel refinery based on the Sherritt Gordon process . A new property, 
owned by Metal Exploration N. L. and Freeport Minerals Co., had been 
developed in 1974- 75 to produce some 20,000 tons a year of 90- percent 
nickel oxide sinter and another project by British Selection Trust and 
MIM Holdings Ltd is under development . In the years ahead Australia 
is expected to continue increasing nickel mine and smelter production 
over present levels (Statistical Appendix Tables A-23 and A- 24) 
reaching at least 75,000 tons by 1980 . Development of other land- based 
operations in the Pacific area and the supply of nickel from sea--bed 
operations may cause deferment or abandonment of other Australian 
nickel projects beyond 1980. 
About 40 percent of New Caledonian nickel ore is exported to Japan 
for processing into ferronickel while some 20 percent is processed 
locally to nickel matte and the balance to ferronickel. Both nickel 
matte and ferronickel are exported, mainly to France but also to Japan 
and the U. S. A. The volume of exports in recent year s has been about 
40-60,000 tons of concentrates, 20,000 tons of nickel matte and 35-
45,000 tons of ferronickel. 
Japan ' s demand for nickel (shown in Statistical Appendix Table A-
27) has given rise to the establishment of a substantial smelting and 
refining capacity, rated at some 133 , 000 annual tons of nickel. Japan 
imports about 55 percent of its total nickel requirements as ores and 
concentrates from New Caledonia, Indonesia and Australia, 20- 30 per-
cent as matte from Canada and New Caledonia and the rest as refined 
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nickel from Canada, Norway , the Soviet Union and other countries . 
Indonesian nickel production , as shown in Statistical Appendi x 
Table A- 23 , had been minor until the early 1970's . The state- owned 
P. T. Aneka Tambang was the only producer , but its production now is 
being expanded to 25,000 tons annually . A new lateritic nickel project 
by P. T. International Nickel Indonesi.a (a wholly- owned subsidi ary of 
Inco Ltd . ) should provide an additional 45,000 tons a year of nickel 
contained in matte by 1978 . Feasibility studies are under way on 
another project involving a consortium including U. S. , Canadian and 
Dutch interests , wh i ch should raise Indonesia's nickel output to some 
115, 000 tons annually by the early 1980 ' s and make the country the 
third largest nickel producer in the western world . 
Nickel production in the Philippines was insignificant until 1974 
when Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp . started production on 
Nonoc Island employing the Sherritt Gordon hydrometallurgical process . 
The Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Company's laterite project will provide its 
Japanese partners with up to 500,000 tons of ore annually starting this 
year. A third project , by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development, 
involving a mine concentrator and refiner y, is likely to be completed 
in the early 1980's . 
Future Outlook 
Established supply patterns of the 1960 ' s are undergoing a 
drastic change in the 1970 ' s . No longer will the Canadian nickel 
industry be a dominant factor in the wor ld market . The weight has 
clearly shifted (and will continue to shift) in the Pacific area to New 
Caledonia , Austr alia , Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan . 
On the consumption side (Statisti cal Appendix Table A- 27) , the 
high annual growth rate of 6 . 8 percent prevailing from 1960 to 1974 is 
unlikely to continue over the longer term . The United States , Japan 
and Western Europe will remain the major consumers of nickel in all 
forms . 
A new factor that is expected to enter the nickel supply- demand 
balance in the mid-1980' s is the recovery of nickel from sea- bed 
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nodules . Canada, the U. S . A. , Austr alia and Japan all are represented 
on the international industrial consortia that is engaged in research 
and development on the exploi ta ti on of sea· bed miner al resources. 
Assuming that an international agreement on sea- bed exploitation is 
reached at the Law of the Sea Conference and that the remaining 
technological difficulties are resolved in the next few years, 
sustained commercial production could begin by the mid·-1980 's . Fur-
ther discussion of ocean mineral resources is provided in Gorham ' s 
paper in these Proceedings . 
Indications are that nickel recovered from ocean nodules might be 
competitive with lateritic deposits . Under such conditions mining of 
sea- bed nodules will have a significant adverse effect on the Pacific 
Rim laterite producers such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Austra-
lia. The short- term outlook is for oversupply of nickel from land 
based projects presently under development, and if sea-bed mining 
proves to be economic , these land- based sources would face increased 
competition , leadi ng to lower relative price levels . 
6 . Tin i n the Pacif:i c Rim 
More than 70 percent of current world mine product i on originates 
from the great tin fields of the Far East that start in Burma and run 
down through Thailand and Malaysia as far as the islands of Singkep , 
Bangka and Belitung in Indonesia . In the South Pacific, Australia 
produces significant quanti ties of tin whi le i n South America, Bolivia 
is a major producer . Large tin deposits also have been identified 
recently in Brazil . 
The Soviet Union ranks second among world producers of primary 
tin . Additional substantial tin resources are known to occur in China , 
which has been an important producer and exporter for several decades , 
although factual reserve and production data are not readily avail · 
able . 
The characteristi c occurrence of tin i n association with granitic 
rocks or in rock debris washed away by water is responsible for the 
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relatively small scale of most tin mining operations. Except fo;' 
Bolivia, where practically all production is from underground mines, 
tin in the Pacific Rim countries is mined mostly from unconsolidated 
deposits by dredging or gravel pumping . Offshore dredging, especially 
off the Indonesian islands, also has become an important technique over 
the years . 
·Production 
World mine production of tin-in- concentrates rose from 87, 500 
tons in 1945 to a peak of 172,900 tons in 1953. A significant decline 
in 1958 to 117,600 tons was followed by a long gradual rise to a record 
of 194,300 tons in 1972, followed again by a gradual decline. Produc-
tion in selected years, shown in Statistical Appendix Table A- 28, 
demonstrates both the relative roles of the major Pacific Rim producers 
and their combined contribution to the total world tin production . The 
changing relation between production and consumption is discussed 
further in Mohamed Ariff's paper in these Proceedings. 
Malaysia 
Malaysia has been a major producer of tin , contributing some 25 
percent of world total production in 1948, 36 percent in 1955 and about 
40 percent in the 1960's and early 1970's . The peak production cl 
76,830 tons reached in 1972 has been followed by a decline in output 
caused by a continuous increase in costs and generally inadequate tin 
prices, leading to a lack of profitability aggravated by the taxation 
burden . The industry is heavily fragmented with hundreds of small - and 
medium- size operators in addition to some larger, technically more 
advanced firms. Malaysian industry in 1975, for example , operated some 
861 gravel pumps and 54 dredges, employing over 40,800 workers . The 
policy of the Malays i an government is to encourage the participation of 
the Malays and other indigenous people in the mining sector by 
according them preferences in the granting of mining rights and by 
providing , the required technical training . Out of over 960 operating 
units at the end of September 1975, 50 units were owned and operated by 
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Malay interests compared to only 26 units in 1970. <1o) 
The efforts of the Malaysian government agencies in prospecting 
and exploratory work have assured the maintenance of mineable reserves 
in the foreseeable future. Potentially economic undersea deposits lie 
off the western coast of Malaysia, and the prospects for their exploi-
tation are regarded as good. 
Thailand 
Most of Thailand's tin production comes from the southern penin-
sular part of the country (which is a continuation of the Malaysian 
fields) and from offshore deposits. Tin-in- concentrates production, 
largely stagnant during the war, increased rapidly to some 10,500 tons 
by 1950 and reached a peak of 13,745 tons by 1957. After a temporary 
decline, production continued to expand after 1960, and in 1963 
Thailand temporarily overtook Indonesia as the world's third largest 
( 11) 
producer. 
While Thailand's potential for increased production over the 
present 20,000- ton level is considerable and her reserve position is 
substantial, economic considerations are likely to direct future addi-
tions to capacity towards other Southeast Asian countries. 
Indonesia 
Indonesian tin production levels fluctuated in the 1960's because 
of loss of both the technical and managerial skills of the former Dutch 
mining enterprises and skilled manual labor of the Chinese workers . 
The Indonesian tin reserve position is very promising both in the 
onshore and offshore category, although offshore ope~ati ons now 
account for about 60 percent of annual production. 
Production comes from the state-owned PN Tambang Timah as well as 
other private domestic and foreign f i rms. Domestic smelting is handled 
by Tambang Timah, and Indonesia has become self-sufficient in smelt)ng 
facilities (up to 32, 000 tons of tin metal) . Tin export controls 
implemented by the International Tin Council and tin surpluses on world 
markets are Hkely to remain a major impediment to the expansion of 
Indonesian production . 
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Australia 
Australia's share of world tin production has always been r ather 
small, averaging between one and two percent until 1960, but increasing 
to 5 . 3 percent by 1975. Product i on tonnage peaked in 1972 at 11 , 997 
tons of tin-in-concentrates and 7 ,027 tons of primary refined tin, 
declining thereafter due mainly to unsatisfactory profitabilityo The 
number of tin mining establishments declined from 107 in 1970-71 to 47 
in 1973-74 and a further decl i ne was ant i cipated i n 1975-76.< 12 > 
Associated Tin Smelters Pty Ltd . in N.S. W. is the only domest i c 
Australian tin smelter, but the output of refined tin has been about 
half the r ated capacity in recent years due to the low average grade of 
concentrates, limitations imposed by technical problems, shortages of 
feedstock and most r ecently, imposition of ITA export quotas . The 
Australian tin mining and smelting industry is unlikely to play a 
greater role in the future supply of tin in the Pacific Rim. 
Soviet Union 
Present Soviet domestic tin production , mostly originating in the 
Eastern Siberian and Far Eastern regions , is estimated at some 25 , 000 
tons annually, up from some 15 , 000 tons in 1965 . Irregular and rather 
insignificant until about 1959 , Soviet tin imports gradually increased 
to 5,800 tons in 1965 and to almost 10,000 tons by 1975 . Soviet tin 
imports in selected years (Statistical Appendix Table A- 32) illustrate 
a growing dependence on Malaysia and a s i gnificant role for the U. K. 
The significance of the soci alist block countries as importers of 
tin from Southeast Asia is likely to grow as their economies become 
further developed and as growi ng demand for consumer products brings 
increased production of tin-plate . The Soviet Union (and other 
socialist block nations other than China) are active members of ITA . 
China 
Available information suggests that Chinese tin production can be 
expanded beyond the present annual level, estimated at some 20, 000 tons 
of pri mary tin . The i ncentive for export earnings makes China a 
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potentially stronger competitor in the future . 
After peaking at 7 , 480 tons in 1949 , Chinese tin exports declined 
to zero in the early 1950 ' s, but started rising again beginning in 1957 
to reach 7 , 140 tons in 1963 . A period of decl .i ne between 1954 and 1969 
was followed again by accelerated exports in the 1970 ' s , reaching 
12,130 tons in 1975 . ( ll) 
Aided by an absence of tariff barri ers in the U. S. market, exports 
of Chinese tin to the U.S . rose from zero in 1971 to 6 , 378 tons in 1975 , 
causing concern among members of the International Tin Council (ITC) as 
Chinese exports are not contr olled by the ITC expor t quotas . 
International Tin Agreement 
Since 1956 , a series of .Lnternational agreements called the 
International Ti n Agreements (ITA) have intervened in the tin market 
through export quotas and a buffer stock to maintain agreed floor and 
ceiling prices . Mohamed Ariff ' s paper in these Proceedings explores 
the operation and influence of the ITA in detail . 
Consumption 
Because tin plate is the principal application for tin (more than 
40 percent of total use), consumption of primary tin is heavily 
concentrated in the industrial i zed countries . As shown in Statistical 
Appendix Table A- 29 , the United States is by far the largest consumer , 
although tonnage consumed peaked i n 1966 and has been declining since 
then due mai nly to the adoption of new tin- saving technology and 
compet i tion from other materials in the packaging industry . 
Japan i s the second largest consumer . Tin consumption reached a 
peak of 38 ,670 tons in 1973 and declined to 28 , 100 tons by 1975 due to a 
substantial decrease in steel production reflecting a general economic 
downturn . A comparison of tin consumption by end use in the three 
largest consuming countries (Japan , U. S. A., and U. K. ) is shown in 
Statistical Appendix Table A- 30 which also reflects the negative 
effects of the economic downturn in 1974 75 on the demand for tin in 
the industrial soci eties . 
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WHh Unplate production presently concentrated mostly in major 
industrial countries, as shown in Statistical Appendix Table A-31 , 
there remai ns a large potential for further growth in t .inplate produc-
tion in the developing economies and in the socialist block. Expanded 
use of solder ing alloys, bronzes and brasses should also contribute to 
an increase in tin demand . The overall growth pattern of the world 
economies suggests a slow but steady growth in demand . 
Future Outlook 
Measured , indicated and infe~red reserves of tin in the Paci fic 
Rim (including China) are estimated by the U. S . Geological Survey(l3) 
at 21 million tons or 54 percent of total estimated world reserves . 
World demand fo r primary tin by 1985 is esti mated at only 284,000 tons . 
Based on historical consumption patterns, but allowing for the effects 
of substitution, the probable average annual growth rate between 1973 
and 2000 is estimated to be 1 . 5 percent . 
The Paci fic Rim countr ies should remain the most important source 
of tin supply in the world in the foreseeable future . Developing 
countries will gradually absorb a greater proportion of the total 
supply , while the present importance of the U. S. and the Japanese 
markets will gradually decr ease in relati ve terms . 
7 . Titanium Minerals in the Pacific Rim 
Ru tile is currently mined only in Australia while ilmenite is 
produced in Australia as well as in Canada , the United States , I ndia , 
and Mal aysia . Rutile contains about 97 percent pur e titanium dioxide 
while ilmenite may contain a maximum of 53 percent titanium dioxide . 
While world reserves of ilmenite are considerable , those of ruti le ar e 
rather limited and are likely to grow in economic significance as the 
demand for titanium metal and pigments expands . 
As the only significant world producer of rutile , Australia has 
the power to control the supply and price of rutile , although the 
significance of synthetic rutile from ilmenite continues to grow. At 
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the same time, Australia is a major producer (and more recently the 
largest exporter) of ilmenite, although the average titanium dioxide 
content of Australian ilmenite (50 percent) is lower than Canadian 
titanium slag (70- 72 percent titanium dioxide). 
Reserves and Resources 
World rutile reserves have been estimated( 6 ) at 37 million tons 
(excluding socialist block countries) , of which Australia accounts for 
at least 9 , 7 million, India 13 . 8 million and Sierra Leone for 3. 1 
million tons . Total Australian rutile resources are at least equal to 
estimated reserves, but their mining is rather questionable because of 
growing environmental concerns . Substantial resources also exist in 
the U. S., Brazil and Mexico , but they cannot as yet be classified as 
economic reserves . 
World ilmenite reserves, at some 770 million tons, are consider-
ably more plentiful, with Australia's share (about 38 million tons) 
considerably lower than Canada's (200 million) or the United States' 
(83 million) . Major ilmenite resources also have been identified in 
India, South Africa and the Scandinavian countries , diminishing the 
long-term economic dominance of the Aust r alian and Canadian deposits. 
Rutile and Ilmenite Production 
Statistical Appendix Table A-33 shows the product i on patter n of 
titanium minerals in the Pacific Rim from 1960 to 1975 . Until recently 
Australian rutile production was derived entirely as a co-product of 
zircon production from beach sands scattered along the eastern coast . 
Ilmenite production was confined to the beach sands of Western Austra-
lia with zircon as a by- product, but the development of huge deposits 
in the Eneabba area of Western Australia since 1974 will substantially 
increase supplies . 
Canadian ilmenite is mined by Quebec Iron and Titanium Corp . by 
open pit methods in eastern Quebec . The deposit constitutes one of the 
world's largest, with reserves exceeding 100 million tons grading 35 
percent titanium dioxide and 40 percent iron . A number of lower grade 
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deposits are in the Canadian Shield , which ultimately may be developed . 
Virtually all Canadian ilmenite is converted into titanium slag and 
exported to the U. S. , Japan, and Europe for process i ng into t i tanium 
pigments . 
While the U.S . share of world titanium ore output declined from 35 
percent in 1965 to iB percent in 1974, the United States consumed over 
34 percent of world mine production during that per iod( 142- rutile from 
Australia and titanium slag mostly from Canada . Pigment manufacture 
accounted for about 92 percent of total consumption , with the remainder 
used in the production of titanium sponge, welding rod coatings, 
carbides , and in cer amic and glass formulations . 
In Malaysia ilmenite is produced as a by-product of tin mining 
with about 75 percent of production exported to Japan . Other potential 
sources of titanium minerals in the Pacific Rim are in Indonesia and 
New Zealand . 
In the absence of domestic production, Japan relies on ilmenite 
and rutile imports to feed growing titanium dioxide and titanium sponge 
j_ndustries . By 1974, Japanese imports of titanium ores and concen-· 
trates had risen to 680,000 tons (gross) of which 24 percent came from 
Austr alia, 24 percent from Canada, 24 percent from Malaysia, 15 percent 
from India , and 13 percent from Sri Lanka . Japanese titanium dioxide 
production capacity substanti ally exceeds domesti.c requirements with 
exports destined to pigment manufacturers in the U. S. and other world 
markets . 
Titanium Metal 
Significant fluctuation in the demand for titanium metal in the 
United States reflects its major use in the aircraft and aerospace 
industries . As shown in Statistical Appendix Table A- 35, the U. S. 
industry is dependent on imports of sponge metal to supplement domestic 
needs . In addition to the U. S. , there are only three other producers 
of sponge metal -- Japan, the U. K. , and the U. S .S . R. Between one- third 
and one- half of the Japanese production is exported to the U.S . market 
and the balance i s consumed domestically or exported to Europe . 
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Despite competit i on from advanced composi te materi als in aero-
space applications and from stainless steel in industrial uses , the 
outlook for a continuing growth in demand for titanium sponge metal in 
the U. S., Japan and the EEC is good . Industrial applications in the 
chemical and metal processing industries will grow in relat.ive impor-
tance . Titani um scrap recycling is likely to remain a major component 
of the metal supply cycle as illustr ated i n Stati stical Appendi x Table 
A- 35° 
Zircon Production and Trade 
Of additional economic significance in the mining of titanium 
minerals in the Pacific Rim is the presence of the mineral zircon as a 
by-product. Australia now has the largest economically recoverable 
zircon reserves , estimated at some 14 . 3 million tons or 34 percent of 
total world reserves, followed by the United States with 28 percent . 
These two, plus India and Sri Lanka account for 30 . 7 million tons or 74 
percent of the world total . 
Mine production of zircon, as illustr ated in Statistical Appendix 
Table A- 36, is limited to Australia and the U.S . Australia ' s share of 
86 percent in 1970 decr eased to 74 percent by 1974 due to a rapid rise 
of U. S. production . 
Japan and the U. S. have been consistently the largest importers of 
Australian zircon (Statistical Appendix Table A-34), although exports 
to the EEC countries have been significant. A decline in U. S. imports 
in 1974 was in response to a sharp increase in prices and growing 
availability of domestic supplies . 
The use of zircon in foundries, refractories, ceramics and abra-
sives accounts for over 90 percent of total consumption . Japan has 
been a large user of zircon in refractories , while in the United States 
foundry applications account for over 50 percent of the total . 
Future Outlook 
The outlook for zircon production in Australia is bright, 
especially in the Eneabba area in Western Australia. However , new 
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supplies of zircon are expected to come on the mar ket in the 1980•s 
from South Africa, Brazil and Canada. In the longer term there could 
well be an oversupply of zircon on the world markets . 
The outlook for rutile is for stronger competition from recently 
developed technological processes involving beneficiation of ilmenite 
to produce syntheti c rutile. Ther e are already four such producer s in 
the Pacific area , in Australia, Japan, Taiwan, and India . However , the 
demand for pigment, weldi ng rod and titanium sponge production is 
expected to be strong and any possible over- capacity is expected to be 
only temporary . 
8 . Iron Ore, Coal and Steel 
Iron Ore 
World iron ore production i ncreased 46 percent (some 280 million 
tons) over the period 1965- 74 , reflecting the rapid growth of the iron 
and steel industry. The share of the major Pacifi.c Rim producers has 
changed substantially mainly because of large scale iron ore develop-
ments in Austral i a , Canada and Braz i l and a small decline in United 
States output . 
Star ting with a small production level of less than 7 million tons 
in 1965, Austral i a became the largest iron ore producer and exporter in 
the western world by 1974 (96 million tons) . While the U. S. still 
holds second place in tonnage produced (86 mi llion tons) , it is likely 
to be overtaken by Braz i l before the end of th i s decade . Canada now 
ranks fourth in production tonnage (48 million) , exporting 77 percent 
of the total. The export ratios of the other major Pacific Ri m 
producers, based on 1974 figures , are Australia 88 percent, Peru 96 
percent , and Chile 88 percent , 
Incr eases in world demand for iron ore have been somewhat slower 
than the rise in world steel production due to a gradual increase in 
the iron content of the or e entering international trade . The average 
i ron content in 1974 was 58 percent , while in the 1950 ' s it was 51 
percent . 
Another major factor influencing the demand for iron ore was 
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technological change j_n the i ron and steel industry . Large scale 
change from open- hearth furnaces to the basic- oxygen method and the 
growing use of electric furnaces, as shown in Statistical Appendix 
Table A-41, have had the effect of i.ncr easing the demand for iron ore . 
Other technological factors of consi.derable s i gnifi cance were the 
wide- scale introduction of beneficiation of lower grade iron ores and 
the gradual advent of direct reduction . Both have had the effect of 
increasing the demand for specific iron ore products and encouraging a 
more selective long- term contractual relati onship between producers 
and consumers. 
While direct shipping iron ores predominated in international 
trade in the 1950' s, concentrates and agglomerates gradually became 
the most preferred form of iron ore shipments . This pattern is 
illustrated by the changing ratio of Canadian iron ore shipments with 
68 percent of the tonnage shipped in 1955 being direct shipping ores 
while by 1974 the proportion had declined to about 14 percent . Over 
the same period, agglomerates such as pellets and sinter j_ncreased to 
55 percent of the total and concentrates to 30 percent . (l6) 
In long distance iron ore transport , freight costs declined as 
bulk movement systems became more efficient . The average share of 
freight, as a percentage of Japan's c . i.f . iron ore import cost, stood 
at 33 percent in 1970 versus 41 percent in 1960 . Competitiveness of 
Australian j_ron ore in Japan was significantly enhanced by a relatively 
low freight cost component of the total delivered cost . In 1970, for 
example, the freight cost of ore delivered to Japan averaged $2 . 25 per 
ton from Australia, Brazilian $4.90, Indian $5 . 20 and Chilean 
$5.10.< 17 ) 
Japan's iron ore imports, shown in Statistical Appendix Table A-
37, have been instrumental in stimulating the development of large 
scale iron ore reserves in Australia and to a lesser degree in India, 
Chile and Brazil . Australia's share rose from less than one percent in 
1965 to 48 percent of Japan's iron ore imports in 1975 . Canadian iron 
ore is not competitive in the Japanese market, mainly because of the 
freight component , except for a limited tonnage mined on the West 
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Coast. Only about 11 percent of Canadian exports go to Japan. 
United States import dependence increased in the 1970's, reaching 
about 40 percent of the 1975 apparent consumption of 114 million tons, 
However, current large scale expansion of the U.S. iron ore industry 
will assist in maintaining self sufficiency at about 65 to 70 percent 
in the 1980's. 
North American iron ore prices are governed largely by a reference 
price established by the steel industry and do not necessarily reflect 
supply and demand balance since more than 85 percent of the iron ore 
traded comes from captive mines. In Japan, Australian ore has estab-
lished price leadership while any ore shipped to the European markets 
must compete with Swedish supplies. North American base prices have 
been, on balance , higher than those prevailing in Japan and in Europe. 
In the 1960's and early 1970's, iron ore was marketed in Japan on 
the basis of long-term fixed price contracts. Inflationary cost 
pressures and the growing bargaining leverage of iron ore exporting 
countries have now led to annual price renegotiations, with increases 
averaging about 14 percent in 1975.(l8 ) 
Japan's iron ore imports have dominated international iron ore 
trade in the Pacific Rim and are likely to continue doing so in the 
future. Brazil will offer strong competition in the future to Austr a-
lia and Japan, and Canadian and U.S. ores will be gradually phased out. 
As new steelmaking capacity is built in the developing countries 
of the Pacific Rim, iron ore trade patterns will gradually diversify 
with South Korea , Indonesia and Mexico becoming significant importers. 
At the same time all producers will attempt to diversify their markets 
in an effort to become less dependent on Japan as a consumer . 
Repeated initiatives aimed at the formation of an iron ore 
producers group resulted in the Association of Iron Ore Exporting 
Countries, formally inaugurated in 1975. Its membership includes 
Algeria, Australia, Chile, India, Mauritania, Peru, Sweden, Tunisia 
and Venezuela. Canada and Brazil declined to join, limiting the 
Association to countries accounting for 48 percent of world iron ore 
exports, and limiting its impact on pricing or market shares . 
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Uneven distribut i on of world coal reserves , and higher grades of 
metallurgical coal in particular, is responsible for the concentration 
of coal mining in a very few countries (shown in Statistical Appendix 
Table A- 38) . Nearly 95 percent of the hard coal output of some 2 , 390 
million tons annually is produced by ten countries . About 66 percent 
of the lignite and brown coal originates in three countries, while an 
estimated 95 percent of all world coal reserves are contained in the 
u .s . A., U.S .S. R. , and the People's Republic of China (PRC) . The result 
is an extensive international coal trade with six exporting countries 
accounting for 95 percent of all coal exports and Japan importing about 
one third of the tonnage enteri ng inter nati.onal trade . 
In the Pacific Rim the dominant producers of hard coal are the 
United States (26 percent of the world ' s total), the U.S .S. R. (22 
percent) , PRC (19 . 7 percent) , and Austral i a (2 .8 percent) . For the 
purposes of this study only hard coal will be considered ; except for 
some limited trade in soft coals between the U.S . A. and Canada practi-
cally all inter national trade in the Pacifi c Rim i s in hard coal . 
Pacific Rim trade i n coal was dominated by rapid growth of the 
Japanese steel industry . Japan ' s intensive search for high quality 
coking coals strongly influenced the development of Australian and 
Western Canadian reserves and increased the dependence on low ash and 
low sulphur content U. S. coals . Impor ts increased rapidly from 6 
million tons in 1960 to 46 . 7 million tons in 1970 and to almost 59 
million tons by 1974 . 
The distribution of Japanese i mports , as shown in Statistical 
Appendix Table A- 39 , was due in part to a desire for diversification of 
supply sources and in part to technological advantages derived from 
blending the most desirable coal grades in the production of blast 
furnace coke . The Japanese steel industry has perfected the technology 
of cokemaking in order to maximize blast furnace productivity and in 
the process became more dependent on the supply of hi gh qual i ty , low 
volatile coals from a limited number of sources . 
The effect of the 1973 oi l cri s is was a conspicuous change in 
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energy policies worldwide reversing the shift away from coal, 
Increased recognition of coal ' s energy value, combined with continuing 
expansion of steel production worldwide , helped raise coal prices to 
levels almost four times higher than in the early 1970 ' s . Japan ' s 
average c . i . f . cost of coking coal in December 1974 was $60 . 50 per ton 
or 2 . 4 times the $25 . 67 per ton in December 1973 . (l8 ) 
The future outlook in Japan is for increased coking coal impor ts 
in the . 1980' s as the Japanese steel industry output recovers . The 
present import structure is likely to change in favor of higher imports 
from Canada and the U. S .S. R. , reflecting long- term contractual commit-
ments and development of new supply sources in Western Canada and in 
Eastern Siberia. 
Pacifi c trade in coking coal will also gradually diversify as 
other countries - - mainly South Korea , Mexico, and Brazil -- expand 
their primary steelmaking capacities . Canada and Austr alia are 
already shippi ng small quantiti es to these markets . 
In the 1980's, a limited trade in lower grades of thermal coal 
will also develop as Japanese electric utilities begin to implement 
diversification programs to lower their heavy dependence on crude oi l. 
However , thermal coal imports are unlikely to reach large volumes 
quickly because of uncertain cost advantages over alternative fuel s 
and because of long lead times required for construction of thermal 
power plants . Most of the Japanese thermal coal imports , estimated at 
less than 10 million tons by 1985, will originate from China, Canada 
and Australia . 
The Steel Industry 
World steel production remains highly concentrated i n a few . 
countries and regions . In 1965 the United States , U.S .S . R. , EEC and 
Japan together accounted for 79 . 2 percent of the 461 . 2 million tons 
produced worldwide, and 76 . 2 percent of the record 710 . 5 million tons 
in 1974 . The impact of worldwide recess i on caused an unprecedented 
decline in the 1975 steel output to 649 million tons without substan-
tially affecting the proportions by count.•7 . Pacific Rim countri es 
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other than Japan and the United States accounted for only 4 . 5 percent 
of the total in 1975. 
World steel consumpti on patter ns were considerably different, 
with Japan and the EEC countries experiencing surplus production and 
all others being net importers of steel . The growth of Japan ' s steel 
production and domestic supply patterns from 1950 to 1975 are illus-
trated in Statistical Appendix Table A- 40 . European countries have 
gradually concentrated most of their trade within the EEC block (71 . 5 
percent of the total in 1970) . This was in sharp contrast to Japan, 
which adopted a deliberate policy of promoting rapid steel expor t 
growth, averaging 13 percent annually between 1965 and 1970 . In 1975 
Japan's steel exports, valued at $10 . 2 billion, accounted for 18 . 3 
percent of Japan's total exports (9 . 6 percent in 1960 and 14 . 7 percent 
in 1970) . (18 ) 
The unprecedented success story of the post- war expansion of the 
Japanese steel industry and its dominant role in stimulating Pacific 
Rim steel- related trade divides into three distinct periods . The first 
(1953- 60) was marked chiefly by extensive rationalization and moderni-
zation of existing steelmaking facilities , construction of lar ge blast 
furnaces and basic oxygen furnaces, introduction of large ore car-
riers, the building of port facilities, and the procurement of essen-
tial raw materials . 
The second phase ( 1961-73) saw the building of large scale 
integrated works in new coastal locations to facilitate the import of 
raw materials and shipments of finished products. The focus was on 
decreasing fuel inputs and on higher productivity through large scale 
introduction of basic oxygen furnaces (BOF) . The BOF share in Japan's 
crude steel output increased from 12 percent in 1960 to 80 percent in 
1973 . Improvements in blast furnace productivity also we~e achieved by 
increases in furnace capacities and rapid progress in automation and 
computerized control. Of the 69 blast furnaces in Japan at the end of 
1975, eight were over 4 , 000 cubic meters capacity and 27 were over 
2,500 cubic meters, the highest number in any country of the world . (l9 ) 
Efforts to reduce coke inputs led to the reduction of the coke 
rate (coke quantity per ton of pig iron produced) to 435 kg/ton in 1973 
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(versus 600 kg/ton in U.S . A. and 495 kg/ton in West Germany) . 
In the third phase (beginning in the early 1970's) a growing 
proportion of steelmaking investments were accounted for by pollution 
control measures and (since 1973) energy conservation. Effective 
utilization of the considerable accumulation of capital scrap in 
Japan, increased use of sponge iron, replacement of slabbing and 
blooming facilities with continuous casting, and various schemes to 
recover wasted energy are some of the current major preoccupations . 
Investment expenditures on plant and equipment by the Japanese 
steel industry averaged about 17 percent of Japanese industrial 
capital investment in the late 1960's but declined to 14 percent in 
1974 . <19 ) In 1975 it increased again to 18 . 9 percent, refle~ting the 
concerns mentioned above . Crude steel production capacity in Japan is 
now estimated at 159 million tons, but the latest production forecast 
for 1980 is only 127- 130 million tons and the outlook for 1985 is 160 
million tons . 
Japan's steel exports are well di versified both in terms,: of 
products and destinations . The trend is clearly toward increasing 
shipments to the developing countries in Asia and the Middle East where 
industrialization programs have escalated demand. In 1975 Asia 
accounted for 45 . 1 percent of Japan's steel exports (33 percent in 
1970), Latin America for 9 . 3 percent (7 . 3 percent in 1970), while North 
America declined to 22. 3 percent (36 . 4 percent in 1970) . European 
markets were the only exception from the trend, absorbing 17 . 1 percent 
of Japanese steel exports in 1975 versus 15.4 percent in 1970 . 
Although further expansion of steelmaking capacity in such Pacific Rim 
countries as Canada, Australia, South Korea, Mexico and the United 
States will gradually increase their share of the Pacific Rim steel 
production, Japan will remain the largest steel exporter for many 
years . 
111 
8 . Other Minerals 
Paci fic Rim countries produce , of course a variety of other 
metals and. minerals . Two of them , molybdenum and tungsten, will be 
ment i oned separately her e because of the concentrati on of their 
reserves and production in the Pacific Rim, and because of their 
technological j_mportance to the industr ial economies . 
Chromium could be i ncluded in the same categor·y because of its 
technological significance , except that the Philippines is the only 
s i gnifi cant Paci fic Rim producer wi th about 8 . 5 percent of the world 
total . Some 52 percent of the world ' s current output is controlled by 
the U.S .S . R. and South Afr ica and an addi tional 26 percent by Rhodesia , 
Turkey and Albani a . 
Japan ' s cht·ome imports , mos tly in the form of chromite ore , are 
well di versified with some 34 percent coming from South Africa • 20 
percent from India , 12 percent from the Phil i ppines and 7 percent from 
the Soviet Union . The United States impor ts chromite ore as well as 
ferr ochromium , supplementing indus trial needs wi th shipments from 
government stockpiles . Major chromite import s ources in recent years 
were the U.S . S. R. 31 percent , South Afr ica 27 percent and the Phil i p-
pines 18 percent . 
Among other metals , the combi ned s ilver product i on of Canada 
Peru , Mexico , the U. S. A. and Australia accounts for over 60 percent of 
all silver recovered as a byproduct of base metal mining worldwide . 
Japan, Chile and other Pacific Rim base metal producers recover 
additional quantiti es , and secondary r ecovery is an i mpor tant com-
ponent of the supply cycle . 
Molybdenum 
Three Pacifi c Rim count r ies -- the United States , Canada and Chile 
contributed about 86 percent of the world molybdenum production in 
recent years . These three , together with the Soviet Union and Peru ; 
control nearly all the world ' s molybdenum reserves . The United States 
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alone accounts for some 57 percent of known reserves and for about 64 
percent of world production. Although Canada controls only about 4 
percent of reserves, it supplies about 15 percent of world product i on. 
About one-half of all molybdenum production is derived as a by-
product of copper mining and its supply is, therefore, directly related 
to the mining of certain copper depos :i. ts . Molybdenum may also be 
recovered from other ores, including uranium. 
The use of molybdenum as an alloying element in steels determines 
its international trading patterns, with Japan the foremost importer, 
followed by the EEC countries . The industry is closely controlled by 
only a few corporations with only one company in the United States 
(AMAX, Inc . ) and one in Canada (Placer Development Ltd . ) playing the 
leading roles , 
World molybdenum production increased from 33,897 tons (in terms 
of metal content) in 1960 to 82,194 tons in 1973, of which about 35 
percent was traded internationally . As new supplies enter the market-
place in the future, price competition should become more pronounced 
than it has been in the past . The long- term outlook is for oversupply 
of molybdenum in international markets, including the Paci fic Rim . 
Tungsten 
Both the market economy and the central economy countries of the 
Pacific Rim are important producers of tungsten as shown in Statistical 
Appendix Table A- 42 . Although nearly 60 percent of estimated world 
tungsten resources are located in southeastern China, very cons i der-
able reserves are found in Canada, the U.S.A., North and South Korea, 
Thailand, Burma and Australia . Outside the Pacifi c Rim, Brazil, 
Bolivia, and Portugal are important tungsten producers with consider ,. 
able reserve potenti al. 
Tungsten production i n the Pacific Rim va~ied widely during the 
last twenty years, the major factors being the U. S. stockpiling program 
in the 1950 ' s and a disposal program of excess stockpile supplies in 
the mid- 1960 ' s . Present U. S. domestic production is obtained almost 
enti rely from only two mining operations, as a co·-product with molyb·· 
denum . U. S. production potential is considerably higher and new 
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projects could increase U.S . domesUc production by about 25 percent in 
1978. Canadian tungsten production comes from only one mine, although 
several other depos i ts have been i dentified . 
Thailand , South Korea and Australia are all capable of incr eas j ng 
tungsten production beyond the present level and are likely to do so 
when market conditions warrant , North Korea, despite a strong reserve 
position, has maintained a slow growth rate and has not been a factor 
in the Pacific trade. 
Extreme hardness, wear resistance and favorable properties at 
elevated temperatures make tungsten an important material in indus-
trial, military, and space applications . With both economic and 
strategic significance , the United States and Japan are by far the two 
largest Pacific area tungsten-consuming markets . 
Historically, tungsten prices have tended to fluctuate in 
response to major shifts in U.S . stockpiling policies and to a rather 
unpredictable pattern of annual sales by China. World prices doubled 
between 1973 and 1974, and increased another 50 percent by 1976 . 
Tungsten ' s volatile price behavior led to discussions, under the 
auspices of UNCTAD, on measures to stabilize price patterns . Major 
d.ifferences of opinion have delayed r esolution of the problem . Some of 
the tungsten producers also formed the Tungsten Producers Association 
in 1975 with Australia, Bolivia, Peru, Portugal and Thailand as 
members , and China as an observer . Without the United States, Canada, 
South Korea and the European producers, the Association is unlikely to 
exercise a strong influence on the tungsten market, but may become a 
factor in UNCTAD negotiations . 
9 . Changing Investment and Trading Environment 
Mineral Investment Climate 
Metal and mineral ores are widely but i rregularly distributed in 
the Pacific Rim countries . Many factors influence the development of 
metallic ores , including their physical characteristics and chemical 
composition, accessibility, availability of infrastructure and market 
price trends . 
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Developing countries, with their limited capital markets anct 
undeveloped technical and marketing skills, have been highly dependent 
on international money markets and the resour ces of multinational 
corporations for financing mining and mineral processing projects, 
The willingness of international capital to flow to a given country has 
always been determined by the degree of eocnomic risk, including the 
ability of the investors to remit convertible currency for servicing 
loans or dividend payments. This topic is discussed further in 
Drysdale's paper in these Proceedings. 
During the 1960's, the growth of pressures for greater economic 
sovereignty in the developing countries, their desire to exercise ever 
greater control over their own resources, and to obtain increased value 
through local processing led to confrontations between some govern-
ments and the multinational corporations . These actions introduced a 
new cri tical element in investment decisions that has become known as 
"political risk analysis," and that has been responsible in part for a 
pronounced shift of new miner al investments away from such areas as 
Latin America and into Australia , Canada and the United States . 
During this time, major :i .. nvestments took in iron ore projects in 
Australia and Canada rather than in Venezuela or Peru, copper deposits 
in British Columbia and the Philippines rather than in Chile or Peru 
and bauxite in Australia instead of in the Caribbean countries 
Exceptions to these patterns occurred, of course , in particular 
as they related to the Japanese preference for mineral development 
through debt financing rather than through equity control. The 
Japanese, generally, took only minor equity positions in large mineral 
development projects while advancing a large part of the required 
development funds as debt capital repayable by delivery of the 
contracted product . Their use of long-term contracts is discussed in 
detail in the Kojima paper in these Proceedings, and to some extent in 
the paper by Smith . 
Investors and developers have been justi.fiably concerned over 
growing difficulties in attracting capital and the required managerial 
and technical skills to mineral development projects in countries 
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where investment terms and conditions are likely to be unilaterally 
changed during the lifetime of the investment . Host governments of 
most resource- producing countries now insist on a substantial, if not 
controlling share of local equity and on a maximum possible degree of 
local processing before export . To redefine a realistic balance of 
interest between mineral developers possessing capital and know- how 
and host countries that own the resources is a major and complex task . 
There are strong indications that, notwithstanding the complexities of 
the problem, new forms of cooperat5on are being successfully 
introduced . 
Institutional Factors 
As a result of extensive discussions held under the auspices of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), an 
Integrated Program for CommodiUes has been proposed which calls for a 
number of far - reaching reforms in the world commodity trading system to 
stabilize prices and generally aid LDC producers, including interna-
tionally negotiated commodity agreements for such metals and minerals 
as bauxite,. copper , tin, manganese and phosphate. Among the proposed 
reforms the most singificant are the establishment of a common fund to 
finance commodity stockpiles, the introduction of a price index system 
between primary commodities exported and manufactured goods imported 
by LDCs, and generally improved LDC access to developed world markets 
for semi-processed and manufactured products. 
While it is likely that the proposed reform package will be 
considerably trimmed and modified, indications are that certain signi-
ficant concessions will be made by the developed countries . Expansion 
of the preferential trading system, or granting trade advantages to 
certain developing countries without reciprocity, will have a net 
effect of eroding comparative natural advantages in specific export 
markets presently enjoyed by some suppliers . Certain moves in this 
direction have already been made, such as the General System of 
Preferences (GSP) introduced by Japan and the United States, and the 
concession extended by the EEC under the terms of the Lome Convention 
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of 1975 . Although it is presently designed to deal primarily with the 
agricultural commodities, provisions exist for inclusion of certain 
mineral products . The Convention also provides for the establishment 
of funds to assist in the development of capital projects, including 
mining, and for extension of technical cooperation. 
While most industrialized countries accept that there are advan-
tages to be gained by both producers and consumers from controlling 
cyclical swings in commodity prices, and that buffer stocks are a more 
sensible stabilization ~echnique than production and export controls, 
there are major differences of opinion concerning objectives, sources 
of finance and methods of operation of a common buffer stock fund . 
Given the complexity of the problem and the likelihood of pro-
tracted negotiations over individual commodity agreements , the effect 
of any new international arrangement .is unlikely to be felt in the 
marketplace for some years . Nevertheless, new international institu-
tional arrangements will become a factor in the mineral market because 
both consumers and producers have a vested interest in limiting the 
gyrations of mineral commodity prices. 
Investment Costs and Capital Supply 
A number of factors have increased mining and mineral processing 
costs and lowered profitability in recent years . These include 
increasing capital intensity, higher energy costs, rising labor costs 
and weak mineral prices . 
The economic viability of exploiting ever lower grades of ore 
depends on application of the most advanced technological methods and 
equipment and on the economies of mass production. This . in turn, 
requires massive capital outlays that can only be justified under 
conditions of firm long- term contractual commitment from consumers to 
absorb at least a major share of the output . Some copper deposits in 
the Philippines , Papua New Guinea and British Columbia now under 
development have ore grades sometimes less than 0 . 4 percent copper 
content . Development of Australian iron ore deposits, despite their 
relatively high quality , was made possible only by large international 
117 
mining consortia that undertook the production , transportation and 
marketing of millions of tons of ore annually . 
Capital requirements for new production capacity vary depending 
on the location, ore grade, availability of infrastructure, antipol-
lution requir ements and other factors , While generalizations are 
always dangerous , it is undeniable that current copper price levels are 
much too low to provide sufficient incentive in underwriting new 
projects . Capital r equi rements of an integrated copper mining and 
smelting project today are estimated to be twice as high as in 1970 . 
While the needs are different, the same principle applies to the 
capital required for new primary aluminum capacity, which has more than 
doubled since 1970 . 
Energy costs also have had a particularly severe impact on energy-
intensi ve metallurgical processes . While a great variety of measures 
have been taken by the i.ndustry since 1974 to reduce the impact of 
rising energy costs , most metallurgical processes have a very con-
siderable energy component . Under conditions of abundant and cheap 
energy supply prevailing in the past, little attention was paid to the 
weight of energy in total production costs . 
Inflationary trends in the 1970 ' s accelerated the rise in labor 
costs, particularly in the industrialized countries of the Pacific 
Rim. Wage rates in mining and mineral processing sectors of Canada , 
the United States, Australia and Japan have risen considerably while 
some commodi ty prices have declined and others have barely kept pace 
with inflation. 
Base metal prices , which are more directly subject to market 
forces, declined at a more rapid rate in 1975- 76 than they had risen in 
1973 and early 1974 . On the other hand , prices of other minerals, such 
as metallurgical coal and bauxite, have risen under the impact of the 
energy crisis and coordinated producer actions . These trends imply 
that future capital flow will be constrained by lower profitability and 
higher risk factors at a time when the indust ry has become increasingly 
capital intensive. Under conditions of intensified competition for 
investment capital, such capital flow is likely to be attracted to 
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projects offering the lowest degree of risk in terms of profitability 
and political stability . 
Although the ability to generate domestic capital will gradually 
increase in many Pacific Rim developing countries, most of their mining 
and mineral processing projects will continue to require huge amounts 
of foreign capital. Given their limited foreign currency earnings from 
exports and the reluctance of international organizations and institu-
tions to finance mineral development, the most readily available 
sources of foreign capital are international private bankj_ng consortia 
and private investors . 
A trend appears to be emerging, therefore, towards an interna-
tional consortia approach to large scale mineral mining and processing 
operations in order to minimize financial risks and to enhance the 
economies of scale . These consortia often include the backing of 
financial institutions from a number of countries and participation by 
local governments or state corporations . Technological and management 
skills have become a marketable pacl<age on their own, without neces-
sarily being linked to equity ownership and control . 
10 . Conclusions 
Many interrelated factors have shaped the mineral mining and 
processing industry in the Pacific Rim. Rising mineral consumption in 
the developed countries brought about rapid mineral development in the 
' main mineral-producing developed countries while at the same time 
increasing the importance of the mineral industry in the economies of 
many mineral- rich developing countries . 
Minerals and metals became an increasingly important source of 
forej_gn exchange and a strong catalyst in the development of national 
infrastructures in the LDCs . This, in turn , has led to the growing 
role of governments in determining mineral policies and in the actual 
ownership of mining and mineral processing enterprises . 
In their desire to exercise increasing influence over mineral 
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markets and to increase the returns from expor ts of mineral commodi .... 
ties, governments have tended to join in the establishment of mineral 
producers associations . This included the developing as well as the 
developed countries of the Pacific Rim , with the notable exception of 
Canada and the United States which favor joint producer- consumer 
ar rangements . 
Growing scale in mineral mining and processing projects, concerns 
over environmental protection, inflationary trends in capital equip-
ment and labor costs and rising energy costs are among the important 
factors that have limited capital i nvestment in exploration and 
development . 
Consuming-country concerns over long- term security of supply and 
producing-country demands for higher levels of processing before 
export are at the root of the debate over future pol j .. cies . This 
struggle highlights the interdependence of producing and consuming 
countries made i nevi table by the uneven distribuUon of natural 
resources and the growing desirability of broad- based international 
consortia as an approach to mineral exploi tation . 
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MINERAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT PATTERNS IN THE PACIFIC AREA 
A COMMENT 
Si rman Widiatmo 
My compliments to the author on the excellent survey of the 
production and trade patterns of the major minerals over the past two 
decades or so. He has identified the main characte·' istics of the 
markets for copper, lead and zinc, aluminum, nickel, tin, titanium, 
iron, coal, steel and other miscellaneous minerals. 
In fact, the bulk of the paper covers this subject matter and only 
a few pages are devoted to the investment patterns. The specific data 
presented on the indi victual minerals can be very useful i.n studying the 
broader subject of the role of these minerals in the future world 
economy. 
We agree with the conclusion that the rise of mineral consumption 
in the developed countries has brought about an increase in production 
in both the developed and the mineral-rich developing countries. 
For the continued orderly development of future mineral produc-
tion, we suggest that there must be full coop era ti on between the 
producers in the developing countries and consumers in the developed 
countries. Each sector has rights as well as obligations and they both 
go together. There are many imponderables and uncertainties in 
predicting future supplies and demands for minerals, and thus it is 
important that the consumer countries aid the producer countries 
during the low demand periods of a cycle so that ample supplies will be 
available during the peak periods. 
We agree with the observation that minerals and metals are an 
increasingly important source of foreign exchange which aid in devel-
opment, and therefore governments are taking a more active role in 
setting policies in the exploration, mining, milling and marketing of 
the minerals. 
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Rather than an inte rdependence of producing and consuming coun-
tries, as suggested, we propose that there is more a mutual needs and 
i nterests relati onship between them, a real community of interests . 
The object i ve of the producers should be the orderly development 
of supplies . There should be no waste of capital resources in surplus 
capacity and no trade or i nvestment barriers. The requisites of the 
consumers are to help in providing technological assistance for effi-
cient mining and processing and to pay remunerative prices . Consumers 
should help finance stocks in times of temporary oversupply in order 
to maintain production capacity. 
We were pleased to note that the author had identif i ed some 
innovative schemes which seem to illustrate investment arrangements 
for the future, such as through i nternational consortia, or through 
debt financing as opposed to equity financing as in the case of Japan . 
Yet, since the developing countries have a mounting debt, can the 
latter scheme be expected to continue in the future? 
The author has documented the unprecedented growth i n demand for 
minerals and metals in Japan, the U.S . and other industrialized 
countries very well. Since Japan is not a nation with abundant 
resources, it will continue to be dependent on large imports of iron, 
copper, coal, nickel, tin and aluminum. 
In our opinion, 1974 was a peak year for the consumption of 
minerals and therefore it is a mistake to use 1974 as a yardstick . 
On the question of the U. S.A . stockpile, it is stated that a new 
set of major long-range planning goals was adopted in 1976 . But this 
is not the case, as they were merely recommended to the President of 
the U.S.A . and have not been acted upon as yet . Consequently, the 
U.S .A. stockpile still constitutes a threat of additional supplies, 
influencing the investment climate . 
The logical mineral market for Canada, a country of some 22 mil-
lion people, is the U.S.A., and the logical market for Australia is 
Japan. The author's statistics substantiate this conclusion. 
We agree with the author that it is a major task for each Pacific 
Area country to devise schemes which will ensure efficient explora-
tion, production and trade in minerals . He states that in the 1970's, 
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some 80 percent of worldwide exploration expenditures have been made i n 
the developed resource-r i ch countries - - namely Australia, Canada, the 
United States and South Africa -- rather than in the developing 
countries . The answer to the question -- why not in developing 
countries -- would be of paramount importance . 
Geology is not a function of national boundaries . Adjacent 
countries with the same geological set ting can be expected to have 
similarities in mineral endowment. 
During the discussion of the markets for the individual minerals, 
we would like to add emphasis on technological changes, such as 
substitution, new mining and extraction methods affecting costs of 
production and also on the effect of releases from stockpiles on 
conventional supplies. With these developments in mind, how can the 
consuming countries guide the producing countries to make sound 
investment decisions? 
For example, in the case of copper, there is substitution by 
aluminum, new extraction techniques both pyrometallurgical and hydro-
metallurgical, new environmental regulations on sulfur dioxide emis-
sions, and declining prices as well as a world oversupply. 
The estimate for lead and zinc resources worldwide is at least 1.5 
billion tons of lead and 2 billion tons of zinc. A recent U.N. study 
by Wassily Leontief, entitled "The Future of the World Economy," lists 
only 235 million tons (metal content) zinc reserves and 129 million 
tons (metal content) for lead reserves . On the other hand, the author 
did not mention the large amount of lead recycled annually and the 
relatively small amount of zinc recycled. 
We agree with statements on the aluminum industry maintaining 
that since the aluminum smelting process is a high capital cost 
industry, it has been located to date in developed countries . However, 
due to the fact that aluminum production requires 7 to 10 kilowatt 
hours per pound, the new trend should be to locate the factories in 
cheap hydroelectric power areas . 
Indonesia is a good example . 
Our Asahan aluminum project in 
We confirm the statements that Indonesia should become the third 
largest producer of nickel in the western world in 1980, with an 
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expected output of 115,000 tons annually from P. T. Aneka Tambang, P. T. 
Inco and P. T. Pacific Nikkel Indonesia. 
On the question of preference for Producers Associations rather 
than Producer- Consumer Associations, I can only state that Indonesia 
was a founding member of the International Tin Agreement in 1956. But 
allow me to withhold my comments on the tin industry until the 
discussion of Mr. Ariff ' s paper . Indonesia's action was taken despite 
the fact that tin has better ingredients for a successful cartel than 
OPEC. 
On the subject of titanium supply, I would like to stress the 
recent substitution of beneficiated ilmenite for natural rutile which 
has been accepted by the titanium pigment and metal industry. The new 
Kerr McGee plant in the U.S . A. , at 100,000 ton annual capacity, the new 
60,000-ton Malaysian plant, the Australian 30,000-ton plant, the 
Indian 20,000-ton plant and the Taiwanese 30,000-ton plant have filled 
the gap of a potential natural rutile shortage . 
The substitution of chromite and olivine sands for zircon has 
reduced the demand for zircon so that today we have a world oversupply 
of zircon . 
The author's coverage of the iron ore, coal and steel industry is 
quite complete. The prices of the strategic metals tungsten and 
molybdenum continue to rise and the impact of Chinese supplies of 
tungsten and new molybdenum mines in the U . S . A. could bring about 
drastic change . 
On the question of investment we believe a transfer of technology 
is needed so that the developing countries can protect the known supply 
lines . Commodity agreements can bring stability to the market place 
which should encourage investment. 
In summary, we believe that studies on production and trade 
patterns of minerals are necessary as they are useful and relevant in 
identifying the main characteristics of the market. Producer coun-
tries as well as corporate investors are always faced with uncertain-
ties of estimating future supply and demand for the irreplaceable 
minerals . 
We believe that, in most instances , the long-term security of 
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supply is mainly a question of the right prices at the right time to 
encourage mineral production. Therefore closer cooperation is needed 
between producers and consumers to deal with cyclical market develop-
ments or temporary market disturbances . 
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MINERAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT PATTERNS IN THE PACIFIC AREA 
A COMMENT 
Francis K. Chan 
Mr. Switucha is to be commended for the enormous effort that he 
has put i n to give us this very comprehens i ve and useful survey of the 
non-fuel minerals situat :i. on in the Pacific Rim region. Some 15 Pacific 
Ri_m countries are included as well as 14 major minerals. 
The paper is compri.sed of three major sections: ( 1) Minerals in 
the Economies of the Pacific Rim; (2) P~oduction and Trade Patterns of 
Major Minerals; and (3) Changing Investment and Trading Environment. 
In the first section, the experiences of both developed countries 
(Japan United States, Canada and Australia) and developing countries 
(grouped into the three regions of Southeast Asia, South Pacific and 
Latin America) were discussed in some detail. Indicators of the 
importance of the minerals i_n the economies of the countries used in 
the paper included percentage share of total annual imports and import 
dependence . Percentage share of GDP and percentage of total export 
receipts were used in the case of mineral exporting countries. 
In the second section, the focus of the paper shifted from the 
countries to the production and trade patterns of the major minerals. 
In addition the paper also included a discussion of the reserves 
position and future outlook. The geographical distribution of mineral 
deposits in the Pacific Rim is uneven, with relative resource abundance 
in the South (Indonesia and Australia) and North East (Canada and U.S.) 
sectors and deficiency in the North West (Korea, Taiwan and Japan). 
This contrasts with the growth in demand especially during the 1960's 
and early 1970's which was greatest in the North West sector. Because 
of this uneven distribution, the trade pattern has been one of resource 
extraction in the South and North East and shipment of largely unpro-
cessed ores to the North West of the Pacific Rim and also to the North 
East (U.S.). This pattern was further strengthened by the Japanese 
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policy of encourag~ng domestic processing of imported ores rather than 
processing at site. 
With respect to the long-term prospects of future supply, the 
reserves of most of the minerals in the Pacific Rim countries comprise 
a significant share of global reserves . Supply may be adequate 
especially because the growth rates of consumption for some minerals 
have slowed down or may slow down (copper, lead, zinc, tin), or because 
of future technologi.cal advances in sea-bed mining, in the rate of per 
unit usage, or in development of substitues (nickel, tin, titanium). 
In the short term, a number of minerals are experiencing overcapacity 
and an unattractive price situation due to overexpansion of supply 
(copper, lead, zinc, steel). 
However, the above trade and production pattern may undergo some 
changes. In the case of mineral ore processing, there will probably be 
a shift towards more processing at source. Among the reasons are the 
effect of increasing energy costs (hence processing of bauxite and 
aluminum in locations with abundant hydroelectric power), greateY-
concern about the environmental effect of processing in Japan, and the 
desire of mineral-p~oducing countries to exercise greater control over 
the exploitation of their resources and to encourage greater value by 
processing at source to obtain a larger share of the economic rent. 
This trend will probably have net beneficial effects all around and 
make economic sense. 
A more serious change highlighted by Mr. Switucha in the third 
section of his paper -- is the change in investment patterns that would 
come about due to a deterioration (from the investors' point of view) 
of the investment climate in some developing countries on the one hand 
and rising capital costs of investment due to price inflation, distance 
and isolation of new mining sites, lower grades of ores, and the need 
to use more capital-intensive and technologically complex methods and 
equipment on the other . While these factors would result in more 
investment in mineral development in the Pacific Rim, it would tend to 
be located in the developed countries because of the investment risk 
factor. The other possible consequence of the increase in capital cost 
is the adoption of an international consortium approach to financing 
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which would spread out risks to individual investors while taking 
advantage of the economies of scale in mining and processing. 
Taking the discussion of this paper in conjunction with the Magee-
Robins paper on the raw material cycle, one implication seems to be 
that resource-poor developing countries need not fear that future raw 
material scarcity and global competition for access to the limited 
supply would be a serious additional constraint on their future 
development prospects. For _ the resource-rich developing countries, 
the bonanzas promised by their possession of mineral deposits through 
OPEC-style operations seem highly unlikely. 
Even if the above scenario is a reasonable one in the future, 
there would seem to be unavoidable and continual short periods of 
resource scarcity because of the difficulty of matching supply and 
demand over time, giving rise to wide price fluctuations. This is 
likely to be true because of short-run price inelasticity of supply due 
to long lead times of investment coupled with unstable demand condi-
tions -- also likely to be price inelastic in the short-run. 
There are two specific points on which I do not share the author's 
opinion. 
The first one refers to the first section of the paper, where Mr. 
Switucha comments that "The contribution of the mining sector to the 
Malaysian economy has always been unimpressive ••• ," citing as evidence 
the fact that "mining accounted for 4.0 percent of gross domestic 
product in 1975 compared to 5,7 percent in 1970" and that "The export 
value of tin ••• amounted to 13.4 percent of total export receipts." In 
terms of these indicators, the figures for the 1950's and 1960's (to 
stick to the postwar era only) are much higher, about 10 percent of GDP 
or higher in some years. This is by no means an unimpressive role. 
Because tin mining tends to be relatively more labor-intensive than 
most mineral mining, the contribution to direct labor employment is 
also quite substantial. The contribution of tin to government revenue 
has been even more substantial since a . large fraction of government 
revenue was formerly derived from export taxes. Also, historically, 
the development of the tin industry was an important factor in stimul-
ating migration of Chinese labor and infrastructural development in 
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the Western states of Malaya , whi ch subsequently contributed to the 
development of the rubber industr y in Malaysia . 
The second point on wh i ch I would like to register disagreement is 
Mr . Switucha ' s evaluation of the role and performance of the Interna-
tional Tin Council. He suggests that it i.s "helping to stabilize 
export earnings of the producing nations" and "also ass i sting in 
reaching rational decisions on production rates and on additional 
investment required to secure adequate supplies to the consumers ." In 
the paper by Mohamed Ariff for this Conference , it is shown that while 
empirical evidence seems to suggest reduced price instability under 
periods of international tin control, " tin controls have tended to 
destabilize output, employment and export proceeds, ••• export controls 
have rendered Malaysia ' s tin export proceeds rather unstable , despite 
relatively stable tin prices , price stability being more than o.ffset by 
export volume instability ." This results from the fact that , "move-
ments in price and quantum have tended to be rather additive ." Given 
the short- run price inelasticity of tin production and the volatility 
of derived demand, further attempts to stabilize price, especially 
through export controls , can only destabilize export pr oceeds . The 
same study also goes on to point out the economic inefficiency of the 
tin control mechanism , in particular the tendency to prevent movements 
towards a more efficient resource allocation within the country and the 
protection of less efficient high- cost producers generally . 
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MINERAL TRADE AND INV:ESTMENT PATTERNS IN THE PACIFIC AREA 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The paper covered two ma i.n topics: g.overnmen t involvement in 
mineral exploi ta ti on and the location of ore processing. 
market and stockpiling questions were also considered . 
Government Involvement 
Capital 
Maintenance of price stability and orderly markets were the 
principal aspects of government involvement discussed. Diamonds were 
.cited as an example where private producers have successfully main-
tained a high degree of market control (for at least the gem stone part 
of their market). 
Stabilization of supply growth as a goal implies the need for an 
international MITI (Japan Ministry of International Trade and Indus-
try) allocating new mine openings among countries as demand expands and 
old mines are depleted . But it is unrealistic to expect such sequenc-
ing to be politically acceptable . One consequence of nationalization 
(or extensive control) is that governments have wanted to keep their 
own capacity fully utilized no matter what. Because of political 
welfare considerations, it is more difficult for a government to decide 
to cut back production . 
The i ncreased role of government has thus led to supply being less 
sensitive to market condition~. The consequences of this are a major 
cause of concern for nonferrous metals producers generally and copper 
producers in particular. 
There is also the paradoxical situation of national i zation 
leading to subsidized exports and loss of rents: revolution is the 
opiate of the masses. 
The below-equilibrium pricing policies and accompanying disequi-
librium on the supply side can have devastating effects on a country: 
the impact of low copper prices on Peru's economy is an example and a 
warning that prices should be moved up to at least the equilibrium 
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level for commodi ti.es that are so singularly important to an )_ndi vi dual 
country. Such a country cannot afford the luxury of price swings . 
To achieve a more efficient long- term expansion path may require 
returning enterprises to the private sector or at least achieving more 
cooperation between the government and the private sector . One 
participant noted that mining companies are unusually articulate in 
expressing their troubles with governments . This led to some brief 
comments on capital markets . 
Private firms may be more risk averse in troughs than at peaks, 
and it was suggested that the paper deal more with these implications. 
One manifestation, although a strange way to deal with risk, is the 
prevalence of consortia formation in troughs, while in boom periods 
firms are more likely to go it alone . 
A study of Canadian firms showed the mean rate of return is lower, 
and the risk higher, for mining companies relative to others -- so 
there may be a pool of capital investing almost exclusively in mining . 
On the other hand, there may be a lot of high- risk takers in the 
investment world . It is also important to distinguish existing capital 
being reinvested from actual new capital flowing into the sector . 
Processing 
Whether the mining country should develop its own processing 
capability rather than export raw ore was a topic repeatedly commented 
upon . 
Processing is usually considered more labor intensive than 
mining, but this was not universally accepted as true -- in part 
because of questioning the generalization that mining is of necessity 
capital intensive . It was pointed out that scale economies are such 
that on-site processing is not always feasible, but developing coun-
tries tend to look at processing as cont r ibuting to employment and 
infrastructure development . 
A producing country must consider more than just the pure economic 
returns . If processing is indeed more labor intensive , it will 
possibly have a social "'ate of return high enough to justify the 
economic costs . The importance of a case- by- case evaluation was 
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stressed by both this speaker and the author, who noted that extensive 
studies suggested it is not attractive to do simple copper smelting in 
Canada . In part , this is because of the existence of a good deal of 
relatively new, currently underutilized capacity in Japan, the main 
market, as well as Japan ' s tariff str ucture and the high cost of 
building processing plants . 
The logic of going to processing is often assumed by producing 
countries without actually analyzing the opportunity cost of the 
· factors to be used . If the same analysis were applied to mining itself 
it might even suggest cutting back on resources allocated to it . 
Higher ener gy costs are a deterrent to new processing plants in 
energy- poor countries . It was also pointed out that sometimes the only 
foreign capital available to a developing country is for exploiting its 
minerals . 
A Japanese participant noted that Japan had encouraged producers 
to move into processing in the early 1970 ' s, but subsequent world 
overcapacity in such areas as copper has curtailed this . 
Stockpiling 
A nine- volume study for the U.S . government concludes stockpiling 
is not economically feasible as there is little real potential for 
cartels in the minerals with which the U. S. is concerned . 
Another participant pointed out that stockpiles are strategic 
rather than pri ce stabilizing i n intent, and also that existing ones 
have been used to balance the budget . 
Other 
While the role of research and development has been stressed , it 
was noted that exploration has had as much or more to do with available 
mineral resources, and i ts determinants are somewhat different that 
those for R and D. Specifically, it was suggested that much of this 
investment was made to secure market shares . This relates to the 
establishment of private oligopolies . Governments have seen the 
concentrated power and in many cases have moved to take it over . This 
process is irreversible . 
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Switucha's comments that the contribution of tin to Malaysia was 
minor were challenged, and his claim that mining was the fastest 
growing sector of the Philippine economy was questioned. 
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RESOURCE TRADE AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Ross Garnaut 
Demand for resource-intensive commodities is strongly correlated 
with industrial production . Although there were some early linkages 
between the location of certain resource deposits (such as coal) and 
the process of industrialization in the now-developed economies, the 
natural deposits from which resource-intensive commodities are pro-
duced are scattered more or less independently of the location of 
demand. Transport costs tend to be high in relation to the value of 
many resource-intensive commodities, so that resource deposits (of 
equal physical quality to those located elsewhere) are mined first in 
the vicinity of the main centers of industrial production. This means 
that continued growth in the industrial economies generates opportuni-
ties for profitable expansion of production of resource-intensive 
commodities from locations that are further and further from the main 
industrial centers, including those from developing countries . A 
shift in the location of world industrial production towards some 
developing countries can produce a similar effect for those countries. 
These relationships have been very important in the Western 
Pacific region since the early 1960s. All Southeast Asian economies 
except Singapore, all of Melanesia, and the high- income, largely 
industrial countries of Australia and New Zealand, are characterized 
by low levels of industrial production in relation to their natural 
resource endowment. This has been reflected historically in strong 
export specialization in some resource-intensive commodities. How-
ever, high transport costs (and to a lesser extent transactions costs) 
associated with trade in resource-intensive commodities with the 
distant industrial centers of Europe and North America long denied 
economic value to some known resource deposits of high physical quality 
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(for example i ron ore and bauxite in Australia and copper in Indo-
nesia) . It also discouraged thorough exploration of the region's 
natural resource endowment . 
High rates of world i ndustrial production through the 1960s anct 
early 1970s extended the margin of profitable production of resource-
i ntensive commodities . The concentration of much of the world indus-
trial growth in Japan, a resource- poor ne i ghboring country that by the 
la t e 1960s had become by far the world's lar gest importer of indust r ial 
raw materials, magnified this effect for countries in the Western 
Pacific region. Opportunities for the development of new export 
industries were further enhanced by innovations in bulk transport 
techniques , which themselves were inspired partly by the extraordinary 
growth of Japanese import demand . 
In response to these developments , the export specialization of 
all Southeast Asian economies strengthened through the 1960s in pre-
cisely those commodities in which Japanese import specialization was 
strongest . A similar transformation occurred in the export speciali-
zation of Southwest Pacific countries , including Australia , Papua New 
Guinea and the small territories of Melanesia. New industries 
producing nickel were advanced i n Australia and Indonesia ; new indus-
tries producing copper in the Philippines , Papua New Guinea and 
Indonesia; and major new i ron ore, coal , alumina and bauxite expor ting 
industries in Australia . Established export industries were greatly 
expanded : oil from Indonesia and Malaysia ; nickel from New Caledonia; 
copper from Australia . 
This paper does not aim to describe the experience of these 
countries . Rather, it seeks to identify the nature of opportunities 
and problems associated with these developments in an abstract way. 
From time to time, reference is made to a particular industry or a 
particular country, but this is simply illustrative . We will keep in 
mind the important case of the minerals and energy industries , but part 
of the discussion could be applied to other resource- based indus tries, 
including forestry , fisheries and agriculture . 
There have been many case studies of the impetus to development 
provided by the exploitation of mineral resources in developing and 
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now-developed countries . A number of models of trade and development 
have emerged from these studies . Caves 1 has reviewed the studies and 
distilled their common features into a statement of a "vent for 
surplus" model of international trade and economic growth . Caves' 
model provides a good starting point for the present discussion, 
although the "vent for surplus" label is misleading. The term 
"resource trade" is used in preference to "vent for surplus" in this 
paper. 
Caves defined the limiting case where all resources complementary 
to the natural deposit were obtained through migration from industrial 
countries . The limiting case is no longer interesting in itself 
(except for the analysis of development in resource- rich regions 
within some countries), but the model is applicable with adaptation to 
many contemporary economies . 
The "resource- trade" models depict the effects of trade on growth 
as involving the exploitation of resources lacking, in that place and 
at that time, any alternative uses of any significant economic value . 
The exploitation of natural resources in the resource- rich country 
proceeds at a pace determined by the rate of discovery of resources and 
by growth in world demand for the relevant commodities (whether through 
growth in total industrial production or shifts in demand that are 
favorable to the increased use of the relevant commodities) . When 
changes in the general economic environment cause the establishment of 
a new export industry to be profitable, the process of growth is an 
adjustment to a disequilibrium situation, and the short- term rate of 
growth is limited only by the constraints on that adjustment . 
The growth of the resource- exporting sector gradually increases 
the scale and diversity of the domestic economy. Production of non-
tradeable commodities increases as demand rises with the spending of 
incomes earned in the exporting industry . Import-competing production 
is extended as successive thresholds of minimum necessary scale of 
domestic demand for efficient production are exceeded in various 
industries . It is possible for "resource- trade" growth to be super-
imposed upon an under lying swell of "neoclassical" growth, with the 
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latter taking the form of gradual increases in population and capital 
and improvements in technique. In this latter case, "resource- trade" 
growth can explain a large part of the variation in the growth of the 
resource-rich country, whether or not it explains a large part of the 
average level of that growth . 
The "resource-trade" literature draws the conclusion that the 
process of growth, and the extent of the export- impetus to general 
growth, depends on the nature of the linkages with the domestic 
economy, without getting very far into the analysis of the effects of 
particular linkages . The linkages can be of a direct kind (through the 
production functions of the resource-based industries, or of indus-
tries requiring the resource-intensive products as inputs), or of an 
indirect kind (through the effect of the increase in incomes on 
domestic demand). The indirect effects depend on the magnitude and the 
distribution of resource rents. 
The next section of this paper describes some of the distin-
guishing characteristics of the resource-based industries, resembling 
somewhat the general characteristics of industries based on minerals 
and energy resources in the Western Pacific region. This description 
of characteristics is a necessary prelude to analysis of export growth 
on the domestic economy. Discussion then proceeds to the organiza-
tional structures through which production and trade are conducted in 
the resource-based industries. Further sections are devoted to direct 
linkages, and to the quantitatively more important indirect linkages 
through the expenditure of resource rents . Two sections discuss the 
macroeconomic impact of the resource developments: first, the impact 
on expenditure, employment, the balance of payments and the sectoral 
composition of domestic production; and then the special problem of 
instability. The paper then turns to the effects of the development of 
new export sectors on long- term growth and income distribution . It 
concludes with some comments on questions of international economic 
policy that arise out of the paper as a whole. 
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1. Characteristics of Resource- Based Industries 
The new resource-based industries tend to use complex technology 
and require a highly sophisticated organi zation to coordinate finan-
cing, construction, production and sales . They are typically highly 
capital-intensive, using little labor or other inputs that can be 
supplied domestically in non-industrial economies . Productive capa-
city is lumpy, and the expansion of production tends to proceed in 
large, discrete steps . Activity in these industries tends to be highly 
concentrated regionally at the location of the natural resource depos-
its. Finally, the contribution of these industries to domestic incomes 
and economic activity tends to be highly unstable . 
Some of the common characteristics listed above are causally 
linked to each other, or have common origins . The common reality that 
natural resource deposits in non-industrial countries are located away 
from established infrastructures raises the minimum scale of feasible 
operations, and also their capital-intensity . Large- scale operations 
require more sophisticated organizations, the nucleus of which must 
usually be provided from foreign sources . The highly capital-
intensive nature of production helps to make supply less sensitive to 
short-term price instability in world markets, and so contributes to 
that instability. The regional concentration of production follows 
mainly from the uneven bounty of nature, but it is also affected by the 
high minimum efficient scale of operation and the associated lumpiness 
of additions to productive capacity. 
There are two aspects to instability in the contribution of the 
resource-based industries to incomes and domestic activity. Invest-
ment is lumpy, and tends to come in waves associated with buoyant 
external economic conditions and particular developments in tech-
nology . This subjects domestic economic activity to considerable 
stimulus during the period of investment and early production, but 
dampens aggregate growth upon the withdrawal of this stimulus . 
Secondly, there are commonly wide fluctuations both in the volume of 
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exports and the price of resource- intensive commodities . Demand f or 
industrial raw materials in the developed economies varies more than 
industrial production , being caught up in the inventory cycle. Supply 
rarely adjusts downwards period, while and when it does the market knows 
that there is cons i derable productive capacity overhanging the market, 
and that output can be expanded at low marginal cost . In the l ong 
term , supply adjusts downwards only when prices fall below the marginal 
cost of less efficient producers for a considerable period , while it 
adjusts upwards only when pri ces have been maintained at high levels 
for sufficiently long to induce confidence that satisfactory returns 
will be achieved on the large capital investment required to add to 
world productive capacity . 
There is some speculative variation in inventories at all levels 
of production and in use of industrial raw materials, and this exer t s a 
modest stabilizing influence on price when general economic events are 
unfolding in more or les s predictable ways . But the anticipated 
"equilibrium" price can swing wildly with changes in community expec-
tations about future growth in world i ndustrial production . The price 
that is sufficiently high to keep existing capacity in production, and 
perhaps to add a small, incremental amount to existing capacity each 
year , may be only half that required to induce major additions to 
capacity . Expected "equilibrium" prices thus vary widely depending on 
expectations as to whether industrial growth will be sufficient ly 
rapid to require major additions to the annual supply of resource-
intensi ve commodities . Changes in the general expectation of indus-
trial growth can cause speculation itself to bring about fluctuations 
in price, as illustrated by the r ise in many metals prices through the 
first half of 1976 , and the easing after mid-year . 
There are exceptions to various aspects of the characterizati on 
of the resource- intensive industries presented here . Mining tech-
niques are not all equally complex and capital-intensive . The contri-
bution of labor and of domestic organizations to production is mor e 
i mportant , for example, in tin mining in Malaysia . In these excep-
tional cases , regional concentration is also likely to be less severe . 
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Similarly, there are exceptions to the general tendency for prices of 
resource-intensive commodities to be highly unstable, because producer 
cartels are able to vary output to maintain price (petroleum, aluminum, 
uranium) or for other reasons . However, the generalizations have wide 
applications, and we will proceed on that basis, pointing out excep-
tions when they are important. 
2 . The Organization of Production 
The establishment of a new, resource-based exporting industry 
requires the assembly of a wide variety of manpower skills within a 
sophisticated organizational structure . Many of the skills must at 
first come from outside the host country, as must the organizational 
structure itself in the early days of resource development . The 
foreign skills and organizations are both expensive , and their use 
reduces the amount of rent that is available for the augmentation of 
domestic incomes. Less recourse to these foreign factors is required 
the more developed the domestic economy becomes . 
As new producers of many of the resource-based commodities that 
became important in their exports from the 1960s, developing countries 
in the Western Pacific region had to reach accommodation with foreign 
firms in one way or another . Only in Australia and the Philippines did 
private, domestic firms take up major equity positions in large 
projects . Foreign direct investment was very important even in these 
countries, and was vital to the initiation of all new ventures in the 
Philippines . 
State corporations employing foreign firms to manage projects on 
a contract basis have been used extensively outside the region , but not 
as yet in the Western Pacific . The most important state corporations 
are the national petroleum companies of Indonesia and Malaysia , but 
foreign companies work in partnership with them under "production 
sharing" arrangements which are equivalent to direct investment in 
their practical economic effects . The role of the national corpora-
tions is more that of a regulatory authoriy than an initiator of 
investments or a risk- taker . 
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The "production-sharing" arrangements pioneered in Indones i a 
after the nationalization of Shell in the early 1960s, and now used 
extensively in the region and beyond, take the legal form of investment 
by a state corporation which employs a foreign firm on a contract 
basis . However, the foreign firm commonly assumes the whole risk of 
failure, finances the project, manages it, and earns high returns if 
the project i s successful. The popularity of production sharing 
arrangements is no doubt due to the fact that they combine the form of 
national ownership wH h the r ealities of foreign direct investment, 
and they have been acceptable politically in some countries in which 
the old form of direct i nvestment was unacceptable. Production sharing 
arrangements , at least in the form in which they were then most 
commonly conceived, were harmed by a United States Internal Revenue 
Service ruling in 1976 that production shares made available to the 
author iti es would not be classified as income taxes for the purposes of 
credits against United States tax obligations . This development has 
inhibited petroleum development in Southeast Asia through 1976 and 
early 1977 while modifications in production sharing agreements have 
been under negotiation and under examination by the Internal Revenue 
Service. 2 
3. Direct Li nkages 
The characteristics of the resource-intensive i ndustries defined 
above suggest a limited role for direct linkages . The amount of labor 
employed is very small i n relation to the value of investment and 
production , and part of the demand for labor must be met from overseas . 
The direct impact on the domestic economy through payment of wages is 
greater in a more developed economy in which wage rates are higher and 
a wider range of skills is available from domestic sources . The mining 
operations themselves can be important to the accretion of industrial 
and managerial skills, although the quantum of these effects will be 
small in relation to the value of production, and also in relation to 
the size of the host economy i n all but the smallest countries . 
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The major resource projects are usually the largest and most 
sophisticated business enterprises in a developing country, and their 
presence provides an important demonstration of business methods or 
organization. This can be helpful to standards of business organiza-
tion elsewhere in the economy, and even in the government itself. 
The power, port, internal transport, telecommunications and other 
public utilities required by major resource developments are commonly 
very large in relation to facilities 'generally available in the host 
country, and especially in the region of the project. Thus the 
standard of services is often improved considerably for communities 
and other economic enterprises in the vicinity of the major resource 
projects. The importance of these linkages depends on the exact 
location of the resource deposits in relation to population and 
alternative economic activities. 
The major material inputs to the projects are commonly machinery 
and transport equipment, various manufactured goods and occasionally 
fuels. The sustenance of the work force requires some foodstuffs,. and, 
together with building materials for construction, these are often the 
most important domestic supplies to major resource projects. The 
direct impact of the projects on opportunities for sales of foodstuffs 
and construction materials is often quite important in the vicinity of 
the project, but not in the national economy as a whole. 
The relatively high cost of transporting raw materials usually 
provides economic incentives to make use of forward linkages in 
processing, although not when transport costs of the product exceed 
those for the raw material (petroleum), or where the need to dispose of 
by-products, tariffs in the countries in which the resource-intensive 
commodities are finally used, or other factors greatly increase the 
cost of trade in processed commodities (for example, smelting and 
refining of copper under some circumstances). The processing indus-
tries commonly share characteristics of large scale, technical com-
plexity, limited local purchases of materials and capital-intensity 
with the mining operations themselves. 
In general, the direct linkages are of lesser importance on a 
national scale in developing countries, although they can be important 
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to particular regions . Indirect effects through expenditure of rents 
generated by resource production are much more important . 
4. Indirect Linkages : The Amount and Distribution of Resource Rents 
By far the major impact of resource projects on developing 
economies occurs via the receipt and expenditure of resource rents by 
the Government or by the owners of domestic resources . This was not 
always the case, as colonial resource developments were often 
associated with very high corporate profits and small contributions to 
domestic revenues . The distribution of resource rents in developing 
countries seems to have been influenced considerably by the confident 
exercise of national sovereignty in recent years . 
Each of the foreign and domestic factors of production has a 
supply price to a particular resource project . The rent that is 
generated in the process of exploiting a natural resource is the income 
that is earned after the deduction of the supply price of all domestic 
and foreign factors used within the production process , including 
factors supplied within the direct investment package . 
The supply price of each factor is affected by the nature of 
competition within the relevant factor market . For ease of subsequent 
exposition , let us define the supply price of domestic factors of 
production as the price ruling in the economy at large, or such higher 
price as would apply in a competitive market . This definition allows 
us to speak of wage earners sharing in the "rent " generated by the 
resource project if their earnings exceed competitive or generally 
applicable levels . 
It is useful to distinguish between potential rent, which would be 
generated through the use of the most efficient technology and business 
organization, and realized rent , which allows for the possibility that 
the profitability of a resource investment will be reduced through 
inefficient exploitation or use of the resource . 
Potential rent may be dissipated in inefficient use of the 
resource , distributed amongst the various factors of production as 
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payments in excess of their supply price, or appropriated by the owner 
of the. resource (which is usually the State) or by local or national 
governments which have veto powers over the exploitation of the 
resource . The distribution or dissipation of potential rent in these 
various _ways determines the extent to which the resource projects allow 
higher levels of expenditure to be undertaken within the domestic 
economy . Rents accruing to for eign factors of production are generally 
lost to the domestic economy, although there may be some circumstances 
in which it is easier to induce the re- investment of profits gener ated 
within an economy than to induce new capital inflow. Rents accruing to 
domestic factors of production generally lead to increased expenditure 
within the domestic economy, as do rents accruing to government . 
The payment of rents to domestic workers as wages above levels 
generally ruling in the economy can have important effects beyond the 
distribution of resource rents in some economies. Highly profitable 
mining operations are in a weak political position to resist wage 
claims, their capital intensity places them in a weak industrial 
position vis-a-vis their employees, and their commonly high profits 
give them relatively little incentive to resist such claims . It is 
common for wage levels in resource projects to be well above levels in 
other parts of the economy. High wages can contribute directly to 
excess supply of labor from rural areas in the mining towns . The high 
wages may spread to other regions through demonstration effects and 
considerations of equity, and lead to excess supply of labor in other 
urban areas . 
The State is usually by far the major domestic recipient of 
resource rents, whether directly or through the earnings of national 
corporations . Both the total amount of rent and its distribution 
between the State and foreign investors are determined to a consider-
able degree by some rather technical matters of fiscal policy . 
I t is possible , in principle , for the State to impose financial 
conditions on access to natural resources which claim the rent for 
public revenues , without deterring any investment that would have 
occurred i n the absence of conditions . This follows from the defini-
tion of rent . In the real world , where there is a high degr ee of 
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uncertainty about the possible outcomes of an investment_, it is not 
possible to appropriate the whole of the rent from all resource 
projects without risking the deterrence of some investments that are 
capable of making some contribution to the national revenue.. The 
amount of r ent that can be taken by the State from profitable projects 
without deterring more marginal projects depends very much on the 
system of fiscal levies that is applied to resource investments . The 
effects of various fiscal policy systems are discussed later . 
The supply price of direct investment is expressed in terms of the 
amount of profit after tax that is available for remittance to the 
owners of the investment . It is common for investors to require a 
project to meet a variety of explicit and implicit criteria on expected 
pr ofitability before they are prepared to commit resources to it. For 
large resource investments , the most important single criterion is 
that the investment must generate positive expected net present value 
at the discount rate which the investor judges appropriate to apply to 
total cash flows associated with the project . 
The rent generated by a project i s higher the lower the supply 
price of private foreign investment . Thus it is higher the lower the 
discount rate applied by foreign investors to future cash flows from 
the project . It is also higher the lower the amount of capital which 
the .private investor must place at risk. 
Where the after- tax outcome of an investment is less certain (that 
it, where the variance of possible outcomes is greater), it is usual 
for the investor to apply a higher discount rate to future cash flows 
from the project . A higher expected return is required when there is 
greater risk . This aversion to risk is likely to be especially 
important in the case of investments where the absolute size of 
possible loss is very large, .and therefore a threat to the financial 
standing of the parent company itself. 
The discount rate that investors apply to anticipated cash flows 
associated with an investment is also a function of the opportunity 
cost to them of any funds that might be committed to the project . In a 
purely commercial situation in which the investor raises capital in 
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open markets , funds to all possible i nvestments have similar oppor-
tunity cost . However , if funds are available for some investments but 
not for others , or if cheaper funds are available for some investments , 
the investor may apply a lower discount rate to projects for which the 
concessional finance is available . Thus the amount of rent from a 
natural resource may be increased by the provision of concessional 
funds for its exploitation by foreign governments . 
There -are other determinants of the supply price of investment, 
and so of the rent associated with the exploitation of a resource . One 
is the investor ' s assessment of sovereign risk, or the risk that the 
host government will change the rules that determine the amount of 
profit that accrues to private investors . The structure of the fiscal 
policy system is .another : the variance of after-tax profits will be 
lower (and wi th it the discount rate applied by investors) the more 
fiscal charges are concentrated on profi ts which represent a high 
discounted- cash- flow return on investment . 
Governments collect revenue from the rents genera ted by private 
investments in resource projects through a great variety of mecha·· 
nisms: license fees ; taxes on personal incomes of employees and on 
imports , and other charges on inputs into production; production 
sharing arrangements ; r oyalties related to the volume of ore mined, i ts 
metal content or its value ; export taxes; profits taxes of various 
kinds; withholding taxes on dividends and interest payments ; and 
dividends from government equity purchased on concess i onal terms . 
There are two distinct approaches to the setting of rent charges 
on resource investments . One approach is to establish a general system 
of fiscal policy including taxation rates within which all investors 
operate. It is possible that a general system which collected some 
revenue from intra- marginal projects would deter some investments , no 
matter how carefully it was designed . Similarly , a general sys tern 
would not be able to extract all of the rent from every project , 
although a well- designed fiscal system could extract a high proportion 
of rents from profitable projects without losing large p-0tential rents 
through deterrence of other investments . ~ more severe fiscal system 
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would claim for the revenue a higher proportion of rents from intra-
marginal projects , but may reduce the total amount of rent that is 
generated from resource investments . A balance must be struck between 
these two factors in the implementation of a general system of fiscal 
levies . 
The alternative approach is to tailor the system of fiscal charges 
to each project, through negotiations with the investor . If a govern-
ment knew exactly how investors viewed future expenditures and income 
from each project, together with their attitudes to risk and the 
discount rates that they applied to cash flows anticipated in the 
future, it would be able to claim all of the rent from profitable 
projects without deterring any marginal investment . 
The advantages of the former approach are that it provides a more 
certain environment for exploration, and that it protects the govern-
ment from being exploited in negotiations through its own relative 
ignorance about parameters relevant to investment decisions. In 
practice, most governments choose to use a hybrid approach, in which 
the system of fiscal charges is negotiated within more or less clearly 
defined limits . 
Whatever the approach adopted, the total amount of rent is 
affected by the nature of the levies by which the government obtains 
this revenue. Any charge applied in the early years of a project's 
life must be balanced by the relinquishment of claims to a greater 
amount of revenue in later years . The interaction of uncertainty about 
the outcome of investments with investors' aversion to risk means that 
more revenue can be collected if levies are applied to profits, and 
especially to profits which represent a high realized return on 
investment, than through charges on production or sales, or on profits 
which do not represent a high return on investment.3 
In examining the effect of variations in the supply price of 
investment on government revenue, let us look first at the case where 
the government negotiates the fiscal system separately for each new 
project . If some external factor leads to a reduction in investors' 
discount rates, the government can claim for the revenue the whole of 
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the increase in rent from projects which were previously intra-
marginal , provided only that it is fully aware of the change in the 
supply price of investment . In this situation, the government can also 
claim revenue from previously sub-marginal projects that are viable 
with the new, lower discount rate . 
Where the government has established a system of fiscal levies 
that are applied in the same way to all investors , a reduction in the 
supply price of investment causes more investments to take place , and 
increases the revenue that the government receives from investments 
that had been undertaken at the old supply price of investment . The 
additional investments might include some that would have been under-
taken at the old supply price of investment if no fiscal charges had 
been levied . 
Beyond some scale of investment , corporations tend to apply a 
higher discount rate to future cash flows in the evaluation of a larger 
project, even where the variance of expected outcomes is identical to 
that associated with a more modest investment . This occurs because 
corporations are cautious about accepting the risk of very large 
losses. In this circumstance , both the government and the investor 
have an interest in establishing a consortium to share the risk . It is 
essentially for this reason to reduce the maximum size of the 
possible loss borne by each foreign investor -- that major resource 
investments in developing countries are now increasingly undertaken by 
consortia . 
Private investors place especially high value on the government 
of the host country as a consortium member . In addition to the usual 
benefits of a consortium , it is commonly thought that government 
membership reduces sovereign risk . 
For its part , the government, through participati on in the 
consortium , can share in any untaxed rents that are allowed by the 
system of fiscal levies , earn the high return required by the private 
investor, and increase the total amount of rent through reduction of 
the supply price of private, foreign investment . The government can 
claim all or part of the additional rent through the negotiation of 
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concessional terms for its equity, or through the imposition of a more 
severe system of fiscal levies than would otherwise have been applied, 
Infrastructure of various kinds usually represents a high propor-
tion of the capital expenditure associated with the exploitation of 
natural resources in developing countries. When this infrastructure 
is provided by the private operators as part of the project, the 
project must be expected to generate sufficient after-tax profits to 
recoup the whole of the investment with interest equal to the inves-
tor's high discount rate. 
There are circumstances in which the power, roads, port, town 
facilities, telecommunications and other infrastructure required by a 
resource development provide benefits to the general community, beyond 
the requirements of the project. These external benefits can justify 
some public contribution to ensure that private investors proceed with 
an investment that would otherwise be marginal. The supply price of 
investment is reduced by government provision of infrastructure . The 
high discount rate of private investors is applied to a smaller 
quantity of capital . In addition, the probability of absolute loss or 
very low return is reduced, so that the investors' discount rate is 
reduced. 
When infrastructure is provided with public funds; the government 
may choose to charge for its use at a rate which recoups its costs, 
perhaps with some profit. Alternatively, the government may choose to 
rely entirely on its share of the increased rent to recoup its outlays. 
If no fee is charged for the infrastructure, it is possible for the 
government to suffer an absolute loss through the development of the 
resource, or a net loss through the provision of infrastructure. If a 
user charge is set at a rate designed to recoup the government's 
outlays on infrastructure with interest equal to its own discount rate 
there is little chance of net loss. In the latter case, the amount of 
rent will be raised above the level associated with the investor's 
provision of infrastructure, provided only that the government's dis-
count rate is less than that of the private investor. 4 
When a government's financial relationship to a resource project 
is simply that of a taxing authority, it runs no risk of absolute loss. 
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Where it purchases equity at a commercial price, it runs the same risk 
of absolute loss as the private investor and, as the taxing authority, 
stands to gain proportionately more than the private investor from a 
successful outcome . However, a government is wise to be very much more 
wary abo_ut the provision of infrastructure without economic user 
charges . In the latter case , the government must make its own 
assessment of the likelihood that returns from the project will be too 
small to cover its outlays , in an environment in which the private 
investor has a positive incentive to obscure from the government some 
aspects of the financial realities of the project . 
Of course , the amount of the absolute loss that might be incurred 
by the government, and the amount of additional revenue that must be 
raised as a consequence of the provision of infrastructure for this 
expenditure to be worthwhile, are less the lower the opportunity cost 
to the government of funds used for this purpose . There are many 
mechanisms through which foreign governments and international agen-
cies make funds available on concessional terms to resource invest-
ments in developing countries . The immediate effect of the provision 
of funds through these mechanisms is generally to reduce the supply 
price of investment directly, or to reduce the opportunity cost to host 
governments of funds allocated to resource developments. 
Although the provision of finance to resource projects appears to 
raise the amount of rent available to host governments from each 
individual project , on a global scale such practice may possibly raise 
or lower the total amount of rents available to the governments of 
resource-exporting countries , depending on the effects of these 
measures in increasing world supply and reducing world prices of 
resource- intensive commodities . It should be noted that the extent to 
which official foreign financial assistance increases resource rents 
received by host governments depends on the extent to which it is 
available in support of intramarginal projects (rather than invest-
ments which would be sub- marginal in the absence of assistance) , on the 
extent to which funds are tied to specific uses and sources of supply 
and on the effectiveness of the administrative systems through which 
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aid is receiv.ed in the host country . 5 It is possible for such 
assistance to provide negative net benefits for a recipient when it 
leads to the inefficient use of a resource, when the recipient govern-
ment's financial commitments to a project exceed the concessional 
element in the foreign funding and the shortfall cannot be recovered as 
increased yields from fiscal levies, or when the receipt of tied, 
specific purpose aid for resource investments lowers the quality or 
reduces the quantity of aid for other purposes . 
5 . Macroeconomic Impact 
Resource investments expand the maximum level of real expenditure 
that is sustainable within the domestic economy . This expansion in 
real spending power has important effects on the balance of payments, 
the labor market , and the profitability and scale of activity in other 
industries . 
These important effects have been widely discussed but poorly 
understood within the Western Pacific region . Some advisers and 
commentators on the Indonesian economy have felt that the strong gr owth 
in oil revenues has caused the foreign exchange value of the Indonesian 
rupiah to remain "too high , " and that this has caused an increase in 
the level of unemployment . Very similar propositions have been argued 
seriously in Australia . However , resource investments give rise to 
adverse effects on the main macroeconomic aggregates only in rather 
special circumstances, involving rigidities in patterns of domestic 
expenditure and in labor markets , and difficulties in implementing 
stabilizing fiscal and monetary polici es . 
The balance of payments is affected by resource investments to the 
extent that adjustments to real expenditure fall short of , or exceed, 
the increase in real spending power . In the construction phase of 
resource investments , the increase in real spending power comes via the 
capital inflow. Once production has commenced , it comes via the export 
income , less payments overseas to foreign factors of production . It 
appears as increased incomes of various individuals and groups in the 
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domestic economy (including the government) , plus increased cash 
balances held by foreigners within the domestic monetary system. The 
behavior of the government, usually the principal recipient of 
resource rents, is crucial in determining whether the increase in 
expenditure (absorption) falls short of, equals, or exceeds the 
increased spending power of the economy, and so whether the balance of 
payments impact is positive, neutral or negative . There is a reason-
able presumption that the increase in real spending power within the 
domestic economy will allow governments to meet demands for public 
expenditure more easily without recourse to fiscal policies which lead 
to payments deficits . However, this may not be the case if public 
expenditure becomes geared to expectations of revenue that are 
eventually disappointed - - a situation covered in the later discussion 
of instability . 
Domestic expenditure rises in the construction phase of resource 
investments principally as a result of work on the project itself, 
possibly augmented by increased government expenditure from the expan-
sion of revenues associated with the increase in economic activity. 
After the commencement of production and export , real expenditure is 
raised by the spending of increased incomes flowing from the project 
(or indirectly by expansion of bank credit that has its origins in the 
increased incomes) . 
The increased expenditure raises demand for the products of 
established and potential local industries, as in the " resource trade" 
models. The impact of increased domestic expenditure on the profit-
ability of industries outside the resource sector depends on the 
combined effects of scale economies and of possible increases in 
domestic resource costs, and especially of domestic labor costs . 
To commence analysis of labor market effects, let us assume that 
domestic labor is a homogeneous resource . We need to distinguish three 
separate cases of labor market conditions . Case 1 is the dual economy 
comprising a village and a modern sector, within which the supply of 
labor to the modern sector is infinitely elastic . This is the case 
assumed in the Lewis and subsequent models of the surplus labor 
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economy . Case 2 is the dual economy within which the village sector is 
highly differentiated , having a positive opportunity cost which varies 
considerably across villages and regions . More labor can always be 
induced to migrate from the villages to the modern sector , but only by 
raising the expected level of modern sector incomes . Case 3 is the 
fully monetized economy, in which the supply of wage labor is fixed 
more or less independently of labor market conditions . These highly 
stylized cases do not fit any economy exactly , but the three cases have 
something in common with conditions in Indonesia , Papua New Guinea and 
Australia respectively . 
The effects of an expansion in aggregate demand on the domestic 
economy depend very much on whether wages are set in the market so as 
to equate the supply of and demand for labor , or whether minimum wages 
are established institutionally . 
When wages are set in the labor market , i ncreased domestic 
expenditure raises the real wage level in Cases 2 and 3, but not Case 
1. It induces migration from villages to the modern sector of the 
economy in Cases 1 and 2, but there is no opportunity for such an 
expansion of modern sector labor supply in Case 3. 
unemployment in any of the three cases . 
There is no 
In the alternative situation where institutionally set minimum 
wages constrain the cleaning of the labor market, increased aggregate 
demand induces migration to the modern sector in Case 1, but does not 
affect permanently the wage level or the rate of unemployment . In Case 
2 , increased expenditure induces some additional migration to the 
modern sector (because of the increased probability that a migrant will 
find employment), but also reduces the rate of modern sector unemploy-
ment . In Case 3, there is an even greater reduction in unemployment, 
because there is no increase in total labor supply to the modern 
sector . In Cases 2 and 3, it is possible that the increased expendi-
ture will lead to the elimination of unemployment and to an increase in 
real wages in the marketplace beyond the institutionally- determined 
minimum levels . 
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Increased aggregate demand only reduces modern sector unemploy-
ment to the extent that there is no offsetting increase in minimum wage 
levels. The feeling of prosperity that accompanies the increase in 
national spending power creates an environment within which wage-
setting institutions are more likely than usual to be sympathetic to 
large wage increases, for reasons of "equity," or in accession to 
pressure from wage- earners . This is an important possibility, as 
evidenced by the recent experience of Thailand, Australia and Papua New 
Guinea, where minimum wages were raised considerably through the boom 
period 1972-74 . But it is not an inevitable consequence of boom 
conditions in the export industries, as evidenced by the substantial 
decline in real minimum wages in the Philippines over the same period. 
Of course , labor is not homogeneous in any economy. Even in the 
dual economy in which the general supply of labor to the modern sector 
is infinitely elastic, the scarcities of some skills will increase 
average labor costs to some extent, at least temporarily . There will 
be opportunities for firms and governments to eliminate scarcities of 
particular skills over time, through training and through the accre-
tion of skills "on the job ." 
The changes in domestic labor costs, discussed above, and the 
relationship between scale of output and unit costs in various indus·-
tries, together determine the effect of increased expenditure on 
prices and the sectoral composition of economic activity . Let us trace 
through the effects on the assumption that the foreign exchange value 
of the domestic currency is fixed . 
Total demand for modern, non-traded goods rises with increased 
aggregate demand, the more so since the income elasticity of services 
tends to be high. Economies of scale are relatively unimportant in 
these industries , except perhaps in very small and underdeveloped 
economies . The price of non- traded goods is thus likely to rise with 
the increased cost of domestic labor in (unconstrained labor market) 
Cases 2 and 3. The general price level rises with the price of non-
tradeables . In all cases, output of modern non- traded goods and 
services is likely to expand, and with it employment in that sector . 
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The increase in wages in (unconstrained labor market) Cases 2 and 
3 may cause continued production to be unprofitable in some established 
export- and import- competing industries in which economies of scale 
are relatively unimportant over the relevant range of output. There is 
no similar tendency towards contraction of some established industries 
in (unconstrained labor market) Case 1, or in (constrained labor 
market) Cases 1, 2, or 3. 
The increase in demand is likely to cause investment to be 
profitable for the first time in some industries in which economies of 
scale are important . This effect will be most important where there is 
no increase in the wage level ((unconstrained labor market) Case 3). 
The overall impact of the increase in expenditure on sectoral 
economic activity and employment is as follows . Output and employment 
in the modern, non- tradeables sector rises in all cases . Village 
population falls in all variations of Cases 1 and 2; village production 
of goods and services falls in all variations of Case 2, and probably 
also in Case 1, al though not if the labor of migrants had been 
unemployed in the village. Activity and employment in the modern, 
tradeables sector rises within some industries and falls within 
others. Total output and employment in the modern, tradeables sector 
rises in (unconstrained and constrained labor market) Case 1, (con-
strained labor market) Case 2, and (constrained labor market) Case 3. 
Employment (and possibly output) in the modern, tradeables sector 
falls in (unconstrained labor market) Case 3, and may rise or fall in 
(unconstrained labor market) Case 2 . 
There may be some contraction of employment and output in the 
modern, tradeables sector if the "resources boom" induces increases in 
the institutionally set minimum wage, even in Case 1, which would 
otherwise be immune from contraction of employment in any part of the 
modern sector . 
Apart from the special problem of instability, discussed later, 
the macroeconomic "problems" that are thought to be associated with 
major resource investments derive from the inflationary effect that is 
felt in (unconstrained labor market) Cases 2 and 3, and from the major 
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shifts in the sectoral and industrial composition of economic acti-
vity, and especially from the decline in profitability and employment 
i n some established industries within the modern, tradeables sector . 
The inflationary effects could be offset by raising the foreign 
exchange value of domestic currency . The associated fall in the price 
of tradeables could lead to an increase in the price of labor (and non-
tradeable goods and services) relative to tradeables without an 
increase in the general price level . However, currency revaluation in 
these circumstances carries the political disadvantage that resources 
appear to be "pushed" out of the declining industries by government 
policy action, rather than "pulled" out by superior opportunities 
elsewhere in the economy . 6 This factor may be thought to outweigh the 
political advantages of avoiding inflation in some political system . 
Structural adjustment, involving reduced profitability and possi-
bly reduced output in some established industries, is often seen as a 
problem by governments, which may seek to suppress the expansion of 
expenditure that would otherwise occur within the domestic economy 
through increasingly restrictive fiscal and monetary policy . If 
successful, such measures channel the increased real spending power 
associated with resource investments into higher net domestic holdings 
of foreign assets . This consequence may be desirable in countries 
whose reserve and foreign debt position had previously been weak (for 
example, Indonesia through the 1970s) , but it is not desirable, and in 
many cases not sustainable for very long , in other countries . The 
sterilization of external payments surpluses associated with resource 
investments through budget surpluses is easier to achieve in a small 
economy in which the government is the main recipient of resource 
rents, but its continuation involves the loss of opportunities for 
development and domestic incomes growth . In larger and more complex 
economies, where the growth in incomes associated with resource 
investments is spread more widely through the economy, sterilizati on 
of payments surpluses through tight fiscal and monetary policy 
involves considerable redistribution of income and access to credit, 
Which is resisted politically by groups which stand to lose from 
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continuation of such policies . The degree of restriction in fiscal and 
monetary policy -- and the amount of income redistribution -- must be 
increased if continuing payments surpluses and tight monetary condi-
tions induce capital inflow. It is very likely that the resistance to 
sterilization will force its abandonment through revaluation or , in 
the more common case , an inflationary adjustment that is the more 
traumatic for having been postponed . This was the Australian experi-
ence through the early 1970s . 
Microeconomic measures to resist structural adjustment may be 
more successful but , like successful sterilization strategies at the 
macro level , they squander opportunities for development and increased 
incomes . As at the macroeconomic level, the effects of particular 
measures to assist industries which have been hurt by increased 
domestic incomes depend on labor market conditions . Let us examine the 
limiting case of successful protection of earlier levels of produc-
tion, employment and profitability in all modern, tradeables indus-
tries . In Case 3, all rents would be dissipated as subsidies and the 
establishment of resource projects themselves would be frustrated . In 
Case 2, protection of threatened industries would dissipate some but 
probably not all of the rent . 
Changes in the industrial composition of economic activity 
generate frictional and structural unemployment , and this is an 
inevitable accompaniment of rapid growth in exports of resource- based 
commodities . But resource investments do not contribute directly in 
any way to tendencies towards increased unemployment in some circum-
stances ; and where they lead directly to the decline in employment in 
some industries , this effect follows from increased tightness in 
modern sector labor markets . However , subsequent government interven-
tion in raising minimum wage levels may be a proximate cause of 
increased unemployment of a general and more permanent kind . These 
problems as well as problems of structural and frictional unemployment 
are greater in unstable economic conditions . 
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6. Macroeconomic Instability 
As discussed above, two different types of instability are asso-
ciated with heavy reliance on exports of resource-intensive 
commodities . First, investment proceeds in large steps, giving rise to 
an uneven rate of growth in productive capacity. Second, exports and 
incomes from established projects vary cyclically with world market 
conditions . Each gives rise to problems for domestic economic manage-
ment. 
The capacity to implement programs of public expenditure effi-
ciently grows incrementally . Private sector expenditure pat terns 
reveal similar if less obvious characteristics . There is thus a 
considerable risk that large increases in public expenditure asso-
ciated with the stepwise growth in revenue from resource rents will be 
used wastefully . This can have a corrosive effect on the development 
effort beyond the purely economic loss involved in the wasteful use of 
financial resources . The dissipation of part of the sudden large 
increase in Indonesian oil revenues through the 1970s provides the most 
dramatic example of this phenomenon in the Western Pacific region . 
Cyclical variations in expenditure that can be associated with 
cyclical variations in the volume or value of exports present different 
kinds of problems . Any substantial fall in total domestic expenditure 
may threaten the viability of new industries established on the basis 
of scale economies that are only available at peak levels of demand . 
It is possible for this to give rise to a process of cumulative decline 
in economic activity . These dangers are less if there is a high 
underlying rate of "neo- classical" growth . They are also less impor-
tant in a large economy in which economies of scale are critically 
important at the margin to a smaller proportion of domestic production 
of tradeables . 
Cyclical variations in expenditure have even more important 
effects through the labor market . Real wage levels that appear to be 
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justified at the height of domestic expenditure are too high for full 
employment to be maintained when the value of resource exports is 
cyclically low. Wages are commonly (although not universally) rigid 
downwards, so that a large reduction in real expenditure can lead to 
intractable unemployment . Several countries in the Western Pacific 
region have experienced problems of this nature in recent years . 
Large fluctuations in the volume of aggregate demand also contri. 
bute to uncertainty in investment decisions (and so to increases in the 
supply price of investment) and to frictional and structural unemploy. 
ment. 
Problems associated both with the stepwise increase in productive 
capacity and with the cyclical variation in demand can be managed if 
governments set fiscal and monetary instruments so as to place total 
expenditure on a path of growth that is sustainable through the 
resource investment cycle and the external business cycle . This 
involves accurately assessing long-term trends in international mar-
kets and their effects on domestic spending power, setting policy 
instruments accurately to produce desired levels of expenditure 
growth, and enforcing these policy settings through periods in which 
official, net foreign assets are rising strongly, against the inevit-
able political pressures to spend up to short-term limits . Each of 
these three elements of successful stabilization strategy is diffi-
cult . If the government succeeds in maintaining aggregate expenditure 
on a path of more or less steady growth, there will inevitably be some 
variation in the components of total expenditure. 
Domestic economic management along the lines described in the 
preceding paragraph can insulate the domestic economy from much of the 
effect of variation in external demand . But stabilization strategies 
must be based on some concept of "average" conditions, and are likely 
to be upset by market developments that are outside the reasonably 
foreseeable range of possibilities . There was nothing in the postwar 
world economy ' s experience to suggest that a dislocation in world 
demand for some non-ferrous metals could be as severe or enduring as 
that which has been experienced over recent years . Individual national 
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governments can do little to avoid economic problems associated with 
unprecedented behavior in markets for minerals and metals . 
7. Longer- term Effects on Growth 
Resource investments raise the maximum level of expenditure that 
can be sustained within the domestic economy . Expenditure of resource 
rents raises incomes , economic activity and modern sector employment . 
The composition of the increased expenditure determines its subsequent 
effects on development within the economy as a whole . 
Analysis of the composition of expenditure takes us into general 
questions of public finance, development planning and development 
administration that have little special relationship to resource 
investments . We have already noted that instability makes it more 
difficult to use increases in spending power that derive from resource 
investments effectively . Good domestic management can reduce greatly 
but not eliminate these difficulties . 
There is a second major connection between the effectiveness with 
which increased spending power is used , and its origins in resource 
investments . The resource rents accrue mainly to governments in the 
first instance . They are thus available for distribution according to 
government priorities, without the political and administrative diffi-
culties and with out the allocative dis tort ions that are commonly 
associated with other means of raising government revenue . 
The initial concentration of increased income in the hands of the 
government carries potentially important advantages . The advantages 
are greatest in countries with limited infrastructure and in which 
public investment can be expected to yield very high social returns , 
but within which it is not easy to greatly increase public revenues by 
other means . Indonesia and Papua New Guinea provide good examples of 
such countries within the Western Pacific region . Alternatively , if a 
government judges that social returns are higher on private than on 
public investment, it can reduce taxation or make funds available to 
the private sector in other ways . I f it judges that funds are best 
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used within the public sector, but invested in directly productive 
enterprises, it can make part of its share of the rents available to a 
state corporation for i nvestment (as was the Indonesian pattern before 
Pertamina ' s financial collapse in 1976) . 
But these are potential benefits that can be realized only through 
wise, honest and efficient administration . The availability of large 
resource rents places a premium on these qualities of good government, 
8 . Income Distribution 
The heavy regional concentration of resource investments, and the 
tendency for direct linkages to be concentrated in the immediate 
vicinity of the mine, generate enclaves of high incomes and high 
standards of services . Where a mine is established in a previously 
poor region, it may eliminate and reverse earlier patterns of inter-
regional inequality . The new, inter-regional inequalities are exacer-
bated to the extent that local communities and a local or provincial 
tier of government can successfully claim a significant part of the 
rents generated by a project, as is possible through legal or political 
processes in many countries . They can be mitigated by large- scale 
migration of labor from more distant parts of the country . 
The macroeconomic impact of resource projects, in raising the 
maximum wage level that is consistent with full employment in urban 
labor markets, or in reducing unemployment, tends to reduce inequality 
in the distribution of incomes in the country as a whole . However, 
this is not the case, and the opposite may be the case, if a changed 
industrial relations environment f ollowing major resource investments 
leads to large wage increases and increased unemployment . 
Provided that the national government receives the greater part 
of rents, as is usually the case, it has a greatly increased capacity 
to promote development in poor regions and redress inequalities in many 
ways. National governments also have considerable influence over 
changes in the wage level following expansion of resource investments, 
and over the inter-regional inequalities associated with projects' 
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direct linkages. 
Major resource developments can be important aids in implementing 
programs aimed at reducing inequalities in the distribution of bene-
fits and services . But as with the long-term growth effects, much 
hangs on the wisdom, effectiveness and honesty of national govern-
ments. A corrupt government, or one that is vulnerable to pressures 
from urban and other privileged groups, is likely to use much of its 
increased spending power in ways that exacerbate existing income 
inequalities. 
9 . Domesti c and International Policy 
We began the discussion of the role of natural resource invest-
ments in the development process by examining briefly the "resource 
trade" models of trade and development . These models describe a number 
of characteristics of growth based on the export of natural resources, 
but indicate that the precise impact of resource exports depends very 
much on the nature of the particular linkages with the domestic 
economy, which vary from industry to industry and economy to economy. 
A brief examination of the characteristics of major minerals and 
energy investments in the Western Pacific region suggested that the 
most important linkages were via expenditure of resource rents . The 
amount and distribution of these rents depends very much on the system 
of fiscal levies that are applied to resource projects. The government 
is the principal recipient of resource rents within the domestic 
economy of the host country. 
The developmental impact of resource investments depends criti-
cally on the effectiveness of national governments in identifying and 
taxing resource rents, and in using the rents in ways that contribute 
to attainment of various national objectives. Resource investments 
can promote incomes growth and reduction in inequalities in the 
distribution of incomes and services, two major stated objectives of 
almost all governments. But the existence of a strong administrative 
apparatus for managing both the resource investments themselves and 
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public expenditure is a precondition for the realization of this 
potential. 
The government of a resource-exporting developing country is more 
likely to succeed in using well the potential for development inherent 
in opportunities for resource trade if there is stable expansion in the 
world economy as a whole, and especially in large, proximate industrial 
countries. There is no new lesson in this, and the industrial 
countries in their own interests are seeking to achieve more stable 
growth. But given that there will continue to be major fluctuations in 
world industrial activity, can the international community do anything 
to reduce the impact of this instability on the resource-exporting 
developing countries? 
Instability in markets for resource-intensive commodities creates 
the largest problems in exporting countries, but the industrial coun-
tries share an interest in stable commodity prices. Private specula-
tion does not have a sufficiently large stabilization effect, because 
the financial resources available are too small and because private 
expectations about future market conditions are subject to large 
shifts in line with the general climate of optimism about future 
industrial growth. In addition, the national and international bene-
fits of commodity price stability are not internalized in the rewards 
of successful, private speculation, so that we can expect a less than 
optimal amount of resources to be provided to these activities. 
There is thus a case for public financing of stocks in an attempt 
to stabilize prices and, since many countries gain from more stable 
prices, for international cooperation in the stabilization exercise. 
This is the logical basis for attempts in recent years to establish 
international buffer stocks of various commodities, and to develop 
countries' demands for a "Common Fund" to finance the holding of 
stocks. The Fund would need to be very large indeed to be effective in 
stabilizing prices, and there would be very large costs in terms of 
eventual market dislocation if attempts were made to stabilize prices 
at levels that were not sustainable in the long term. The "Common 
Fund" would need to be well conceived and very large to provide 
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important beneficial effects . Short of such large- scale international 
efforts, it would seem to be sensible for governments of individual 
industrial countries to finance the holding of stocks on a large scale 
in times of weak demand . This would be least costly for each country 
when the weak demand coincided with tendencies towards surplus in 
external payments, as in Japan and West Germany at the present time. 
The main problems created for developing countries by instability 
in resource markets could be eliminated through international arrange-
ments which guaranteed government revenue against fluctuations in 
export prices . Governments in developing countries could be invited to 
plan future expenditure on the basis of reasonable expectations of 
revenues from resource investments in "average" conditions, along the 
lines of the Papua New Guinea approach in the Mineral Resources 
Stabilization Fund. 7 Loans, repayable only in the event of market 
prices later exceeding agreed expectations of "average" levels , could 
be made available to developing countries on a bilateral or multi-
lateral basis when revenues fell below "average" levels . The Interna-
tional Monetary Fund's Compensatory Finance Facility has some of the 
required characteristics, although the scale of its activities is too 
small to be of major importance . This approach also has much in common 
with the "Stabex" arrangements of the European Economic Community, and 
with requests of Japan made by ASEAN countries in 1977 . It makes fewer 
demands on financial resources than successful buffer stock arrange-
ments, and by avoiding direct intervention in commodity markets it 
avoids the risk of future dislocation associated with attempts to 
stabilize prices at unrealistic levels . 
International cooperation could assist the governments of 
developing countries in turning endowments of natural resources into 
broadly- based development . But the most important determinant of the 
effects of resource exports on development will continue to be the 
performance of those governments themselves . 
FOOTNOTES 
1Richard E. Caves, "'Vent for Surplus' Models of Trade and 
Growth," Trade Growth and the Balance of Payments, Essays in Honor of 
Gottfried Haberler , Rand, McNally and Co . , Chicago, 1965 . 
2rronically, news of the I . R.S. ruling came to the Western Pacific 
region at about the same time that Secretary of State Kissinger was 
endorsing the production sharing concept at the Nairobi meeting of 
UNCTAD . Subsequent IRS rulings , however, may have resolved this 
conflict . 
3These issues are discussed and an optimal system of resource 
taxation is suggested in Ross Garnaut & Anthony Clunies Ross, "Uncer-
tainty, Risk Aversion and the Taxing of Natural Resource Projects ," 
Economic Journal , 85, (June 1975) , pp . 272- 287 ; and the same authors 
in, "The Neutrality of Taxes on Resource Rents" (unpublished paper) . 
4This is the usual case (if only because the government does not 
need to discount for sovereign risk) whenever governments have some 
access to international capital markets (which is also the usual case) . 
5These issues are discussed in Ross Garnaut, "Aid , Natural 
Resources and Development ," paper delivered to the Development Studies 
Centre, Australian National University , Canberra, 15 June 1977 . 
6This assymetry between political responses to revaluation and 
increases in the domestic price level has been pointed out by Richard 
Snape in a: paper to the University of New South Wales workshop on 
exchange rates , Sydney , 1977 . 
7The Papua New Guinea Mineral Resources Stabilization Fund was 
discussed at some length at the Seventh Pacific Trade and Development 
Conference in Auckland in 1975 . 
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RESOURCE TRADE AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
A COMMENT 
Kuo-shu Liang 
Garnaut's fine paper seeks to identify the nature of opportuni-
ties and problems associated with the resource trade and development 
process in developing countries . The analysis is, in an abstract way, 
aimed at understanding fundamentals . I am very happy to have an 
opportunity to comment on this fine paper . My brief comments will 
focus on the following points : 
(1) Garnaut began his discussion of the role of natural resource 
investments in the development process by examining briefly the "vent-
for- surplus" model of trade and development. This model is an 
interesting tool for the analysis of the "opening up" phase of trade 
development, 1 but the mineral sector may, by its nature, become very 
export-oriented. The effects of production- function differences may 
emerge as an important determinant of development pat terns, by com-
paring a development which specializes in export-oriented, labor-
intensi ve manufacturers with one of mineral industry projects which 
are very capital-intensive and require enormous infrastructures . Much 
greater investigation of country experiences may be required so as to 
understand more fully the effects of production-function differences 
which may have to be carefully considered in the formulation of plans 
for further development. 
(2) As pointed out by Garnaut, substantial benefits can accrue to 
a country from properly structured and administered mineral industry 
projects . Mining activity provides additional public and private 
revenues, furnishes foreign- exchange earnings, stimulates development 
of infrastructures , and improves the professional and technical skills 
of nationals . However, there is no doubt that the development of the 
mineral industry can also have adverse effects on the economy of 
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developing countries . Demand for industrial raw materials varies more 
than industrial production . Changes in the general expectation of 
industrial growth and price trend can cause speculation to be destabi-
lizing . Mineral- export projects have also remained enclaves in many 
cases, better integrated with the outside world than with the host 
economies, and have allowed few backward linkages . Even though Garnaut 
points out that indirect effects thr ough expenditures of rents 
generated by resource production are much more important than the 
direct linkages, he also correctly realizes that much hangs on the 
wisdom, effectiveness , and honesty of the national government . It 
seems to me that the problems of export- induced internal instability 
need more careful investigation . Developing countries may be more 
vulnerable to export fluctuations because of their limited capacity to 
deal with disturbances generated by export instability . Even pros-
pects for any kind of international endeavor , whether by exporters , 
importers, or both , are far less predictable . 2 
(3) With attendant risk and capital requirements in the mining 
industry much higher than for other industries , an industry structure 
has been created which is dominated by international corporate giants 
that are sophisticated in finance and technological information . With 
the changing role played by these giant corporations , and in order to 
open up new opportunities for cooperation in joint ventures , it seems 
to me that , from a long- term growth standpoint, it is particularly 
important to provide a framework of fairly predictable rules 
especial ly a predictable tax structur e of the fiscal policy system 
by which the investment decisions are to be made . The precise relation 
between the multinational cor porations or joint ventures and the host 
country has to be clearly defined . Governments must respect its 
agreement, and companies , on their part, must show increased concern in 
their economic contribution to the country in which they operate . 
Their role has to go beyond the traditional objective of maximizing 
company profits . 
(4) Regarding mineral processing , both scale economies and costs 
of capital investment have to be carefully taken into account . Since 
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forward linkage into fabricating minerals is not so reliable as 
backward linkage, market opportunities become very important . With 
excess capacity now existing in developed countries , I do not think 
that developing countries should carry on mineral processing projects 
at this time . New firms in developing countries will face very keen 
competition from established firms in developed countries which may 
price at their marginal costs . 
FOOTNOTES 
1R. Findlay, Trade and Specialization (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 
1970)' p . 76 . 
2s. Krasner, "The Quest for Stability : Structuring the Inter-
national Commodities Markets," in G. Garvey and L. A. Garvey, Interna-
tional Resource Flows (Lexington, Mass .: Lexington Books, 1977), p. 
54. 
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RESOURCE TRADE AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN DEVELOPlNG COUNTRIES 
A COMMENT 
Anthony Scott 
Garnaut' s paper reveals his wide familiarity with the options 
open to host countries whose minerals and other durable natural 
resources have attracted offers from raw-material- hungry firms and 
countries . In view of the smallness of the domestic markets in host 
countries, and the enormous concentrations available for production 
and sale , he rightly bases his analysis on Richard Caves ' well- known 
vent- for- surplus model, modifying it for the different conditions in 
different economies . Other writers have of course noticed the appro-
priateness of this model. Harold Innis and Douglas North made much of 
the approach to explain the whole "staple" or "export- orientation" of 
early North American settlement and development . The later Spengler 
volume on natural resources and growth contains several useful global 
applications, not the least those by Adler and Kindleberger . 
As Garnaut makes clear, the problem does not lie in applying the 
staples (i . e., vent- for- surplus) approach to explain the life-history 
of the export industry itself; the model fits very well . Nor is there 
any difficulty in tracing the backward linkage from the resource 
industry to the supplying industries and activities that it engenders . 
Garnaut can be brief on this subject because so much has already been 
done by other writers. 
I was surprised that after a fairly long list of types of backward 
linkage, Garnaut concluded that they were of "limited importance . " 
This conclusion may have emerged because the backward linkages are not 
for current inputs so much as for capital goods , structures and 
infrastructures . Unfortunately these important durable inputs do not 
often show up on input- output tables , and are therefore forgotten or 
written off. There is some evidence that Garnaut is not interested in 
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the employment created by the construction complementary to the 
resource project . 
Apart from this parenthetically- mentioned problem, Garnaut makes 
it clear that the real challenge of the staple approach to development 
is in what he calls " indirect linkage," referring to the capture of a 
share of the rent from the foreign developer ; in the instability of 
this revenue; and in the labor market ratchet effects . Surprisingly 
little is said about forward linkages . In many resource- export regions 
these are created by requiring that the developing industry establish 
refineries and other plants to process the raw materials on the spot. 
I am particularly impressed with the thorough examination of 
modes of taxation (indirect linkage) and of macroeconomic instability. 
These authoritative sections, which extend the previous Garnaut- Ross 
advocacy of a Resource Rent Tax, applied to profits rather than to 
output . This system is very like the "stumpage" or "Crown dues " system 
of pricing already used in taxing the use of publicly- owned timber, and 
has recently been applied (as a "net-royalty" ) to the newly- developed 
coal resources of Alberta, and doubtless to many other resources and 
locations . In ·one way or another, this subject is blended with 
Garnaut's concern about the domestic inflationary effects of resource 
booms . The inflation is expressed in terms of the foreign value of the 
domestic currency . At various points Garnaut seems to be leading up to• 
a suggestion that the Resource Rent Tax could itself become a means of 
sterilization and wage control, but I do not think that this point is 
fully made . 
I wish to draw attention to what I believe is a major omission in 
Garnaut' s exposition . As an expert on mining taxation and tenure, 
Garnaut must be aware of the fact that most minerals occur in a 
Ricardian array of grades, so that prolonged mining runs into higher 
costs; and that most mineral sites are eventually exhaustible, no 
matter how low the cut- off grade that is chosen . How do these facts 
modify the approach of the paper? 
First , the staple or Caves approach is not fully applicable 
because the discovery and opening- up of a new resource site will 
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eventually be followed by its decline and closure . I have dealt with 
this problem in my "declining regions" application of the staples 
approach (1965) . This is no curiosity . It makes the somewhat academic 
division of types of labor force suggested by the author inadequate to 
deal with the cycle of labor force problems that accompany mineral 
development. Garnaut may hope that something else will come along 
after the mineral is all removed; but as Welsh and Appalachian coal 
suggests, this does not usually happen . 
Second, Garnaut's paper seems to me to be based on the assumption 
that the costs and productivity of mines are fixed . In reality they 
rise as the amount removed accumulates, and fall with new local 
discoveries of extensions or of technologies that are locally 
applicable. Thus mines may open and close in a fashion that Caves 
(dealing mostly with agriculture) did not fully realize. Garnaut is 
correct, for example, in pointing out that -- as transport costs change 
-- whole resource regions may be admitted to, or shut off from , world 
trade . What he omits is that this process may not be monotonic . 
Regions may be opened up, abandoned, rediscovered, and so forth , many 
times. Placer gold and tin, coal and peat, bedded minerals, and most 
metals illustrate this theme . Today's played- out region is tomorrow ' s 
new play . 
Third, and more serious, Garnaut seems always to take the proposed 
rate of production as given . It is important to recognize that in the 
mineral world the rate of production impinges on fixed mineral reserves 
and so increases inversely with the life of a mine . Consider the 
following itemized list of connections between Garnaut's subjects and 
the life of the mine . 
1. A true net tax on mineral profits probably has no effect 
on the investor ' s planned life of his mine; but the Garnaut-
Ross scheme is not exactly neutral in this sense . 
2 . The impact of the mine on the labor market can be 
minimized by specifying by law or contract that the mine must 
be exploited at a certain slow rate . This may cut the cash 
profits and the financial revenues to the government , but it 
will also reduce the social cost of overly rapid labor 
immigration , followed by early unemployment as the mineral 
is exhausted . 
172 
3. Government provision of infrastructure makes labor less 
expensive , increases the privately planned rate of mining , 
and shortens the life of the mine . 
4 . Rapid mining wastes specialized infrastructure at both 
the "boom- town" and "ghost- town" ends of the life of the 
deposit . 
5 . High rates of interest, that deter structural invest-
ment , also increase the opportunity cost of holding minerals 
. in the ground and so may result in increased (not decreased) 
rates of investment . 
6 . High taxes , high labor costs, and the absence of infra-
structure, may lead to the postponing of production , but 
they do not lead to the destruction of the resource . If the 
"user cost" of the mineral is rising faster than the domestic 
demand for revenues, the economy may gain, not lose, from 
delaying going into production . In particular , it may be 
worthwhile to skim the cream and leave the rest for better 
markets . 
Finally , Garnaut ' s paper suggests that all mining and raw-
material extraction is capital intensive . It certainly may look that 
way , especially in developing countries , where capi tal is otherwise 
very scarce . But in general, mining can vary in its capital intensity, 
as can manufacturing and the service industries . Furthermore , there is 
general agreement that the resource industries in general pass thr ough 
phases, of which the high- capital intensity phase is not the fina l one. 
It is poss i ble that new technologies will encourage small establish-
ments and shor t transportation routes rather than massive investment . 
I have examined some of these possibilities in my 1962 paper ; the work 
of Nathan Rosenberg and of John U. Nef points the same way . 
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RESOURCE TRADE AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Garnaut agreed with Liang that the internal impacts of export 
instability created an important policy problem, but noted that a 
detailed discussion of it was outside the general scope of his survey, 
He further pointed out two offsetting influences on the exposure of 
LDCs to export instability . On the one hand, LDCs were generally 
heavily specialized in a few exports, but, on the other hand, macro-
economic adjustment policies may be more effective than in developed 
countries, due to greater real wage flexibility and other factors . A 
recent Brookings study on economic stability was cited in support of 
the latter point . Garnaut also agreed that an environment of well-
defined government rules was important for the investment decisions of 
multinationals, but thought that other types of investment uncertainty 
were more important . He further noted that incremental processing 
capacity probably would shift to developing countries more efficiently 
located, as evidenced, by the relocation of Japanese non- ferrous metal 
industry capacity . 
In response to Scott, Garnaut said that his point was not that 
direct linkages were unimportant, but rather were relatively unimpor-
tant compared to indirect linkages . Variation in a special resource 
rent tax would not in itself be important for stabilization since 
corporate expenditures in the resource industry were more related to 
expected future profits than current profits. In addition, disposi-
tion of government rents is more important than the disposition of 
corporate rents . The domestic effects of possible exhaustion were 
ignored because this was not an immediate problem in the Pacific 
Region, although it may be in the long term. 
In some countries, such as Chile, the resource industry consists 
largely of domestic private firms, rather than foreign or government 
enterprises . For such countries price instability may induce 
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potentially inefficient conglomeration for purposes of diversifica-
tion, which points to the need for more developed capital markets in 
LDCs to provide diversification opportunities . Garnaut agreed that 
inefficient capital markets could lead to underinvestment in resource 
industries . 
Considerable controversy arose over whether tax on rent would 
have neutral allocative effects . One participant asserted that a rent 
tax will always affect the long- term level output . Corresponding to an 
array of investment opportunities is a distribution of rents, and the 
pattern of investment depends on the ordering of the distribution . 
Unless a tax is applied evenly across investment projects , a rent tax 
will change the ranking of investment opportunities . It was pointed 
out that if international capital markets were perfect, and if taxable 
rent was exclusive of minimum return necessary to induce investment, 
then a rent tax would be allocatively neutral . But if capital markets 
were imperfect, so that loanable funds were inelastic, then a rent tax 
would influence the allocation of loanable funds . Garnaut insisted 
that if the correct discount rate were incorporated, a tax on pure rent 
would be allocatively neutral regardless of capital market conditions . 
There was a related discussion on the appropriate definition of 
rent . It was agreed that it should exclude essential costs of 
production as well as minimally required risk premia . 
Some discussion also focused on the ethical question of the 
distribution of rent . One participant contended that there should be 
no presumption that taxing away of rent was either necessary or 
desirable . Distribution of economic rent between profits and wages may 
have efficiency benefits, including less unemployment . However , 
Garnaut noted that higher wages in a resource industry could have 
negative spillover effects on other segments of the economy . A counter 
ethical argument was that resources were a commonly shared natural 
endowment . Rent in excess of normal returns to risk taking should be 
equitably distributed . It was pointed out that , empirically , the body-
politic concurs that a general distribution of benefits is more 
desirable . Finally , someone half- facetiously suggested that the 
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common heritage argument implied that benefits should be distributed 
across the world community rather than a national community. 
A participant felt the paper should have discussed the structural 
changes resulting from expenditures of the government surplus from 
running operations, and their implications for development, and that 
it might be useful to analyze such structural change within subclasses 
of LDC experience . Garnaut countered that the pattern of government 
expenditures was generally unrelated to revenue sources, and so was not 
directly relevant to a discussion of resource-based development. 
Another participant remarked that the case for public financing 
of commodity stocks to stabilize prices was not obvious, since it was 
not known how such a scheme would actually work, nor whether increased 
government intervention in markets might be self-defeating. Garnaut 
agreed on the latter point, particularly if market clearing prices were 
incorrectly assessed. He thought the least danger for market disloca-
tions lay in schemes for stabilizing revenues of host countries . 
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OCEAN MINING IN THE PACIFIC BASIN : STIMULUS AND RESPONSE 
Michael Gorham* 
1. Introduction 
There are scarce mineral resources resting upon the ocean floor 
outside the domain of any nation state .** There are a number of 
countries who would like to control the allocation of these resources 
and these countries can be divided into three basic categories : those 
who want to directly exploit the resources; those who want to prevent , 
or at least delay or slow down , the exploitation ; and those who simply 
want to share directly in the benefits of exploitation. 
The first group consists chiefly of many of the developed or 
industrialized countries of the world . Their motivation is dual . On 
the one hand, the governments of the developed countries are acting in 
a national security sense to assure their economies continued supplies 
of strategic raw materials. This desire is based upon both the extreme 
import dependence of many industrialized countries for a number of 
important minerals, and the OPEC- induced fear of the future cartel-
ization of some of these commodities .*** The other motivation of the 
*Associate Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco . The 
author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Gigi Hsu, 
Pat Rea and Miriam Ciochon and the constructive criticism of Jack 
Beebe, Larry Butler, Kurt Dew, Yvonne Levy, Nick Sargen, Ken Froewiss 
and other members of the Research Department of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco. 
**While the ocean in general and the seabed in particular contain a 
number of valuable resources, the focus in this paper is the potato-
like concretions of nickel, copper, cobalt, manganese and a number of 
trace minerals, known as manganese nodules. 
***The actual potential for cartels in strategic minerals is 
apparently small according to the nine volume, Charles River Asso-
ciates, Policy Implications of Producer Country Supply Restrictions, 
Washington, D. C.: Experimental Technology Incentives Program, 
National Bureau of Standards, February 1977 . In particular, the study 
found that price of cobalt was already near its monopoly optimum. .Q£.!_ 
~. Vol. I, p. 188. 
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industrialized countries lies in acting as agents for the companies who 
would like to exploit the seabed minerals. These companies (generally 
large natural resource companies) see the seabed as a potentially 
cheaper source of minerals in light of the rapidly rising cost of land-
based mining, and are large and technically experienced enough to 
command the large amounts of financial capital required to develop 
ocean mining and processing facilities. 
The basic negotiating position of these countries in general and 
of the United States in particular is that of as free access as 
possible by private enterprise to the seabed minerals . For countries 
which house potential ocean miners, the self-interest basis of this 
position is obvious . Unimpeded and lightly taxed (by international 
authorities), ocean mining for the processing country means decreased 
import dependence, an improved balance of payments, increased govern-
ment revenues (through customary taxes) and eventual trickle-down 
benefits to secondary producers and consumers. But to go along with 
this pure self-interest argument, the developed countries have at 
their disposal an economic efficiency, world welfare argument : that 
the world output of all goods and services would be greater with 
unfettered ocean mining than without. 
The second group consists of those countries who perceive them-
selves as being net losers should ocean mining become important . These 
include countries such as Gabon and Zambia who employ more than 
10 percent of their workforce in landbased mining or Zambia, Chile, and 
Zaire who derive more than half their export earnings from copper. 
Actually, the number of countries which would be net losers from free-
access, untaxed ocean mining may be quite small, but it is clearly in 
the short- run self interest of this group to attempt to either delay 
ocean mining or to demand compensation for damages suffered from ocean 
mining . However, the world welfare implications of this approach 
should be clear, since one would be hard put to find a single 
technological change in the history of mankind which did not do some 
harm to someone . 
The third group of countries includes those who neither intend to 
mine the seabed nor have domestic mining industries subject to serious 
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revenue losses when the seabed is mined, but would still like to 
benefit from the exploitation of what has come to be considered by many 
to be international property . While international legal scholars 
still debate the issue, the seabed has become transformed from being no 
one's property to being everyone's property, at least in the minds of a 
large portion of the international community .* If the seabed is 
international property, reasons this third group, then the interna-
tional community should share directly in the benefits generated by its 
use, either through taxation and regulation of miners from private 
industry or through direct exploitation by an agency representing the 
international community. 
This paper takes on three tasks: ( 1) to define the economic 
factors responsible for the very recent interest in ocean minerals, 
despite the fact that their existence had been known for a century; 
(2) to examine the likely economic consequences should ocean mining 
commence under a traditional free- access, unregulated institutional 
framework for the use of ocean resources; and ( 3) to examine the 
potential for the construction of a new institutional framework in 
light of both economic efficiency and the self- interest of the various 
nations potentially affected by ocean mining . Thus the paper is 
constructed in terms of explaining a stimulus and a response -- the 
stimulus to the interest in ocean mining and both the potential 
response of the world economy (or the relevant subparts thereof) to the 
advent of ocean mining and the actual response of the world polity to 
the threat of this potential response of the world economy . 
*The first manifestation of this transformation can be seen in the 
famous 1967 UN speech of the Maltese Ambassador in which seabed 
resources were declared to be the "common heritage of mankind ." In 
December, 1969 , the UN passed Resolution 2574-D, better known as 
"Moratorium Resolution," which declared that no claims to seabed ore 
deposits be recognized and no seabed mining take place until an 
international regime was established . Then a year later, the General 
Assembly passed the "Declaration of Principles" Resolution in which it 
was reaffirmed that the seabed was not subject to appropriation and 
that no party should acquire or exercise rights to the seabed that were 
incompatible with the yet-to- be decided international regime . 
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What will be discovered in Section 1 is that ocean mining Will 
become a viable new sector in the early 1980's due to a convergence of 
three factors : (1) a significant rise in the value of nodules over the 
past decade, (2) a decline in the potential cost of ocean mining due to 
a changing technological environment, and (3) a gradual rise in the 
cost of the existing method of obtaining minerals through traditional 
land- based mining . In Section 2 it will be shown that even though the 
benefits of free-access ocean mining are heavily skewed toward the 
industrialized countries, only a handful of countries stand to lose 
from free access ocean mining . Section 3 will discuss several basic 
economic issues involved in the design of the new institutional 
framework for allocating ocean resources . 
1 . Why Ocean Mining Now 
One of the first questions that arises concerning ocean mining is 
"why now?" Why the surge of interest in nodule mining during the early 
1970's? While one could phrase an answer in political terms -- that 
is, in terms of the increasing dependence of the U. S., Japan and other 
industrialized countries upon the import of strategic raw materials, 
accompanied by an OPEC- induced fear of the rise of new commodity 
cartels -- this would only explain why the governments of these 
countries have become interested. 1 While there is keen government 
interest -- the Japanese, the United States, the French and the German 
governments have all devoted some effort to both basic and more 
commercially-oriented research on manganese nodules -- very large sums 
of private capital have also been expended on the exploration of ocean 
mining sites and the development of mining and processing techniques. 
In short, the pri va.te sectors of several countries, but especially of 
the United States, have decided that nodule mining is finally profit-
able . 
This new profitability has resulted from both a rise in the 
potential revenue from nodule mining due to the rise in the prices of 
the minerals contained in the nodules, and from a fall in the cost of 
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producing metals from the sea, especially when compared to the cost of 
land- based production . Each of these is discussed in turn . 
The Value of Nodules 
Since there has never been a market for manganese nodules, neither 
has there been an observed price . However, there have been markets and 
observed prices for the component metals which will be won from the 
nodules . Using historic price data for the four metals most likely to 
be extracted from nodules , along with prospecting data on the average 
composition of nodules from three oceans and one private claim , a time 
profile of the implicit gross value of nodules has been constructed . 
The profile, depicted in Figure 1 , denotes the value of a pound of 
nodules after mining and processing, assuming no ocean- mining effect 
on metal prices . What one observes in both the nominal and deflated 
series is that the value of nodules rose during the early and mid-
1950 ' s, peaked in about 1957, slid back until the mid- 1960 ' s and then 
began an almost uninterrupted ten- year ascent , reaching record levels 
in 1975 . So during the past ten years the nominal value of nodules has 
more than doubled and increased about 50 percent more rapidly than 
either the U. S. Wholesale Price Index or the I.M .F. Index of World 
Traded Good . 2 
However, if one goes back another decade it is clear that , 
relative to other goods, nodules had barely regained their mid- 1950 ' s 
value by 1975 . What this says is that it was not the rise in metal 
prices alone that stimulated the ocean mining rush of the 1970 ' s , 
since, to the producer, nodules would fetch just as attractive a price 
relative to other goods back in 1957 as they would today . The full 
explanation requires a consideration of the cost side of the ocean 
mining picture . 
Before discussing cost , there is one other story implicit in 
Figure 1. Nodules are almost ubiquitous in the wor ld ' s oceans and 
extensive exploration has taken place in the Atlantic, Indian and 
Pacific Oceans . As can be seen in the chart , the average Paci fic 
nodule is roughly 20 percent more valuable than nodules from the other 
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Figure l 
GROSS VALUE.OF MANt;ANESE NODULES 
FROM THREE OCEANS, 1951-1975T 
Pacific Ocean 
Indian Ocean 
A Atlantic Ocean 
• 08 DP Paci fie Ocean (Deep Sea 
Ventures Cla i ) 
1This is a weighted sum of the annual average 
prices of copper, nickel , cobalt and manganese 
where the weights reflect the mineral content 
of an average nodule from each ocean . 
2Deflated by the Wholesale Price Index . 
.06 
Sources: Prices from 1) Co11111odity Yearbook, New 
York: Commodity Research Bureau, Inc., various 
years, and 2) Yearbook of the American Bureau of 
Metal Statistics, New York : American Bureau of 
Metal Statistics, various years . Nodule Composi-
tion figures from 1) D.S. Crowan, "Regional Geo-
chemistry of Ferromanganese Nodules in the World 
Ocean" in David R. Horn (ed) Ferromanganese De-
osits on the Ocean Floor, Washington, D.C.: 
Nat1ona c1ence Foundation, 1972 , p. 20; 2) G. P. 
Glasby, "The Geochemistry of Manganese Nodules 
from the Northwest Indian Ocean" in David Horn , 
op.cit., p.99; and 3) Frank T. Manheim, "Composi-
S/lb . 
. 06r--~~~~~~~~~~~~---
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tion and Origin of Manganese- Iron Nodules and .OZU.--J.---_.__...::..:::i:....::...;.;;;::_,,_ __ __, 
Pavements on the Blake Plateau," in David Horn, 1955 1965 1975 op.cit . , p. 105 . 
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two oceans. This should explain, at least in part, why all commercial 
ventures being currently discussed are aimed at Pacific nodules . 
Deepsea Ventures, the only one of these operations which has publicly 
"staked a specific claim," is looking to mine an ore which is roughly 
50 percent more valuable than the Pacific Ocean average . 
Cost of Ocean Mining 
It is not really possible to discuss changes in the cost of nodule 
mining over the past ten or twenty years directly, both because 
commercial mining has not yet commenced and because cost data are 
typically one of the most carefully guarded of company secrets, 
especially in a new industry . Both the mining trade and the academic 
literature on nodule mining is sprinkled with various cost, revenue and 
rate- of- return estimates for the 1970's, but even if these were 
reliable there is virtually nothing before this period with which to 
compare them and thus establish a trend. However, what is possible is 
to discuss nodule mining in terms of the technological environment 
required for its advent . The hypothesis here is that while nodules 
were just as valuable relative to other goods in the mid- 1950 ' s as they 
are today, the technological environment has changed during those 
twenty years in such a manner that the cost of discovering nodules, 
pulling them off the deep seabed and winning metals from them has 
decreased considerably . 
While the technology for s i mply pulling a few nodules off the 
ocean floor with a bucket and long cable was available back in 1876 
when nodules were first discovered by the HMS Challenger, the discovery 
only are another matter . Not only are data on ore composition , nodule 
density, and seabed terrain necessary for calculations of profita-
bility, they are also necessary for the very design of both the mining 
and processing equipment . 
Accurate mapping and assessment of nodule deposits3 has been 
facilitated by the "dynamic positioning" technology developed in the 
offshore oil industry - - enabling a ship to be navigated within a few 
feet of any desired path . Sophisticated sonar depth recorders for 
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charting seabed topography are another relatively recent offshoot of 
the offshore oil industry. Widespread deep- sea use of closed- circuit, 
underwater cameras dates to 1968 when the U. S. Naval Research Labora~ 
tory tested a new wide angle camera for surveying seabed nodules . 4 And 
a number of smaller developments (such as the tube- type gravity corer 
to collect undisturbed nodule and sediment samples) have emerged 
during the past two decades to make the prospecting and exploration 
phase of ocean mining much more effective than it would have been in 
the 1950 ' s . 
The efficient mining of nodules has also become increasingly 
possible over the past twenty years . Until only recently, drill 
vessels and crane barges could lift only about a million pounds of 
material at a time. Vessels capable of lifting the 2 to 4 million tons 
required in ocean mining have only been developed during the past 
decade. 5 The mining apparatus of the most advanced ocean mining firms 
resembles a large vacuum cleaner running along the seabed . 6 This 
hydraulic lift technology had typically been used to pull coal and ore 
slurries from depths averaging 750 feet and rarely exceeding 1300 feet, 
but a quantum extension of the technology was required to reach the 
10,000- to 15,000- foot depths which will characterize seabed mining.7 
Processing technology appropriate to the unique physical and 
chemical characteristics of nodules has also become more efficient. 
Prior to 1966 , the cost of processing nodules to obtain four minerals 
was about $25 per ton of raw nodules . A newly developed leaching 
technique to extract the basic three minerals has reduced processing 
costs to about $8 to $15 per ton of nodules. 8 
Some of these changes in the technological environment represent 
new technologies, some represent improvement of old technologies and 
some simply represent adaptation of old technologies to a new situa-
tion . Whatever the nature of the change, these changes in the 
technological environment have allowed all three components of ocean 
mining -- exploration, exploitation and processing -- to become rela-
tively cheaper over the past two decades, enough so that the ocean 
mining which did not take place in the mid-1950's is beginning to do so 
in the late 1970 ' s and early 1980 ' s . 
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Ocean Versus Land- Based Mini ng 
But while ocean mining is becoming economically more attractive 
in its own right , there are several characteristics of land- based 
mining which are responsible for much of the pressure to develop new 
mining projects on the seabed rather than on land . For a number of 
minerals , land-based mining has reached the point where technological 
change has become unable to offset the movement to increasingly 
inferior ore bodies . On top of this, the movement to increasingly 
remote land- based mines involves the construction of an increasingly 
expensive infrastructure - - an expenditure kept to a bare minimum in 
ocean mining . And finally, there is some indication that because of 
the way in which certain mineral prices move against one another , 
nodule mining may prove more attractive than one- or two- mineral land-
based mining with respect to net revenue uncertainty. This section 
examines each of these three issues . 
(a) Ore Quality Decline 
The gradual decline in ore quality and accessi bility should be no 
surprise given the rational tendency to exploit the richest deposits 
first. The quality of nickel ore in New Caledonia (which produced 
about 18 percent of world nickel output in 1974) has declined from 
about 9-percent nickel in 1890 to roughly 3- percent nickel in 1950 and 
2. 3- percen t nickel today . 9 And the sulfide nickel mines in Sudbury 
(Canada) are some 8,000 feet deep today and are expected to extend to a 
depth of 12 , 000 feet within the next two decades . 10 Over the past 
decade the average copper content of Kennecott's U. S. and Canadian ore 
has fallen from 0 . 82 to 0 . 71 percent -- an ore quality decline of 
13 percent . 11 While historically technological improvement has tended 
to offset the effect of declining ore quality and accessibility , mining 
costs finally appear to be headed upward . One study of cost data for 
new mineral projects in the U.S. found that capital costs for a given 
amount of capacity rose 6 percent annually from 1965 to 1970, and 10 
percent annually between 1970 and 1975 . These cost increases are 
considerably above the rate of inflation for this period . 12 
186 
This decline in the quality of land-based ore can be contrasted 
with a very interesting characteristic of deep- sea nodules, specifi. 
cally that they may be non- exhaustible . There is general consensus 
that nodules are constantly being formed on the ocean floor, probably 
from dissolved minerals precipitated out of seawater around some 
nucleus . While it was once believed that the formation of mi ne able 
nodules took centuries , the recent discovery of nodules formed ar ound 
soft drink caps and the success of forming nodules in the laboratory 
lead scientists to believe that formation may be relatively rapi d. 
(b) Relative Infrastructure Costs 
A second issue in comparing the attractiveness of nodule and land 
mining is that of infrastructure development . New land mines , being 
away from population centers and transport facilities, typically 
require the development of shelter for workers and transport facili-
ties for the ore . Actual investment costs of 11 major Australian 
mining projects in the 1960s are broken out into several categories in 
Table 1. What becomes quickly obvious is that about 65 percent of 
total investment is for infrastructure development . An advantage of 
ocean mining is that it minimizes these types of expenditure since (a) 
no railway or roads need be developed -- the water can take one 
anywhere , (b) existing port facilities can be used and (c) processing 
facilities can be constructed near established labor markets , elimina-
ting the need for new worker housing . 
(c) Uncertainty 
The third phenomenon which might make nodule mining relatively 
more attractive than land- based mining relates to the relative uncer-
tainty characterizing the methods of obtaining minerals . Producers as 
producers prefer less uncertainty to more . l3 Uncertainty raises the 
unit costs of production via increased information and transaction 
costs . In order to decide whether an existing mining firm ' s net 
revenue uncertainty would be reduced more by adding another land- based 
mine or a nodule mi ne to its portfolio, we must examine the two sources 
of net revenue uncertainty - - cost uncertainty and revenue uncer-
tainty . 
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Table 1: Investment Costs of 11 Major Mining Projects 
Developed in Australia in the 1960s 
(in mi 11 ions) 
U.S.$200 
125 
93 
73 
24 
285 
$800 
railways and transportation 
ports 
townships 
power and water 
other 
mines 
Total 
Source: Conrad G. Welling, Ocean Mining Systems op. cit., 
2nd page _of article. 
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Cost Uncertainty: In general, investment in a commercially 
untried enterprise is considered to be riskier than one in a similar, 
but well-established enterprise. The reason for this is that it is 
generally easier to forecast future values of variables, given infer-
mation on their past values. The less past information, ceteris 
paribus, the more uncertain the forecast. Since commercial nodule 
mining has yet to commence, it would be considered a riskier investment 
than a traditional land- based mineral exploitation project . One 
mineral economist has suggested that before commencement a nodule 
exploitation project would require a 25 to 30 percent rate of return, 
in contrast to the usual 15 to 20 percent for land-based mineral 
projects . 14 Once the technology and other aspects of the nodule mining 
operation are tried and proven, the risk of such projects should fall, 
but not necessarily to the level of land- based mining . Once the bugs 
are out, nodule mining may still be intrinsically riskier than land 
mining, due to ocean weather uncertainty, for example. On the other 
hand, nodule mining may prove less risky than land mining, since a 
nodule deposit may be much easier to evaluate for quantity of contained 
mineral than a land mine with a lot of overburden, and there would be 
much less likelihood of labor disruptions in an industry which is 
likely to use very little labor . Also, once an international Law-of-
the- Sea regime is established, there may be less likelihood of changes 
in the "rules of the game" than would be the case in a single 
developing country . While it is difficult to say whether eventual cost 
uncertainty will be greater for sea or land-based mining, it is clear 
that the cost uncertainty in sea mining should decrease as sea mining 
becomes an established industry . 
Revenue Uncertainty : In theory, product di versification can 
reduce the risk associated with a firm's earning stream. Whether or 
not risk is in fact reduced depends both upon the riskiness of the 
added product (relative to the average ri skiness of the existing 
product line) and the way in which the price of the new product moves 
with the prices of the established products . Specifically , the 
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likelihood of diversification reducing risk is greater when the risk-
iness of the added product is small and when its price moves against 
the prices of the firms' other products over time . 
If one compares the revenue uncertainty (as measured by the 
coefficient of variation of per pound revenues between 1948 and 1975) 
of each of the nodule component minerals to the revenue uncertainty of 
a hypothetically marketed nodule (see Table 2), it turns out that the 
producers of zinc, copper and nickel would reduce revenue uncertainty 
by moving into nodule mining, while producers of cobalt , manganese, 
molybdenum and vanadium would find revenue uncertainty virtually 
unaffected (assuming that they extracted at least the four basic nodule 
minerals . ) 
Table 2: Relative Revenue Uncertainty of Nodule 
and Component Minerals of Nodules** 
. 46 nickel 
.43 zinc 
. 38 copper* 
. 31 nodules (Ni, Cu , Co) 
. 28 molybdenum vanadium 
cobalt 
. 27 manganese 
nodules (Ni, Cu , Co , Mn) 
. 26 nodules (Ni, Cu , Co , Mn, Mo, V) 
*U.S. Producer price . London Metal Exchange prite had 
a coefficient of variation of . 48 . 
**As measured by the coeffic~ent of variation of per 
pound revenues of nodules and component metals using 
monthly data 1951-1975. Coefficient of variation is 
the standard deviation of a va ri able divided by its 
mean to eliminate scale effects. 
190 
It should be noted that while the joint product nature of ocean 
mining could lower the income variability of the ocean miner relative 
to a single- metal land-based counterpart, a significant amount of 
ocean mining could even further increase the variance in prices of 
in di vi dual metals, and thus the variance in income of single- metal 
land- based miners . This is because producers of (fixed proportion) 
joint products are less free to vary the output level of each of their 
products in response to price changes, thus weakening the major source 
of price stability . 
But even more important than this might be the desire to hedge 
one ' s bets . In some cases, the very prospect of ocean mining changes 
the outlook for land- based mining . That is to say , if nodule mining 
promises to be the future source of the bulk of a particular metal , 
causing a decline in price and the consequent phase- out of a number of 
land- based mines, then it could be important for land- based mi ning 
firms to get in early on this new source of metals . This is really 
identical to the situation of a new or low- cost technology being 
introduced i nto some industry with those who quickly adopt it being 
mor e likely to survive and , in fact , even making temporary higher- than-
average profit to boot . Thus it should not be surprising that three of 
the four most serious and advanced ocean mining groups contain three of 
the world ' s largest mining compani es: Kennecott Copper , I nter nat i onal 
Nickel (INCO) , and Union Miniere (of Belgium and Zaire) . 
Profitability 
We have discussed rising metal prices and potenti al cost reduc-
tions in ocean mining via a series of technologi cal breakthroughs as 
well as the rise in the cost of land- based mining , but this only says 
that costs and revenues are moving in such a direction as to make ocean 
mining eventually profitable . Is profi tability a decade down the road 
or is it upon us today? A number of authors have made estimates of the 
r evenues , costs and rates of return to nodule mining . Given that such 
estimates require long- term forecasts of metal prices, assumpt ions 
about how many metals will be extracted from nodules , and an assessment 
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of the cost of a technology which has yet to be commercially tested, it 
is not surprising to find pre-tax rate of return estimates ranging from 
9 to 112 percent . 15 One survey of these studies found the average pre-
tax, rate of return estimate in nodule mining to be roughly twice the 
average . 27-percent rate of return to U. S . mining firms in 1974- 1975 .
16 
The consensus seems to be that nodule mining is potentially very 
profitable and the R & D investments and lobbying activity of U. S. 
mining companies tend to support this notion. 
Summary 
This section has attempted to explain the economic stimulus 
behind ocean mining . The explanation has noted a decade long rise in 
the value of nodules (though in constant dollars, 1957 nodules were 
worth about the same as 1975 nodules), a gradually improving 
technological environment which has lowered the potential costs of 
ocean mining, and a rise in the cost of land-based mining because of a 
decline in ore quality not offset by rapid technological changes in 
that industry. The relatively large infrastructure costs associated 
with opening up new land-based mines would be avoided in ocean mining 
and it is possible that nodule mines, once established, will face less 
net revenue uncertainty than land- based mines producing one or two 
minerals. Given that ocean mining has been stimulated, it is now 
appropriate to turn to its potential economic consequences. 
2. The Economic Consequences of Ocean Mining 
The question to be addressed in this section is : what would be 
the economic impact of ocean mining should it take place under the 
traditional notion of free, unregulated access to all ocean resources 
lying outside the territorial waters of any country? Ocean mining will 
most likely not take place within such a framework, since some 140- odd 
countries have already spent four years attempting to design a new 
institutional framework to govern both the exploitation of seabed 
minerals and the use of many other ocean resources . Still, it is 
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important to address this question for two reasons. First, it was the 
developing countries ' answer to this question which provided an 
important part of the stimulus to renegotiate rules of ocean usage in 
the first place . It would be useful to see how the answer reached in 
this paper compares to the answer reached by the developing countries, 
since this answer underlies the negotiating position of the 
Group of 77 in the Law of the Sea Conference. 17 Second, one cannot 
describe the consequences of ocean mining under the institutional 
framework which will exist, since the consensus has not yet been 
reached and a number of frameworks are still possible. Thus a 
description of the consequences under the old framework could provide a 
sort of base solution to which consequences under other frameworks 
could be compared, though such comparisons will not be made in this 
paper. 
The following analysis is crucially dependent upon a number of 
assumptions and these must be made explicit. There has never before 
been an international agreement on the proper use of minerals in the 
deep seabed, but the 1958 High Seas Convention recognized a general 
free- access-by-all approach to the use of the ocean outside the 
territorial limits of coastal nations and made specific reference to 
navigation, fishing, overflight and laying of submarine cables and 
pipelines. It is here assumed that this free access, unregulated, 
untaxed approach applies also to the exploitation of deepsea minerals. 
The second assumption involves the supply of ocean minerals. With 
commercial mining not having yet commenced, it is impossible to 
generate an econometrically estimated supply schedule for ocean 
minerals. However, there appears to be general industry and government 
consensus that there are only four groups which will likely become part 
of the first generation of ocean mining (with production commencing in 
the early 1980's) and that each of these groups will be producing from 
18 one to three million metric tons (dryweight) of nodules per year . It 
is therefore assumed that the first decade of ocean mining will be 
characterized by an average annual supply of four to twelve million 
metric tons of nodules per year. The assumption is somewhat unrealis-
tic since supply will probably no t be perfectly price inelastic even in 
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the short run . However , supply schedules for minerals do tend to 
exhibit less than unitary price elasticity and the four to twelve 
million ton production assumption is probably broad enough to include 
any short- run adjustments in supply . 
The third assumption concerns the location of nodule processing . 
A review of the trade literature and discussions with government and 
industry representatives reveals that almost all first generation 
nodules will be processed in the United States and mainly on the West 
coast . 19 Considering that the site of first generation seabed mining 
will be in the North Pacific about halfway between Hawaii and Mexico, 
that the U. S. probably provides the largest single market for these 
minerals, that the U. S. (and Canada) are probably perceived to have the 
most stable investment climates in the immediate area, and that the 
four ocean mining groups are currently based in the United States, it 
is probably a fairly safe assumption that the bulk of first generation 
nodule processing will take place in the U.S. 
Given these three assumptions, this section now examines (1) the 
relative importance of ocean mining in each of the four mineral 
markets, (2) the nature and likely distribution of the benefits of 
ocean mining, as well as potential adjustment in : (3) land- based 
mining, (4) employment, (5) trade and export earnings . 
(1) Effect of Ocean Mining on the Four Mineral Markets 
It is difficult to discuss the impact of ocean mineral exploita-
tion on employment, trade, and balance of payments without first 
developing a sense of the relative importance of each ocean mineral in 
its own market . Though there is some discussion about extracting a 
number of trace minerals from nodules (such as vanadium, molybdenum and 
zinc), it is generally believed that nodules will be used to extract 
nickel, copper, cobalt and perhaps manganese . If 1974 mine production 
of these four metals were valued at U.S. prices for the refined metal, 
the total value of all four metals would be roughly $15 billion, with 
the value distributed thusly: copper 80.6 percent, nickel 17.3 per-
cent, cobalt 1.5 percent, and manganese 0 . 6 percent . Even though the 
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latter two metals are relatively unimportant in terms of volume, they 
are both important industrial materials -- manganese, for example , is 
an essential ingredient in steel production, for which ther e is 
currently no substitute. 
A first-order approximation of the impact of ocean mining on each 
of these metal markets can be obtained by examining the ratio of the 
potential seabed production of a mineral to current land- based produc-
tion of that mineral. Table 3 contains a set of such ratios for each 
of the four minerals and for five alternative levels of nodule produc-
tion. What quickly becomes clear from these ratios is that seabed 
copper will scarcely make a dent in the world copper market, seabed 
cobalt will surely play a very significant role in the world coblat 
market and seabed production of the other two metals will play inter-
mediate roles. Actually, the table overstates the role of seabed 
manganese for each level of nodule output since only one of the four 
ocean mining groups currently plans to extract manganese . 20 So scaling 
the manganese column down by a factor of four may provide a better 
indication of the actual role of seabed manganese in the world manga-
nese market . 
Table 3: Seabed Production of Minerals as a Pl?portion 
of 1975 Land-Based, World Productioll.!..! 
Nodule Mining Capacity 
in millions of metric tons Mansanese Nickel Copper Cobalt 
3. 0 1.8 0.1 8. 9 
5 14. 9 8. 6 0.7 44.6 
10 29.9 17.2 l. 5 89.2 
15 44.8 25 . 8 2.3 133 . 7 
20 59.6 34.4 3.1 178 . 4 
l!Assuming that the average nodule mineral content is the same as that 
of Deepsea Venture's claim, i . e. 29 . 00% manqanese, 1.28% nickel, 
1 .07% copper and 0.25% cobalt. 
World production figures taken from Commodity Yearbook 1976. 
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Note also that this table displays the relationship between 
hypothetical seabed production and actual land- based production in 
1975 · Since ocean mining is not likely to commence until the early 
1980 ' s, the land- based production of these minerals will surely be 
larger and the ratios of sea to land production correspondingly smaller 
by that time . 
A more refined approach to exploring the impact of ocean mining 
upon the four metal markets was taken by Adams at Wharton . 21 On a 
contract from UNCTAD, Adams built, borrowed, modified and integrated 
econometric models for the four metal markets, then simulated the 
production of from one to 20 million tons of nodules, in order to 
determine new equilibrium levels of prices and quantities . The models 
generally consisted of demand, supply and price- inventory equations 
and ranged from the competitive (copper), through the mixed (nickel and 
manganese) to the monopolistic (cobalt) . Adams estimates equilibrium 
prices, production and consumption for each of the four metals markets , 
under varying ocean- mining assumptions . 
A portion of these estimates (expressed as a percentage differ-
ence from the base solution without ocean mining) is presented in 
Table 4 . As might have been expected, the copper market is barely 
affected by seabed mining . However, all of the other three markets are 
considerably altered by the seven-ocean- mines scenario. By the 
seventh year, for example, both Canada and other Western countries 
would be producing 10 to ll percent less nickel and nickel prices 
would be 12 percent lower than they would have been without ocean 
mining . In the manganese market, significant cutbacks in land- based 
production keep prices from falling by more than 3 percent . And in the 
cobalt market, Zaire's willingness to cut back production to a dramatic 
one- quarter of her base solution level keeps prices from falling by 
more than 10 percent . 
Only two of Adams' results seem counter- intuitive . Because 
nickel production from tropical laterite ores is considerably more 
expensive than production from northern hemisphere sulfide ores , one 
would have expected to see seabed nickel grow at the expense of New 
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Caledonian , not Canadian nickel, as the study has it . And secondly, i t 
seems highly unrealistic that a monopolist would reduce its output by 
three-quarters in order to maintain price as the study assumed Zaire 
would do . Recalling the rule of thumb that a dominant producer stands 
to increase its revenue only as long as its market share exceeds the 
price elasticity of demand and noting that the price elasticity ~ 
demand for cobalt is on the order of . 3422 , it is not clear that Zaire 
would reduce its current output (and 60 percent share of the market) by 
more than about 50 percent. 
In summary, the fi r st generation of seabed mining should have a 
negligible effect upon the copper market and copper producers should 
thus have little to fear from seabed mining . Nickel producers will 
find that six years after ocean mining commences, they will be pro~ 
ducing about 10 percent less than they would have been and facing a 
12 percent lower price than they would have been had ocean mini ng not 
taken place . The price of cobalt will be at least 10 percent below 
where it would have been without ocean mining and land- based output 
will be down considerably . The price of manganese will be down 
modestly and land- based output down by almost a fifth . (Note that 
Adams assumes all producers will extract manganese where , in fact, 
perhaps only one will do so . Therefore the price and land- based 
production effects for manganese will not be as large as estimated in 
Table 4 . ) 
(2) Benefits of Ocean Mining 
There i s little doubt that the benefits of ocean mining will more 
than offset the losses . Any time society develops a more efficient 
method of producing some good , it either has more of that good or more 
of other goods available since resources now saved in the producti on of 
the first good can now be allocated to produce other goods . Most 
technological changes probably involve a combination of these two 
effects . 
In the case of ocean mining , extensive , lower- cost sources of 
industrially important minerals should ultimately lower the pri ce to 
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Table 4 
Effects of Sea Bed P!"oduction -
Seven Mining Operations 
(Percent Difference from Sa~e Solution) 
Cotioer 
1974 1975 ~ lJ2l. .!.ill ill2. 1980 
Mining Production 
u .s. -0.02 -0 . 1 -o. 2 -0. 33 -o. 44 -o . 53 -o. 63 
Other Western Countries -0.02 -0 . 08 -0.15 -o. 24 -o. 31 -0 . 39 -o. 47 
Consumption 
U. S. 0 . 0 0. 01 0. 05 0 . 09 0.13 0.15 0.19 
Other Western Countries o.o 0.04 o.u 0.19 0. 25 o. 28 0. 31 
Net Imports of U. S. 0.41 1.29 1.57 1. 76 2. 09 2. 48 2. 82 
Inventory 
U.S. 0.02 0 . 05 0.03 -0 . 14 -o . 43 -0. 75 -1.0B 
Other Western Countries o. 28 o. 65 1.08 1. 54 2. Ol 2 . 52 3.1 
Price 
Producer Price of U.S. -0 . 08 -0 . 27 -0 . 54 -a. 1 -0. 79 -0. 89 -0. 99 
London Metal Exchange 
Price -0.23 -0 . 75 -1. 31 -1. 25 -1. 24 -1.42 -1. 55 
Nickel 
~ng Production 
Canada -3.5 2 -5 . 63 -7. 62 -9. 03 -9. 94 -11. 0 -U.8 
New Caledonia -1.11 -1. 74 -2. 38 -2 . 85 -3 . 22 -3. 61 -3. 93 
Other Western Countries -2.9 -4 . 7 -6 . 36 -7. 68 -8 . 59 -9. 65 -lO . 40 
Consumption 
Wor ld 0.15 0 . 54 1. 07 1. 75 2·. 57 3.10 4. 3 
Price -3.23 -5 . 26 -7. 34 -8 . 57 -9 . 56 -10. 76 -11. 59 
Cobalt 
~ng Production 
Congo -19. 81 -JO. 24 -41.26 -50. 94 -60 . 28 -6 7. 97 -73 . 56 
Outside Congo 0 .0 0 . 0 o.o 0 . 0 o. o 0 . 0 0.0 
Consumption 
World 0.19 o. 48 o. 89 -0 .1 4 1. 74 2. 30 2. 79 
Price -2.01 -2. 78 -4 .04 -s. 41 -6 . 94 -8. 35 -9. 70 
Manganese 
Pro<luccion from Land 
Sources -l. l -6. l -8 . 8 -11. 5 -13. 9 -15. 8 -17. 5 
Consumption 
Price -0 . 66 -o. 66 -1.14 -2 . 30 -2. 89 
Assumptions: Each ocean mining operation produces one mill ion dry metric 
tons of nodules per year and ocean mining corrmences in 1974. 
Source : Adams, op. cit., p. 148 . 
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consumers of goods containing (or produced with) these minerals . This 
happens since new mineral technology (which is essentially what ocean 
mining is) should lower the cost of producing minerals, stimulate a 
rise in mineral output and a fall in mineral prices . Cheaper minerals 
stimulate firms who use minerals to produce intermediate and final 
goods to expand their own output, causing a decline in the price of 
those goods . If all markets in this linkage are competitive, all cost 
savings are passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices . Where 
markets are not competitive, monopolists and oligopolists will tend to 
transform some of the cost savings into higher profits. 
The proper measure of the total benefits of ocean mining would be 
the increase in consumer surplus plus the increase in factor rents 
attributable to ocean mining . However, two characteristics stand out 
concerning the benefits . First, they are spread so thinly as to be 
unnoticeable by any consumer beneficiary (though not, perhaps by 
producer beneficiaries) and second , their distribution tends to be 
highly skewed toward the industrialized countries . 
While the aggregate benefits to consumers of ocean mining may be 
significant, they are likely to be negligible for any given final 
product or product class . Take the case of manganese . All steel 
production requires manganese, but this input accounts for no more than 
about 1. 7 percent of the wholesale price of ordinary carbon steel. 23 By 
the time this steel is combined with labor , capital and other factors 
of production, the role of manganese in the value of the final consumer 
good would be measured in terms of tenths or hundredths of a percent . 
Thus if the price of manganese were even cut in half due to ocean 
mining (the likely manganese price reduction will be more like 10 per-
cent) , no consumer will notice it in the prices of the goods he buys, 
even though the aggregate consumers ' surplus generated may be substan-
tial . 
The distribution of benefits from ocean mining will be heavily 
skewed toward the industrialized countries . Since ocean mining will be 
undertaken exclusively by firms from industrialized countries , any 
rents generated will be captured by those firms and their factor 
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suppliers . Any share in the portion of the benefits by the developing 
countries will be negligible , since very few factor supplies to or 
stockholders in these firms will be from developing countries . 
To the extent that people in developing countries consume goods 
containing or produced from the four minerals , they will share in the 
increased consumer surplus generated by ocean mining . However , since 
this share is proportional to consumption and since consumption of most 
goods is positively related to the level of development , the developing 
countries will likely capture a relatively small share of increased 
consumer surplus . Table 5 indicates, for example , that per- capita 
consumption of copper by the United States and the Federal Republic of 
Germany is more than 100 times per capita consumption in India . While 
these figures are biased in such a manner that the gap between the 
industrialized and developing countries is not quite as great as it 
appears in the table, a correction of the bias, were it possible, would 
likely only reduce but not erase the gap . (See note in Table 5 . ) 
While the benefits of seabed mining should far exceed the costs, 
the costs are potentially more concentrated and visible than the 
benefits . The shut- down of land based mines accompanied by lay- offs of 
workers and declines in export earnings is an image generated in some 
discussions of the Law of the Sea . It is the validity of this image 
that will be examined in the remainder of this section. Potential 
adjustments in land- based mining, employment, trade and export 
earnings will be discussed in turn. 
(3) Adjustments in Land-Based Mining 
Schumpeter referred to technological development under capitalism 
as the process of creative destruction . When something new and more 
efficient is created, something old and less efficient is destroyed 
through the market place . Ocean mining offers just such a potential 
scenario. Should ocean mining prove to be considerably cheaper than 
land mining, then a number of land mines face the possibility of being 
rendered obsolete . Specifically , for this to happen, the production of 
a particular mineral would have to become so ~heap and so much would 
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Tab l e 5 
Per Cap i ta Cons umpti onl/ of Refined Copper and 
Ni ckel ror Selected Countries , 1974 
Germany, F.R. 
United States 
Japan 
Yugoslavia 
Brazil 
Albania 
Mexico 
India 
Per Capita Consumption 
of copper (lbs) 
25.976 
20 . 756 
17. 708 
11. 338 
3. 435 
3.377 
2. 513 
0. 184 
Per Capita Consumpti on 
of nickel (l bs) 
2. 175 
2. 024 
2. 394 
0. 146 
0. 134 
lf Consumption = production + import s - expor ts + decl i nes in stocks .. Thus 
consumption referjs to use in producti on regardless of whether t~e fi nal 
products are use<ldomestically or exported . To the extent that ~ndus ­
t r i al i zed countri es tend to be net exporters of manufactures t heir . 
domestic consumption of minerals would be l ess than the levels s~own in 
the table. And to the extent that develop i ng countries are net importers 
of manufactures, their domestic consumption of minerals wou~d be g'.ea~er 
than the levels shown in t he tables . Thus t he gap between industr ialized 
and developing countries in terms of domestic consumption 9f these 
mi nerals in final products would not be as great as shown in the table . 
Source : Population from World Bank At las,_Worl d Bank , 1976. 
Total Consumption from Metal Statistics 1964-1974, Frankfurt 
Am Main , 1975. 
have to be produced that price would fall below the land-based cost of 
production . 
There are actually three possible scenarios for each mineral : 
land mining ceases; land mining continues until existing mines are 
mined out, with no new land mines being developed; or land mining 
continues to be a viable industry with both old mini ng continuing and 
new mines being developed . 24 For the first case to occur , the price of 
the mineral must fall below the variable costs of the land- based mi ne , 
and this would occur only if the total (fixed plus variable) cos t of 
ocean mining falls below the variable cost of land- based mining and 
sufficient ocean mines enter to actually drive the price down . One 
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could imagine an ocean mining monopolist who finds his maximum profits 
in simply collecting a very large rent on a relatively small output, 
and thus not extending his output to the point where price is signifi-
cantly affected . But free entry to a new technology (ocean mining) 
might increase supply sufficiently to lower price below the variable 
cost of land mines , thus rendering the land mine obsolete . 
The second scenario would occur where the total cost of ocean 
mining is above the variable but below the total cost of land mining. 
In this case, free entry to ocean mining increases supply sufficiently 
to bring the mineral price down to a level which prohibits new 
investment in land-based mining but still allows a return that exceeds 
variable costs in existing land-based mines. 
The final scenario is one in which the cost structures of land and 
ocean mining are actually similar and miners are actually indifferent 
to expansion into either type . In this case, land and sea mining would 
continue side by side . 
While these categories may be useful, the analysis is simplis-
tically static . Rather than considering only levels of costs, one must 
also consider time rates of change in cost which probably vary with the 
age of technology . Thus a given cost relationship between an old and a 
new technology would not be expected to maintain itself over time and 
would generally change in such a manner as to make the newer technology 
increasingly more attractive . A relationship between old and new 
technologies, and between land-based and ocean mining specifically, 
might be represented by the curves in Figure 2. The figure has two 
related characteristics . First, reductions in unit costs are most 
rapid in the early years of a new technology, and second , a new 
technology becomes increasingly more attractive than an old technology 
over time . 
Three phenomena lie behind these curves. First is the traditional 
learning curve25 which demonstrates a positive relationship between 
productivity and the cumulative level of output . With continued 
output , this relationship translates into a negative relationship 
between unit costs and time . In tui ti vely, this can be viewed as 
unit 
cost 
s 
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Figure 2: Time Profile of Unit Costs for 
Two Technologies of Different Ages 
o 1 d tech no 1 ogy 
(land-ba$ed mining) 
time 
new tech no 1 ogy 
(ocean mining) 
working the bugs out of a new process and generally reducing unneces-
sary costs as workers and managers become increasingly familiar with 
the new system. One would expect the returns to these cost- reducing 
efforts to diminish over time -- thus the curves are convex to the 
origin . The second element underlying the curves is the economies- of-
scale effect. Since new technologies are first adopted on a small 
scale, it is only over time that they are designed and implemented to 
bring a firm close to its minimum, long-run average cost. The third 
element involves changing factor prices . New technologies are typi-
cally more capital intensive than the technologies they replace, 
because of a secular rise in the price of labor relative to the price 
of capital. 26 But given that this rise continues, any given more-
capital- intensive technology must become increasingly attractive 
relative to a less-capital-intensive technology. And since ocean 
mining will likely be considerably more capital intensive than land-
based mining, the curves in Figure 2 show it becoming increasingly 
cheaper relative to land-based mining as the wage/price-of-capital 
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ratio marches upward over time . 
The most recent land- mining technology is a number of years old 
(though small innovations do continue in both surface and deep mines) 
and thus is some distance down on the time- cost profile . Ocean mining, 
on the other hand, is still in its technological infancy and being at 
the top of its cost- time profile, is likely to face a much more rapid 
decline in production costs than will land mining . 27 Thus, even though 
a particular relationship exists between the production costs under 
the two technologies , this relationship is not likely to maintain 
itself . So , none of the above- mentioned static scenarios is likely to 
be an adequate description of reality for very long, and the most 
probable situation may be one in which the relationship between the two 
technologies moves very gradually and perhaps discontinuously through 
all three scenarios (i.e ., initial coexistence and eventual obso-
lescence of the older technology) • All of this has been a rather 
tedious way of saying that creative destruction sometimes takes a 
little time. 
It would be useful at this point to be able to plot the relevant 
time-cost profiles for ocean and land- based mining for each of the four 
minerals . Good cost- of- production data a r e extremely hard to obtain i n 
mining, and we have to confine ourselves to a few more qualitative 
observations in this matter . All land- based mining operations are 
clearly not the same and because of lower labor costs and higher ore 
quality , third- world countries are generally considered to possess 
lower cost mining operations than the industrialized countries . For 
example, Chile , Peru , Zambia and Zai re can generally produce copper 
more cheaply than can the United States and Zaire can produce cobalt 
more cheaply than can Canada . So , in this sense mines in the 
industrialized countries are prone to more rapid obsolescence than 
many third- world mines . An exception to this general trend is nickel , 
since the best ores (sulfides) are found in the North , especially 
Canada, while the lower grade and more expensive- to- process ones 
(laterites) are found in the tropics . 
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One 1976 study (see Table 6) suggests that nodule mining is likely 
to be an intermediate cost method of mining nickel, the metal con-
sidered to be the major attraction to nodule miners. Land-based nickel 
mining is concentrated mainly on the higher-grade sulfide ores of 
Canada, Australia, South Africa and the Soviet Union, though these 
mines have not been able to keep pace with the growth of nickel demand 
and the gap has been filled with the more energy-intensive mining of 
lower grade laterite ores of various tropical areas. While nickel from 
nodules is likely to cost more than nickel from sulfide ores, it does 
appear that nodule nickel will be about 30 percent cheaper than 
laterite nickel in terms of both capital and operating expenses. Thus, 
in early years, nodules may substitute for laterite ores in filling the 
growth in the world demand for nickel. What this would mean is that 
new laterite nickel projects might not be developed, and if energy 
costs continue to increase more rapidly than the general price level, 
some of the more marginal laterite mines might actually shut down . 
In summary, if land-based mining declines as a result of competi-
tion from ocean mining, the transition will likely be rather gradual as 
we move through the three scenarios and down the two curves discussed 
above. With the exception of nickel, the marginal land-based mines for 
nodule minerals probably lie in the developed countries, so it could be 
there that the first production cutbacks would be faced. This does not 
mean that the developing countries will not face potential losses, 
since ocean mining may prevent the development of a number of new third 
world mines which would have come on line in the absence of ocean 
mining. 
Given that some land-based mining will be phased out and new 
mining not developed, how serious might the implications of this be for 
the economies of the countries engaged in land-based mining? This 
question is now examined with respect to employment, export earnings 
and trade. 
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Table 6: Nickel Mining Cost Comparison 
capital costs 
Source of Mineral in $/lb 
ocean mining (nodules) 3.89 - 5.92 
land-based mining (laterites) 
Indonesia 
Guatemala 
Dominican Republic 
New Caledonia 
Japanese producer2 
Philippines 
6.07 - 7.66 
7.67 - 8.00 
Ocean vs. Landll 
operating costs 
in $/lb 
1.01 - 1. 39 
1.39 
1.67 
2.87 
0.96 
l!Note, the nodule by-products, copper and cobalt, are converted vi a 
prices into nickel equivalent, so that costs for nodule mining are 
actually expressed per lb. of nickel equivalent. 
fflocation not given. 
Source: Rebecca Wright, "Ocean Mining: An Economic Evaluation," 
Professional Staff Study, Ocean Mining Administration, U.S. 
Bureau of Mines, p. 17.-18. 
(4) Potential Employment Adjustments 
One can view the effects of ocean mining upon employment in two 
ways. Any person released from land-based mining because of competi-
tion from ocean mining is both an unemployed person and a person 
available to engage in other productive activity . Whether one empha-
sizes the status of unemployment or the status of new employment 
probably depends upon the state of the particular economy and how 
rapidly it can transform the individual from a laid- off miner to 
another type of worker . The cost to a country of having a part of its 
labor force displaced by ocean mining is inversely related to the 
tightness of its labor markets . Even with an instantaneous re-
employment of displaced labor, some countries could face a net loss of 
output , since workers will generally be re-employed in an activity 
where the value they create is somewhat less than they created in 
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mining (since they would have been initially employed in their highest 
valued activity) . However, this loss could be more than offset if the 
country is a large net importer of the minerals which will be ocean 
mined, since cheaper, more abundant minerals could stimulate employ-
ment in the manufacturing sector. 
One method of assessing the potential employment disruptions that 
could occur should a country's land-based mines become subject to 
output curtailments is to examine the portion of each country's work 
force engaged in the mining of the four minerals to be extracted from 
nodules . Since data are not generally available for mining employment 
by type of mineral, employment data for all mining will at least serve 
as an upper- bound figure. The proposition here is that the degree of 
economic dislocation is related to the percentage (not the absolute 
number) of workers employed in the potentially affected sector . Thus, 
even though Canada employs twice as many miners as Zambia, were all 
miners in each country to become unemployed, Canada would find it 
easier to absorb the displaced workers into other sectors than would 
Zambia, because of the relative size of the two labor forces . 
Mining, like agriculture, is an essential sector but one whose 
relative size shrinks with economic development. Thus, among the 
industrialized countries listed in Table 7, not a single one has a 
mining sector which employs more than four percent of its labor force 
and most have mining sectors employing less than one percent of their 
labor force. And since only a fraction of those employed in mining are 
copper, nickel, cobalt or manganese miners, none of the industrialized 
countries should have a serious problem absorbing into other sectors of 
their economies any workers laid off from nodule-induced mine 
closures . 
And while most developing countries have a relatively large 
portion of their populations engaged in agriculture, mining is impor-
tant only if the country happens to possess the minerals to be mined. 
Thus, of the 20 developing countries for which mining employment data 
are available (Table 7), only 4 employ more than 5 percent of their 
labor force in mineral extraction, and of these, only two are important 
producers of minerals contained in nodules -- Gabon for manganese and 
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Table 7: Mining Employment in Selected 
Industrialized Countries, 1973 
employment 
employment total in mining as 
Countries in mining emtlowent 
Industrialized countries (1000) lO 0) 
Canada 123 8,759 
U.S. 638 84,409 
Japan 130 52,330 
Austria 28 3,042 
Belgium 144 .2 3,744.5 
Denmark 2.4 2,385.2 
Spain 108. l 12 ,986.2 
France 197 20,939 
Fed. Rep . of Germany 320 26,202 
Ireland 10 1,041 
Italy 318 18 ,500 
Norway 12 l,654 
Netherlands 13 4,553 
Sweden 18 3,879 
U.K. 363 24,641 
Australia 69 5,640 
New Zealand 4 1,141 
USSR 2,051 113, 152 
Grou11 of 77 
(developing countries) 
Egypt 15.4 8,712 . 4 
Gabon (1972) 7. 0 68.5 
Kenya 3.1 761.7 
Malawi 0.8 215. 7 
Mauritius 0.1 136 .8 
Swaziland 2. 9 57 .0 
Tunisie 25 .o 1,417.0 
Uganda 5. 3 347.6 
Zambia 62 . 0 380. 7 
Jama ica 79.6 629.6 
Panama (1972) 0.5 449. 4 
Cyprus 3.8 258 . 9 
Rep. of Korea 47.0 11, 139. 0 
Pakistan (1972) 79 . 4 18, 107. 5 
Philippines 62 . 0 13,262 .0 
Singapore 1. 9 595 .5 
Syria 14.4 1,612. l 
Thailand 110.9 17,042 .7 
Malta 0.5 101.6 
Yugoslavia 166.0 4,213 .o 
Source : International Labour Off ice, Yearbook of 
International Labour Statisti cs, 1975. 
% of total 
1.4 
0.8 
0. 2 
2.5 
3.9 
0. 1 
0.8 
0.9 
1. 2 
1. 0 
0. 2 
0.7 
0. 3 
0.5 
l. 5 
1.2 
0.4 
1.8 
0. 2 
10 . 2 
0.4 
0.4 
0. 1 
5.1 
1.8 
1.5 
16 . 3 
12.6 
0 
1.5 
0.4 
0. 4 
0.5 
0.3 
0.9 
0. 7 
0.5 
0.4 
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Zambia for copper . Gabon ' s development of new oil fields
28 
should ease 
any adjustment to a fall in the world price of manganese, but as oil 
production is considerably less labor- intensive than manganese mining, 
the value of new oil must be serveral times the value of lost manganese 
to avoid the short- term rise in the unemployment rate that might 
otherwise occur . And aside from Zambia , there are several countr ies, 
such as Zaire, Chile and Peru, which likely have considerable segments 
of their labor force employed in mining generally and copper mining in 
particular, though the U.N . did not report mining data for those 
countries . But again, copper miners have the advantage that it should 
be a full decade, at least, before ocean mining begins to have any 
noticeable effect on copper prices , so there is plenty of time for 
anticipatory government policy . 
So it is unlikely that ocean mining will considerably r aise 
unemployment rates in any country . The countries with the largest 
percentage of their labor forces in mining tend to have them employed 
in non- nodule minerals (e . g . , bauxite in Jamaica) or in copper, which 
is fairly well insulated from ocean mining competition over the next 
decade . The exception is Gabon which employs 10 percent of its work 
force in mining, much of that being manganese mining, but employment 
problems will be at least partially offset by the rapid growth of the 
petroleum industry in that country. 
(5) Adjustments in Trade Patterns and Export Earnings 
In theory, ocean mining could affect international trade in three 
categories of goods: (1) the minerals to be mined, (2) the inputs to 
the mining industry and (3) the various intermediate and final prod-
ucts produced with the minerals. However, because ocean mining demand 
for various categories of inputs is likely to be such a small portion 
of total demand for those inputs and because the value of metals is 
generally such a small portion of the total value of the final, or even 
intermediate, goods produced with them, trade in those two categories 
of goods is likely to be imperceptibly affected . Measurable effects 
will probably occur only in trade in the four basic nodule minerals. 
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The first-round shifts in trade patterns should essentially 
involve reductions in U. S. imports of the four minerals, since practi-
cally all nodule processing will take place in the United States . 29 
Given the fact that mineral prices will fall, however, increased U. S. 
demand should keep imports from declining by the full amount of the 
seabed output . Also, first - round shifts may be very temporary and the 
post-ocean- mining equilibrium structure of trade may be to the detri -
ment of countries that are not major sources of U. S. imports . That is 
to say that some producers now shipping to the U. S. may have relatively 
low production costs and thus be able to penetrate other markets at the 
expense of more marginal producers . Without production cost data, it 
is difficult to suggest what the post- ocean- mining equilibrium 
structure of trade will look like . It is possible, however , to say 
something about first - round shifts and the vulnerability of various 
economies to these shifts . 
In order to determine which countries' exports may be immediately 
displaced by the advent of ocean mining, it is necessary to note which 
countries are i mportant U .s . suppliers of these minerals . Table 8 
allows one to determine roughly the extent to which total U. S . imports 
will be displaced (by comparing total imports to potential seabed 
production), whose imports will be displaced (by examining the list of 
importers), and how serious the impact of such displacement might be 
(by noting the share of each country ' s mineral production being 
exported to the United States) . Each mineral is discus sed in turn . 
Manganese 
Because most manganese is used in steel production and because it 
accounts for such a small amount of the final value of steel, the 
demand for manganese is almost completely price inelastic . 30 Thus, 
unless other currently minor uses of manganese were expanded dramati-
cally or new uses developed, there would likely be little short-run 
increase in demand . So if all seabed miners extracted manganese from 
their nodules, ocean production of manganese might easily fill U. S. 
import needs in the early 1980 1 s (Table 8) . If, on the other hand, 
only one of the four mining groups (Deepsea Ventures) extracts manga-
nese, as is currently anticipated, and if this group sends up to half 
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its nodules to Belgium for processing, then as little as 12 percent of 
U. S. requirements might be met from the ocean. Spread evenly over the 
dozen countries exporting to the U. S., a 12- percent cutback in manga-
nese imports should not cause very serious adjustment problems . How~ 
ever, if cutbacks were not spread evenly, manganese producers in 
countries such as Japan, Mexico and Brazil, where a quarter to a third 
of total manganese output is exported to the U. S. , could face diffi-
culties in quickly finding other markets to which to shift their 
exports . 
Note, however, that for most of the manganese exporters to the 
U. S., this mineral accounts for but a tiny share of total export 
earnings (Table 9). The exception is Gabon which derived almost a 
fifth of its export earnings from manganese in 1971 . However, even 
Gabon is not in as precarious a position as might first appear. Since 
manganese accounted for a fifth of its export earnings and since only a 
fifth of these manganese exports found their way to the U. S . in 1973, 
only 4 percent of Gabon's export earnings was derived from U. S. imports 
of Gabonese manganese . So even with a total withdrawal from the U.S. 
market, accompanied by, say, a 10-percent fall in the price of manga-
nese (recall that Adams predicted a 3- percent fall), Gabon's export 
earnings would decline by less than 6 percent . Furthermore , as 
mentioned earlier, petroleum is becoming an increasingly important 
export of Gabon and could well forestall any actual decline in export 
earnings should Gabon be forced to cut back its production of manga-
nese. 
Cobalt 
Even the low esti mate of seabed cobalt production would have more 
than fulfilled U. S. cobalt requirements in 1973 and would almost 
satisfy projected U. S. cobalt requirements in 1981 (Table 8); the U. S. 
currently obtains no cobalt from its own land mines . Since Zaire is 
the source of most U .s . cobalt -- more than 80 percent in 1973 
(including that shipped through Belgium) -- and since almost half of 
all Zairean cobalt finds its way to the U. S. (Table 8), that country 
clearly stands to lose the most , at least temporarily, from the U. S. 
Country 
south Africa 
Gabon ( 1971 ) 
India 
Brazil (1973) 
Australia (1971) 
Morocco 
Ghana 
Zaire (1970) 
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Table 9 : Export Dependence on Manganese , 1974 
(in thousand U.S. $) 
Manganese Exports Total Exports 
84 , 465 4,906, 101 
33,717 177 ,845 
19,643 3,906,068 
18,866 6, l 99, 192 
15,964 5,072,647 
10.782 1 ,773,525 
9, 117 646,611 
2,009 735 , 366 
New Hebrides (1973) 387 17,602 
Source : United Nations, U.N. Stati stical Yearbook, 1975 . 
Manganese Share 
of Total Exports 
1. 7 
19.0 
0.5 
0.3 
3.1 
0.6 
1. 4 
0.3 
2. 2 
United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1975, Vol. I . 
mining of seabed cobalt . However, since only about 6 percent of 
Zaire ' s export earnings are derived from cobalt (Table 10) , withdrawal 
from the U. S. market accompanied by a 20- percent reduction in pr ice in 
other markets (Adams forecast only a 10- percent price reduction) would 
result in, at most , a 4- percent decline in export earnings f r om the 
level which would exist in the absence of ocean mining . Za i re is not 
so fortunate as Gabon to have discovered relatively large amounts of 
petroleum to help offset these losses . However, a 4- percent decline is 
not unmanageably large, especially since the country has a number of 
years to plan for the event . Even though Finland and Canada also send 
respectable shares of their cobalt output to the U. S., cobalt does not 
account for even one percent of export ear nings fo r either count r y . 
Thus, even though all cobalt producers face price and thus revenue 
declines (demand for cobalt is price inelastic) , only Zaire should 
suffer a noticeable decline in export earnings . 
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Table HJ: Export Dependence on Cobalt, 197~ 
(in millions of U.S. $) 
Mine Production Cabal t Share of 
Country of Cobalt Total Ex2orts Total Ex2orts 
Zaire 132 ,479 1,381 ,458 9.6 
Zambia 19,376 l '136 ,229 1. 7 
Canada 14,552 32,783,390 0 
Morocco 13,234 1'777 ,525 0.7 
U.S.S.R. 13 ,015 27,405,003 0 
Finland 9,590 5,521,587 0.2 
Cuba (1972) 8,330 837,936 0.1 
Norway 7,535 6,274,399 0.1 
France 6,850 4lhlJ9,346 0 
Australia 5,823 10,787,293 0 
W. Germany 2,685 89, 165,480 0 
l/Note that these are production, not export figures (export data on 
cobalt was not available) so that as indicators of export dependence 
the ratios are ~iased upward somewhat. 
Source: Co111TIOdity Research Bureau, Inc. Corrmodity Yearbook 1976. 
Copper 
United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 
1975, Vol. I. 
The copper market, as explained earlier, is, by its size, the most 
insulated from any disruption by ocean mining . A full 10 million tons 
of ocean nodules would not even generate copper equivalent to 2 percent 
of 1975 world copper production (Table 3). And for Adams' 7 million-
tons-of-ocean-nodules scenario, neither price nor land- based produc-
tion would fall by even one percent (Table 4) . Thus, even though a 
number of countries derive very large shares of their export earnings 
from copper (especially Zambia, Chile and Peru; see Table 11), ocean 
mining is likely to have a negl.igible effect on these export earnings. 
-
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Table 11: Export Dependence on Copperl/ (1974) 
(in thousand U.S . $) 
Copper share of 
Country COQQer EXQOrts Tota 1 EXQOrts Tota 1 ExQorts 
Chile 1 ,897 ,959 2,480,567 76 . 5 
Zambia (1973) 1,072,418 1,136 ,229 94.4 
Belgium- Lux . 1,042,632 28 , 125 , 619 3.7 
Zaire 953,826 1, 381, 458 69 .0 
Germany, Fed. 974,915 90 , 021 ,382 1.1 
Canada 661,628 32,783,390 2. 0 
Japan 715,553 55,537,758 1.3 
U.S. incl. Puerto Rico 433,402 98,506 ,890 0.4 
United Kingdom 427,856 8,661 ,515 1.1 
Philippines 396,725 2, 701 , 161 14. 7 
Peru 347,910 1,499 ,300 23 . 2 
Australia 303,796 10, 787,293 2.8 
South Africa 283,583 4.,906 . 101 5 .• 8 
France 249,035 45, 139, 46 0.6 
Yugoslavia 216,288 3,804,590 5.7 
Sweden 188 , 744 15 , 909 ,463 1.2 
Italy 146 , 998 30 ,251 , 786 0. 5 
Netherlands 129,969 32,734,235 0. 4 
Indonesia 117 ,276 7,426,338 1.6 
Norway 90,954 6,274,399 1.4 
Finland 64, 713 5,521,587 1.2 
Austria 59,612 7, 161 ,482 0.8 
Switzerland· 48 , 781 11,838,027 0.4 
Mexico (1973) 41 , 662 2,631 ,496 1.6 
Spain 27,205 7,058,608 0. 3 
Ireland 26,469 2,629,497 1.0 
Israel 24,550 l ,824 ,859 1. 3 
Turkey 21 ,561 1 ,537 ,822 1.4 
Uganda 16,891 315,361 5. 4 
Denmark 14,951 7,683,430 0.2 
Morocco 8,732 1,773 , 525 0. 5 
Indi a 5,908 3, 906,068 0. 1 
Nicaraqua (1973) 1,009 274,652 0. 4 
l!Includes both unrefined and ref ined copper (SIC Codes 682 and 283. 11) 
Source : United Nationsl Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1975 , 
Vol . I and Vol . II p. 145,238 . 
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Ocean mining will, however, stimulate some minor restructuring of 
world copper trade . The United States imports a relatively small 
portion of its primary copper -- about 15 percent over the 3 years 1972 
to 197431 -- and obtains three-quarters of this imported copper from 
Canada , Peru and Chile (Table 8) . Seabed copper output is estimated to 
substitute for about 10 to 30 percent of these copper imports by 1981. 
If these curtailments of copper imports are spread rather evenly over 
the seven major exporters listed in Table 8, no one country will have 
to redirect more than 10 percent of their copper exports and most will 
have to redirect less than 3 percent. The worst that could happen in 
terms of trade adjustments would be for Peru to be cut off from the 
U. S. market completely . Peru would then have to find new markets for 
over a third of its copper and face a temporary loss of about 8 percent 
of its export earnings while it did so. However , given the fact that 
Peru's total copper exports account for less than 3 percent of the 
world copper trade, finding new outlets, even under this worst-case 
scenario, should not prove overly difficult -- especially given the 
lead time available for developing new markets . 
Nickel 
Of the nickel exporters listed in Table 12, most derive less than 
one percent and all but one derive less than three percent of their 
export earnings from this meta1. 32 By the early 1980's , from 
22 to 66 percent of U. S. nickel imports could be eliminated by seabed 
mining (Table 8). Depending upon how these cutbacks are distributed, 
nickel producers in some countries could find themselves having to 
locate new outlets for as much as a third (e . g ., Rhodesia and South 
Africa) to roughly a half (e . g., Dominican Republic and Canada) of 
their nickel output . The maximum impact that seabed mining could have 
in the first round of trade restructuring would be for the Dominican 
Republic and New Caledonia to each face up to an 8-percent temporary 
decline in export earnings . In the longer run, however, it should be 
the nickel producers of the tropics and subtropics (such as the 
Dominican Republic, New Caledonia, Cuba and a few others) whose 
expensive- to-process laterite ores will not be able to compete if faced 
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Tablel2 : Export Dependence on Nickell! (1974) 
(in thousand U.S. $) 
Nickel share of 
Country Ni eke 1 Ex2orts Total Ex2orts Tota 1 Ex2orts 
Canada 498,385 32,783,390 1.5% 
United Kingdom 218,966 38,661,515 0. 6 
Norway 167, 174 6,274,399 2. 7 
New Caledonia (1973) 121 ,366 N.A . N.A. 
. ~ustral ia 115 ,826 10,787,293 1.1 
U.S. incl. Puerto Rico 114,668 98,506,890 0.1 
Gennany Fed. 98,821 89,165,480 0.1 
Dominican Rep. 93,097 636,826 14.6 
France 53,484 45,139,346 0.1 
South Africa 40,656 4,906, 101 0.8 
Netherlands 32,607 32,734,235 0 
Finland 19,973 5,521,587 0.4 
Sweden 17,625 15 ,909 ,463 0.1 
Switzerland 11,862 11,838,027 0.1 
Japan 10,594 55,537,758 0 
Belgium-Lux . 9,583 28,125,619 0 
Italy 7,477 30,251 ,786 0 
Austria 3.301 7,161,482 0 
Ireland 2,533 2,629,497 0.1 
Spain 1,028 7,058,608 0 
Hong Kong 946 5,906,788 0 
Malaysia 746 4,234,244 0 
Chile 558 2,480,567 0 
Singapore 179 5,785,144 0 
Denmark 106 7,683,430 0 
Bunna 100 195,390 0 
Portugal 13 2,302,044 0 
lf 1ncludes both unrefined and refined nickel (SIC codes 683 and 283.2.) 
Source: United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1975, 
Vol. II, p. 146, 239 and Vol . I. 
218 
with a declining price of metal. 
In summary, ocean mining will cause some restructuring of mineral 
trade patterns as well as some decline in export earnings . Zaire, for 
example, could face a 4- percent decline in export earnings due t o a 
fall in its cobalt exports and a fall in market price . Gabon could 
face a 6- percent decline in export earnings from displacement in the 
U. S. market by seabed manganese, though this decline would probably be 
more than offset by a rise in oil production and prices . The copper 
market should be the least affected , though one worst- case scenario has 
Peru facing a temporary 8- percent decline in export earning as it 
searches for new outlets for its copper . Finally , seabed nickel could 
cause serious adjustments for a number of nickel producers , but no 
country, save New Caledonia and the Dominican Republic , faces 
potentially serious declines in export earnings . 
Summary 
Part II of this paper has at tempted to outline the economic 
consequences of ocean mining should it proceed under a free- access, 
non- taxed and unregulated institutional framework . From the discus-
sion of ocean mining's pot ential effect upon prices and quantities of 
the four minerals, and the employment level and export earnings of 
countries currently producing the mineral from land- based mines , a 
picture of a rather modest impact of ocean mining emerges . The most 
likely situation is one in which few countries will face serious 
economic adjustments after the advent of seabed mining . The only 
countries likely to be noticeably affected include Gabon , Zair e , the 
Dominican Republic and New Caledonia , since they could face temporary 
declines in export earnings of up to 6 percent, 4 percent , 8 percent 
and 8 percent respectively in the worst- case situations . 
3. Political Response : Redesigning the Institutional Framework 
The previous sections have examined the stimulus to ocean mining 
and discussed the likely market response to the first generation of the 
seabed production of minerals should it cocur under a traditional free-
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access approach to ocean resources . In reality, economic and political 
systems are inextricably mixed and individuals and groups pursue their 
objectives through both . Thus, the perceived economic effects of ocean 
mining have stimulated a political response and this political 
response, in turn, is transforming the institutional framework within 
which the seabed will be mined , thus resulting in a different set of 
economic effects than those originally perceived . What is intended in 
this final section is to delineate the basic three interest groups in 
the ocean-mining debate, suggest forms of compromise, and discuss 
economic efficiency considerations for implementing these compromises . 
(1) Political Trade- offs 
From the discussion in the previous section there emerge three 
categories of countries with respect to seabed mining : (1) the 
industrialized countries in general and the (potential) ocean- mining , 
industrialized countries in particular which would receive the lion's 
share of the benefits; (2) a small number of developing countries which 
stand to suffer temporary losses in export revenues of up to 8 percent ; 
and (3) a very large number of countries which will be essentially 
unaffected by ocean mining in any measurable sense . It is not 
difficult to see that the interests of these groups are not in harmony . 
The first group stands to gain the most from a free-access , 
unregulated, first- come first - served framework . The second group 
would gain most from a total prohibition on ocean mining . The third 
group would gain most from a situation in which full seabed production 
was assured but all economic rent was taxed away to be redistributed 
according to some agree-upon criterion . 
If the first group would satisfy itself with only the increased 
consumer surplus generated by this new source of minerals , and give up 
any economic rent captured by its ocean mining firms, then the first 
and third groups would be no longer in conflict . This assumes that 
taxing away the rent is both administratively feasible and would not 
reduce the level of ocean- mining activity from its free - access opti-
mum, about which more will be said in a moment . 
The conflict between both of these groups and the middle group 
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would not be reduced by this compromise, unless the appropriated rents 
could be used to compensate, in some way, the middle group for the 
losses to its land- based mining sector. Whether the advent of ocean 
mining could be made truly Pareto-superior through such a move depends 
upon two factors . First, the third group of countries must be willing 
to allow the general fund of appropriated rents to be reduced by the 
amount sufficient to compensate the middle group, thus having less for 
themselves . Second, the fund of appropriated rents must be large 
enough to actually allow compensation for losses to the middle group, 
While the benefits (increased rents plus increased consumer surplus) 
will surely exceed the losses (the reduction in factor incomes in land-
based mining) when ocean mining occurs , there is no assurance that the 
increase in rent alone will exceed the losses . Thus, even if the third 
group is willing it may not be able to compensate the second group out 
of the appropriated rent fund . 
But whether or not full compensation is possible, the total 
benefits do outweigh the total costs since new, more efficient tech-
nologies allow greater production with the same use of resources, and 
it is not at all clear that it would be either a socially or 
economically progressive precedent to prevent the introduction of a 
new technology, because compensation of the losers was not administra-
tively possible . If one were willing to look far enough back in 
history, an application of such a principle could have prevented the 
transition from the stone age to the age of metals and thus destroyed 
the basis for the business of these very land- based producers who are 
at tempting to impede the progress of the new transition . In other 
words , accepting the principle that prohibited any technological 
innovation which did not allow full compensation of the losers would be 
putting a strong fetter on material progress . So while it may be best 
to have compensation for the losers accompany a new technological 
development , when such compensation is impossible, it is better to have 
technological change without compensation than to have no tech-
nological change at all . 
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(2) Considerations for Economic Efficiency 
There are two criteria or sets of criteria to guide the architects 
of the new institutional framework -- an eequity criterion and an 
economic-efficiency criterion. Neither is unambiguous. The equity 
criterion involves some acceptable interpretation of the notion that 
the resources of the seabed are the common heritage of mankind -- a 
principle that has been accepted, in one form or another, by practi -
cally all countries . While the equity criterion will not be discussed 
here, it is assumed that an internationally acceptable interpretation 
will involve either some type of system of taxation or some type of 
direct participation which will allow the developing countries a more 
proportionate share of the benefits than they would have received under 
a free- access, untaxed system . The Single Revised Negotiating Text 
which was serving as a basis for negotiation in the Law of the Sea 
Conference during early 1977 supports this assumption, since it 
contains provision for both taxation of private mining firms as well as 
direct seabed exploitation by an international agency . The efficiency 
implications of both taxation and direct exploitation by an interna-
tional agency will be discussed . 
Rent Tax Does Change Output Decisions 
Even the economic efficiency criterion is not unambiguous . For 
example, could the rent accruing to ocean mining be taxed away with no 
effect on the level of ocean mineral production? There are t wo 
important questions in the general issue of taxing economic rent , one 
theoretical, the other administrative . First, is it correct to 
maintain that economic rent can be taxed away (either all or in part) 
without causing any distortion in the allocation of scarce resources? 
Second, can economic rent actually be identified in the real world and 
can a tax be designed which can capture economic rent and only economic 
rent? We concern ourselves here with only the first question, for if 
the first is answered in the negative , then the second becomes largely 
irrelevant . 33 
Given the very definition of rent (i . e ., as the return above the 
minimum return necessary to induce all factors , to assemble themselves 
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to perform the activity in question) and given a fully competitive , 
instantaneously-adjusting world, a tax which only captures some por~ 
tion of rent and no portion of any factor return will create no 
distortions in the allocation of resources. 
What characteristics of the real world would allow a pure rent tax 
to create distortions in the allocation of resources? One of these is 
the time dimension to decision making. In the real world, it takes 
time to acquire and process information. Investment funds thus do not 
flow instantaneously into all projects for which the rate of return 
exceeds the cost of capital. In fact, the higher the expected rate of 
return for projects in a given sector, ceteris paribus , the more 
rapidly funds should be expected to flow into that sector, the more 
rapidly that sector will become developed , and the greater the level of 
output from that sector at any point in time . 
The effect of a rent tax on output, given the non- instantaneously 
adjusting nature of the real world, is traced out in Figure 3. Graph A 
denotes the positive relationship between the marginal rent (i . e . , the 
rent captured by the last project) to be obtained in a sector and the 
rate of entry (or growth in investment) in that sector . Given that the 
entrance of new firms decreases the marginal rent, Graph B shows the 
decline of the marginal rent over time, and Graph C the associated 
decline in the rate of entry over time . With a declining rate of new 
entry, total capacity in the sector increases at a decreasing rate as 
depicted in Graph D and as long as capacity is increasing (and 
utilized), the cumulative level of output is increasing at an 
increasing rate . The solid curves represent a no- taxed sector and the 
dotted lines that same sector with a portion of the rent taxed away. 
Note that marginal rent and rate- of- entry curves tend to converge as 
the marginal rent falls to zero. However , the level of cumulative 
output does not converge, demonstrating that the cumul ative level of 
production falls as the rent tax rises above zero . Thus while the 
imposition of a rent tax does not affect the short- term production 
decision , it does affect the intermediate- term production decision and 
thus the total amount of the product produced over a given period of 
time . 
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Figure 3: The Effect of a Rent Tax on Output 
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Ocean- Mining Tax Must Be Harmonized with Other Taxes 
Note that this argument is based upon the assumption that economic 
rent is not taxed away in other sectors . If all rents, everywhere, 
were taxed away there would be no effect upon allocative efficiency 
among sectors (though the redistribution of the rents would likely 
involve some change in expenditure patterns) . However, rents are not 
everywhere taxed away and the tax treatment of other sectors must be 
considered when examining the allocative efficiency of a tax in one 
particular sector . If, for example, land- based mining is taxed in some 
particular fashion, then to tax ocean mining in another fashion could 
cause the relative private rates of return in the two sectors to 
diverge from the relative social rates of return, resulting in under-
investment in one of the two sectors. The problem of tax harmonization 
is complicated by the fact that land- based mining is taxed differently 
in different countries . 34 
Competitive Bidding Inadequate 
However, given that the international collage of existing tax 
schemes probably makes the conceptual design of an optimal tax impos-
sible, a few general remarks can be made regarding the design of a 
reasonable tax . One concerns allocating mining sites to the highest 
bidder and the other the imposition of a profits tax on ocean mining 
firms . In a world of atomistic competition and full knowledge of the 
cost and revenue structures associated with each potential ocean 
mining site, the allocation of sites by competitive bidding would both 
appropriate the full amount of the rent and avoid any distortion in 
factor proportions or short- term output levels. To the extent that the 
number of bidders relative to the number of mine sites is very small --
there could easily be only _a single bidder for any given mine site --
and the fact that there is a great deal of uncertainty in ocean mining, 
at least in its early stages, the portion of the rent appropriated 
would likely fall considerably below 100 percent . In a study of 
Alaskan oil, for example, Norgaard found that game- strategic 
approaches to bidding caused the level of bids to be highly sensitive 
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to the number of bidders and to allow capture of only about 
5 to 20 percent of the rent . 35 Thus reliance solely upon competitive 
bidding for ocean mining sites would probably generate relatively 
little revenue for redistribution . 
Profits Tax and Firm Behavior 
A second candidate, used by practically every country in the 
world, is the profits or net income tax . 36 This tax has the advantage 
that it requires no competition for mine sites and it has the taxing 
agency sharing in the risk faced by the firm . However, in order to be 
effective, the mining companies (which currently plan vertically inte-
grated operations) would have to establish seabed mining as an entity 
(or profit center) separate from nodule processing, and create a sort 
of shadow market in nodules . Since vertically integrated companies 
have considerable latitude in the way they price internally exchanged 
goods and services, one should expect to find relatively low nodule 
shadow prices if the international seabed tax is greater than the tax 
rate prevailing in the countries in which processing takes place, and 
relatively high nodule prices if the opposite is true. From the 
international taxing agency ' s point of view the optimal tax rate will 
be at least as high as that prevailing in the processing country (48 
percent during the first generation since processing will initially 
take place in the U. S.) and perhaps higher depending upon the elasti-
city of shadow nodule prices with respect to the international-
national tax rate differential . 
Exploitation by an International Agency 
Would a free-access, appropriately taxed seabed mining framework 
yield a higher level of benefits to each country than would a framework 
in which an international agency became the exclusive producer of ocean 
minerals? Unfortunately, an unambiguous analytic answer to this 
question is not possible, though the relevant considerations can at 
least be pointed out . If the international agency had the tech-
nological and financial support to be as efficient as the best poten-
tial nodule producer from private industry, and if the agency made the 
same production decision that would be made by a number of private 
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producers, 37 then the agency would extract both the rent and the normal 
profit from seabed mining and thus end up with larger revenues than 
would be the case if it were only taxing away the rent from a number of 
private operators . Also, since uncertainty over returns to ocean 
mining and administrative difficulties would probably mean an appro-
priation of less than the full amount of the rent in the open access 
case (recall the example of Alaskan oil discussed earlier) , the 
exclusive agency would do better to mine itself since it would be 
guaranteed the full amount of the rent . 
The key assumption in this comparison is that the agency would be 
as efficient as the best potential nodule producer for the private 
sector . In the real world this is far from the truth at the pr esent 
time . If an international mining agency were created tomorrow , it 
would have access to only a portion of the existing body of knowledge 
on seabed mining . While most of the basic scientific information on 
nodule formation, composition and distribution is in the public 
domain , much of the practical information on mining and processing 
technology along with detailed mine site survey data is proprietary 
information, and there is no way that an international agency could 
acquire this information short of purchasing it at a very high price. 
But aside from printed technical information and test models of mining 
machi nes , the natural resource companies currently closest to seabed 
mining also have teams of highly skilled people with many years of 
experience in the problems of land- based mineral extraction . This 
would also put the agency at a serious competitive disadvantage unless, 
again, it tried to hire this human capital away from the private 
sector, by paying these people more than they are currently earning. 
Starting from scratch , an international agency would be con-
siderably less efficient than the firms that have already put mil l ions 
of dollars and more than a decade into ocean mining, and it could 
eventually reach this technical effici ency only by bidding information 
and manpower away from the private sector through paying higher factor 
prices . The final result would , of course, be a higher cost structure 
than would have existed in private industry in the first place . The 
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question then becomes, would the increased cost of production faced by 
the agency be greater or less than the normal profit earned by the 
private firm? If greater, then the international community would have 
more dispensable funds available if it simply allowed free- access 
ocean mining and taxed the rent away . If less, then the international 
community should set up its own exclusive shop for the exploitation of 
seabed nodules . 
This final section has attempted to identify the three basic 
interest groups in the ocean mining debate, suggest grounds for 
compromise and discuss some guidelines to encourage economic effi-
ciency when the compromise is made . It was argued that, contrary to 
the opinion of some economists, taxing away the rent does affect output 
decisions . It was also argued that competitive bidding would be 
inadequate for capturing the rent, due to the small number of bidders 
and uncertainty over cost structures. A profit tax allows a sharing of 
risks between the taxer and the taxed but given the integrated nature 
of potential ocean mining firms, selection of the tax rate must be 
undertaken with an eye to the existing tax rate on the processing 
firms. Finally, it was pointed out that mining by an international 
agency would probably involve a higher cost structure than the private 
firms currently involved in ocean mining R & D due mainly to the 
technological and human capital disadvantage that would be faced by an 
international agency . 
Conclusion 
This paper has at tempted to put ocean mining in a stimulus-
response framework. It first tried to explain the stimulus to the 
current interest in ocean mining in terms of the rising value of ocean 
nodules , the falling cost of ocean mining and the rising cost of 
traditional land- based mining . It then devoted considerable discus-
sion to the hypothetical short- run response of the economic system to 
the first generation of ocean mining . Seabed mining was described as a 
new technology which could gradually, over a very long period of time , 
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render land-based production of some minerals obsolete, though it is 
conceivable that ocean and land-based mining could coexist indefi, 
nitely . As for short-term effects, it was discovered that a very small 
number of countries stood to face measurable losses from free- access 
ocean mining. In some very worst-case (and unlikely) scenarios, Gabon 
' Zaire, the Dominican Republic, New Caledonia and Peru could face 
temporary declines in export earnings of up to 6 percent, 4 percent 
' 8 percent, 8 percent, and 8 percent respectively . In reaction to this 
hypothetical market response, the countries of the world have 
responded politically in attempting to redesign the institutional 
framework for allocating ocean resources in general and seabed 
minerals in particular. The final section of the paper attempted to 
identify the three basic interest groups, suggest areas of compromise, 
and suggest economic efficiency guidelines for implementing the com-
promise . 
229 
FOOTNOTES 
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mining . ) However , the learning curve is predicted to be very steep , and 
subsequent units are expected to have approximately 35 percent overall 
recovery efficiency. Small evolutionary improvements in mining tech-
nology are predicted to result in an overall recovery efficiency of 
greater than 50 percent after the year 2000 . " Alexander F. Holser , 
Manganese Nodule Resources and Mine Site Availability, Washington , 
D. C.: Ocean Mining Administration , Department of the Interior, August 
1976. 
28 In 1973, Gabon ' s oil output had risen by 20 percent from the 
previous year ' s level and there were 13 companies searching for oil . 
Henry E. Stipp , "The Mineral Industry of Gabon ," Mineral Yearbook 1973 , 
Vol . III, Washington, D. C. : U. S. Bureau of Mines , 1976, p. 320 . 
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29The fact that all first generation ocean miners a r e i nte rna-
tional consortia could mean that there are intra- consortium agreements 
to ship some of the processed metal to Japanese or Europe , thus 
displacing Japanese or European as well as U. S. imports . 
30see, for example , "An Econometric Model of 
Industry ," United Nations Conference on Trade 
Document TD/B/483/Add 1 , April 1974 . 
the Manganese Ore 
and Development, 
31H. J . Schroeder , "Copper, " Mineral Facts and Problems 1975 , Wash-
ington , D. C., U. S. Bureau of Mines , 1976 , p. 309 . 
32one important exception for whom UN data on total exports was 
unavailable is New Caledonia , a French territory just east of Austra-
lia . New Caledonia has produced about one- fifth of the world nickel 
supply in recent years , is the second or third largest producer behind 
Canada and sometimes the Soviet Union, and derives practically all of 
its export earnings from nickel . It is also considered to be a high-
cost producer . 
33Actually, even if a rent tax distorts, it may cause less distor-
tion than other types of taxes and thus still be a conceptually 
preferred form of taxation . In this case the second question would 
still be relevant . 
34For a comparison of tax structures across countries see George 
F. Kopits, "Taxation and Multinational Firm Behavior: A Critical 
Survey," IMF Staff Papers, November 1976, pp . 624-673; and Seynour 
Fiekousky and Alvin Kaufman , "Mineral Taxation," in William A. 
Vogely (ed), Economics of the Mineral Industries , New York : American 
Institute of Mining, Metallurgical and Petroleum Engineers , Inc . , 
1976 , pp . 673-682. 
35Richard B. Norgaard, "Uncertainty, Competition and Leasing 
Policy, " unpublished manuscript , Department of Agriculture and 
Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley , pp . 21 and 26. 
36A very specific form of this tax designed for natural resource 
projects is the resource rent tax, which pegs the tax rate to the 
project rate of return and has the advantage of guaranteeing producers 
some minimum rate of return before a tax is imposed . See Ross Garnaut 
and Anthony Clunies Ross, "Uncertainty Risks Aversion and the Taxing of 
Natural Resource Projects ," The Economic Journal , June 1975, pp . 272-
287 . 
37 Even though an international agency would have a monopoly in 
nodule mining, it would not be a monopolist in any of the markets for 
component nodule metals and thus it would not be able to control 
through its output decisions either the metal prices or the derived 
prices of nodules . Its output decisions would thus be more like that 
of a competitive firm than a monopolist . However , to the extent that 
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control of the agency could be used for political as well as profit 
maximizing ends , the level of output could differ from the perfectly 
competitive case . 
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OCEAN MINING IN THE PACIFIC BASIN: STIMULUS AND RESPONSE 
A COMMENT 
Leslie V. Castle 
I found Michael Gorham's paper of considerable value in lessening 
my ignorance about ocean mining. I was scarcely aware of the existence 
of manganese nodules until the 1975 Pacific Tr 2.de and Development 
Conference when the subject was touched upon in a paper by Fran-
cis Christy and Lew Alexander and, I might add, fixed in one ' s memory 
by Vladimir Yakubovsky. 
Gorham sets out very concisely and clearly why, in his view ocean 
mining is capable of being part of the world economic scene within a 
few years . They are persuasive arguments, at least to the uninitiated, 
but my impression is that he is perhaps over- optimistic and tends to 
play down the manifold uncertainties, for example about location , size 
and concentration of deposits and about the mining and processing 
technology . One of the problems here is that the degree of uncertainty 
on the cost side may not be much further reduced until a full - scale 
commercial operation is mounted and the prerequisi te for that may well 
be a removal of the political uncertainty about the institutional 
framework . In turn , the degree of cost uncertainty must place con-
siderable constraints upon the choice of institutional framework. I 
will come back to this point in a moment . 
Gorham is also rather optimistic about the effects of the develop-
ment of ocean mining on existing producers. He refers in several 
places to " temporar y" declines in earnings by various count ries. 
However these declines may not be very temporary . With thin industrial 
structures and with rather poorly developed levels of human skills, 
alternative avenues of employment or of future development may not be 
easy to find within lead times of just a few years . Nonetheless this 
is not an argument sufficient to justify artificial barriers being 
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placed in the way of the development of cheaper sources of raw 
materials. It may be an argument in favor of structural adjustment 
assistance; though I see no particular reason , other than one derived 
from the particular context in which the issue is being discussed 
interna~ionally, for distinguishing in terms of such assistance 
between one unfavorable effect of change and any other. The problem is 
simply part of the general question of development and development 
assistance. Even in the absence of an agreed international framework 
for ocean mining the adverse effects would need to be taken into 
account in international trade, aid and investment policy, especially 
by those developed countries which stand to gain most. 
The need for an international institutional framework which Gor-
ham discusses in the third section of his paper I see as much more a 
political than an economic issue. While there is. no difficulty in 
accepting as a harmless piece of rehtoric the statement that ocean 
minerals are "the common heritage of mankind" this does not amount to 
accepting as an analytical proposition that they are a common property 
resource with the implication that economic efficiency requires the 
establishment of enforceable property rights in them by an interna-
tional organization. On the surface of it, given what is known about 
the nature of the resource and of the technology required, free access 
even without the specification of property rights is unlikely to ~esult 
in excessive investment and the consequent inefficient dissipation of 
all rent as we find in the case of ocean fisheries; nor should there be 
free-rider or claim-jumping problems leading to too little investment. 
The expectation of substantial rent implies very limited entry . 
Thus, the main argument for some form of international framework 
is an equity (i.e., political) one : that because the resources do not 
lie within the acknowledged boundaries of any nation, the benefits 
should accrue to all nations and not simply to those who, for whatever 
reason, have the technological capacity to convert them from mere 
curiosities into actual resources about which choices can be made . I 
find the argument unconvincing, but what is more important is how that 
idea is translated via an international institution into an equitable 
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program of benefit sharing . 
Gorham discusses a number of proposals in this context and I find 
myself in general agreement with his views. I agree in particular with 
his views on exploitation of the resources by an international agency 
and about the taxation of the economic rents that would be generated , 
While we may think we know what we mean when we talk about economic 
rent it is quite another thing to discover it and measure it in 
practice and to make the concept the foundation for an international 
taxation policy . Moreover, it may be that rent or excess monopoly 
profit (call it what you will) is the necessary large carrot to induce 
the investment . If it is to be taxed away there is no particular 
reason why resources should flow into this new technology rather than 
into less efficient existing land based mineral development . Further, 
there seems little justification for chasing after this particular 
source of rent and not others such as that from oil resources , except 
of course that most oil resources are or will be within the boundaries 
of some nation state . But that is a matter of historical or political 
accident , not of economic logic . 
For my part , I believe that a preferable course is to leave the 
development of ocean minerals to those who know how, to leave the 
question of how those enterprises should be taxed to the nation state 
of which they are members , and to leave the question of distribution of 
benefits to negotiation between those countries and the international 
community at large . Failure to reach an international accord on this 
issue would be unfortunate not only because of its effects on 
developed/developing country relationships out of all proportion to 
the intrinsic importance of the issue in relation to world welfare , but 
also because it might foreclose on future possibilities of creating 
international i nstitutions where they may really be needed , such as in 
ocean fisheries or in the exploitation of other unowned resources such 
as those of Antarctica . 
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OCEAN MINING IN THE PACIFIC BASIN: STIMULUS AND RESPONSE 
A COMMENT 
David V. Hudson, Jr. 
1. Why Ocean Mining Now? 
The author appropriately notes that the "dP.flated" value of 
nodules was no higher in 1975 than in the mid-1950's, and prices of 
copper and nickel have since fallen . So the stimulus must come from 
the cost side, and may be supported from the market viewpoi nt. 
Costs 
While no new technology is involved in nodule mining (like the 
nodules, the technology has been available), constant refjnements and 
improvements in its application are to be expected . The "learning 
curve" will undoubtedly exis t . (The first venture or two may suffer 
severely as the early lessons are learned . ) But costs are relative. 
It appears that the cost of nickel and co- products (Cu and Co) may be 
lower from deep ocean mining than from alternative on-shore mining of 
laterite deposits . 
The author notes the uncertainties of costs . Recent experience 
with major new applications of "old" technology gives one little 
comfort - - substantial cost over runs are a real risk, as experience in 
the Alaskan pipeline , the first liquified natural gas projects, North 
Sea oil platforms , etc., have shown . 
One of the costs is the tax regime . Mos t stud i es assume taxes on 
deep ocean mining will be of similar impact to U. S. corporate income 
taxes . This var i able is as great as any other, yet i s often treated 
lightly . 
The author notes the trend of both ore body locations and quali-
ties to yield higher costs for land mining . This is true also in ocean 
mining -- the first sites to be mined will be those with the highe s t 
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metal values and best seabed mining conditions . Subsequently . t he 
trend to higher costs will set in. Hopefully, as in the history of 
land mi ning, technological i mprovement8 will operate at least 
partially to mitigate these factors . 
Land and sea mining will compete at the margin when new capacity 
is developed, with higher quality resources, when discovered, being 
att r active to mine whether on land or at sea . 
Prelimi nary estimates indicate that nodule mining on a "pro j ect" 
basis may be very attractive versus alternate investments, if all the 
assumpt:i.ons hold up . 
2 . The Economic Consequences of Ocean Mining 
Gorham's assumptions regarding the i mpact of nodule m~ ning appear 
directionally correct -- little impact on the very large copper market, 
some impact on nickel (particularly laterite mine development) , and 
greater impact on cobalt. Manganese, if recovered, would have great 
impact . 
Adams noted that his modell i ng of cobalt did not provide adequate 
linkage with nickel, and 
find i ngs. Zaire's cobalt 
Gorham is correctly dubious of Adams' 
is a by-product (of copper) as is the 
nodule's . Other observers feel the price of cobalt would approach that 
of nickel, for which it is a substitute i n many uses. 
The world's consumers benefit any time the real resource cost of a 
product is reduced. The allocation of the savings may spread widely 
and thus thinly, and the producers may have the most apparent gain. 
The industrialized countries may gain most . But any reduction of the 
relative costs of capital goods is of vital interest to the developing 
countries . 
The impact on land mining is more a question of slowing develop-
ment of marginal resources rather than one of technology. Metals 
mining is ore-body critical and ocean mining is no exception. 
However, the i mpact on existing mines j s perhaps also overstated. 
The ocean mining ventures are likely to proceed slowly at first. By 
the time the economics are clar:i fied, whether favorably or not 
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potential nickel- laterite projects will be advanced only after taking 
the impact of ocean mining to consideration . Existing ventures, having 
high capital costs, will tend to operate at nearly full capacity unless 
the price of nickel falls to cash costs . (And this is no different 
from the classic behavior of the copper gold and silver markets; ocean 
mining introduces no new factors, only potentially more supplies 
having lower marginal costs . ) 
As Gorham states, the likely impact on mining employment would be 
small at most -- probably less than he has est~mated because the first 
few projects would not be started simultaneously as assumed in the 
model . 
The trade pat tern effects are clear, al though the forecast for 
cobalt probably overstates the losses to Zaire . 
3, Political Response -- Redesigning the Institutional Framework 
First, I believe neither the "rents" or the "losses" would be as 
easy for one observer to define as suggested . Moreover, agreement 
among the nations would be enormously difficult . 
A rent tax would affect decisions -- it becomes an upper limit on 
profits yet does not provide insurance against loss . A "rent" tax is 
assumed theoretically to tax away only the returns, not necessarily to 
induce economically-warranted investment . However, in the case of 
huge uncertainties, such as in the ocean mining of nodules, any limit 
on potential returns increases the possibility of losses . The chances 
would be that all the exploration, research and development, and pre-
development costs would not be recovered as complete agreement is 
unlikely as to the scope of costs to be allowed . 
Bidding may prove to capture more rent than exists -- witness the 
bidding on the Destin anticline off Florida . In conjunction with a 
profits tax it is perhaps the best mode . The concern over pricing 
practices of integrated companies is unwarranted . Governments have 
been dealing with companies effectively in this area for years . (While 
much could be said about the problems of development through an 
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international mining agency, it would also suffer from lack of a 
competitive standard of efficiency and there would be no assurance that 
this approach would maximize realization of "rents . ") 
By far the most important factor, however . is stability of the 
system of compensation. If 500 million dollars are to be risked on 
each venture, the participants will have to have assurance that the 
rules will not change after the investments are made . Moreover, the 
lesser the risk of changing rules of taxation, the lower the risk 
premium required for investment and thus higher bids for projects and 
more activity would result. 
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OCEAN MINING IN THE PACIFIC BASIN : STIMULUS AND RESPONSE 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Considerable discussion focused on the political aspects of ocean 
mining . A common heritage principle did not imply that ocean minerals 
were a common property resource, but there still might be important 
efficiency reasons, peculiar to ocean mining, for establishing and 
enforcing property rights . Gorham agreed that political uncertainty 
over international rules was a major obstacle to private investments, 
but noted that the Metcalf Bill before the U. S. Congress would remove 
most of this risk by guaranteeing compensation to U. S. companies for 
losses resulting from a treaty . Someone pointed out , however, that the 
guarantees covered only negotiated tradeoffs and were considered 
insufficient by the industry. Worries were expressed that passage of 
the Metcalf Bill might deter U. S. agreement on a treaty, or that 
unilateral action by the U. S. would breed unilateral actions of other 
nations, further aggravating political problems . Cautious optimism 
was expressed that the Law of the Sea Conference would reach agreement 
on an ocean mining regime by next year . 
The resource rent tax question arose again . Garnaut stated that a 
pure rent tax, which only taxed profits in excess of those necessary to 
induce investment, was, by definition, allocatively neutral . On the 
other hand, the application of the U. S. tax structure to ocean mining 
was not a neutral solution, since distortion of markets for land-
minerals would simply be carried over to ocean- minerals . Another 
participant pointed out that the theoretical literature on asset 
markets indicated that the costs of equity capital were independent of 
specific project risks, but related to a firm systematic risk position . 
Hence a resource tax would not effect resource allocation for existing 
technology, but would reduce the incentive for new investments . How-
ever, as a matter of practice, bankers do consider project risk in 
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approving loans. Still another participant thought that some positive 
marginal rent may be necessary to induce entry, and pointed, as a 
compromise proposal, to a tax being considered in Thailand, which woulct 
fix a constant positive marginal rent to private firms . 
The impact of ocean mining on export earnings may not be temporary 
for structural reasons, but Gorham emphasized that even under worst 
case assumptions the impact on the third world would be modest, except 
for a few countries . Another participant thought that it was mis-
leading to conclude that the unemployment impact would be small as a 
percentage of the national labor force, since unemployment effects 
would be regionally concentrated . Also some minerals are mined 
jointly, such as copper and nickel, and so cutbacks in the production 
of one mineral may affect other markets. 
Some doubt was expressed about Gorham ' s conclusion that the 
impact of ocean mining on port infrastructures would be small . Gorham 
replied that what he meant was that the new infrastructure requirements 
would be small compared to those required for new land-based mines. 
Gorham said that reports and conversations with industry offi-
cials on experimental operations led him to believe that profitable 
ocean mining was right around the cor ner if not already here today . 
But someone pointed out that , to date, industry had made only a small 
portion of the investment required for large scale operations and was 
waiting for a reduction in risks . Mining corporations wished to be 
number two or three in ocean mining, but not number one. Someone else 
remarked that there still are large technical problems to be solved . 
Several participants commented that ocean mining would signi fi-
cantly change mining industry structure . Contrary to Gorham's assump-
tion, they thought that the new technology would induce new entrants 
into the market . Also some marginal local enterprises which currently 
compete in markets for land-based minerals would no longer remain 
competitive. Since nodules contain a basket of minerals, forwa r d 
integration of the industries might take place for marketing numerous 
by-products . On the question of whether there were any economic 
advantages to joint production, the major costs were getting t he 
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minerals to the surface rather than separating them, except for 
manganese . On the question of whether nodules are an exhaustible 
resource , the ocean floor does reproduce nodules but it is not really 
known how fast or whether new nodules would be of the same quality as 
the old . 
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AUSTRALIA'S MINERALS PRODUCTION AND TRADE : CASE STUDY OF A 
RESOURCE-RICH DEVELOPED COUNTRY* 
Ben Smith 
1. Introduction 
Australia ' s rise to prominence as a minerals producer has been 
rapid, having really only commenced in the early 1960s . The rate at 
which mineral developments have taken place, and the generally remote 
locations of those developments, have created strains for resource 
allocation within Australia . While the mining industry argues that i t 
is already disadvantaged by the existence of direct or indirect 
subsidies to other activities , arguments have recently been advanced 
favoring deliberate restraints on the growth of the mining sector in 
order to curtail the effects of unfavorable exchange rates on other 
traded-goods sectors . 
Australia's growing mineral production and trade has been closely 
associated with Japan ' s recent rapid industrial growth . The high level 
of dependence of the two countries on one another in the minerals trade 
has raised important issues relating to price bargaining and the degree 
of government regulation of the bilateral trade in minerals. At the 
same time , the effects of rapid inflation , exchange rate changes, and 
the Japanese recession have placed strains on the degree of security 
provided by long- term trade arrangements , and these have stimulated 
considerat ion of the relative merits of alternative means of providing 
secure access to markets and supplies . 
Partly because of the speed of development, growth in minerals 
production has depended heavily on foreign investment and substantial 
*The author is indebted to Jennifer Macklin for valuable research 
assistance . 
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overseas loan financing. The nature of Australian pol i cy towards 
foreign investment has been, and remains, an important determinant of 
the rate and nature of minerals developments and of the benefits to 
Australia from such developments. In the future, attitudes adopted 
towards foreign investment, as well as the manner in which the problems 
of maintaining security and stability in the trade are dealt with, may 
be an i mportant influence on Japanese decisions about the transfer of 
inefficient processing activities out of Japan and about the appro-
priate location of those activit i es. 
In recent years there has been a renewed interest internationally 
in the formation of producer cartels for a number of mineral products, 
in commodity stabilization arrangements, and in a reduction of ba'"'-
riers to trade in processed mineral products . While Australia has a 
clear interest in the last of these, its position as a developed 
country minerals producer has caused it to approach the questions of 
producer cartels and international commodity arrangements in a cau-
tious and somewhat ambivalent manner. However, the Australian govern-
ment has not appeared to discourage Aus tralj_an companies from joining 
private international producer groups seeking to raise, or maintain, 
stable prices for mineral products. 
Australia's rapid growth as a minerals producer has taken place 
during a period of growing concern over environmental and resource 
conservation issues. Although this has not as yet led to any great 
opposition to mining in general, in some instances there have been 
substantial conflicts of interest and the appropriate means of 
resolving such conflicts is an important policy issue 
In any discussion of Australian mineral developments it i.s impor-
tant to recognize the major role of the various State governments in 
determining the rate and nature of mining developments and the condi-
tions under which they may take place. Each State claims ownership 
rights over the mineral and energy resources within its territory, and, 
therefore, the direct power to regulate and to tax the exploitation of 
those resources . The Commonwealth (federal) Government only exercises 
regulatory powers over mineral and energy resources lying in federal 
territories or offshore. 
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Commonwealth control over mineral developments in the Sta tes 
arises indirectly through its powers over i ncome taxation, over the 
conditions under which internat i onal trade may take place . and over the 
conditions under which foreign investment may enter the country . 
Frequently the Commonwealth is constrained by the Constitution not to 
discriminate between States, between activities , or between companies 
engaged i n the same activity. The separation between State and 
Commonwealth responsibilities , and the constraints on the exercise of 
Commonwealth powers, have been argued to result in substantial diffi-
culties and inefficiencies in adopting and administering appropriate 
policies towar ds the mining sector . 
The next section of the paper reviews Australia's development as a 
minerals producer since the early 1960s, while the following sections 
provide detailed examinations of the particular i ssues raised above 
2 . The Development of the Australian Minerals Industry 
Until the early 1960s the Austral i an minerals industry was domi-
nated by the underground mining of coal for domestic use, the pr oduc-
tion of gold , and the min i ng, smelting and refining of copper, lead and 
zinc . Production of iron ore was l i mited to the needs of the well-
developed but domestically- or iented iron and steel industry , and Aus-
tralia was wholly dependent on imports of nickel , bauxite and petroleum 
products . In general, the principal developments of the preceding 
several decades had been a steady expansion of output from long-
established mining areas and the growth of domestic processing of mine 
products , particularly of copper , lead and zinc . 
In 1960 , then, the mining industry was heavily concentrated 
around a few locations -- the coal mining area around Sydney and the 
mining towns of Broken Hill , Mount Isa, Kalgoorli e , and Mount Lyell - -
where the necessary infrastructure and ancillary activities were fully 
developed . The direct contribution of mining to GDP was less than 
two percent , while minerals and primary metals accounted for only 
6. 5 percent of total exports . The .principal export commodities , 
representing almost 80 percent of total exports of minerals and pri-
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mary metals, were copper, lead, zinc and the mineral sands, rutile 
(titanium) and zircon . 
As a result of a spate of mineral discoveries from the late 1950s 
onwards, the nature and importance of the Australian minerals industry 
has changed dramatically since 1960, and Australia has emerged as one 
of the world's major minerals producers (see Tables 1, 2, and 3). 
Exploration was stimulated by a number of factors. A variety of 
exploration incentives was offered, particularly for oil exploration, 
and the removal of long-standing embargoes on the export of iron ore 
and manganese ore provided a substantial stimulus to explore for these 
products. As the Japanese economy moved into sustained and rapid 
industrial growth, an obvious market emerged for a wide range of 
mineral products. By 1960, Japan was already taking over one th i rd of 
Australia's minerals exports, and Japanese purchases of copper concen-
trates and coking coal, in particular, had given a significant boost to 
existing mining establishments. 
The major discoveries resulting form the upsurge in exploration 
activity were of iron ore, black coal, bauxite, nickel, manganese, oil, 
natural gas and, more recently, uranium. With the exception of the oil 
and gas discoveries, where the domestic market has provided a secure 
basis for development, 1 the new deposits gave Australia a production 
potential far in excess of domestic requirements. Importantly, many of 
the discoveries were in remote regions away from established mining 
areas and their efficient development required major capital expendi-
tures on new townships, transportation and port facilities . In order 
to raise the large capital sums necessary for development it was 
essential that secure export markets could be found for a substantial 
proportion of the projected output. 
While the circumstances of Australia's minerals developments may 
have made secure market access particularly important, it is a general 
feature of the international minerals trade that producers have a 
strong interest in obtaining guaranteed long-term access to markets 
and that minerals consumers have a similarly strong interest in 
obtaining guaranteed long-term access to supplies. The importance of 
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Table 1: Share of Mining in Gross Domestic Product, and 
Share of Minerals and Primary Metals in Exports : 
Australia , 1960 to 1975 . 
1960 1965 1970 1975 
Mining GDP (a) (%) 
Total GDP 1. 87 1. 92 3.57 4 . 50 
Mineral ExEorts (%) 
Total Exports 6 . 56 10 . 60 26.83 34.63 
(a)GNP in mining only -- does not include minerals processing . 
Sources : Australian Bureau of Statistics, Overseas Trade Bulle-
tin, A. G. P . S., Canberra, various issues . 
Bureau of Mineral Resources , Australian Mineral Indus-
try Review, A.G . P.S ., Canberra , various issues. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian National 
Accounts, A. G. P . S., Canberra, various issues. 
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Table 2: Shares of Commodities in Total Mine Production and 
Exports of Mineral Products: Australia 1960 and 1975 . 
% of Mine Production 
1 
% of Mineral ExEorts 2 
1960 1975 1960 1975 
Black Coal 35.0 29.9 10 . 1 23.9 
Brown Coal 4.4 1.5 
Crude Oil 9 . 6 0 . 5 
Natural Gas 1. 5 ( ) ;~ 2 (e) Liquid Petroleum Gas 3.2 e 
Iron Ore 
3 
3.1 20.1 4.1 31. 3 
Tungsten 0 . 4 0.6 1.4 0.5 
Nickel 5.5 
Manganese 0.2 7. 7 ( e) 1.0 15.0(e) 
Bauxite 
Copper 
Lead 
Zinc 
Tin 
Titanium 
Zircon 
Salt 
Gold 
TOTAL 
Notes: 
Source : 
16.2 4 . 7 21. 8 4 .3 
13.1 3. 1 32 . 8 4.1 
4. 9 4.4 13.6 3.8 
1. 3 1. 2 0.2 1. 0 
2.5 2.4 7 .0 2.1 
0.6 2.2 2. 1 1. 8 
0.6 0.7 0.2 0 . 5 
10.1 1. 6 _M_ _M_ 
92.4 93.3 94.3 97 . 5 
1Value of mine production as a proportion of the total ex-
mine value of Australian minerals production (excluding 
construction materials) . 
2 
3 
Value of exports of ores and concentrates plus smelter and 
refinery products as a proportion of Australia's total 
exports of minerals and primary metals . 
Exports include exports of crude iron and steel -- there 
were no exports of iron ore in 1960. 
(a)Export of minerals and primary metals calculated net of 
exports/imports of gold bullion. 
(e)Estimate. 
Calculated from data provided in Bureau of Mineral Resources, 
Australian Mineral Industry Review, 1961 and 1975 (preprint). 
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such guarantees lies in the highly capital-·intensive nature of both the 
mining and processing activities, with a high ratio of fixed costs to 
variable costs dictating continuous operation as close to full capa. 
city as possible. In the absence of well-developed and relatively 
stable "free" markets, to which both producers and consumers would have 
ready access, it is often in the interests of both parties that the 
output of particular mines be tied, on a long-term basis, to the 
requirements of particular minerals users. For a large part of the 
world trade in many minerals this link has been achieved through 
ownership ties between metals producers and "captive" mines. 2 
However, al though subsidiaries of European and North American 
companies had played a major role in the discovery of much of Austra-
lia's new resource potential, these companies had generally not been 
seeking sources of supply for their overseas parents. The distance of 
Australia from the North Atlantic market placed Australian mineral 
supplies at a severe transport cost disadvantage relative to existing 
supply sources, especially for unprocessed products, and the extent to 
which the basic requirements of European and North American minerals 
consumers were already met by investment ties or long-term contracts 
with established suppliers offered little short-term prospect for the 
scale of entry into the market necessary to develop some of the large 
Australian deposits. 
As noted earlier, Australia's growing potential as a minerals 
producer coincided with the acceleration in Japan's industrial growth. 
Just as Australia's access to the North Atlantic market was limited by 
distance and by rigidities in existing trade patterns, so Japan's 
access to rapidly growing supplies of basic minerals from established 
sources was limited by the same factors. This substantial resistance 
to alternative directions in trade provided a strong incentive for the 
development of an intensive bilateral trade in minerals. 
However, Japanese metals producers did not look to investment in 
Australian resource developments as a means of establishing a secure 
supply position . There are probably several reasons for this. Until 
1971 there were severe governmental restraints on overseas investment 
by Japanese companies and, in any case, the rapid expansion of invest-
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ment in metals production is likely to have meant that the metals 
producers were not able to spare funds for investment in resource 
developments. On the Australian side, where the holders of mining 
leases were seeking additional equity contributions, they were essen-
tially concerned to obtain participation from companies with expertise 
and experience they did not themselves possess --in particular aspects 
of mining, in bulk materials handling, or in marketing. Significantly, 
in the few instances where there was any substantial Japanese equity 
this was taken by trading companies rather than metals producers. 3 
Although equity holdings by Japanese trading companies undoubt-
edly provided important links between some Australian minerals pro-
ducers and Japanese consumers, their main purpose seems to have been to 
secure the rights to handle the trade with Japan and to share in mining 
profits, and they were not sufficiently large to affect the indepen-
dence of Australian mining companies from Japanese purchaser 
interests. 4 
In the main, then, ownership ties with overseas processors were 
relatively unimportant in providing the guarantees of market access 
necessary for Australian mineral developments. Rather, the essential 
security for mining investments was obtained by the negotiation of 
long- term supply contracts with independent Japanese metals producers. 
Typically, these contracts were for the sale of unprocessed minerals 
and they extended over 10-15 years. The tonnage to be delivered in 
each year was specified <.:t. 10 percent at the purchaser's option) and a 
fixed-dollar US price was set, subject to renegotiation within a 
predetermined range (.:t_ 7 1/2 percent in the case of iron ore) at 
5 intervals of 5 years or so. 
Such contracts were of fundamental importance in allowing a wide 
range of mining activities to proceed. Even in the case of bauxite, 
where Australia now has a quarter of the world's production and where 
Australia's trade has increasingly become integrated with the interna-
tional operations of the major aluminum companies, initial mining 
developments were underwritten by long-term contracts negotiated with 
independent aluminum producers in Japan. In the cases of iron ore and 
coking coal, which together account for half of Australia's mineral and 
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primary metal exports, contract sales to the Japanese steel mills still 
account for three quarters of the export volume and few, if any, new 
projects appear capable of development until a firm contract has been 
negotiated. 
As a result of the mineral developments since the early 1960s, the 
dependence of the Australian mining industry on exports, either of ores 
and concentrates or of processed products up to primary metals, has 
increased very substantially. As Table 4 shows, export dependence is 
very high for almost all of the major minerals. While the energy goods 
appear significantly less dependent on exports, the figures somewhat 
understate the role of export sales in the development of energy 
resources. The main growth in black coal production since 1960 has 
been due to the opening of the large open-cut mines in Queensland, 
which are almost wholly export-oriented. 
Although natural gas production to date has been based on sales to 
domestic consumers, development of the extensive North-West Shelf 
field will require large exports of liquified natural gas to Japan 
and/or the United States. Similarly, whatever development of Austra-
lia's major uranium deposits takes place will be wholly dependent on 
export markets. Only in the case of crude oil is present and expected 
production insufficient to meet domestic requirements. In the absence 
of substantial new oil discoveries, Australia's degree of self-
sufficiency in oil will decline from the present figure of about 
70 percent after the early 1980s. 
Sales to Japan currently account for half of Australia's exports 
of minerals and primary metals (see Tables 5 and 6). However, depen-
dence in the bilateral minerals trade has not been a one-sided pheno-
menon. Australia supplies over a quarter of Japan's imports of mineral 
and energy products, excluding oil, and is the largest supplier of iron 
ore, coal, bauxite/alumina, and nickel for nickel metal production. 
The availability of supplies of a wide range of minerals from Australia 
played a major part in avoiding resource bottlenecks in Japanese 
industrial growth during the 1960s and early 1970s. To give one 
example, Japan's import requirement for iron ore increased by 163 
percent between 1965 and 1970 and Australian supplies met 58 percent of 
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~le 4: Export Dependence of the Australian Mining Industry: 
Major Products, 1960 and 1975. 
% of Mine Production Exported as Ores and 
Concentrates or Smelter and Refinery Products 
Black Coal 
Brown Coal 
crude Oil 
Nat-. al Gas 
1960 
7.0 
0 
1975 
45 . 1 
0 
0.9 
0 
Liquid Petroleum Gas 95 .1 (e) 
1 
Iron Ore 
Tungsten 
Nickel 
Manganese 
Bauxite 
Copper 
Lead 
Zinc 
Tin 
Titanium 
Zircon 
Salt 
TOTAL 2 
Notes: 
0 
58.0 
75.2 
46.0 
74.5 
64.7 
6.5 
86.5 
100.0 
3.9 
31. 7 
82.4 
100.0 
97.0(e) 
91.0(e) 
90 . 0(e) 
68.8 
79.9 
61. 3 
48 . 7 
64. 5 
79.0 
79.9 
57.2 
1Proportion exported as iron ore or pellets only -- does not 
include iron content of iron and steel exports . 
2 Average found by weighting products by shares in total ex-
mine value of mining production . 
(e)Estimate 
Source : Bureau of Mineral Resources, Australian Mineral Industry 
Review. 
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Table 5: Direction of Australia's Mineral Trade : 
Proportion of Exports to Major Markets 
by Value, 1960 and 1975 . 
1960 1975 
Japan 37 . 2 49 . 9 
East and S. E. Asia (a) 6 . 0 
Pacific 3 . 0 1. 7 
United States 12 . 7 7 . 7 
Canada (a) 1. 9 
Other America (a) 3.1 
U. K. 30.1 6 . 4 
EEC 9. 0 14 . 9 
Other Europe (incl. USSR) (a) 5 . 3 
India and Middle East 3 . 4 2 . 1 
Other 4 . 6 1.0 
TOTAL 100 . 0 100 . 0 
(a)Included in "other" 
Source: Bureau of Mineral Resources, Australian Mineral 
Industry Review , 1960 and 1975 (preprint) . 
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this growth i n demand . 
From this general survey of the nature of Australia ' s minerals 
developments and the trade relationshi ps established, we turn to a 
closer examination of some of the more important aspects of those 
developments. 
3. Macroeconomic Influences and Structural Adjustment Problems 
Over the decade to 1973/74 , gross product in mining grew three 
times as rapidly as gross domestic produc t for the economy as a whole . 6 
Other things being equal, such rapid growth in one traded goods sector 
would be expected to affect adversely other traded goods activities --
directly through increased competition for resources, or indirectly 
through pressures on the balance of payments and the exchange rate . 
The Australian mining industry is highly capital- intensive and, 
although mining employment has grown twice as rapidly as overall 
employment, the mining industry still employs less than 1 . 5 per cent of 
the workforce . 7 However, this somewhat understates the contribution of 
mining to employment . Because of the remoteness of many of the new 
mineral discoveries, labor has not only had to be attracted into mining 
itself but also into a wide range of service activities catering almost 
exclusively to the mining commumity . Thus, the total workforce of the 
Pilbara region of Western Australia, which has grown in step with the 
development of the large iron ore mines , is three times as large as the 
mining workforce in that region . 
The highly capital-intensive nature of mining , and the rapid 
growth of mining output , have resulted in a disproportionately large 
share of private fixed capital formation being directed into the mining 
industry . During the past ten years gross fixed capital formation in 
mining has been about 40 percent of that in manufacturing, although 
mining still employs only one twentieth the number of people employed 
in manufacturing and contributes only one fifth as much to GDP . If the 
capital requirements of the mining industry had to be met from the 
Australian capital market alone, this would clearly have had enormous 
repercussions for the structure of the economy . Domestic capital would 
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have gained substantially at the expense of other factors, and capital-
intensive activities (including a number of proposed mining ventures) 
would have been cut back . In fact, however, a large proportion of the 
capital needs of the mining industry has been met from outside Austra-
lia, both through equity investments and through the raising of long-
term debt finance in Europe, the United States, and Japan . 8 
The main impact of mining developments on other traded goods 
activities has not come through direct pressures on domestic resource 
availability but through substantial effects on the balance of pay-
ments, the exchange rate and the rate of domest i c inflation . 
During the period 1960/61 to 1975/76 the real value of mineral 
exports grew at an average annual rate of 18 . 5 percent . A steadily 
rising annual growth rate through the early and middle 1960s exploded 
to over 30 percent per annum in the three years 1968-1971 . Thereafter , 
mineral export growth fell to around 5 percent annually , reflecting 
the fact that the minerals developments of the late 1960s were reaching 
full production capacity . 
The impact of the world commodity boom of 1972- 1974 on real 
mineral export growth was smoothed by two important factors . Ini tial 
contract prices for coal and iron ore were fixed, so that the Austra-
lian exporters faced difficulties in obtaining price increases i n the 
early stages of the boom. Thus , in 1973/1974, the real value of coal 
and iron ore exports increased by only 2 . 6 percent when the real value 
of other mineral exports rose by 34 . 1 percent . In the following year, 
however, the growth in export value for coal and iron ore was almost 
40 percent, compared to 9 percent for other mi neral products . The 
second important factor was the tendency for energy (and, therefore , 
coking coal) prices to continue to rise as the boom collapsed . This 
meant that , although the real value of exports of other mineral 
products was static in 1975/1976, coal export value rose suffici ently 
to provide an overall increase in the real value of mineral exports of 
8 percent . At present, the continued recession in the Japanese steel 
industry in particular has halted real mineral export growth . 
In addition to the substantial growth in export revenues , the 
heavy reliance of the mining industry on overseas sources of finance 
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played an important part in generating the large capital inflows 
experienced in the late 1960s and early 1970s . On a conservative 
estimate, overseas investment in the minerals industry has accounted 
for 40 percent of all new overseas investment (excluding undistributed 
profits) in Australian companies in the last ten years . In some years 
more than 50 percent of the foreign investment inflow has been directed 
to the mining industry . The significance of this can be seen if 
overseas investment inflows are compared to total expenditures on 
imports . In the last three years of the 1960s foreign investment was 
running at about 23 percent of the value of imports . This figure 
jumped to 33 percent in 1970/71 and 1971/72 , before dropping sharply 
below 10 percent in the ensuing years . 9 
Both because of its rapid export growth and because of its high 
level of financing from overseas , the minerals industry was largely 
responsible for the substantial balance of payments surpluses recorded 
in the early 1970s . The expansion of mineral exports was not by any 
means unpredictable , since it derived essentially from a steady expan-
sion of output from new mines to meet specific contract tonnages . 
Thus, it should have been possible for the monetary authorities to 
anticipate a good deal of the balance of payments pressures and to 
recognize the trade component as reflecting a permanent change in 
export capacity . The appropriate policy response would have been to 
revalue the Australian dollar ($A) progressively through 1971. In 
fact, the exchange rate was held until December 1971 when the Austra-
lian government responded to the devaluation of the $US by devaluing 
the $A slightly against all currencies on a trade- weighted basis . The 
approach to the external payments surplus was to attempt to sterilize 
it by counteractive monetary policy . Al though this strategy was 
partially successful until the end of 1971, it was unable to prevent a 
domestic monetary expansion which was large in historical terms . 
During 1972, monetary discipline was abandoned, although the external 
payments surplus continued and became increasingly inflated by specu-
lative capital flows . 
While the revaluation of December 1972 was necessary, it came 
more than 12 months too late. Australia was already firmly on the path 
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to external adjustment through rapid inflation . The continuing trade 
surplus after that revaluation reflected the strong rise in commodity 
prices, the temporary nature of which required caution in monetary and 
exchange rate policy . In that event, monetary expansion continued and 
the export surplus was countered by further revaluations and by a 25-
percent cut in tariffs in July 1973 . As Garnaut (1977 , p. 24) has 
observed , it was destabilizing to act so strongly to lower the relative 
prices of imports late in the boom. 
Since 1972/73 the balance of payments has moved i nto persistent 
deficit, although the lagged response of mineral export values to the 
commodity boom and the rise in energy prices have made the downturn 
less sharp than it would otherwise have been. While the recession has 
produced very high levels of unemployment, the legacy of the monetary 
and exchange rate policies of the early 1970s is a continued high rate 
of domestic inflation . 
Although the 25- percent tariff cut and the r evaluations of 1972 
and 1973 were the most obvious manifestations of the rapid growth in 
mineral exports , they have been more than offset by the devaluations of 
the $A in 1974 and 1976 and by recent i ncreases in protection for 
manufacturing industries . Since mid- 1970 the effective (trade-
weighted) value of the $A has fallen by just under 10 percent . 10 Thus , 
the real effect of the rapid growth in minerals production and trade on 
other sectors of the economy has come through a relatively hi gh rate of 
domestic inflation , which has not had to be offset fully by exchange-
rate depreciations . 
So far as the effects on other traded goods sectors of the economy 
are concerned, it makes little difference whether the growth of the 
minerals sector is reflected i n an appreciating exchange rate or i n a 
relatively high rate of domestic inflation . In one case the competi-
tive position of these industries is weakened by downward pressures on 
prices , in the other by upward pressures on costs . 11 
In a r ecent paper , Gregory (1976) has attempted to indicate the 
magnitude of the effects of minerals export growth on the rural expor t 
industries and on the impor t - competing manufacturing sector . Greg-
ory ' s analysis seeks to estimate the relative price shifts against 
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domestic traded goods production necessary to maintain balance of 
payments equilibrium in the face of the emergence of the "new" export 
sector . These relative price shifts are expressed as "tariff equiva-
lents" -- that is, the alteration in tariff levels which, in the 
absence of the mine~als developments, would have had the same effects 
as minerals export growth has actually had. Thus, assuming plausible 
elasticity values, he estimates the effect on the rural export indus-
tries as equivalent to a doubling of all import duties since 1964/65, 
while the effect on the average import- competing manufacturing 
industry is estimated as equivalent to the abolition of all tariffs and 
the imposition of a slight import subsidy. 
The major limitation of the Gregory analysis is that it impli.citly 
assumes that all adjustments to the strong minerals export growth comes 
through price effects, rather than income effects. To the extent that 
the income growth resulting from minerals developments increases 
demand for traded goods, the size of the relative price shifts neces-
sary to maintain balance of payments equilibrium is corespondingly 
reduced. On the other hand, the Gregory analys i s takes no account of 
the inflow of overseas capital associated with mining developments. In 
so far as this is not used to import capital equipment, it increases 
the short-run pressure on relative traded/non-traded goods prices, 
although remission of profits and interest overseas reduces the long-
run pressure for structural adjustment . 
Overall, it would be hard to object to Gregory's central thesis 
that the relative price effects of the rapid growth in minerals exports 
on other traded goods activities have been substantial. 12 The problems 
lie not so much in that conclusion but in the interpretations and 
inferences which have been drawn from it . Particularly at a time of 
high unemployment, the "Gregory Thesis" was bound to be cited as 
evidence of the need to strengthen protective trade barriers . 
Rational discussion of the "Gregory Thesis" has centered on 
whether the relative price effects of rapid growth in minerals exports 
require structural adjustments in the rural and manufacturing sectors 
which are beyond the capacity of the economy to handle. In this 
context, Australia has been seen to be in a similar position to Norway, 
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which is deliberately restricting the rate of oil developments because 
of the limited capacity of the economy to adjust to a large increase in 
export revenue . 13 It i s ostensibly reasonable to argue that rapid 
income growth from one sector which uses relatively little labor may be 
undesirable if it necessar ily results in the under- utilization of 
resources elsewhere in the economy, especially if that income growth 
derives from the exploi ta ti on of exhaustible mineral deposits whose 
real values may be expected to rise over time . 14 However , in a period 
of high general unemployment , and in the total absence of any sensible 
strategy aimed at facilitating structural adjustment , it is impossible 
to draw any conclusions as to the true capacity of the economy to 
adjust to growth of the mineral sector . 
A policy of restraining mineral export growth, if adopted under 
present circumstances , would be likely to retard structural adjus t ment 
both by reducing the private stimulus to reallocate resources and by 
reducing the pressure on governments to formulate policies aimed at 
assisting such reallocation . In that sense , advocacy of miner al export 
restraint has the same ostrich- like quality as arguments for increased 
tariff protection . 15 
Both the Gregory analysis and recent projections using the IMPACT 
model of the Australian economy16 suggest strongly that structur al 
change in the manufacturing and rural sectors is essential if Australia 
is to reap the full benefits from its mineral wealth . The primary 
policy response should be concerned with achieving that structural 
change as quickly and smoothly as possible, while assisting those who 
are necessarily disadvantaged . It is encouraging that the Industri es 
Assistance Commission has embarked on studies of the nature and 
problems of structural change . 17 
Once serious efforts are made to accomodate the impact of miner als 
export growth , it may be found that it is not possible to achieve 
structural adjustments at the rate required . In that case , the 
question wi ll again arise whether it i s desirable to allow miner als 
development s to proceed unhindered . Broadly, there appear to be t wo 
ways in which structural adjustment pressures can he reduced t o a 
manageable level . One is to restrict the rate of growth of minerals 
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exports, which would involve the cost of postponing real income gains. 
To the extent that Australian minerals developments are closely linked 
to Japanese import requirements, it may not be possible to determine 
the timing of developments independently of Japanese needs . Thus, 
restrictions on the rate of development may involve losses of potential 
real income gains, rather than their postponement . The alternative 
strategy is to allow minerals developments to proceed unhindered , but 
to slow down the relative price effects on other sectors by temporarily 
"recycling" part of the external surplus generated . This strategy 
would seem to have particular attractions where , as has been the case 
in the past , minerals developments are heavily bunched in par ticular 
periods and where they are accompanied by a substantial temporary 
increase in net capital inflow. Then, temporary "recycling" may allow 
pressures for structural adjustment to be spread more evenly over time 
and to reflect long- term comparative advantage conditions . However , 
the argument needs to be interpreted carefully . The relative price 
effects of minerals growth impinge not only on the rural and manufac-
turing sectors but also on the mining sector itself . Thus, a recycling 
strategy which goes beyond that outlined above and which seeks to 
reduce long- run adjustment pressures on the rural and manufacturing 
sectors wil l result in a more rapid growth in minerals production than 
Australia ' s competitive position warrants . 
Essentially, the nature of the problems caused by minerals 
developments depends on assessments of the likely future rate of growth 
of minerals exports . Much of the discussion of the "Gregory Thesis" 
has been predicated on the assumption that minerals growth will be very 
rapid in the future • Al though there are a number of new mining 
. projects in the pipeline , simultaneous development of which would 
result in a short- term mini-boom in minerals production and export, it 
seems most unlikely that minerals exports will grow over the next 10 to 
20 years at the sort of rates experienced in the past . Importantly, an 
increasing dependence on imported oil after 1980 will tend to offset 
the balance of payments effects of continued expansion of minerals 
exports . The basic problems of structural adjustment may not be 
outside the capacity of the economy to handle so long as the problems 
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are not allowed to accumulate until they become insurmountable . 
4 . Federal and State Regulation of Mining and Related Issues 
Australian mineral and energy deposits are mined under leases 
acquired from State governments or from the Commonwealth, depending 
upon their location . Exploration leases are generally granted on a 
short-term basis, and their renewal usually requires evidence that a 
sufficient exploration effort is being maintained . Production leases 
18 are often very long term, but they invariably stipulate that a 
particular capital expenditure and production program be undertaken, 
As part of the lease conditions, companies have often been r equired 
either to establish processing facilities by a certain date or to 
undertake costly studies of the feasibility of processing . Also , it is 
normal for royalties to be set at lower rates where minerals are 
processed locally rather than exported . 19 The nature of these lease 
provisions illustrates the emphasis which has been placed by the 
governments concerned on short- term employment and income generation, 
either directly from mining or through the establishment of processing 
activities . While it might be thought , a priori , that the lack of 
tenure of mining companies, unless they are actively engaged in 
exploration or mining, would lead to a more rapid exploitation of 
mineral deposits than is optimal, this effect may be offset , for 
exploration at least , by the tendency. for company taxation to discrim-
inate against risky undertakings . 20 Also, the major minerals produced 
in Australia are those for which there are relatively long-lived world 
reserves, so that the exhaustion rents lost by any current over-
exploitation would generally be small . 
Provision of Mining Infrastructure 
A feature of most Australian mining developments has been that the 
heavy infrastructure costs have been borne almost wholly by the mining 
companies . Aside from provision of such services as police, schools 
and hospitals , the relatively impoverished State governments , in 
particular, have seen mining as a means of achieving decentralization 
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and employment objectives at no cost to State revenues . 
The question of whether, and to what extent, assistance should be 
given with infrastructure costs is of considerable importance . Evi-
dence submitted to the I .A. C. suggests that around 25 percent of all 
mining investment has been devoted to infrastructure items, and the 
21 proportion has been much greater for the more remote developments. 
The choice between alternative mine developments is presently heavily 
influenced by infrastructure costs, and any significant government 
assistance with those costs would not only increase the viability of 
proposed projects generally, but would also influence the choice 
between alternative projects . 
Although the mining companies argue that mining infrastructure 
should attract the same degree of public provision as infrastructure 
elsewhere in the economy, there is clearly no general case for this . 
In deciding whether to provide a particular item of infrastrucutre, 
public authorities ought to assess whether the users would be prepared 
to pay for it . In areas of di verse economic activity many infra-
structure items have important public good characteristics, so that it 
is inappropriate to charge for their provision . 22 By contrast, most 
mining infrastructure is used only by the mining company concerned 
(including employees and activities associated with the mining pro-
ject), so that it would only be appropriate for the state to provide a 
particular item of infrastructure if the company would itself have been 
able to provide it without making the venture unprofitable. 
While there is no general case for public provision of mining 
infrastructure, there are clearly instances where an element of sub-
sidy is justified. To the (probably very limited) extent that roads, 
etc . , built by mining companies provide benefits to the community at 
large, and not simply to those people associated with the mining 
activity , the state should provide an element of subsidy for their 
construction . Also, where mining developments in remote areas have the 
effect of easing congestion in urban centers , those mining develop-
ments provide external benefits which might appropriately be compen-
sated for by assistance with infrastructure costs . Finally, where a 
number of community services, and such items as housing, are subsidized 
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in other areas from general government revenues, rather than from local 
taxes and rates, the same subsidies should apply in mining towns. 
Clearly this already happens with services such as police and schools, 
but the full range of government support is not available to some of 
the new mining towns in remote areas. 
A separate argument advanced relates to the terms on which finance 
should be provided for infrastructure investments. It is suggested 
that the large sums involved make it difficult for companies to raise 
sufficient loan finance on appropriate terms, so that they may be faced 
with high interest charges or repayment schedules which do not reflect 
the long- term nature of the projects . The argument, then, is that 
governments should either provide relatively cheap, long- term loan 
finance themselves, or should provide guarantees which would assist 
companies to raise such loan finance . 23 
The argument for government loans or government guarantees has 
centered on the degree of risk associated with mining projects and has 
implied the existence of imperfections in the private capital market's 
attitude to risk. However, while it is probable that the small 
Australian capital market is myopic and excessively risk averse, there 
is no obvious reason to believe that this is true of the wide capital 
market to which the major Australian developments have had access. 24 
Essentially, the ability to raise large loans has depended on the 
security offered by long-term sales contracts and on the credit 
standing of the companies associated with projects . Only to the extent 
that these factors do not appropriately indicate the risk attached to 
financing particular project developments is there any case for 
government assistance with loan financing . 
Current uncertainties as to the value of long-term contract 
arrangements25 and the rapid increase in the costs of new mine and 
infrastructure development appear to have made large-scale loan 
finance both more essential for developments to take place and more 
difficult to obtain . Thus, project developments increasingly seem to 
depend on the availability of loan finance from the Export-Import Bank 
of Japan, channelled through Japanese trading companies or raw 
materials purchasers . In that situation, both Australian minerals 
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producers and Japanese bankers have a tendency to feel that assistance 
with loan financing should not be the responsibility of Japan alone but 
should also be borne, in some part, by governments in Australia . This 
apparently equitable suggestion has limited appeal. The fact that 
Japanese loan finance is available on concessional terms reflects a 
Japanese desire to reduce risks associated with possible future supply 
shortfalls. To the extent that provision of such finance to a project 
is perceived as strengthening the value of contractual guarantees, it 
should also make it easier for Australian producers to raise loan 
finance elsewhere . By contrast, Australian government assistance in 
the provision of loan finance would have no impact on the overall risk 
associated with project development, but would simply transfer some 
26 part of that risk from the mining company to the government . 
Al though there may often be a valid case for some form of 
government assistance with the provision of mining infrastructure, the 
level of external benefits deriving from mining developments will vary 
widely from project to project and those benefits are most likely to be 
felt in the State in which the project is located . Thus, it seems 
appropriate that the problems of determining and granting assistance 
should be dealt with by State governments on a case-by-case basis, 
rather than through any general attempt to subsidize infrastructure 
costs by the Commonwealth Government . However, rather than providing a 
solution , this sort of "first - best" observation merely throws the 
question of infrastructure assistance into the problematical arena of 
Federal/State financial relationships . 
Taxation of Economic Rents from Mining 
With the exception of a particular case to be discussed shortly , 
the main method whereby the owners of resource deposits (State and 
Commonweal th governments) seek to extract the economic rent from 
exploiting those deposits is through the imposition of royalties. 
Although royalties are sometimes related to profitability, they are 
generally set as a fixed payment per unit of output or as a proportion 
of sales value . In the wide variety of royalty arrangements operating, 
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Livingstone (1977) has observed that "there is little trace of consis-
tency from State to State and little evidence of the rationale whereby 
individual States have arrived at their methods and rates of royalty,11 
For example, the initial royalty rate on bauxite for export was 
10 cents per ton in Queensland and 30 cents per ton in the Northern 
Territory, although the grade of ore and production costs would not 
have favored the latter . Recently, the Queensland royalty jumped 
sharply to a $A 1 per ton , while the Northern Territory rate remained 
unchanged . 
The fact that royalties are set in a manner which affects marginal 
costs or marginal returns means that there is often an incentive for 
"wasteful" resource exploitation and under- investment . As the values 
of many minerals have risen , and royalty charges have correspondingly 
increased, the marginal disincentive effect has tended to strengthen. 
Although it is possible, in principle , for different royalty rates to 
apply to different projects , this is ,often administratively difficult 
for State governments so that they tend to prefer uniform rates wi t hin 
the State . Thus, the marginal disincentive effect not only affects the 
management of deposits which are developed, but also deters investment 
in deposits which would not , in the absence of royalties , be considered 
marginal . 
In addition to the levying of royalties, it has been argued by the 
mining companies that the State governments impose quasi - taxes through 
high charges for provision of various services . In most cases the 
evidence on this is unclear . However , there is no doubt that t he 
Queensland Government uses rail frieght charges as a means of extrac-
ting economic rent from mining activities . Companies are required to 
lend the State Government the finance necessary to build rail links 
between mine and port, and these loans are repaid with nominal interest 
from the frieght revenue received . Since debt service is conditional 
upon the amount of revenue received, the arrangement effectivel y 
allows the State to make riskless investments in rail links . Thus , any 
frieght charge in excess of the amount necessary to cover operating 
costs, economic depreciation, and debt service results in "pure pr o-
fits " accruing to the State government . 
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This method of transferring rents from mining is essentially 
equivalent to the imposition of a unit royalty per ton shipped, and has 
the effi ciency defects common to other royalty arrangements . From the 
viewpoint of the Queensland government, however, it has the advantage 
that the actual royalty paid through high freight charges does not 
appear as government tax receipts in the budget accounts and cannot 
readily be identified. This has advantages in bargaining over Common-
weal th/State revenue sharing. 27 
During 1975, the Commonwealth Government became concerned at 
large profits being earned, in particular by a US-owned coal company . 
In an attempt to claim back some of the rent from that company, the 
Commonweal th imposed taxes on the export of coking coal. Although 
these taxes were tailored to some extent to the grade of coal exported, 
their general non-discriminatory nature meant that a number of compa-
nies not earning large profits were adversely affected . Also the 
existence of the tax had a significant impact on the development of new 
. 28 mines . 
In recent years there has been a growing interest in academic 
circles in the use of taxes on economic rents themselves as an 
alternative to the inefficient and often arbitrary application of 
royalties and export taxes (Garnaut and Clunies-Ross, 1975; Garnaut, 
1977b; Swan, 1976, 1977 ; Smith and Ulph, 1977) . The essential proposi-
tion is that, above some threshold rate (or rates) of return on funds 
employed, mining companies should be subject to an excess profits tax 
at a relatively high rate . In principle, the threshold rate of return 
should incorporate an appropriate margin over the market rate of 
interest to allow for risk (and for the fact that incomplete loss-
offset provisions are provided) and any profits in excess of that 
threshold would be taxed at a rate of 100 percent . In practice, a 
number of difficulties arise: the rate of excess profits tax must be 
sufficiently below 100 percent to provide a continued incentive to 
efficiency; the inability to define accurately the appropriate thresh-
old rate is likely to lead to wasteful investment or to under-
investment; the question arises whether the tax should be imposed on a 
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project-by-project basis or incorporated in a general way into the 
company tax system in cases where some activities or projects are more 
risky than others . Various al terna ti ve views are taken as to the 
appropriate formulation and administration of a resource rent tax 
arrangement, but the area of disagreement is, in fact, relatively 
minor . 
Although the Industries Assistance Commission (1976a) initially 
dismissed of the resource rent tax concept, it was forced to consider 
the issue more seriously in its Report on Crude Oil Pricing (1976b), 
For a number of years the price of Australian crude has been held below 
import parity, and the I . A. C. recommended that this practice cease. 
There were three reasons for that recommendation . First, i mport parity 
pricing would bring Australian consumption of oil into line with the 
true opportunity costs of oil consumption. Second, import parity 
pricing would increase Australia's economically recoverable oil 
reserves by about 20 percent . Third , although production from new 
discoveries is already priced at import parity (less a $A 2- per-barrel 
levy accruing to the Commonwealth), in the absence of a clear commit-
ment to import parity pricing the industry was faced with uncertainties 
which slowed down exploration. 
While the arguments for import parity pricing are overwhelming in 
efficiency terms, the consequence would be a windfall gain of about 
$A 1 billion to the oil producers, a large part of which would accrue 
to overseas interests . Thus, the I.A.C . suggested the possibility of 
imposing a petroleum rent royalty, along the lines of the resource rent 
tax proposals, in conjunction with the relaxation of price controls . 
Although there appear to be strong arguments for imposing a resource 
rent tax in the context of the crude oil pricing decision, there is no 
difference in principle between a situation in which producers gain 
large profits because of a relaxation in price controls and one, such 
as coal, where they have gained similarly large profits because price 
was not controlled in the first place . 
Despite the practical difficulties associated with the implemen-
tation of a direct tax on economic rents from mining, there is little 
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doubt that such a tax would be substantially more efficient in extrac-
ting rents as and when they arise than the present royalty and other 
charges . The major difficulty again lies in the division of responsi-
bility between the State and Commonwealth governments . While i t would 
clearly be preferable for resource rent taxes to be incorporated into 
the Commonwealth system of company taxation, 29 the States will want to 
guard jealously their right to raise' revenue independently of the 
Commonwealth . 
Environmental Problems and Control 
Historically , control over the environmental impact of mining 
developments has rested with the State governments concerned . The 
controls exercised have been regulatory rather than fiscal , and mining 
has either been forbidden (in rare instances) or has been permitted to 
proceed subject to the company fulfilling conditions for management 
and rehabilitation of the environment. In general, State controls have 
not been very forceful, and the procedures for investigating potential 
environmental damage have not been thorough . 
With the growing level of concern over environmental issues, the 
Commonwealth Government passed an Environment Protection Act in 1975 . 
This reflected the fact that the adverse environmental effects of some 
mining developments were felt not only in the State in which mining 
took place but also in the Australian community generally , and the 
view that the State governments did not give sufficient weight to 
environmental damange . Although the Commonwealth Government has no 
direct power to control the exploitation of mineral resources in the 
various States , its power to control exports provi ded it with the 
authority necessary to enforce its environmental legislation . 
The division of powers and the different interests of State and 
Commonweal th Governments over environmental issues have come most 
sharply into focus in relation to mineral sand mining and , in parti-
cular, in the case of sand mining on Fraser Island . After its own 
investigations , the Queensland Government granted mining leases sub-
ject to a number of conditions relating to management and rehabilita-
tion . However , at the urging of the Commonwealth Department of the 
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Environment, export licenses were granted for only some leases and on 
an interim basis30 pending an inquiry by a Commonwealth Select Com-
mittee . Eventually the Committee recommended that mining should be 
limited to beach areas below the high water mark and that mining of 
dune areas should be terminated . 31 This recommendation was accepted by 
the Commonweal th Government and existing export licenses we"'e not 
renewed . Compensation was paict to the Queensland Government on behalf 
of local people whose incomes had been adversely affected by the 
decision . However, the Queensland Government remained vigorously 
opposed to the decision to cease mining . 
The division of powers, and the different biases in evaluation of 
environmental issues of the Commonwealth and State government, have 
generated substantial uncertainties for exploration investments . In 
part, these uncertainties are a transitional problem in that companies 
which have been accustomed to obtaining automatic rights to mine any 
deposits discovered will , in future, take greater account of likely 
environmental resistance in determining worthwhile areas to explore . 
However , considerable uncertainty must surround such assessments i n a 
situation where there are no reasonable guidelines and where political 
relations between governments are likely to determine the nature of the 
bias in policy decisions . 
A further unsatisfactory aspect of the present procedures is that 
Commonweal th control over environmental matters depends on the re-
striction of sales to consumers overseas . Although this is in fact not 
very different from direct control of production, given the heavy 
export dependence of Australian mining, it has the unfortunate appear-
ance of discrimination against foreign purchases in protecting the 
Australian environment . Where the Commonwealth intervention comes 
after the negotiation of export sales contracts, uncertainties are 
generated about Australia's reliability as a supplier . 
So far conflict over environmental issues has arisen importantly 
only in respect to mineral sands and uranium, and uranium is an unusual 
and special case . Australia is fortunate in that the large land mass, 
and the relatively remote locations of many minerals developments, 
permit mining to take place without imposing substantial environmental 
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damage . Thus, it is unlikely that environmental considerations will 
impose serious constraints on future resour,ce availability from Aus-
tralia . However, as the level of environmental consciousness 
increases, and as greater concern is directed to issues such as 
aboriginal land right, it is probable that conflicts of interest will 
become more widespread . In order to maintain consistent policy with 
respect to environmental aspects of minerals developments, it is 
important that Commonwealth and State governments seek means of exer-
cising a joint authority which satisfies the interests of both. It is 
likely that this would result in a greater flexibility of approach to 
particular problems , so that a wider range of outcomes could be 
examined . 
Company Taxation 
The main source of Commonwealth Government revenue from mining is 
from the collection of company profits taxes . Until 1973174, the 
mining industry received substantial concessions in the taxation of 
company profits . These included depreciation allowances on items of 
capital expenditure which would not be allowable elsewhere in the 
economy (mainly infrastructure items), immediate or greatly accel-
erated write-off for a wide range of capital assets, and exemption from 
tax of one- fifth of the profits earned from production of a number of 
"prescribed products" (including bauxite, mineral sands, copper and 
nickel) . Also, deductions against personal income tax were, in some 
circumstances, allowed on subscriptions paid for new mining shares , 
with the recipient company foregoing the possibility of receiving 
future depreciation allowances in respect to the investments financed 
by such subscriptions . 
It has been estimated that the cost of shareholder deductions to 
Commonweal th revenues was about $A 200 million between 1967 /68 and 
1972/73 , while the cost of the company tax concessions has been 
estimated at about $A 4 ~ 0 million allowing for future payments of 
deferred tax . 32 Actual tax paid by the mining industry in th i s period 
was only $A 263 million . 
Though the various calculations of the cost of the tax concessions 
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tend to overstate both the cost and the extent to which the concessions 
actually constituted favorable (non-neutral) treatment of the mining 
industry, there is no doubt that the company tax provisions for mining 
during the 1960s and early 1970s provided a substantial encouragement 
to the industry and were relatively favorable by international stan-
dards. 
During 1973 and 1974, the most important concessional elements in 
mining ind us try taxation were removed and, in some respects, tax 
treatment of the industry swung in the opposite direction . This had a 
substantial effect in slowing down exploration and mining develop-
ments. 
Following a Report by the Industries Assistance Commission 
(1976a), the tax provisions were again amended in 1976. The Report had 
based its recommendations on the principle of preserving neutral tax 
treatment between the sectors of the Australian economy . For example, 
it was accepted that items of infrastructure which, because of the 
remote locations of many mining activities, could be expected to have 
no value at the end of the mine's life should be allowed as depreciable 
assets, even though they would not be so allowed in other activities. 
In general, as a result of the 1976 tax changes, the mining 
industry is now taxed on an equivalent basis to that applying for other 
sectors of the Australian economy . There appears to be some element of 
favorable treatment in the rate of depreciation allowed on mine 
development expenditures, but this would not be very significant . The 
main area of difficulty now is in the treatment of exploration expendi-
tures for tax purposes . An important feature of exploration is the 
high level of risk associated with the activity. Given that company 
taxation penalizes gains but does not subsidize losses unless those 
losses can be set against profits elsewhere, it discriminates against 
activities in which the risk of loss is relatively high . In the 
Australian context, expenditures on petroleum exploration can be set 
against income from any source, while minerals exploration expendi-
tures can be set against income from (non- petroleum) mining only. The 
effect of this is for the tax system to discriminate against minerals 
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exploration, except where it is conducted by companies with sufficient 
Australian mining income to take advantage of the loss offset provi-
sions . For those companies, however , the question then arises whether 
successful exploration expenditure should be treated in the same way as 
unsuccessful exploration expenditure. At present both are immediately 
deductible against eligible income but, as Swan ( 1977) points out, 
successful exploration results in the creation of a capital asset which 
should be depreciated over its economic life . In general, then, it is 
not possible to assess whether the tax treatment of exploration acts as 
an incentive or deterrent, but it is clear that it discriminates 
against small exploration companies and against non- mining companies. 
This may actually have some advantages in that smaller exploration 
companies may be relatively inefficient and there are some suspicions 
that, in the period when shareholder deductions allowed small com-
panies to attract funds relatively easily, significant misuse of those 
funds occurred . 33 
Overall, then , Australia's taxation provisions for mining have 
moved, in a relatively few years, from being favorable by international 
standards to the point where there is now almost no incentive element . 
By comparison with most other countries, Australia's company taxation 
provisions for mining would not rate as being relatively harsh . 
5 . Foreign Investment in the Australian Mining Industry 
As has been remarked earlier, the rapid growth of the Australian 
mining industry has been heavily dependent on foreign investment . In 
1963, foreign ownership of the industry accounted for 27 . 3 percent (of 
which UK held 16 . 3 percent and US 9. 2 percent) of the total equity, and 
36 . 8 percent of the industry was under foreign control . By 1974/75, 
foreign ownership had risen to 51.8 percent (UK 11.6 percent, US 
28 . 7 percent) and foreign control to 58 . 9 percent . 34 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, foreign investment came 
under increasing criticism and suspicion. In part, McKern (1975) 
attributes this to the fact that projects had passed "from the stage of 
great uncertainty and high perceived risk to that of stable, profitable 
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production , when the earlier risk- bearing role of the investor may be 
forgotten . " Important, also, was the view that substantial tax 
concessions had been enjoyed by the mining industry , which allowed 
foreign investors to obtain greater benefits from mining than t heir 
contribution warranted . 35 
Although there were some attempts during the 1960s to achieve 
greater Australian ownership , no significant restrictions were placed 
on foreign participation in mining until the advent of the Labor 
Government in late 1972 . The Labor Government adopted a tough stance 
on the issue of foreign ownership and control, and sought in a number 
of ways to assert greater Australian control , to encourage gr eater 
Australian ownership, and to reduce concessional treatment of the 
mining industry generally . However, no coherent set of policies had 
been developed by the time the Labor Government was removed from office 
in late 1975 , and the principal policy plank which the new government 
inherited and maintained was a guideline r equiring companies devel-
oping new resour ce projects to seek 51 percent Australian equity . 36 
However, whereas the Labor Government had placed a rigorous 
interpretation on the Australian equity requirement , with the result 
that a number of proposed developments had been held up , the new 
government has been prepared to interpret the guidelines more liber-
ally and more flexibly . Thus, for example, one large new coal project 
has been allowed to proceed wi th Australian equity equivalent to a 
majority interest in the project being taken as a minority interest in 
the overall operat i ons of the foreign controlled company concerned. 
The simple desire to see Australia ' s resources managed by Aust r a-
lians cannot be dismissed as mere chauvinism . Clearly there are real 
benefits associated with the satisfaction of nationalist i c sentiment , 
for which some costs will rationally be accepted . However , there i s a 
considerable difference between seeking majority Australian ownership 
and seeking Australian control of resource exploitation . Unless 
established Australian companies are able to gain dominant shares of 
new projects , control is likely to remain firmly in the hands of the 
principal foreign participants . Given that there are really only three 
Australian companies with the experience and financial resources 
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necessary to take tip this role, it can be seen that any significant 
alteration in the degree of foreign control of the mining industry in 
the short term would require either a very substantial restriction of 
the rate of development of the mining sector or large scale government 
participation in the industry . 
Aside from nationalistic sentiment, there are two sorts of objec-
tions to foreign ownership and control which require consideration . 
(i) Foreign companies may earn excessive profits, which accrue to 
overseas residents, from the exploitation of Australian resources . 
(ii) Foreign companies may be able to avoid Australian taxation of 
their profits by adopting various transfer pricing strategies . 
In the absence of transfer pricing problems, it is possible to 
ensure that excessive profits do not accrue overseas from the exploita-
tion of Australian resources by pursuing appropriate taxation poli-
cies. As already mentioned, Australia's company taxation arrangements 
now provide very little in the way of favorable treatment for the 
mining industry . However, the levying of a flat rate of profits tax 
cannot prevent large profits accruing overseas where the deposits 
mined are capable of earning high rents . Given the high degree of 
foreign ownership of the Australian mining industry , failure to exer-
cise state property rights efficiently through the adoption of a 
resource rent tax arrangement may result in much of the potential 
benefit to Australia from natural resource exploitation being lost. 
Clearly, adoption of taxation arrangements designed to allow 
"reasonable returns" to foreign equity will only resolve the problem if 
foreign companies are not easily able to avoid payment of Australian 
tax . The fact that most of the overseas investment in the Australian 
mining industry has come from the US and Europe, whereas the bulk of 
the output is sold to independent companies in Japan, means that there 
are limited opportunities for foreign companies to transfer profits to 
overseas affiliates by concessional pricing of export sales. The major 
exceptions are in the trade in alumina, where Australia's production 
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and marketing are tied closely i nto the operations of the major 
international companies, and industrial salt, where Japanese interests 
control a number of Australian producer companies. In both of these 
cases, the Australian government has associations with other producer 
nations, which are the subject of a later part of the paper . 
At the present time, then, the sorts of transfer pricing problems 
faced by Australia are generally more likely to be related to the terms 
by which loan finance is supplied and to royal ties and fees for 
technical services provided by overseas parents . While it is rela-
tively easy to police the former , by simple comparisons with known 
international lending rates, the appropriate fee for particular tech-
nical services is extremely difficult to determine . Perhaps the most 
expedient approach is to disallow such royalties and fees as deductions 
against taxable income . 
Given that it is extremely difficult for taxation authorities to 
monitor, and set standards for, the prices at which commodities are 
transferred within multinational enterprises , there might be some real 
grounds for concern if the extent to which exports are sold to overseas 
affiliates were to increase significantly . The main way in which this 
would be likely to occur would be through increased Japanese equity in 
Australian minerals production . However, this does not suggest any 
need for restrictions on Japanese investments per se, but rather a 
caution in allowing controlling interests in resource projects prin-
cipally designed to supply the Japanese market to pass into Japanese 
hands. In fact, although there seems to be a growing Japanese interest 
in equity participation in Australian resource developments, there is 
no sign of a desire to acquire sufficiently large equity interests to 
provide any degree of control . Thus, there is no immediate area of 
difficulty in absorbing increased Japanese investment . 
Greater Australian ownership and eontrol of the minerals industry 
is a desirable, and generally accepted , long-term objective . In the 
short term, however, efficient growth of the minerals sector continues 
to require the expertise and ability to mobilize funds of the large 
international companies . In order to ensure that Australia reaps the 
maximum benefit from minerals exploitation in these circumstances, it 
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is important that adequate taxation provisions be implemented and that 
some restrictions on foreign control be exercised in a way which 
minimizes the possibility of transfer pricing problems arising . The 
51- percent Australian equity provision will not necessarily contribute 
greatly to the resolution of these problems . However, if administered 
selectively and with substantial flexibility , it can help to speed the 
process of transfer to Australian ownership and to avoid transfer 
pricing difficulties without restricting the rate of growth of 
minerals production . 
6. Long- Term Contracts and Security and Stability 
in the Minerals Trade 
As indicated earlier, the essential security for a large part of 
Australia ' s mineral developments was provided by long- term contracts 
to supply the Japanese market . The advantages of these contracts were 
that export quantities were guaranteed , within reasonable margins for 
a relatively long period and that a fixed price was specified which was 
expected to ensure the profitability of resource developments . At the 
same time, Japanese purchasers were guaranteed long- term access to 
large supplies of essential raw materials at prices which would allow 
them to maintain a competitive position in metals production . During 
the 1970s, however, the adequacy of contractual guarantees for Austra-
lian exporters has been called into question by the effects of exchange 
rate changes , higher rates of inflation and, more recently, by the 
failure of Japanese purchasers to meet contractual commitments during 
the recession . On the Japanese side , concern has been expressed at the 
tendency of some suppliers to divert sales to spot markets in periods 
of strong demand, although this has not been a major problem in trade 
with Australia . 37 The principal concern expressed over stability of 
supply from Australia has been that the high level of industrial 
disputes in some mining areas threatens the capacity of suppliers to 
meet contract tonnages and has the effect of disrupting shipping 
arrangements . 
It is important to recognize that mineral export supply contracts 
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are not interpreted as formal and binding documents , either by pur-
chasers or suppliers . Rather, the existence of a contract gives each 
side a commitment to trade with the other , and the contract terms 
represent a basis for continuing discussions as to the manner in which 
that trade should be conducted . Such flexibility is an important 
component of the security sought by each party, since neither has an 
interest in seeing the viability of the other threatened . Thus, in 
recent years , Australian exporters have been able to negotiate signi-
ficant price increases outside the formal provisions of contracts . In 
return, they have accepted, more or less philosophically, the failure 
of Japanese firms to take deliveries during the recession . 
While one side or the other, if not both, would resist any 
movement towards more formal and binding contract speicfications , this 
does not mean that the nature of those specifications is unimportant. 
The fact that contract prices were initially fixed in nominal terms and 
that only limited provisions were made for price adjustments has meant 
that , as inflation has accelerated, Australian exporters of a number of 
products have continuously been seeking price concessions from the 
Japanese purchasers . This "begging-bowl" approach to price discus-
sions has almost certainly placed Australian exporters in a relatively 
weak position. 
In this context, two alternative sorts of changes to contract 
specifications have been suggested which would result in a more even 
balance between the parties in pricing discussions . The alternative 
favored by the Australian Government and by much of the industry is for 
contracts to provide formally for more frequent, and open- ended, price 
renegotiation . However, the problem with this approach is that it is 
unlikely that each side will be able to resist the temptation to 
exploit fully whatever bargaining strength temporary shifts in world 
commodity markets confer . The danger is that the generally cooperative 
long-term framework for the minerals trade may be replaced by a more 
unstable relationship conducted on a year-by-year basis.38 In that 
case, the security value of contracts for minerals producers and 
consumers could be eroded substantially . 
The alternative to more frequent formal price renegotiation is to 
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attempt to build inflation protection and exchange rate cover into the 
initial contract price . One suggestion has been that the price for 
half the delivered tonnage be denominated in $A, with the price for the 
other half being denominated in Yen, and that each of these prices be 
linked to an appropriate inflation index for the country in whose 
currency the price is denominated . 39 With such an arrangement real 
windfall gains or losses to either party from inflation or exchange 
rate changes will arise only to the extent that differential inflation 
rates are not offset by exchange rate movements , and then for only half 
the delivered tonnage. 
The essential purpose of this proposal is not to fix pr ices 
rigidly over long periods, although they might be less susceptible to 
change than at present if reasonably accurate expectations as to future 
market movements were built into the initial contract negotiations . 
Price discussions outside the formal contract terms would continue to 
take place as necessary , but the advantage of the dual - currency , index-
linked pricing arrangement is that it would provide a neutral frame of 
reference on which to base those informal price di scussions . Ex ante , 
it would be as likely that each party would be asked to make price 
concessions as that it would need to seek them. 
In addition to the provision of price guarantees , an important 
function of mineral export contracts is to stabilize quantities 
traded . However , the quantity speci fications really represent a 
declaration of intent, rather than any firm commitment . Variations 
from cont ract tonnage are accepted as inevitable and are only really 
objected to in circumstances where some discriminat ion is evident . 
In the present recession almost all contracts have been operating 
at or below the minimum specified tonnages . However , the crucial 
consideration is whether the effect of the recess i on on Australia ' s 
minerals exports would not have been greater in the absence of the 
contractual obligations . Certainly , Japanese consumers have carried 
substantially greater stocks of mineral products than they would 
normally wish to do . The problem in assessing the extent to which 
Japanese purchasers have failed to take up contract tonnages is that 
some producers , who are selling well below contract levels , would not 
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have been able to deliver larger quantities in any case. Signifi-
cantly, given the relatively reliable contract performance of Aus-
tralian producers in the past, the reduction in Japanese uptake of 
Australian coking coal has been considerably smaller than the reduc-
tion in purchases of United States coal . Whereas imports from the us 
in 1976 were 31 percent below both the 1974 quantity and the 1976 
contract tonnage, imports from Australia were 24 percent greater than 
in 1974 and only about 15 percent below the 1976 contract tonnage . 
As noted earlier, the somewhat reduced security value of con-
tracts seems to have led to a greater dependence on Japanese financing 
in order to bring new projects into operation . Thus, the proposed 
large iron ore developments in the Pilbara require substantial 
Japanese loan financing in addition to firm sales contracts and, in 
most cases. significant equity participation has been offered to the 
steel mills and trading companies . The offer of equity is principally 
designed to attract Japanese interest in the project, and to create a 
situation in which it is possible to obtain loans from the Export-
40 Import Bank of Japan . It is not clear that Japanese involvement in 
financing of minerals projects significantly increases the stability 
of quantities traded . 41 More important seems to be the sheer availa-
bility of large amounts of debt funding, on concessional terms , in 
circumstances where the security offered by contracts is no longer 
sufficient to allow the level of commercial debt raising required . 
By contrast with the above situation, it is possible that , if 
satisfactory contract agreements cannot be reached with the Japanese 
steel mills, one or two large new coking coal projects will go ahead 
without those guarantees . This reflects the favorable expectations as 
to future coal demand, the high quality of the deposits, and the 
financial strength of the companies concerned, which makes them less 
dependent on debt financing (or more able to provide alternative 
guarantees) . However , only the combination of all three factors would 
be likely to permit development of any new project without the prior 
conclusion of a firm contract . 
Japanese metals producers have used long- term contracts to secure 
their supply position for a number of years ahead . It is difficult to 
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assess how adequately future requirements are covered at present, 
since available data relate only to firmly committed tonnages (see 
Table 8) , A number of iron ore and coal contracts come up for renewal 
over the next few years, and there is a firm understanding on both 
sides that renewal will take place . However , in the present recession, 
the Japanese steel mills have been reluctant to commit themselves to 
new projects, so that (after allowing for contract renewals) the 
tonnages contracted for 1980 would be only 70- 75 percent of the 
requirements forecast for that year in 1973 . 42 While this may be 
adequate for 1980, given present forecasts of steel production , it 
seems likely that significant additional tonnages will need to be 
contracted for the period after 1980 . With the long lead times in new 
mine developments, it is possible that the Japanese steel industry may 
run into a supply shortfall situation in the early 1980s unless 
contracts are soon concluded for some of the projects presently on 
offer . 
7 . Export Pricing and Monopoly Power in Trade 
Australia only has substantial monopoly power in the world ma r ket 
for relatively few mineral products . Most notably, Australia produces 
91 percent of the world's rutile and 70 percent of the wor ld ' s zircon . 
Al though, with the assistance of the Commonwealth Government , pro-
ducers have maintained restrictions on sales and have accumulated 
stocks of zircon in periods of low demand, this appears to have 
functioned more as a price stabilization device than as an attempt to 
force the price onto a higher long- run path . In rutile , where the 
degree of monopoly power is substantially greater , there have been no 
restrictions on sales except for environmental reasons . Indeed , the 
main arena in which Australia's monopoly power in pr oduction of these 
mineral sand products has been stressed has been in consideration of 
environmental problems . Opponents of sand mining in particular areas 
have suggested that restriction on supply would improve the terms of 
trade sufficiently to allow the environmental benefits of those 
restrictions to be achieved at no cost . However, this consideration 
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seems not to have weighed heavily in policy decisions . 
More important than the exercise of any unilateral monopoly power 
is the extent to which Australia has, at government level or at company 
level, cooperated with other producers to influence world prices . 
There is evidence that Australian uranium companies have participated 
in an international cartel to control the price of uranium . Similarly, 
recent information suggests that the international Lead- Zinc Study 
Group, of which the Australian producers are active members, has 
manipulated the London Metals Exchange in attempts to maintain high 
prices . The advantage of this approach is that, since the LME is a 
small market , it is relatively easy to manipulate the price which then 
becomes the benchmark for the major contract sales of the producers 
concerned . While the evidence on the uranium case is unclear, it is 
certain that the Australian Government (or at least part of the public 
service) was fully aware of the activities of the Lead- Zinc Study 
Group . In contrast to the United States' approach, the Australian 
Government seems generally prepared to allow private companies to 
combine with overseas producers to exercise monopoly power in interna-
tional markets, so long as they do not attempt to do so in Australia . 43 
At government level, attitudes towards producer cartels have been 
more cautious. With 25 percent of the world production of bauxite, 
Australia joined the International Bauxite Association but has so far 
only participated in the exchange of information . Australia ' s 
inactivity in the IBA imposes a major constraint on the effectiveness 
of the producer group . Although the active members enjoy substantial 
transport cost advantages over Australia in the North American and 
European bauxite market, transport cost differentials are relatively 
unimportant for alumina . As the IBA countries seek to gain a higher 
level of processing to alumina, there is likely to be a substantial 
incentive for the aluminum majors to seek greater supplies from 
Australia -- already the largest supplier of alumina to the United 
States . 
However , Australian alumina production is concentrated in the 
hands of the aluminum majors, and there are problems in assessing the 
prices at which it is transferred out of Australia . Australia ' s 
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information exchange with the IBA countries presumably facilitates the 
policing of transfer pricing arrangements, and it is possible that, if 
there is substantial long- run shift of trade towards Australia , the 
Australian Government may see its interest lying in maintaining the 
monopoly power of the IBA and this may lead it to play a more active 
role . 
One other area in which Australia has cooperated , informally, 
with overseas producers has been in the trade in industrial salt. 
Australia and Mexico each supply around half of Japan's import require-
ments of this commodity . Historically, the Japanese purchasers had 
played the fragmented suppliers in the two countries off against one 
another and had succeeded in maintaining relatively low prices . In 
recent years, however, both governments have intervened in trade 
negotiations and have established mutually supportive roles . In 1976, 
the Australian producers were close to conceding a lower price than the 
Mexican Government had established . However, at the request of some 
producers, the Australian Government refused to grant export licenses 
unless the Mexican price was matched . 
Export Price Bargaining in Bilateral Trade 
The main focus of policy attention relating to export prices for 
mineral products has been concerned with bilateral bargaining in the 
trade with Japan, rather than with world prices generally or with 
participation in producer groups. The central problem has been to 
achieve a bargaining situation in which the relatively fragmented 
Australian producers are not placed at a disadvantage relative to the 
Japanese purchasing consortia . 
Given the short- term rigidities in minerals trade patterns, the 
short- term bargaining margins in the Australia- Japan minerals trade 
are very large . However , the interest of the two parties in main-
taining access to markets and supplies means that bargaining needs to 
be conducted with a longer- term view. In the long term, the bargaining 
margins are principally determined by the transport cost savings 
associated with bilateral trade . 44 These are ·quite substantial , in 
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relation to f . o . b . values, for a number of unprocessed mineral pro-
45 ducts . 
The recent Australian Labor Government sought to come to terms 
with the bargaining issue by reasserting the Commonwealth's power to 
contrql export licensing . By withholding export licenses until 
"satisfactory" prices had been agreed upon, the government forced 
Australian exporters into a more united stance. On one occasion , the 
Minister responsible attempted to negotiate directly with the Japanese 
purchaser consortium after the Australian exporters had failed to 
achieve the required price . 
Two important problems are created by government intervention in 
the bargaining over mineral export prices . The first is the danger 
that politicians and government agencies will, through incomplete 
understanding of the basic economic issues, and particularly of the 
long-term issues , take an excessively optimistic view of the bar-
gaining margins and of their own bargaining strength . In general, it 
seems likely that avoidance of the risk of over- bargaining will best be 
achieved when bargaining is conducted between companies with direct 
interest i n the outcome . The second problem lies in the fact that 
direct government involvement in commercial bargaining can readily 
shift to , or be interpreted as , a politicization of the conduct of the 
trade . Since political interests are less stable and less predictable 
than commercial interests, the appearance of a move towards a politici-
zation of trade issues will generate uncertainty as to the future 
stability and reliability of bilateral trade for the trade partner . 
The nature of the minerals trade is such that, given government 
monopoly of export permits , Australia holds an enormous short-term 
bargaining advantage over Japan . An embargo on coal or iron ore 
exports would damage Australia ' s economy, but would have a much more 
disastrous effect on Japan because of the substantial l i nkage effects 
that a sweeping cut-back in iron and steel production would have on the 
whole of Japan ' s manufacturing industry . In the short term , Japan 
would have no alternative source of supply for the bulk of the imports 
normally coming from Australia, and any supplies which could be 
replaced would probably be at high prices . Japan ' s vulnerability to a 
288 
threat to withhold supplies of basic raw materials means that , at 
almost any time, an Australian government could force very large short-
term increases in the prices obtained for the sale of a number of 
minerals to Japan . Given the relatively short period over which 
political success is measured , the danger exists that a government 
involved in setting the terms for the minerals trade might have a 
strong temptation to use its short- term bargaining strength to an 
extent which would prejudice Australia ' s long- term trading interest s . 
Perhaps more important , the high level of concern in Japan over that 
country ' s vulnerability to exercises in resources diplomacy is likely 
to mean that direct intervention in the minerals trade by the Aus-
tralian government will , regardless of whether there is any immediate 
threat to withhold supplies, be perceived in Japan as greatly 
increasing the risks of remaining heavily dependent on Australian 
supplies . 
The dangers inherent in direct and overt government intervention 
in the conduct of the minerals trade do not mean that the Australian 
government has no responsibility to ensure that Australia receives 
"fair and reasonable" prices for its mineral exports . Rather , what is 
at issue is the manner in which that responsibility can most appro-
priately be exercised . The essence of the above argument is that 
bargaining should be conducted along lines which reflect the basic 
long- term commercial realities, and that this should be perceived by 
Japanese purchasers to be the case . Where Australian exporter s have no 
significant bargaining disadvantage relative to Japanese importers, 
bargaining can most safely be left to the commercial interests . The 
case for government intervention arises when, as in the coal trade 
before 1973, united Japanese importers are able to play Australian 
exporters off against one another and to extract the lion's share of 
the gains from bilateral trade . In such a situation there is a need to 
bring exporters together to operate a countervailing cartel- type 
arrangement . 
However, the problems involved in attempting to cartelize Austra-
lian exporters, without formal government participation in the opera-
tion of the cartel, are fairly substantial . In general, the individual 
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producers have quite different interests and objectives, so that they 
are not likely to adhere to any informal arrangement . In this 
situation, a balance needs to be struck between the dangers inherent in 
open government action to regulate the bargaining situation and the 
losses which will arise from incomplete cooperation between producers 
in trade negotiations . 
The present Government has moved back considerably from the 
degree of intervention practiced by the Labor Government. In the coal 
trade, for example, producers are required to exchange information and 
to discuss their bargaining strategy with the appropriate government 
department . Thereafter, however, they are left to conduct negotia-
tions privately . In this situation it is still possible for the 
Japanese steel mills to attempt to weaken the bargaining positions of 
the price leaders by failing to take full deliveries in the period 
leading up to price negotiations. However, the experience of coopera-
tion and the advantages which it has brought, seems to have generated a 
move towards increasing unity among the coal exporters, so that their 
bargaining stance is now considerably stronger than in the past . 
Overall, there is no simple formula for ensuring that Australia 
gains appropriately from the bilateral minerals trade with Japan . 
Continuous government surveillance is necessary, but this should be 
concerned more with the market conditions under which price negotia-
tions take place than with any attempt to set prices. 
8. Future Direction and Pattern of Australia's Minerals Trade 
As can be seen from Table 6, the bulk of Australia's exports of 
minerals is of unprocessed products and this is particularly true of 
the trade with Japan. To the extent that metals production has been 
developed in Australia, this has depended principally on export mar-
kets in Europe. The exception is aluminum, where Japan is easily the 
largest market. However, aluminum is one of the few commodities where 
Japan depends heavily on imports of refined metal and, in any case, 
aluminum exports provide an outlet for only a small fraction of 
Australia's bauxite. 
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Table 6: Australian and Japanese Trade in Selected Mineral Products 
.D.ustra 1 i an Exoorts (1975/76) Japanese Imports (1976) 
Coal 
Liq. Petroleum Gas 
Iron Ore 
Pig Iron 
Crude Iron and Steel 
Nickel Concentrates 
Nickel Matte 
Nickel (unwrought) 
Manganese Ore 
Tungsten Concentrates 
Bauxite 
Alumina 
Aluminium 
Copper Ore 
Copper (unrefined) 
Copper (refined) 
Zinc Ores 
Zinc and Zinc Alloys 
Lead Ores 
Lead and Lead Alloys 
Tin Concentrates 
Tin (unwrought) 
Rutile 
Ilmenite 
Zircon 
Salt (industrial) 
Value 
$USm. 
1 290.5 
151.3 
972 .2 
51.1 
201.4 
13.6 
175. 9 
47.0 
.52 . 3(e) 
18.5 
62 .4(e) 
549.9 
55 .5 
51.4 
17.0 
104.3 
78.4 
89. 3 
24.0 
139. 7 
17 .9 
15.4 
82. 7 
10 .6 
65.2 
28.5 
Total Minerals +Metals 4 366.0 
All Corrmodities 12 105.6 
% to 
Japan(a) 
77.4 
61.0(e) 
79 . 2 
2. 5 
1.6 
5.0(e) 
62.0(e) 
7.0(e) 
49 . 0(e) 
8.4 
45 .0(e) 
13.0(e) 
72.8 
96.4 
86 .3 
6.9 
41. l 
9.6 
4.2 
17.4 
31.5 
80 . 2 
54 .2 
32 .9 
Value 
$USm. 
3 518 . l 
880 . 1 
2 333 . 8 
53 . 3 
15 .8 
131.2 
135 .6 
54 . 6 
118 .0 
20.9 
74 .2 
73 . 5 
355.8 
854.2 
52.6 
287 .3 
210.4 
20.9 
33.7 
22.6 
(b) 
231.0 
20.2 
22. 3 
90.4 
9 610 .5 
64 842 .9 
~~ from 
Australia (a) 
43.9 
29.7 
47 .9 
37.1 
99 .9 
61.8 
17.5 
44.4 
12.0 
62.8 
98.7 
10. 3 
7. 7 
28 . l 
2.9 
26.0 
6. 3 
100.0 
40 .9 
96.5 
50 . 8 
32 . 7 
8.3 
/cont . 
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Table 6: continued 
Notes: (a) % by volume for individual commodities, 
% by value for totals. 
(b) value close to zero. 
(e) estimate. 
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Overseas Trade BuZZetin, 
A.G.P.S., Canberra; 
Ministry of Finance, Ja:pan's Exports and Imports, 
Japan Tariff Association, Tokyo. 
$US values estimated using I.M.F. Conversion Tables 
for relevant period averages. 
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In Australian policy discussion it has generally been considered 
desirable that minerals should be processed as far as possible before 
export . On occasion, it has been suggested that Japan "exploits" 
Australia by purchasing only basic raw materials and preserving the 
value added in processing for Japanese capital and labor . Clearly, 
however, it is not necessarily true, as a general proposition, that a 
higher level of processing would increase the benefit to Australia from 
the minerals trade . While Australia has an obvious comparative 
advantage in mining, it does not automatically follow that the addi-
tional resources needed in processing will be more efficiently 
employed there than in other activities . 
To some extent, efficient processing in Australia is constrained 
by problems of scale and by the high cost of internal transport and 
coastal shipping . Thus, the main areas where processing is feasible 
are where large processing facilities can be fed by the output of 
closely located mines . In the case of copper, lead and zinc, for 
example, a high level of processing has developed around rich mining 
areas, but the smaller and more geographically- dispersed mines have 
relied on exports of ores and concentrates . 
The main commodities for which expansion of Australian processing 
seems feasible are nickel, aluminum, and iron and steel . Importantly, 
Australia has relatively low- cost energy supplies and is better able to 
absorb the pollutants from minerals processing than more densely 
populated countries . In the case of nickel, the major Australian 
producer was able to persuade its Japanese customer to purchase nickel 
matte instead of nickel concentrates and to close down an inefficient 
smelter in Japan . However, the Australian refining industry has 
developed wholly on the basis of sales to Europe . As more nickel 
deposits are brought into production, the trade is increasingly 
shifting towards the export of matte and concentrates to nickel 
refineries and smelters in North America, accompanied by a steady 
expansion of metal sales to Europe . For aluminum, the main area of 
processing has been the production of alumina for export to the 
overseas smelters of the aluminum majors . Australian aluminum metal 
production is small but has prospects of significant expansion based on 
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exports to Japan and the newly industrializing countries of the region . 
The Australian iron and steel industry has significant exports to Asia 
and the Pacific (excluding Japan), but this accounts for only a tiny 
fraction of Australia ' s production of iron ore and coking coal . Any 
substantial expansion of Australia ' s iron and steel industry will be 
likely to depend heavily on exports to Japan . 
The future direction and pattern of Australia ' s minerals trade 
depends importantly on Japanese reactions to increasing energy and 
pollution costs . If Japan does move signifi cantly away from a depen-
dence on imports of basic mineral ores and becomes an importer of 
processed minerals and crude metals, this will have important implica-
tions both for the direction of Australia's exports of basic raw 
materials and for the level of Australian processing . Australian 
exports of a number of unprocessed minerals products will increasingly 
be directed to other countries in the region where processing is more 
efficient than in Japan . At present , Australia has established 
important links with Korea and Taiwan in the coal and iron ore trade , 
and these are expected to become steadily more important . At the same 
time, there will be substantially greater opportunities for Australian 
production of processed minerals for export to Japan . 
In relation to the latter possibility, the established trade 
links between Australian minerals producers and Japanese processors 
may provide an impor tant vehicle for rat i onal decision making on the 
efficient location of processing facilities . Thus, one may envisage 
the setting up of joint venture processing facilities in Austral i a , 
selling to Japan through the distribution networks of the Japanese 
participants in those ventures . While this will depend crucially on 
Japanese policy attitudes towards inefficient processing activities, 46 
it will also depend heavily on the extent to which present contractual 
arrangements are perceived to operate in a stable and cooperative 
manner and on the nature and stability of Australian policies towards 
foreign investment . 
While it is generally true that Australia's minerals trade will 
continue to depend heavily on exports of ores and concentrates and 
processed products to the South East Asian and Western Pacifi c markets, 
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for some products the market is likely to become much wider. Australia 
is already an important supplier of alumina to the United States anct 
this trade is likely to expand . The bulk of exports of liquifiect 
natural gas will go to the United States, and any exports of uranium 
will be widely dispersed . If the real price of coal continues to rise, 
a number of large new coal deposits may be developed on the basis of 
sales to Europe, rather than to countries in the Pacific Region . Thus, 
the prospect seems to be for a greater diversification of markets, both 
within the Asian- Pacific Region, and between that market and markets in 
Europe. 
Competition for Australian resource suppliers has emerged most 
importantly in the case of iron ore from Brazil. However, although 
Brazil has made substantial inroads into the Japanese market, which has 
had the effect of delaying new mine developments in Australia, it is 
unlikely that this will continue beyond the point where Brazil and 
Australia have roughly similar market shares . The more important 
prospective competition lies in the location of future processing 
facilities aimed at supplying the Japanese market. Even if Australian 
and Japanese companies successfully enter into joint venture pro-
cessing activities, based on the use of Australian resources, there is 
no guarantee that those facilities will be located in Australia . 47 
9. Concluding Remarks 
The range of issues discussed in the paper can be classified into 
three broad areas of policy interest: balance of payments adjustment 
and problems of structural change; Federal/State relationships and 
problems deriving from the division of powers; and policy relating to 
trade and foreign investment. 
Growth in minerals production has created, and will continue to 
create, pressures on the balance of payments, resolution of which will 
have adverse effects on other traded goods activities . The contractual 
nature of much of the minerals trade should allow much of the payments 
pressure to be anticipated and seen in a long-term context . Thus, it 
should be possible for exchange rate responses to be more rapid than in 
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the past, so that inflationary pressures can be minimized . There is an 
urgent need to examine methods of smoothing the consequent structural 
adjustment problems and the emphasis should be on promoting change, 
with appropriate assistance to those affected adversely, rather than 
on reducing the pressures for change . However, there may be some case 
for "recycling" a portion of external surpluses resulting from mineral 
export growth if the pressures for structural change cannot be met or 
if future income payable overseas is expected to result in a smaller 
long-term need for adjustment . 
The nature of Federal/State relations creates several problems 
for the management of Australia ' s resources . In general , there is a 
need to develop a uniformity of treatment of environmental , infra-
structure and taxation issues which requires substantially more co-
operation between the Commonwealth and States than presently exists. 
Of major importance is the need to develop taxation arrangements which 
do not distort investment decisions in exploration and mining , but 
which ensure that the rents from exploitation of mineral resources 
accrue to the community at large . Such taxation arrangements are 
particularly necessary given the large share of foreign equity in the 
Australian minerals industry . The major problem in introducing any 
resource rent tax arrangement is that the States will be reluctant to 
surrender their rights to tax minerals exploitation . As Table 7 shows, 
mineral royalties contribute importantly to State revenues , parti-
cularly in Western Australia and Queensland . 48 These States have 
traditionally been relatively heavily dependent on Commonwealth assis-
tance, and the expansion of minerals production has provided them with 
a measure of independence and equality with the more densely populated 
States of N.S.W. and Victoria which has been of substantial political 
importance . Although the Commonwealth could introduce a resource rent 
tax without the consent of the States, they would have the power to set 
royalty rates at levels which ensured that the rent tax earned no 
revenue -- with severe efficiency effects on the mining indust r y . 
Given the general financial powers of the Commonwealth , it is likely 
that a struggle over resource rents would eventually be won by the 
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Commonwealth , but the disruption could be substantial and the States 
might well be able to muster sufficient electoral support to redress 
the situation. 
The major issues in relation to foreign investment and trade lie 
in setting appropriate taxation arrangements for company profits and 
in ensuring that commodities are exported at "fair and reasonable" 
prices . In only a few products are there pr oblems in policing 
transfers within multinational companies, and it i s probably sensible 
to attempt to administer policy on foreign ownership so that control of 
minerals production does not lie in the hands of the purchasers of the 
output . The policy role in determination of prices for arms- length 
transactions principally should be to ensure that Australian exporters 
do not operate in a market framework which places them at a bargaining 
disadvantage re la ti ve to overseas purchasers . Given the consortium 
purchasing policies of many Japanese consumers , there is a need to 
bring Australian exporters into a relatively united bargaining stance . 
However, it is important that this should be done consistently and 
quietly , and that it should not have the effect (or be perceived to 
have the effect) of shifting trade bargaining away from the essential 
commercial framework . The paper has stressed the need for stable , 
long-term relationships to be established in the minerals trade . 
Rhetoric and direct government intervention in the conduct of the trade 
are likely to generate uncertainties which are not consistent with 
long- term development objectives . 
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FOOTNOTES 
1In fact, Australian oil production was marginal or sub- economic 
at the import parity price ruling in the late 1960s . In order to allow 
developments to proceed on an assured basis, they were given guaranteed 
domestic prices . Since 1973, the producers have come to regre t the 
administered pricing policy, as domestic prices have fallen well below 
world prices . 
2The most striking examples have been in the world aluminum and 
nickel industries and in the US iron and steel industry . 
3A detailed discussion of ownership structures and the manner in 
which they came about , for the most important minerals developments, 
can be found in McKern (1976), pp . 206-225 . 
4 The one exception is the relatively small Savage River iron ore 
operation, in which two Japanese trading companies hold 50 percent of 
the equity . 
5This general contract form has applied, with variations, in the 
trade in iron ore, coking coal, and bauxite . In other contracts , for 
example nickel and copper ores , price was directly related to a "world" 
price (INCO and LME, r espectively) . For an analysis of long- term 
contracts and a discussion of the terms and conditions of contracts for 
different commodities see Smith (1976). 
6sixteen percent per annum compared to 5 . 5 percent, in real terms 
(Industries Assistance Commission, 1977, p. 5) . 
7 A similar proportion of the workforce is employed in basic 
minerals processing, but the bulk of these people are employed in the 
long established iron and steel industry . 
8Foreign equity accounts for around half the total ownershi p of 
the Australian mining industry . According to evidence submitted to the 
Industries Assistance Commission (1976a), about 70 percent of total 
capital needs between 1964/65 and 1973/74 was met by borrowing, with 
overseas borrowing accounting for 40 percent of the total . 
9The sharp fall in foreign investment inflow had a number of 
causes including the ending of the minerals development boom as new 
projects became operational, the revaluation of December 1972 , and the 
election of a Labor government with stricter policies towards fo r eign 
investment generally and towards the mineral industry in particular . 
10 
Garnaut (1977) , p . 8 . 
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11 However, there may be significant differences in the rate at 
which these pressures occur . Also , and more important, the generation 
of a relatively high rate of inflation involves wider costs for 
society, and perhaps greater uncertainties for traded goods produc-
tion, than the alternative exchange rate adjustment . 
12Gregory's main purpose, in fact, seems to have been to demon-
strate that the 25 percent tariff cut represented a fairly small 
relative price shift compared to the total impact of mineral export 
growth . 
13see, for example, Dixon (1977) . 
14If Australia were a "small" producer in a perfectly foreseeing 
competitive world market, the value of Australia's minerals deposits 
could be expected to rise over time at the rate of interest . In that 
case, postponing mining developments would have zero cost . 
15Except that, whereas increased tariff protection merely trans-
fers part of the burden of adjustment from the import- competing 
manufacturing sector to the export sector and, importantly , worsens 
the position of rural exporters, mineral export restraint reduces the 
adjustment burden for the manufacturing and rural sectors more or less 
evenly . 
16Dixon, et al (1977) . Assuming, among other things , a moderate 
real growth in mineral exports over the next ten years, the model 
predicts that a number of important manufacturing industries, 
including motor vehicles, will grow at less than half the average 
growth rate for the economy, or will actually decline, over the next 
decade in the absence of increased measures to assist them. However , 
the projections do not suggest any substantial general need to transfer 
resources out of manufacturing but, rather, a need to restructure the 
manufacturing sector itself . 
17Industries Assistance Commission (1977a , 1977b, 1977c). 
18For example, the lease on the Weipa bauxite deposit extends for 
84 years . 
19 In some cases, these concessions apply only where the processing 
is conducted within the State concerned and shipments to other states 
are treated as exports . 
20see the discussion at the end of this section . 
21 Industries Assistance Commission (1976a) . The Australian Mining 
Industry Council (1971) estimated that, for eleven projects completed 
between 1959 and 1969 ~ infrastructure expenditure accounted for nearly 
two-thirds of total capital expenditure . 
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22on the one hand, an average charge would deter marginal users 
who, in the absence of congestion, should be allowed free access. On 
the other hand, it is generally impossible to tailor charges to the 
benefits accruing to different users. 
23The Western Australian State Government has, in fact, recently 
offered guarantees on part of the debt finance for a new nickel 
development. 
24 Large long-term loans have been raised, principally from United 
States' banks, through various financing vehicles. The credit 
standing of many of the companies involved, or their overseas parents, 
has meant that no significant premiums have had to be paid for these 
loans. 
25see the f 11 · t' o owing sec ion. 
26To the extent that Australian government assistance with 
financing made it easier to bring projects into operation, it would, of 
course, reduce the risk of supply shortfalls for Japanese purchasers, 
so that part of the subsidy implied would be to those purchasers rather 
than to the Australian companies. 
27 It also has the possible advantage that the true level of 
Government subsidy to the uneconomic rail services in areas where there 
is no mining traffic is concealed by incorporating mining "royalties" 
in the accounts of the State Railways. 
28Although the coal export tax is still applied, the rate of tax 
has been reduced somewhat and it is expected to be phased out gradually 
over a number of years. 
29 Apart from administrative convenience and uniformity of the 
basis of assessment, this would have the advantage that the tax would 
rank as a tax credit for the purpose of double-tax arrangements. 
Charges levied by the States are only deductible, rather than credit-
able, against overseas tax liabilities. 
30whether or not the arrangement was an "interim" one is open to 
dispute. One of the companies concerned is presently seeking substan-
tial compensation on the grounds that it undertook large development 
expenditures on the understanding that blanket approval had been 
given. 
31 Fraser Island Environmental Enquiry (1976). 
32Fitzgerald (1974) and McKern (1976). Swan (1976) has estimated 
the cost of the accelerated depreciation allowances alone at 
$A 25 million for 1974. 
33 
McKern (1976), p . 169 . 
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34The share of foreign ownership is found by apportioning value 
added in each company according to the equity shares in that company . 
The share of foreign control is found by apportioning all of the value 
added in a company to overseas interests if (a) foreign companies own 
more than 50 percent of the total equity, or (b) a single foreign 
company owns more than 25 percent of the total equity. Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (1968, 1976). 
35This represented the major feature of Fitzgerald's (1974) criti-
que of the contribution of the mineral industry to Australian welfare . 
36The requirement is for 75 percent Australian equity in the case 
of uranium developments . 
37The major area of difficulty has been with the United States ' 
coal exporters, who diverted large contractual tonnages to high-priced 
spot sales (to Japan frequently) during the commodity boom . With one 
exception, the Australian suppliers were notably more reliable . For a 
Japanese perspective on Australian- Japanese bilateral minerals trade 
arrangements, see the paper by Kojima in these Proceedings . 
38 rn the past, Japanese purchasers have insisted on including 
clauses allowing them to terminate contracts on 12 months notice, 
wherever annual price renegotiation was provided for . Most Australian 
exporters wish to avoid such termination clauses in their contracts. 
39Arndt (1974), Smith (1976, 1977) . The operation of cost escala-
tion clauses in some coal contracts has , to the extent that they have 
been effective, had some of the effects that this proposal would imply . 
40 rn general, the Export- Import Bank is only permitted to lend 
directly to Japanese companies . 
41 For the most part, the financing links have come through trading 
companies. Where all of the trade is handled by trading companies, 
each has an interest in persuading the purchaser to maintain shipments 
from projects with which it is associated , whether or not there is any 
financing link. 
42 Japan Economic Research Center (1975) . 
43rn fact, of course, sales in Australia have also been held at 
high prices, in order to prevent Australian buyers from engaging in 
arbitrage . However, domestic sales are relatively minor compared to 
export sales . 
44 
For a survey of the determinants of the bargaining margins, and 
analysis of the bargain outcome under alternative conditions, see 
Smith 0977) . 
45For example, in 1973 freight costs between Australia and Japan 
for iron ore were about $US 4 . 00 per ton , compared with $US 6 . 00 per 
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ton between Brazil and Japan and $US 7 . 00 per ton between Aust r alia 
and Europe . The average f . o . b. price for Australian exports to Japan 
was $US 9 . 17 in 1973 , while the average f . o. b . price for sales to 
Europe was $US 6 . 45, though it is likely that the average quality of 
Japanese shipments was s omewhat higher than that of European ship~ 
ments . 
46rn a number of instances Japanese minerals processors enjoy 
substantial effective protection, particularly when world metals 
prices fall sharply and variable tariffs are used to maintain the 
Japanese producer price . 
47rhe main example of such a venture to date has been the Bluff 
aluminum smelter , which is located in New Zealand . 
48 rn assessing the contribution of royalties to State revenues in 
Queensland, one should bear in mind also the hidden contribution 
through rail freight charges . 
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AUSTRALIA'S MINERALS PRODUCTION AND TRADE : CASE STUDY OF A 
RESOURCE- RICH DEVELOPED COUNTRY 
A COMMENT 
H. Edward English 
The paper by Ben Smith provides much support for the point made by 
Kojima, namely that, with all its problems, "a country that has is 
better than one that hasn't." Like Canada , Australia has enough 
resource weal th that it can be wasteful. Sometimes it seems that 
Australia, even more than Canada, is testing the limits of wastefulness 
to the point of finding a new solution to Garnaut 's problem of distri-
buting rents. 
Smith's paper deals mainly with policy issues, under three 
headings: the short- term macro-effects of foreign investment; the 
problem of jurisdiction in the federal state, and the implications of 
foreign control. The last part of the paper deals primarily with more 
specific arrangements -- the long-term bilateral contract, and the 
joint selling approach. 
One can quite quickly dispose of the macroeconomic argument , with 
which I have little quarrel . He makes it clear that the Australian 
government chose the wrong exchange policy in 1971 (by devaluing 
instead of revaluing) and that its subsequent moves constituted too 
slow a reversal. Monetary expansion was the main compensator and of 
course laid the basis for inflationary conditions . The substantial 
tariff cuts which were also used came too late in the boom, at least 
for Smith with the advantage of hindsight . 
I do not fully agree with Smith when he says that it makes little 
difference whether mineral-sector growth is reflected in an appreciat-
ing Australian dollar or a relatively high level of inflation. The 
immediate effect may be the same for other traded goods, but the 
expectation effects of inflation are likely to be more damaging . In 
the Canadian case, a commercial policy or lasting exchange-rate change 
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would generate a rationalization of manufacturing whereas inflation 
would be more discouraging to any investment. It would depend on how 
long the appreciation was expected to last. If the inflation was 
expected to last it would, I think, have much more serious implications 
for labor-market conditions. 
I agree very strongly with Smith's criticism of the Gregory 
thesis . The income effects of a resource boom have had major positive 
consequences for the rest of the Canadian economy (notably in the 
1950's) and would have more if, at the same time, rationalization of 
secondary manufacturing had been systematically achieved under well-
timed tariff phase-outs and appropriate complementary policy. 
The jurisdictional dispute in resource policy is also one 
familiar to Canadians. The provinces in Canada also control the 
national resources, and the federal government has to rely on trade and 
income-tax policy. It has not been common, or perhaps one should say 
explicit, for the states to require processing in the state (province), 
That sounds like a serious breach in economic nationhood. 
I agree with Smith that the infrastructure subsidy issue is 
largely a question of whether a public good aspect is present. 
The taxation of economic rents in Canada is also a subject of 
great recent interest . Australia's state governments have apparently 
adopted a deterrent form of royalty, but are moving deviously to a rent 
royalty in the petroleum sector . Smith rightly points out that the 
fear of windfall-like profits to the oil companies should be no greater 
than that already enjoyed in other mineral sectors; but of course he 
knows that there is at least one major political difference, even 
setting aside the special place that oil companies have in the hearts 
and minds of the electorate . A substantial, government-authorized, 
sudden upward shift is politically impossible and probably undesir-
able. 
In this matter and in company taxation more generally, it is 
important that there be a clear view of the comparative national tax 
position. In Canada generous depletion allowances gained respectabil-
ity largely because the same sort of thing was done in the U.S. and we 
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were most anxious that Canadian minerals not suffer from underinves-
tment . The U. S. , Canada, and Australia have all been withdrawing from 
historic taxation attitudes during the same period, though not at the 
same pace . 
Finally to foreign investment itself . According to Smith the main 
problems of foreign investment in resource industries are of three 
sorts -- the loss of foreign control, the loss of rents (and other 
"excess profits" ), and the related avoidance of taxation . I can 
understand as well as any other nonexpert in public finance the 
difficulty of designing a resource rent tax . I don ' t share Smith's 
concern about transfer pricing . In a society with an advanced bureau-
cracy, I do not see why most if not all transfer pricing practices 
cannot be whittled away by a tough tax administration . That is the 
kind of problem which a good bureaucracy seems ideally suited to 
resolve . Further, I think they do solve them . The transfer pricing 
problem is pri marily a problem for less- developed countri es , for two 
reasons : the incentive to use transfer pricing is much greater where 
tax systems vary so substantially (in many cases) between host and 
parent nations; and the bureaucracy is thinner, and more easily 
intimidated by politicians in cahoots with multinationals. Is Smith ' s 
concern over transfer pricing a commentary on the Australian govern-
mental system? 
More particularly I do not think the technical services fees and 
royalties are that difficult to police . In Canada I have not yet hear d 
of a confirmed case where the subsidiary was found to be paying more 
than the economic value of such resources . 
On the specifi c trading arrangements, Australia's experience 
again is like Canada ' s . Actually the long- .term contract came rela-
tively recently to Canada in the form of copper and coal deals with 
Japan . In copper, the Japanese typically provide capital, Canada or 
U. S. the management, and the Japanese get a long- term commitment to 
supply at approximately LME prices . In the coal case , the arrangement 
involves less finance and an unhappily more rigid price commitment . I 
have the impression that the Canadians ' deals were treated as more 
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binding than the Australians . It is a little difficult to evaluate the 
significance of the particular pricing practices under the Australian 
arrangements . Smith at one point makes it appear that Australia has 
the upper hand while at another he writes about the begging bowl . I 
presume that the main problem was the unusually violent fluctuation of 
market conditions in recent years . I am intrigued by his methods of 
hedging exchange rates and inflation in these arrangements . 
Let me deal very briefly with the international trade and invest-
ment arrangements . I am somewhat encouraged by Smith ' s paper that 
Australia and the rest of us can all learn something from the 
experience of recent years, but the main lesson is that it is prefer-
able to make arrangements to avoid short- term bilateral deals in favor 
of long- term and preferably more multilateral ones . The Pacific region 
has some potential as a multilateral group in these matters of mineral 
resources trade and investment . 
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AUSTRALIA'S MINERALS PRODUCTION AND TRADE: CASE STUDY OF A 
RESOURCE-RICH DEVELOPED COUNTRY 
A COMMENT 
Hang-Sheng Cheng 
In his paper, Ben Smith has presented a panoramic view of the 
issues arising from Australia's role as a major mineral producer and 
exporter . Altogether, ten issues have been discussed, and on each he 
has something interesting, informative, and provocative to say. 
Rather than covering all the ten issues, I have decided to comment on 
only a few of them . 
The first topic is the balance- of- payments impact of the rapid 
growth of Australia ' s mineral industry on the rest of the economy . 
Among the issues raised in the paper, this is to me not only the most 
interesting but also the most controversial . It is referred to in the 
paper as the "Gregory thesis," in reference to a 1976 article by R. 
Gregory . Simply stated, it is as follows . Since 1960, Australia ' s 
mineral production and exports have grown very rapidly . In addit i on, 
the growing mineral industry has attracted large capital inflows . The 
combination of export growth and capital inflow is said to exert an 
upward pressure on the exchange value of the Australian dollar . 
According to this argument, the Australian authorities face a di ffi-
cult policy choice : if they let the Australian dollar appreciate , i t 
would adversely affect the trade competitiveness of all the other 
Australian products and thus bring about recession and unemployment ; 
if they intervened to prevent appreciation , it would r esult in a rapid 
rate of reserve increase , monetary expansion, and domestic inflation . 
The policy recommendation is either to restrict mineral- export growth 
and capital inflow or to encourage capital outflow. 
Now , that is a curious argument . It is just the opposite of the 
"export- led growth" thesis familiar in development economics litera-
ture . Instead of export expansion leading to a vigorous domestic 
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economic growth, the "Gregory thesis" asserts that expansion in the 
mineral industry, through the balance- of- payments impact, would result 
in domestic recession and unemployment. What is so special and 
detrimental about mineral-industry expansion? Smith mentions two 
factors : (1) high capital intensity in the mineral industry, and (2) 
sluggish adjustment in shifting resources from other sectors to the 
mining industry . 
Smith states very clearly that he is against restraining mineral-
industry growth . He favors adjustment assistance . I do not disagree 
with him on the policy stance. But, my interest is focused on the 
theoretical and empirical validity of the "Gregory thesis ." Because if 
the thesis is valid, not only Australia, but all mineral- producing and 
exporting countries should re- examine their policy toward the mineral 
industry . 
It might appear that the thesis could find support in both 
balance- of- payments theory and international-trade theory . 
examine the two in turn . 
Let us 
The balance-of- payments argument has already been stated : 
mineral-export growth plus capital inflow tends to put an upward 
pressure on the exchange value of the national currency, and hence a 
depressive effect on the aggregate demand for the nation ' s products . 
The reasoning is strongly reminiscent of the argument the former 
Governor Coyne of the Bank of Canada used against capital inflow in the 
late 1950's when Canada had flexible exchange rates . Governor Coyne 
blamed Canada's high unemployment and slow economic growth on capital 
inflows, which resulted in appreciation of the Canadian dollar, 
current-account deficits, and deterioration in Canada's competitive-
ness in world trade . 
Governor Coyne's argument has since become a favorite classroom 
example for teaching balance- of-payments theory . Capital inflow is 
not the~ of current- account deficit , but merely the other side of 
the same coin . A current-account deficit does not mean a reduction in 
aggregate demand; it merely reflects the country's demand for foreign 
capital . In Canada ' s case, both the large capital inflow and the high 
unemployment in the late 1950's were a result of the tight monetary 
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policy pursued by the Bank of Canada . In Australia's case, a high rate 
of return on capital plus short-run exchange- rate speculations can 
perhaps explain much of capital inflows in recent decades . 
In Australia's case, in view of the high degree of protectionism 
against imports, it would be particularly difficult to justify the 
argument that export growth and capital inflows tend to exert upward 
pressure on the exchange value of the national currency . Even if there 
were such pressure , it could be relieved by reducing trade barriers and 
thereby achieving more efficient domestic resource allocation. More-
over, in a growing economy, with the rising import demand, the upward 
pressure on the exchange rate should not arise at all . 
Data on Australia's balance- of- payments lend support to this 
analysis . Smith tells us that Australia's mineral- export growth was 
very rapid from 1960 to 1971 and slowed down sharply thereafter . 
During the 1960- 71 period, Australia had a fixed exchange rate for its 
currency . The rapid mineral-export growth paralleled rapid expansions 
in import demand, such that there was a growing current account deficit 
financed by capital inflows . Official foreign reserves increased only 
moderately . There is no evidence that mineral- export growth and 
capital inflow had resulted in any upward pressure on the exchange 
value of the Australian dollar . 
The "Gregory thesis" emphasizes the capital intensity of the 
mineral industry and the difficulty of absorbing the labor released 
from other industries. The argument recalls the Stolper- Samuelson 
Theorem in international trade theory, which states that the opening of 
international trade in a two- product, two- factor economy leading to 
the export of the capital-intensive product will necessarily reduce 
the real wage rate of labor . Now, if in addition we assume that labor 
through union power resists reduction in real wage rates , the outcome 
will be a rise in unemployment . 
My comments in this regard are twofold. First , the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem is a general- equilibrium analysis with given amounts 
of labor and capital . It is not applicable to a case in which there is 
continuous injection of foreign capital into the country . The capital 
312 
inflow could enable labor to have a higher productivity, more than 
offsetting the reduction in labor productivity resulting from the 
substitution of labor for capital as a result of trade . Secondly, as 
we turn to empirical data, we find that the period of rapid growth of 
Australia's mineral industry (1960- 1971) coincided with the period of 
rapid growth in manufacturing employment (by 25 percent); and that 
after mineral-industry growth slowed down since 1971, manufacturing 
employment has remained essentially flat and even declined in recent 
years . Thus, there is no evidence that mineral-industry growth had 
caused unemployment in the manufacturing sector . 
The outcome of this analysis is that there appears to be no 
justification for restraining mineral- industry growth on balance-of-
payments considerations. Let us turn the table around and ask whether 
there are grounds for using fiscal devices for encouraging mineral-
industry growth . This brings me to the second topic I would like to 
discuss: namely, subsidies and tax incentives for the mining indus-
tries. Smith has some very interesting discussion on this issue . He 
shows that prior to 1973, Australia accorded very favorable tax 
treatment of mining companies in the form of immediate or accelerated 
depreciation allowance and exemption of one-fifth of the profit earned 
from the production of certain mining products . For a five-year period 
prior to 1973, the tax reduction amounted to some $A700 million 
compared to $A260 million tax paid . 
This kind of tax incentive not only applied in Australia, but is 
very common in many developing countries . The presumption is that 
because of the high risk involved it is necessary to offer these 
incentives for attracting investment in the mining industries. Many 
developing nations apply the same justification for offering substan-
tial tax benefits for attracting foreign investment in their local 
industries. I am sure that foreign investors love it and would not 
hesitate to play one developing country against another in competition 
for their investment. The result has been distortion in resource 
allocation and loss of revenue for the host countries . I am glad to 
know that Australia abolished all such incentives in 1973, and in 1976, 
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following an Industries Assistance Commission report, adopted the 
principle of tax neutrality among the various sectors of the economy . 
I suspect that the Commission report might qualify as required reading 
for tax authorities in both developed and developing countries . 
I would like to make a few points concerning some of the foreign 
trade and foreign investments issues raised in Smith's paper . First , 
the Australian requirement of majority Australian equity in all new 
mining projects has aroused a great deal of controversy . Although one 
can appreciate the "satisfaction of nationalistic sentiment ," the 
crucial question is whether the policy is in Australia's long- run 
interest. Smith attempts to draw a distinction between "Australian 
ownership" and "Australian control" of resource exploitation . I am 
rather dubious that foreign investors would go along with that distinc-
tion : to have control without ownership or have ownership without 
control. In this regard, I call your attention to Smith's statement 
that "there are really only three Australian companies with the 
experience and financial resources necessary to take up this role (of 
control) ." If that is true of Australia, how much more true it must be 
of the developing nations in the Pacific Basin region ! 
My last comment has to do with foreign trade policy on mining . 
Australia exports mostly unprocessed mineral products and does not 
attempt to encourage processing within Australia . I fully endorse 
Smith ' s suggestion that it is a matter of comparative advantage in 
terms of economies of scale and cost of overland or coastal transport . 
In this regard, I find particularly intriguing Smith ' s speculation on 
the future pattern of Pacific Basin mineral resource trade . In terms 
of location economics, it may well be most beneficial for all parties 
concerned to have Australia export unprocessed mineral products, Indo-
nesia, the Philippines, Taiwan , or Korea do the processing, and Japan 
to use the finished products in higher manufactures . However, many 
existing trade barriers would need to be removed before that kind of 
trade pattern could emerge . 
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AUSTRALIA ' S MINERALS PRODUCTION AND TRADE : CASE STUDY OF A 
RESOURCE- RICH DEVELOPED COUNTRY 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
1 . Speed of Exploitation 
There a.re conflicting vi ews concerning the proper speed of 
resource exploitation : some argue that it is "better to take the money 
now" because in the long run , the terms of trade will decline , while 
others argue that a number of other considerations may make slower 
development economically and socially more desirable . 
Foregoing mineral exploitation is different from foregoing other 
types of economic opportunities : In manufacturing , for example , since 
the mineral will remain in place, waiting may be better, especially if 
other countries ' tax and other policies are such that immediate 
exploitation means losing rents that may accrue under different condi-
tions . The mining country also needs to consider alternative invest-
ments . While Smith feels some slowdown is possible, he pointed out 
that some opportunities can in fact be irretrievably lost in that one 
must deal with buyers when t hey want to buy, ·which also puts the seller 
in a somewhat better bargaining position . It is not clear that future 
scarcity will cause such high future prices that anythi ng is gai ned by 
wait i ng for them. 
2 . Balance of Payments 
Australia's current account surplus -- specifically its bilateral 
components with developing Asian countries -- raised the issue of why 
Australia was not more willing to buy goods from its minerals custo-
mers . It would also be in the interest of Australia ' s consumers . 
Adjusting to slower growth or even declines in output means 
resource reallocation , and the private costs may be less than the 
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social ones. Rather than slow export growth , Smith feels it better 
over the long run to buy from the more efficient foreign producer while 
providing transitional aid to those leaving the dying domestic 
industry in a systematic way rather than on an ad hoc basis . 
It was observed that inflation is not an efficient way to compen-
sate for structural changes in most cases . However, exchange rate 
variations are not very desirable either , especially when balance of 
payments difficulties are cyclic rather than secular . Tariffs might be 
adjusted in such cases . 
As an overview, it was suggested that Australia should recognize 
that it is now, or might consider becoming, a rentier country . Given 
the huge resource base relative to the present population, immigration 
restrictions, and the lackadaisical work ethic, it might be best to use 
current mineral earnings to acquire foreign assets . The current 
situation may reflect a capital- market problem rather than be an 
indicator of structural imbalance and a move in this direction is 
already underway . 
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OPTIONS FOR A RESOURCE-POOR DEVELOPED COUNTRY -- JAPAN 
Yasuhiro Murota* 
1. Introduction 
Japan is poor in natural resources, especially relative to its 
large population. Weinstein has outlined three options for Japan given 
this situation: 
1. buy resources; 
2 . directly control resources (often through military power); 
3. do not obtain resources and enter economic depression and 
decline. 
Weinstein is a political scientist writing about the 1930s and his 
categories are perhaps a little rough from an economist's point of 
view. However, to me they seem appropriate because Japan has actual 
historical experience with the first two and some concern that the 
third will also happen. Moreover, resources involve political issues 
and time horizons longer than those in usual economic analysis. 
Section 2 discusses prewar Japanese development (when option 2 was 
tried) while section 3 covers the postwar (option 1) period . Special 
attention is given to iron and steel, copper, lead, zinc and aluminum 
1 in the text and in tables at the end of the paper . 
Weinstein sets out the third option negatively, but in section 4 I 
recast it as a positive evolution from a wasteful to a frugal society 
and briefly explain why I consider it both feasible and preferable for 
*I would like to thank Hugh Patrick, Larry Meissner and Lawrence 
Chau for their comments on revising my paper for publication . Early 
drafts benefitted from the suggestions of Richard Kosobud, Martin 
Weinstein and Sueo Sekiguchi . They do not agree with all my conclu-
sions . The Japan Economic Research Center has provided significant 
financial support for my work. 
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the future of Japan. 
For at least the last 300 years, Japan has had a few broad 
national goals which have had profound impact on the patterns of life. 
Initiated as policies to deal with specific issues at the time, they 
evolved into abstract concepts with lives of their own . As such, they 
have continued with little consideration of other possibilities even 
after their original purpose has been achieved, until some external 
shock strengthens the internal forces working to discard them . 
Thus, from the mid-17th to mid-19th centuries Japan sought to live 
largely separated from the rest of the world . The threat of western 
imperialism helped shake the country out of its isolation and a new 
desire emerged -- catching up with the advanced western countries . 
Before World War II this meant both economic and military strength . 
Victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1905) suggests the latter had by 
then been achieved . But the military continued to be important and, 
while there was considerable deemphasis of its role and status during 
the 1920s, the shock of the depression helped push Japan back into the 
active, ultimately overriding pursuit of military strength . Only 
defeat in the 1940s eliminated the goal. Since the war, economic 
growth alone has been the target . 
It should be remembered that Japan sought military strength 
initially as a defense against western imperialism, and then itself 
became imperialistic. Variations of option 2 were the international 
norm before World War II . In the peaceful 1920s Japan also cut back 
its military establishment and overt use of option 2 methods . Option 1 
has been the postwar norm and , in entrusting itself to the functioning 
of the market mechanism, Japan has been one of the chief beneficiaries 
of an international environment which has made the option viable . 
Postwar growth was so impressive for so long that sight is sometimes 
lost of its exceptional nature (table l; major indexes of the economy 
are given in tables Al and A2 at the end of the paper) . 
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2 . Prewar Development and Recovery 
In 1868, with the Meiji Restoration, Japan began to establish a 
modern nation . The new government adopted policies calculated to 
enrich and strengthen the country through expansion of military forces 
and promotion of industrial development, so as to avoid subjugation by 
the western imperialist powers . Among the steps taken were the 
establishment of army and navy arsenals in 1877, construction of 
government- operated plants, and promotion of railway and marine trans-
portation. 
Great success resulted , and Japan soon followed the western model 
further . War with China ( 1894- 95) gave Japan Formosa and large 
reparations , which made possible the transition to the gold standard 
and construction of iron foundaries . Confrontation with Russia led to 
the Russo- Japanese War ( 1904-5) . Japan, again victorious , gained 
dominant power in Korea and Kwantung , as well as control of the South 
Manchurian Railway . Establishment of the Manchurian Railway Co . in 
1906 helped develop the area ' s mineral resources for Japan . As an 
example, the railway constructed the Anshan Iron Foundary in 1918 . 
Korea and Formosa, like Japan, have few minerals, but they became 
important sources of foodstuffs -- particularly rice and sugar . 
In Japan proper , apart from gold and silver , the only extensive 
mining was for copper . In the late 19th century Japan was one of the 
world ' s principal copper producers and the metal was an important 
export (table A7) . The industry was able to increase production 
despite pollution problems and an 1884 riot in Ashia over working 
conditions. 
The government- owned Yahata Steel Foundary began production in 
1901, and full - scale operations were achieved in 1905 . Outside of i ron 
and steel , government policy was to encourage private ownership , and in 
the 1880s many copper mines were sold off . While some foreign 
engineers were used, primarily by the government in the 19th century, 
no foreign ownership occurred . 
The First World War pr oved to be advantageous for Japan as the 
most- industrialized country i n Asia . When trade with Europe was 
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curtailed, Japanese exports and domestic import substitution expanded . 
Growth of machinery, chemicals, and metals (including lead and zinc 
smelting as essentially new industries) was especially striking . How-
ever, in the 1920s, in part because European goods were available 
again,- the economy suffered from repeated recessions (in 1920, ' 23, 
and '27) and industrial activity remained at a low ebb . 
During the 1910s and 20s domestic pig iron was only marginally 
competitive, and the large, fully - integrated firms such as Yahata 
faced severe competition from an increasing number of mills making 
steel from imported scrap and pig iron . In the 1920s Japanese copper 
ceased to be competitive as technological innovations such as the 
flotation and reverberatory processes enabled large- scale refining by 
American companies of low grade North American ores . By the end of the 
decade many small smelters had been liquidated and the remaining 
industry was dominated by five firms, three of which were affiliated 
with major zaibatsu . 
Between 1912 and 1928, Japanese exports grew at 6 . 2 percent a 
year. Japan's share of world trade increased from 1 . 8 percent in 1913 
to 3.1 percent in 1925 . 
The depression saw the world divide into blocs . In 1931 the 
United Kingdom left the gold standard and in 1932 tried to organize a 
sterling bloc at the Ottawa Conference . The United States abandoned 
gold in 1933, placing emphasis on rebuilding its domestic economy 
largely in isolation from the rest of the world . Germany formed an 
exchange control zone with Eastern Europe. The international gold 
standard collapsed, hindering trade and transfer of capital. 
Korekiyo Takahashi became Japan's finance minister in 1931 and 
immediately took the country off gold . He tried to reflate the economy 
through government deficit spending , with stress on rural construc-
tion . A devaluation policy caused the yen to fall 43 percent against 
the dollar between 1930 and 1932 . This helped expand exports and thus 
brought protests from other countries. In 1936, Japan accounted for 
3. 6 percent of world trade . 
Weapon procurement -- particularly naval vessels - - aided heavy 
industry, as did penetration of Asian markets for machinery and steel . 
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World crude steel output was halved between 1929 and 1931 , but Japanese 
production fell by less than one- fifth . Nippon Seititsu was formed in 
1934 from government and private steel firms in an attempt to 
rationalize production for increased productivity , and thus also 
export competitiveness . 
Yen devaluation helped restore the domestic copper industry , as 
did munitions orders . For strategic reasons full-scale development of 
lead and zinc mining began in the late 1930s . Led by demand for 
aircraft, aluminum emerged as an important new industry , with sever al 
companies established to produce it using the Bayer process and 
Indonesian bauxite . 
Japan sought to form a bloc and, with the 1931 Manchurian inci-
dent, tightened control of Northeast Asia and its resources . But the 
region lacked oil, bauxite and other minerals needed for a self-
sufficient bloc . For example, attempts- to exploit Manchurian alum and 
aluminous shale failed , and in 1939 Japan obtained only 17 percent of 
iron ore and 1 . 4 percent of other ore imports from the yen bloc . 
Copper , lead and zinc imports all were from outside (Gendaishi Shiryo, 
p. 114) . Even at the height of its prewar power Japan was obtaining 
most of its raw materials through purchases on the world market . 
Such dependency was a reason for looking to China and then 
Southeast Asia as components of what came to be called the Greater East 
Asian Co-prosperity Sphere . A 1940 semi- official report on the sphere 
saw Japan at the center with sophisticated industries such as precision 
machinery . Manchuria was to expand as a mining and processing center, 
utilizing its coal-based electric power capacity, and develop related 
heavy industry . China's role was similar to Manchuria's, though with 
less emphasis on industrialization. Later, when Southeast Asia was 
brought into the concept, it was for Indonesian coal, oil and bauxite, 
Thai tin and tungsten, Malaysian rubber, tin and iron, and Philippine 
copper and iron . 
Western colonial powers dominated the Southeast Asian countries 
Japan looked to for resources . War in Europe again seemed advantageous 
to Japan's position in Asia, and in 1940 troops were stationed in 
Vietnam. The west retaliated, with the United States putting scrap 
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i ron and oil exports to Japan on a quota and in 1941 embargoing oil . 
These actions, and American harassment of Japanese shipping, were 
considered serious threats to the country's well being and helped drive 
Japan further down the road to World War II. 
After war with China began in 1937, mining and the metals indus-
tries came under increasing government control . American attacks on 
Japanese shipping following Pearl Harbor decreased raw material sup-
plies, and by 1943 metal production was declining . 
The Allied Occupation following World War II carried out various 
institutional reforms including recognition of labor unions, dissolu-
tion of zaibatsu, and land reform. These were part of the foundation 
for subsequent rapid economic growth. In 1947 a priority resource 
allocation system was set up to increase steel and coal production and 
eventually put the economy back on the rails to rehabilitation . The 
Dodge Plan, with its large budget surpluses, was adopted in 1949 to end 
inflation, but it also significantly slowed the recovery . 
Another war injected new vitality into the economy . Hostilities 
in Korea expanded domestic and foreign markets rapidly . In 1952 Japan 
regained independence under the San Francisco Treaty. 
It took longer for the nonferrous industry to recover . One reason 
was serious deterioration of the mines. Only high grade ores had been 
extracted during the war and adequate maintenance of the shafts had not 
been conducted because of a shortage of materials. In addition, large 
quantities of copper metal were released from military sources and 
copper could also be recovered from war scrap. Copper ore output in 
1947 was one-third the prewar high . The Korean War swept away the 
metal inventories. Full-scale rationalization of the industry began 
in 1952 with mechanization of mines and new technical considerations 
given to differing smelter treatment of low and high grade ores. 
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3, Rapid Economic Growth (1955-73) 
Loss of the war precluded the second option, and Japan had no 
desire to stagnate . This meant only option 1 was left, and the world 
situati on has made it feasible, since the postwar era had been one of 
relatively free trade . Between 1955 and 1973 Japan's annual growth was 
9 . 8 percent, approximately twice that of world GNE . By 1968 Japan had 
the third largest economy in the world, although in per capita terms 
several countries still are larger . 
Japanese exports also expanded about twice as rapidly as world 
trade , increasing from 4 . 0 percent of the total in 1955 to 6 . 5 percent 
in 1974 on an export basis . Japan became the third largest exporter 
(after the United States and West Germany) in 1970 . 
In the late 1960s , overseas direct investment began to increase as 
Japan sought to deal with a continuous surplus in its balance of 
payments, loss of comparat i ve advantage in many light industries , and a 
desire to secure the large amounts of energy and other resources 
necessary to maintain the economy . The last has not been a nonmili-
taristic return to option 2, as even peaceful control (direct owner-
ship) of mineral sources is only limitedly possible because of 
nationalism in most resource- rich countries, as discussed by Kojima in 
his paper . 
Outstanding overseas di rect investment ( table 2) jumped from 
$143 million in 1958 to $12 , 666 million in 1974 , fourth after the 
United States, United Kingdom and West Germany . Most investment in 
minerals has been in iron and copper , some 12 percent of the total in 
1971 . Offshore processing , almost all for iron and steel mills , is 
less than 5 percent of the cumulat i ve total . 
Rapid export and investment growth has caused friction with other 
countries , with Japan usually agreeing to restri ctions . Thus in 1968 
Japan voluntarily controlled iron and steel exports to the United 
States and in 1972 did the same for textiles . 
Japanese metal product i on has expanded three to fou r times faster 
than world production . By the late 1960s Japan was the largest 
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importer of ores, though not of every specific one . This relates to 
heavy industry growing even faster than the total economy -- as shown 
in the appendix, GNP elasticities for most metals have been much 
greater than one . Increased demand has meant ever larger imports, with 
the few domestic sources becoming less and less important. The 
declining self-sufficiency levels and sources of ore supply are in 
tables A6, A9, Al2, Al5, and Al8 . 
Postwar steel grew up around shipbuilding (see Blumenthal) and 
construction, although autos are now the second largest user after 
construction . Exports are currently about 20 percent of direct out-
put, but since many of the cars and ships are exported , the actual 
production share is much higher . Most of Japan's industrial capacity 
is on coastal soils requiring piling, and pipe for this purpose is a 
major product (about 10 percent of total output) . In 1974 iron and 
steel provided 8 percent of GDP on a value- added basis . (See 
Tables A3-A6) 
The industry has undertaken three rationalization programs . The 
first, begun in 1951, stressed introduction of foreign technology . On 
advice from the American steel industry, strip mills were built even 
though Japanese demand for sheet at the time was limited (principal 
uses are automobiles and other consumer durables). In the last half of 
the 50s, iron foundries were modernized . The third program, in the 
early 60s , sought general productivity increases to improve interna-
tional competitiveness . Several specialty steel makers went bankrupt 
in the mid-60s . 
Large, fully integrated mills with capacities over four million 
tons and using continuous casting were started in the late 60s, 
including Fukuyama (at 16 million tons , the. largest in the world), 
Mizushima, Kimitsu and Kajima . In 1970 , Yahata and Fuji, the result of 
the Occupation ' s breaking up of Nippon Seitetsu, were remerged. Shin 
Nihon Seitetsu is the largest steel company in the world . 
Steel industry programs to deal with pollution accounted for 
about 20 percent of such investment in 1973 . 
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While distances for imported iron ore have become greater 
(table A6) , innovations in marine transportation have reduced delivery 
costs from $5 . 00 a ton in 1965 to $3.70 in 1972. 
The nonferrous metal industry, increasingly reliant on foreign 
ore, has moved from domestic mine sites to coastal areas . (see 
tables A3 and A7-Al8). In the early 60s, partly because of strong 
pressure on Japan to liberalize trade in general, import restrictions 
began to be relaxed : aluminum starting in 1961, copper in 1963, and 
lead and zinc in 1964 . With the exception of titanium sent to the 
United States, the nonferrous industry has not been export- oriented, 
although it has used foreign markets to adjust its inventory levels . 
Copper is one area where overseas investment in ore development 
has occurred about one- fourth in Zaire and a sixth each in Canada 
and Malaysia as of 1975 . Imports of the metal have increased as well, 
from 59 thousand tons in 1960 to 310 thousand in 1973. 
Nickel, as a specialty steel and electrical equipment component, 
has become an important industry . It is now also used in space and 
ocean exploration . 
Government encouragement has helped production of titanium (used 
in the chemical industry since it resists corrosion) , zirconium (also 
corrosion- resistant , and used in nuclear reactors) , beryllium (for 
reactors) , germanium (semiconductors), SCR (high- purity silicon , used 
in electronics) , and tantalum (condensers) . 
The oil crisis was a hard blow to the Japanese economy since 
foreign energy dependency (mostly oil) is very great . The over all 
balance of payments in 1973 was a $13 . 4 billion deficit . In 1974 the 
economy experienced a decline in the GNP for the first time since the 
war, and in 1975 the increase was only 2 . 4 percent . The decline was 
especially marked in plant and equipment investment . Influenced by the 
worldwide recession, 1975 exports remained at the 1974 level and 
overseas direct investment plummeted . 
As the recession became more severe and prolonged, processed 
mineral stocks accumulated . Japan exported substantial amounts of 
electrolytic copper in 1974 , bringing cries of protest from CIPEC. 
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Aluminum smelting, being very energy- intensive, has faced huge cost 
escalation . This poses the question of its continued viability in 
Japan in the face of competition from smelters with access to cheap 
hydroelectric power. 
4. The Future 
Where does Japan go from here? A semi-official view from MIT! 
(The Ministry of International Trade and Industry) has been published 
periodically, each looking about ten years ahead, and the Japan 
Economic Research Center has published two studies in English closely 
paralleling the MIT! ones . The 1975 MIT! report notes higher living 
standards, approaching those in advanced western countries, and that 
some of the negative consequences of past growth have caused Japanese 
to question the desirability of continued rapid growth (pp . 3-4) . 
Partly from these considerations, and primarily from concern over 
resource availability, the report sees a slowing of growth to around 
6 percent between 1970 and 1985 (p.87) . It recommends increased 
investment in housing and social overhead items, even at the expense of 
plant and equipment investment (p . 80) , 
Labor- and resource-intensive industries in which Japan has no 
comparative advantage will be deemphasized in favor of knowledge-
intensi ve industries. Thus , textiles, i ron and steel, and food will 
decline in importance while electronic products and industrial 
machinery will continue to grow. Supply and environmental constraints 
are the reason why metals growth generally is expected to slow. The 
report sees steel exports experiencing an absolute decline in the 1980s 
(p . 98) and the weight of all ores in total imports being reduced from 
its 1974 level of 8 . 6 percent to 5 . 5 percent in 1985 (p . 105) . (Before 
oil prices increased , causing fuel ' s share to double, ores ' weight had 
been over 14 per cent . ) Japan ' s share of world mineral consumption and 
domestic demand for metals will nonetheless increase (table A3). 
Greater geographical dispersion of plants is also advocated both 
within Japan and offshore . Overseas investment will grow over 18 per-
cent a year to 1985 (table 3) . 
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Kojima ' s paper outlines evolution within option 1 during the last 
25 years, from Japan being a marginal buyer to one for whom large new 
mines are developed . MITI ' s vision is a continuation of this , modified 
somewhat by greater offshore processing in facilities increasingly 
Japanese- financed . 
Let us constder some aspects of this pattern. The international 
environment that made option 1 such a success for Japan in the 1950s 
and 1960s is passing . The world is economically tenser and more 
unstable . Pluralism and increased interdependence means that when 
something happens it takes longer and costs more to return to equili-
brium. The Nixon Shock in 1971 and the 1973 Oil Shock raise the 1930s 
specter of bloc economies and trade wars . And also as in the 30s, 
Japan faces strong resistance to any attempts at full control of 
resources -- even by peaceful ownership , let alone by milita~y force . 
Resource exploi ta t i on has become a major issue in North- South 
relations . Increasi ngly resource- rich less-developed countries look 
to their minerals and other raw materials for t heir own development --
as both the basis for industrialization and a source of foreign 
exchange to finance it . Japan ' s ever- rising share of natural resource 
supplies thus faces a much higher risk of disruption , in terms of both 
pricing and physical availability . After the Nixon and Oil Shocks , and 
with Club -of-Rome -type studies circulating, physical limits were taken 
very seriously , stimulating a good deal of discussion on "The Condi-
tions to Overcome Zero Growth ," as one book was titled . The author, 
Osamu Shi momura, became famo us for being one of the very few in the 
early 50s to predict Japan ' s subsequent growth . With the possible 
exception of oil/energy/supplies, and then only as short- run disrup-
tions , I do not expect resources to be completely unavailable , nor do I 
even see pricing posing insurmountable difficulties . But the possi-
bilities and increased uncertainties mean Japan ' s economic underp i n-
nings are less stable than they have been . 
Japan runs trade deficits with a number of its resource suppliers, 
particularly the oil producers . To pay for raw materials Japan exports 
finished goods , running surpluses with quite a few customers . If 
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bilateral balancing is sought by very many of them , Japan ' s position 
becomes very diffi cult . The impact of Japanese trade on specific 
countri es has been an ongoing issue for some time , but with both the 
impact and protectionism greater than in the 1950s and 60s , Japan is 
much less secure . 
For a variety of reasons , slowing of Japanese growth is generally 
acknowledged , but the absolute increments will still be large -- today 
a 6- percent growth rate yields a larger absolute increase than the 
11- percent rate of the mid- 60s . Pollution and other negative aspects 
of past growth will remain serious problems . 
Crowding in urban areas, worker alienation and other social woes, 
while not inherent results of growth , are nonetheless popularly viewed 
as problems of it . By the early 1970s the desirability of continuing 
rapid growth policies was openly questioned in books such as Kutabare 
GNP Damn GNP, published by the prestigious Asahi newspaper) . 
Japan is a country in which almost everyone (90 percent in a 1969 
government survey (EPA 1970 , pp . 5- 6)) feels -- and in fact is --
middle class . Indeed, in 1970 the government reported a dissolution of 
poverty was underway (EPA 1970, pp . 192- 93) . But with affluence has 
come a "new poverty" (atarashii hinkon) noted by, among others , 
Chubachi and Taira ( p . 4 34) • "Despite their high level of living 
(seikatsu suijun) , the affluent of today's povertyless Japan claim 
they are worse off than before relat i ve to the standard of life 
(seikatsu hyojun) their productivity should bring about . " Fulfillment , 
stability , and equilibrium have become the most common answer s to 
public opinion surveys asking questions such as , "What is important as 
a social target for Japan?" Growth, development, and expansion, which 
overwhelmingly dominated such polls in the ·1960s are now among the 
least common responses, although affluence has held its ground . Japan 
is a very materialistic society, but is not entirely comfortable as 
such . 
There are two broad approaches to measuring the happi ness of life . 
In the first , favored by the growth believer , happiness is indicated 
mainly by the absolute level of consumption (quantity of life) . The 
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growth believer thinks material progress i s good and its continuation 
is desirable . In the second, favored by the nongrowth believer, 
happiness is measured by the "quality of life." The nongrowth believer 
thinks composure, calmness and creative work are desirable, while 
intensified human relations, monotonous work and destruction of natur e 
is undesirable . Japanese have been growth believers for the past 
century, but the Buddhist and Shinto traditions are more steady state 
and austere . So, for Japanese, the change from higher to lower growth 
is not so much to enter a new era but to return to old tastes . Japan 
seems to be in a transition phase again, internally disillusioned with 
the concept of rapid growth, and shocked by external events into 
concern over its feasibility . 
Japan is moving toward zero population growth (table 4) . I think 
at the same time it can and should move toward zero economic growth --
2 to 4 percent for 1985- 2000 and 0 to 2 percent in the 21st century . 
This is not the place for an extended discussion of steady- state 
economics (see Daly and Landsberg). For Japan, there can be a cutting 
back of demand for resources, at least relative to world demand, 
through greater recycling and less waste . Anyone who rides Japanese 
trains or hikes knows the potential for recovery of glass, paper and 
metal is significant . Less dependent, Japanese will be more secure, 
and the resources will be released to other countries for their 
industrialization . 
The EPA estimates that a 20- percent increase i n current metal 
recovery rates will reduce demand 17 percent for the ferrous and 
23 percent for the nonferrous metal industries (Nihon Keizai , p . 24) . 
American calculations suggest energy used to recycle steel is 70 per-
cent less than for new steel, with air pollution cut by 85 percent and 
water pollution by 75 percent (Nihon Keizai) . 
Unemployment is frequently cited as a problem in low- growth 
economies . In the worst case, labor demand will decline because of 
labor- saving technological change , but this depends on relati ve 
prices . On the supply side , the working- age population, its participa-
tion rate, the number of hours worked , and quality are all factor s. 
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Quality is likely to continue to improve , but the movement toward zero 
population growth will stabilize the number of potential workers . 
Lower participation rates (e . g . from people staying in school longer) 
and shorter working hours (through job sharing) can reduce actual labor 
supplied without necessarily creating unemployment . 
The possibility of less social mobility is also not a problem for 
a steady-state Japan. Artists and craftsmen have a long tradition of 
being respected (ranking ahead of merchants during the Tokugawa 
period) . Money, after all, is not the only source (or indicator) of 
status . A steady- state economy does not mean living standards will be 
frozen . They have reached a sufficiently high level that slower growth 
of the material aspects are, I feel, quite tolerable as long as other 
issues are being addressed . 
One of these is worker alienation . To say Japanese are more loyal 
and committed to their employers than workers elsewhere is not to say 
they are happy. This problem must be dealt with regardless of which 
option Japan chooses. I think the simple release of tension from 
deemphasizing growth will help solve it, and more of the time and 
talent spent spurring growth can be applied to the problem. In this 
regard I see the emergence of a more handicraft- oriented production 
system. By this I mean the worker being more a human being creating 
something than an appendage of a mass-production machine . 
I think movement to nongrowth in Japan is feasible -- dealing with 
its problems will be no more difficult than dealing with those of 
continued growth . I also feel it is desirable both for other advanced 
countries and Japan, since solving the problems of nongrowth goes a 
long way in dealing with fundamental problems of human happiness that 
have been ignored for too long in the world of more is better . 
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FOOTNOTES 
1copper is used in the electric power and machinery industries , as 
well as communications, construction and metal products . Lead's main 
usages are for storage batteries, cables and inorganic chemicals with a 
variety of applications . Zinc is alloyed in steels, and used in dies 
and with copper sheet. Aluminum has substituted for steel, iron and 
copper in construction, electrical and metal product applications. 
Within this broad overview the weight of each use has of course changed 
in the course of development . 
Arisawa, Hiromi (ed . ) . 
bun . 1965. 
331 
REFERENCES 
Nihon Sangyo 100-nen Shi . Nikkei Shim-
Blumenthal, Tuvia . "The Japanese Shipbuilding Industry." In Japanese 
Industrialization and its Social Consequences edited by Hugh 
Patrick with Larry Meissner, University of California Press . 
1976 . 
Chubachi, Masayoshi and Koji Taira . "Poverty in Modern Japan ." In 
Japanese Industrialization and its Social Consequences edited by 
Hugh Patrick with Larry Meissner. University of California 
Press . 1976 . 
Daly, Herman E. (ed . ) . Toward a Steady-State Economy . Freeman . 1973. 
EPA (Keizai Kikakucho) . Keizai Hakusho . 1970. 
Fried, Edward R. and Philip H. Trezise . Japan ' s Future Position in the 
World Economy. Brookings Institution . 1974 . 
Gendaishi Shiryo . Kokka Sodoin, Vol . 1 . Misuzu . 1974 . 
Japan Economic Research Center (Nihon Keizai Kenkyu Senta) . The 
Structure of a Three-Trillion Dollar Economy The Japanese 
Economy in 1985 . February 1974 . 
Kaiji Sangyo Kenkyujyo . Kaigai Shigen to Kaijyo Yuso ni Kansuru Cllosa 
Kenkyu . 1977. 
Kaneko, Takanosuke . Nanpo Shigen to Nihon Keizai . 1942 . 
Kenmochi, Michio . Nihon Tekkogyo no Hatten . Toyo Keizai . 1964 . 
Kawasaki , Tsutomu . Nihon Tekkoron . 1976 . 
Kikakuin Kenkyukai . Daitoa Kensetsu no Kihon Koryo . 1943 . 
Kokudocho. 21-Seiki no Hito to Kokudo. 1977 . 
Landsberg, Hans H. et al . The No- growth Society . Norton . 1974 . 
LTES (Long- Term Economic Statistics of Japan) seri es edited by Kazushi 
Ohkawa, Miyohei Shinohara and Mataji Umemura, Vol . 10, Manufac-
turing, by Miyohei Shinohara et al . 
332 
MITI (Tsusho Sangyo Sho) . History of the Mining Trends of Japan for 
1905-60. 1964 . 
Sangyo Kozo no Choki Bijyon . 1975 . 
Wa ga Kuni Kigyo no Kaigai Jigyo Katsuda. 1976 . 
Hitetsu Kinzoku Kogyo no Gaiyo . 
Shigen Tokei Nempo. 
Tekko Tokei Nempo. 
Mitsubishi Kenkyujo . Shin Kyokumen o Mukaeru Shigen Mondai to Wa ga 
Kuni no Taio . 1975. 
Mitsui Shoji . Ichiji Sanpin Mondai. 1976. 
Nakamura, Takaharu . Senzenki Nihon Keizai Seicho no Jyoken . Iwanami . 
1971. 
Nakamura, Takahide. Sengo Nihon Keizai . Chikuma . 1968 . 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun (ed.). Shigen Resaikuring. 1975 . 
Novic, David . A World of Scarcities. Associated Business Programs . 
1976 . 
Ohkawa, Kazushi and Henry Rosovsky . Japanese Economic Growth. Stan-
ford University Press . 1973 . 
Ohkawa, Kazushi and Miyohei Shinohara with Larry Meissner (eds . ) . 
Patterns of Japanese Economic Development . Yale University 
Press. 1978 . 
Okita, Saburo. "Natural Resource Dependency and Japanese Foreign 
Policy . " Foreign Affairs . July 1974 . 
Seikai Keizai Kenkyu Kyokai . Seikai Keizai to Nihon Keizai. 
Shin Nihon Seitetsu . Sekai no Chuki Tekko Mitoshi . 1977 . 
Sorifu. Nihon Tokei Nempo . 
Tekko Renmei . Tokei Kara Mita Nihon Tekko yo no 100- nen . 1973 . 
Toyo Keizai . Bukka Soran . 
Showa Sangyoshi. 1950 . 
U.S . Strategic Bombing Survey . The Effects of Strategic Bombing .2.!2 
Japanese War Economy . 1946 . 
333 
Weinstein, Martin E. "Three Options of the Japanese Foreign Policy" 
(in Japanese) ; Sekai Shuho . November 12 , 1974 . 
Yanai, Katsumi (ed . ) . Sekai Keizai Ron . Todai Shuppan Kai . 1965 . 
Yanai , Katsumi and Akihiko Ishizaki . Gendai Sekai Keizairon . Todai 
Shuppankai . 1973 . 
1904-11 
1. 94 
1955-62. 
9.10 
Table l 
1911-19 
4.33 
1962-69 
10.76 
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GNE Growth 
1919-30 
1. 92 
1955- 73 
9.79 
1930-38 
4.90 
1904- 38 
3 . 18 
Compund annual growth in real GNE; bridge calculations between 
years shown, which, prewar, are swing turning points in Ohkawa 
and Rosovsky. Data from Ohkawa and Shinohara. 
TABLE 2 SEE NEXT SHEET 
Table 3 Overseas Investment 1973 and 1985 
Percentages in : 
Mineral Smelting 
total a Resources Refining 
1 9 7 3 10.3 29.8 4 . 7 
l 9 5 80.7 33 . 8 10.4b 
a total outstanding in billions of US dollars. 
b about 55% in ferrous metals, 37% in aluminum . 
Source : MITI 1975, P.306 
Table 4 Japanese Population 
Year 
Population 
1975 
111. 9 
Source: Kokudocho . 
2000 2025 
136 .7 145.2 
(in millions) 
2050 2075 
148 . 0 149 . 0 
and 
2100 
149 . 3 
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Table 2 Outstanding Overseas Direct Investment 
(millions of GS dollars) 
Total Minerals and Fuels a Minerals b Iron 
1951 10 JO lit 19 lJ 
S9 ns u HI 21 15 
50 299 96 lO\ 26 19 
61 (5( Ul "' 41 19 
u 5SJ 225 41\ u 20 
n 619 250 J7\ n l~ 
64 ,., 271 JI\ 52 20 
"' !56 J05 Jll ., 20 
" l.lBJ J77 J2\ 108 Jl 
67 1,.f5l 06 lOI 136 60 
" :z. 015 594 29' 21' n 
" 2. 69) 9!2 33\ (29 154 
10 l,S95 1.121 JI\ ,., 211 
7l 4,02 1.He )01 590 211 
12 6, 71J :Z,27J JI\ - -
7J 10, 210 2,7114 27\ - -
74 12,6&G J;-527 291 - -
Sources: MITI 1976 and Sekai Keizai 
a Resource sector 
Copper 
' 
' 
I 
22 
24 
27 
l2 
Cl 
'" 
70 
152 
229 
JOS 
Jl8 
-. 
. 
Lead & 
Zinc 
0 
0 
0 
0 
• 
0 
0 
( 
1 
1 
1 
15 
15 
1' 
-
-
-
B . Mineral 
au.xi. te Processi."lgc 
0 ( J\ 
0 a .. 
0 10 " • JI 91 
• JI 71 -• (! ., 
0 57 71 
1 n .. 
. ' 51 .. 
' 97 " 
' 91 H 
JI 12• Sl 
JI Ill " 
38 180 0 
- 210 " . 48' 51 
- 635 51 
b Resource sector; component of minerals and fuels, and sum of the 
four columns of specific metals. 
c Manufacturing sector 
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Table Al Major Indexes of the Japanese Economy 
Prewar (1934-36 constant prices; billion yen) 
GNE Imports Exports Population 
a 
1904 7.14 0 . 64 0.38 na 
19ll 8.17 0 . 76 0 . 57 50 
1919 ll .4 7 1. 61 o.97 55 
1930 14.14 2 . 43 1. 60 64.5 
1938 20.73 3.29 3 . 30 71. 0 
Postwar (1970 prices; trillion yen) 
1955 16.9 0.9 1.1 89.3b 
1962 31.1 2.4 2.5 95.2b 
1969 63 . 6 6 . 2 7.2 102.Sb 
1975 91. 8 10.7 14 . 1 lll.9 
a in millions 
b excludes Okinawa 
Sources: (prewar) GNE: Ohkawa, trade: Yamazawa and Yamamoto, 
both in Ohkawa and Shinohara 1978; (population and postwar) 
Sorifu . 
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Table A2 Ferrous and Nonferrous Metal Production 
Prewar Postwar 
(1934 - 36 prices, 
million yen) 1970 = 100 
Iron & Steel Nonferrous ~tal Iron & Steel Nonferrous ~tal 
Production Production Production Production 
1910 40 50 1955 10. 2 12.5 
11 50 70 56 12. 4 15. 0 
12 60 60 57 14. 4 16. 7 
13 70 70 58 13 . 6 17 .1 
14 80 80 59 18 .1 22 . 3 
15 90 150 60 23 . 8 29 . 6 
16 100 250 61 30 . l 35 . 4 
17 130 300 62 30 . 0 34 . 7 
18 150 350 63 33.9 39 . 6 
19 120 400 64 42 .1 48 . 6 
20 200 230 65 43 . 3 48 . 3 
21 170 260 66 50.1 54 . 4 
22 190 320 67 64 . 8 65 . 6 
23 210 250 68 72 . 6 79 . 2 
24 280 240 69 87 . 6 92.3 
25 380 230 70 100. 0 100. 0 
26 450 220 71 96 . 8 102.0 
27 440 290 72 104 . 7 115. 5 
28 480 230 73 129.4 140. 1 
29 660 280 74 128.3 121.4 
30 620 340 
31 590 390 
32 860 390 
33 880 410 
34 1220 360 
35 1540 430 
36 1730 450 
37 1640 550 
38 1960 790 
39 2410 800 
40 2490 560 
Sources: (prewar) LTES vol. 10, (postwar) Sorifu 
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Table A4 
Japanese Supply and 
Demand for Iron and Steel 
(thousand tons) 
Jron Ore 
Jrnport r.~port OOITIC'ntlc' r·ro<liicTIOn-Tii\j10 rt 
Or.ftl,,ncl 
l - 255 n 109 
s - 291 G4 125 
10 - HO 69 199 
9 1 109 71 200 
9 0 02 90 299 
l - 511 91 309 
1 2 571 101 200 
2 6 711 139 297 
9 9 814 200 lGl 
12 16 009 211 621 
4 9 906 190 662 
J 4 8ll 97 57" 
15 4 919 78 81'9 
19 4 974 llJ 093 
10 5 1,105 75 l,065 
11 5 1,106 00 1,104 
H 2 1,538 lJO 79) 
09 2 1,771 159 9l1 
90 J 1,991 150 l,234 
l&G ) 2, 457 170 1,945 
70 4 2, lSS 246 1,974 
26 - 1,909 208 1,550 
26 - 2,424 227 1,402 
105 - 3,lOl 321 1,524 
82 - l,92G 412 2,112 
274 - 4,970 516 l,404 
242 - 5, 465 G20 l,780 
4H - 6,215 602 J,011 
)00 - '· 712 771 2,00 
214 - 6,910 9)6 4,548 
291 - 1,147 1,121 4,690 
l>omci;tl~S 
rrlcc 
O< 
OG 
92 
9G 
90 
H7 
260 
419 
439 
383 
223 
177 
ll9 
156 
ll9 
110 
112 
107 
114 
101 
09 
70 
57 
10) 
101 
97 
102 
172 
107 
197 
187 
'trttr 
1955 
5G 
57 
so 
59 
60 
61 
&2 
6l 
64 
65 
u 
67 
60 
6!I 
10 
71 
12 
7J 
74 
75 
85 
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Table A4 (continued) 
Japanese Supply and 
Demand for Iron and Steel 
(thousand tons) 
_!';(\lllc_sttc.• 
Product ion · Import Export. IJotncntlo 
DOt.l.ln(1 
9,409 - 367 9 1 OH 
.;J..__ 
11, lOG 29 2J9 10,119g 
12,570 2G7 62 12,7H 
12,119 - 71 12,047 
lG,629 ·1 12 l61Gl9 
22,130 4 • 22,iH 
29,260 127 J 20,392 
21, 546 116 Jl 27, 631 
31,501 4 57 Jl,449 
39,799 1 59 39, 141 
41,161 2 459 40, 704 
47,794 4 164 41,6~4 
62,154 20J Sl 62,306 
66,991 97 so GG,940 
82 ,HG 105 354 01,917 
93,322 80 4GO 92,934 
88,557 29 1,092 97,494 
96,900 64 296 96,67A 
119,JU 132 70) 118,671 
117,Ul lJJ 631 116,6JJ 
102,Jll 70 1,892 100,0l 
.173-178 million of tons 
lron_U.r_e!_ 
rroductlon 6· Impo rt 
l,OSJ S,193 
951 6,572 
975 7,50 
1,255 7,546 
1,Ho IO, JOO 
1,161 13,JS7 
1,lH 10. 6 44 
1,252 21,711 
l,26J 24,610 
1, 211 29,552 
1,257 35,lOJ 
l ,JlG 40,092 
l,J20 49,J9'0 
1,060 55,791 
1,024 69,960 
791 OJ,OBB 
927 92,441 
950 9J,940 
711 114 ,655 
499 116,736 
561 113,271 
a implicit deflator for ferrous metal industry 
b excludes pellets and f erromanganese 
Sources: Tekko Rcnmci; MITI 1975 and Tekko; 
Toyo Keizai , Bukka; LTES vol . 10. 
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Table AS Steel Elasticities 
1912-38 
R2 = 0.958 
ln- s = -21. l + 3.01 lnY - 0 .9 1 ln(Ps/Py) 
(-15 . 3) (20.7) (-1. 2) o.w. = 0 . 63 
1955-73 
R2 = 0 . 983 
ln S = 5.87 + l.30 lnY - 0 . 37 ln(Ps/Py) 
(6 .3 ) (5 . 3) (-0 . 9) o.w . = o. 63 
S = crude steel production Y = real GNE 
Ps = price of crude steel Py = GNE deflater 
see table Al? for cross elasticity with aluminum 
Table A6 Iron Ore Sources 
(percentef l 
1910 1915 1920 1925 l928a 1930 1935 1940 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1985a 
26 27 21 7 NA 11 13 19 17 8 3 l o.s 
46 
18 
51 25 19 15 
24 16 
19 
21 
40 
9 13 43 20 
a percentage of ~rts 
Japan 
Australia 
Brazil 
India 
Malaysia 
Chi lie 
Philippines 
China 
Others b 
b includes shares of 11ilITEd countries if not one of the three largest foreign 
suppliers 
Sources: (prewar) Toyo Y.eizai: Nihon Boeki Seiran, 1935; ([Xlstwar) Tsusho-
sangyosho: Tckko Tokei Nerrµi and Siuc;cn '!'ckei Nerrtx:J, 1976 editions; 
(1985) MITI 1975. 
Yt.:in 
-
I'; o -
ll 
11 
lJ 
--·---
14 
---
15 
H 
17 
I e 
)9 
10 
---
11 
n 
---
l :: J 
' f 
74 ) 
I 
' 2S I 26 
t 
27 l 
29 
1 21 j 
JO 
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31 
J2 
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H 
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)6 
,___ 
J7 --
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-
H 
40 
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342 
Table A7 
Japanese Supply and 
Demand for Copper 
(thousand tons) 
I -
rrorfocllon'-v ll'lport r.~ror·t: 
H.J o. s H.9 
5J.4 0.1 H.9 
62. 4 0.2 39. l 
66.5 0.4 42. 7 
70, s 0. 2 45, 9 
7 s. ( 0. 4 so.s 
loo. 6 J.l G 2. 6 
lOB.O S.6 7S.9 
-
?O.J 0.9 41. J 
7S,4 27.9 24.) 
67.0 2], 0 11. 2 
55.0 ll. 2 -
54. l 23. 4 1. G 
s~.1 6,2 l. 9 
6J. l 7.1 2.7 
G6. S 4. J -
6 7. 4 16. 5 2.5 
GG.G ll.2 2.0 
68.2 20.5 J,0 
75.5 B.5 9.) 
79.0 2.5 Jl. 2 
1s.e 2.0 26. G 
71. 9 2.0 23.1 
69.0 17. 6 8.5 
6'1. 6 51. 4 12.6 
69.6 69.2 11. e 
67.S 53.4 i2.4 
67.) l OS. 1 12.7 
6B.O 104.7 6.9 
70.2 117. 2 -
'1.9 145.4 -
Oom<'•tlc l!omcf.CTC-•:; 
l1rm.rntl l'rlco 
13.' -
19.2 -
21.S 6'78 
24. 2 6H 
24.9 554 
17.3 G9l 
41. l l,OS6 
34. 0 1,1 02 
0.9 l ,OJJ 
92.0 960 
79.6 699 
G0.2 576 
75.9 639 
63,6 719 
' 
OJO I 67,5 I 
70. 9 SGS I 
91.~ 001 ! 
77.0 750 
GS,7 847 
75.7 962 
48.) 719 
51. 2 514 
so.o 6JJ 
78,1 765 
100. 4 719 
120.0 758 
109.5 977 
160.J 1,400 
HS,9 1,909 
107.4 1,106 
213.3 -
i 
I 
I 
Y~l1r rroductlon 
l.955 107 
56 109 
57 108 
50 U1 
59 129, 
60 152 
61 169 
---
62 150 
GJ HU 
64 179 
65 196 
6G 207 
67 1n1 
69 lOG 
69 2Jl 
70 216 
71 219 
7~ no 
13 241 
74 209 
75 167 
OS JOO 
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Table A7 (continued) 
Japanese Supply and 
Demand for Copper 
(thousand tons) 
l>omaotle 
J;i>port t:11port bc,.111nl 
G lG 101 
40 4 142 
19 2 lG7 
0 2 1J9 
90 1 '16 
-
155 2 )02 
212 1 371 
-
157 2 299 
201 1 359 
2YO 2 .j59 
20 J 4J() 
279 1 405 
H2 1 617 
519 u 692 
590 15 79!) 
654 47 024 
6J9 11 010 
16J 25 967 
1,024 24 1,205 
1,018 279 817 
820 22 838 
1,550 0 1,060 
a production from domestic scrap 
b yen per ton 
c 1970=100 
llomc!Jt le \:A lnvantory 
l'rlco !lot. Jr\crenco 
Gl - 4 
74 2 
59 l9 
51 - G 
56 - 9 
so l 
54 7 
54 G 
51 - 9 
54 - 1 
G4 2 
87 0 
80 5 
8J 5 
100 15 
100 - l 
75 17 
60 -9 
97 JG 
119 70 
75 127 
0 
Sources: MITI 1964, 1975 and Shigen; Toyo Keizai, 
Bukka; Nihon Ginko 
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Table AS Copper Elasticities 
1912-38 
R2 o. 798 
ln C = -12.37 + l.80lnY - 0.25 ln(Pc/Py) 
(-6 . 9) (9.8) (-1.7) D. W. = l.10 
R2 = 0 . 959 
1955-73 
ln C = l.31 + 1.28 lnY - 0 . 12 ln(Pc/Py) 
(4 . 7) (16.2) (-0 . 6) o.w. = l. 25 
C = domestic copper demand Y = real GNE 
Pc = copper price Py = GNE deflater 
see table Al7 for cross-elasticity with aluminum. 
Table A9 Copper Ore Sources 
1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1985a 
99 100 75 94 97 51 32 95 50 42 20 17 16 Japan 
19 26 Canada 
3 21 23 Philippines 
ll Bisrrark Isl. 
4 Australia 
l Fonrosa 
l 14 23 Othersb 
Sources: See Table A6 
a. estimate 
b. see note b Table A6 
\'c:nr l'rodllc t lot• 
191 0 
i -I 
11 -
12 -
1l -
14 -
15 -
lG -
17 -
~ -
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Table AlO 
Japanese Supply and 
Demand for Lead 
(thousand tons) 
l"'porl~ Export 
ll. 7 -
H.7 -
10.2 -
vomc•lic 
Dcm~n<l 
11.1 
H.1 
19.2 
-
15. 7 - 15.7 
H.l - lC.1 
15.7 - 15.7 
21. g - 21 . B 
16.'.5 - 16,5 
~ -· 3G.O 
Oot.\(!!ftlcc""' 
r~lcf! 
-
-
171 
l 9S 
200 
245 
390 
396 
430 ili J6.o 
__ l? !---------JG.) 36.3 266 
21. ~ 21.4 JG6 
J 9. 6 39.6 2Jl 
H.6 H.G ,240 
:n 4Ca H,0 262 
44.2 44.2 )Bl 
is 4,0 40., - H.9 07 
26 
I 
3.9 55.l - 59.0 346 
i1 C2 56.0 - 60.2 269 
---;;-j 3.4 62. 6 0.6 GS.4 235 
29 2.9 61. 0 0.6 63.J 2s1 
JO l. a SG.2 O.G sa.4 195 
Jl 4. a SJ . 9 o.s SB.2 HO 
32 S.3 ~&.o 0.5 60.8 172 
JJ 6.2 67.J 0.9 12. 7 20} 
)( 6.1 95.l 2.1 99.l 20G 
I 
[ 
~ JS 7.7 91. ~ l. 9 97.2 250 
~ 
' )6 9.2 97.B l.J 101.7 311 ~ 
I H 10.0 H.7 2 , 0 106.7 !>SO 
l l 9 I ___ lo.4 Go.7 l. 9 69 .. 2 7UO 
l :; 1 l l. 0 101. 0 1.4 111. 6 370 ! 
I (0 ---- 14. 5 91.l 1.1 105.5 -
l 
! 
! 
i 
I 
I 
--
Ycnr 
·-
1955 
SG 
57 
58 
59 
60 
H 
! &l 
I 
161 
! 
64 
65 
66 
67 
! 
GO 
69 
10 
71 
72 
I 
7l 
74 
75 
I res-
rroducllon 
27.S 
37.l 
)6.0 
32.8 
o.i: 
40.9 
~l.9 
57,5 
64.4 
76.4 
ll.4 
94.4 
02,9 
02.7 
I 
9),2 
H.4 
102,9 
99.11 
99,5 
90.7 
95,) 
120 
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Table AlO (continued) 
Japanese Supply and 
Demand for Lead 
(thousand tons) 
l>omc9Hc 
Import: l:11port: n<?ru,11u1 
1).7 0.1 ~0.5 
27.2 0.1 65.5 
so.2 0 lll.9 
12.1 0 50,5 
22.0 0 71. 4 
-
40,0 0 95.) 
H.O 0 12l. l 
50.8 - 11l.0 
57 .1 - 12), 6 
95.1 - 162.6 
7J.9 4.9 146.6 
57.2 .... JO,O 
05.2 - 160.9 
9).5 - 179.4 
110. e - 105.5 
115. 4 J,2 206,7 
115. 0 2.0 207,.1 
127. 7 5.l 225.4 
107.1 J.o 290,7 
1G6.0 28.0 209.9 
114. 7 25.5 202.0 
260 0 390 
See Table A7 for notes and sources. 
60,,,c!lt le.-. -lici ·inventory 
rrlr.o Jncrc~no 
106 0,, 
115 ~ l.l 
112 12.3 
92 - 5.6 
97 - 5,0 
DO l.~ 
19 4.4 
71 - 4.7 
69 - 2.1 
05 0.9 
too ~ 4.2 
09 - r.;, '(. '. 4 
79 7,2 
70 - 2.2 
90 8.5 
100 - 0.1 
95 9.4 
05 - l.l 
100 2,, 
151 19.8 I 
115 - 17.5 ! 
I 
0 
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Table All Lead Elasticities 
1912:-38 
R2 = 
ln L = -14.82 + 2.01 lnY - 0.36 ln(PL/Py) 
(-11.l) (14.3) (-3 . 6) D.W. 
R2 = 
1955-73 
ln L ~ 2.13 + 0.75 lnY - 0.32 ln(PL/Py) 
(3 .0) (4.1) (-1.6) o.w. 
L = domestic lead demand Y = real GNE 
PL = lead price Py = GNE def later 
Table Al2 Lead Ore Sources 
1920 1925 1928a 1930 1935 1940 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 l985b 
0 9 5 8 14 
48 
41 
11 
67 50 50 
ll 8 
14 26 
7 9 
l 7 
45 45 
36 
13 
6 
32 
0 . 899 
= l. 63 
0.909 
= l. 78 
Japan 
Canada 
Peru 
Australia 
Bolivia 
USA 
Othersc 
No significant anounts of lead were mined in Japan before the 1920s. 
Source: See Table A6 
a percentage of imports 
b estimate 
c see note b Table A6 
I T~.1r-
i 1910 
i 11 
' 
I 12 
! 1l 
I lC 
§E 
'-· 19 
I 20 
I 
21 
22 
2) 
H 
l-2:_ 
I 25 
27 
28 
R,- -0 ----
l1 
n 
Jl 
J4 
JS 
H 
17 
)9 
39 
-~:_L_ 
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Table Al3 
Japanese Supply and 
Demand for Aluminum 
(thousand tons) 
rroJuctlon Import. Expox-t 
- o. 5 ~ 
- o.4 -
- 1. 0 -
- 0.1 -
- o.s -
- o.s -
- O.B -
- 1. 0 -
- o.9 -
- 1. s -
- 2.0 -
1. B 
~.o 
3.7 
4.1 
4.7 
7.5 
6.0 
!I. 3 
12.) 
11. 7 
5.2 
0.) 
7.2 
10. ~. 
ll. 4 
10.2 
11. 4 
23,B 
- - - ·-· -··· -.___ ___ 
Oo1ncatlc l>cmcstic 
I Oemnnd rrlco 
- - I 
- -
- 605 
- 719 
- 013 
- 069 
- 2,703 
- 2,1107 
- 1,00B 
- 1,654 
- 1, 47( 
1,012 
790 
040 
l,001 
1,250 
1,169 
1,029 
1,002 
927 
BO 
635 
!IH 
1,414 
l,23G 
1, HO 
1,292 
1,05 
1, 710 
Yr::!nr 
19S5 
56 
'1 
5~ 
59 
60 
Gl 
G2 
6) 
64 
65 
66 
G7 
69 
69 
70 
71 
72 
7J 
74 
75 
95 
Proauctlon 
-
-
-.. 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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Table Al3 (continued) 
Japanese Supply and 
Demand for Aluminum 
(thousand tons) 
Donmstlo 
Import Export tl~m~ntl 
57.5 24.l J),. 
60 ,6 9,4 59,2 
77,5 4.6 12.9 
95.l 10.9 74~3 
115. 5 ?.4 107.6 
162. l o.~ 1Sl.1 
l 02. 6 0 104.l 
107. 9 S.5 174,7 
239.l 14. l 2H.9 
202 .9 19.2 26 l. l 
314 .o 29.1 274.S 
360.3 H.7 378 .1 
5:12.6 1. 9 496. 0 
621.1 1.3 f;22.li 
on. o 3.0 921.G 
965.5 2.7 90, l 
1,096.9 20.0 909. 5 
l,Jo2.s 5.1 1,290.5 
1,525.l 0 l,SU.8 
-
1,542.7 30,0 l,J 0& .4 
1,352.l 17.4 1,102.4 
3,100 0 l,100 
IJomc~tic 
Pd co 
94 
95 
102 
101 
99 
9? 
97 
96 
96 
91 
91 
91 
93 
94 
99 
100 
96 
91 
95 
136 
lU 
See Table A7 for notes and sources . 
-:i:1~~~;~~~~ \ 
1 - i 
- i l -
-
-
-
~ 1.5 
7.7 
O,J 1 I 
2.6 1 
10,4 I 
-16.5 I 
23.9 
_3,0 
ll. 2 
H.7 
89.4 
6.9 
...- 21. 7 
206,3 
172.l 
0 
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Table Al4 Zinc Elasticities 
1912-38 
R2 = 0 . 850 
on Z = -16.03 + 2 . 09 lnY - 0.0064 ln(Pz/Py) 
(-9.4) (11 . 9) (-0 . 053) o.w. = l. 24 
1955-73 
R2 = 0 . 993 
ln Z = 2.47 + 0.94 lnY - 0 . 53 ln(Pz/Py) 
(8.9) (14 . 0) (-4 . 2) D .W. = l. 95 
Z = domestic zinc demand Y = real GNE 
Pz = zinc price Py = GNE deflator 
Table Al5 Zinc Ore Sources 
I 
1915 1920 1925 l928a 1930 1935 1940 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1985~ 
72 67 38 47 43 72 99 74 62 44 45 
33 
27 
6 
Sources: See Table A6 
a percentage of imports 
b est·imate 
c see note b Table A6 
0.5 
0.5 
21 18 
3 
5 
10 
8 
10 
24 Japan 
Canada 
Peru 
Australia 
M=xl.co 
Irrlia 
USA 
Othersc 
r~ 1910 
I=* J ~ 1-1~ 
1~ u 
n 
1-~ t--1, 
lo 
21 
22 
1' 
24 
25 
I 26 
21 
a 
2' 
)0 
31 
u 
)J 
34 
H 
-· 
lG 
J1 
·-
H 
H 
-
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Table Al6 
Japanese Supply and 
Demand for Zinc 
(thousand tons) 
rrotlucUol\ ltnport l:l<f'OJ:t 
- 5.R -
- 7.1 -
- 9.4 -
- 1 J. !I -
5., II. 2 -
~1.1 n.2 -
J9.0 5,9 :n.2 
54.7 '·' H.9 
39. 9 4. !; 11.0 
19,9 21.1 5.7 
B.7 1.1 o.:z 
10.4 21.' . -
12. 5 H.9 1.1 
l J. g H.5 -
1<.1 J2.J -
17.0 21. 9 -
27 .o 40. 4 -
17 .5 Jl.' -
1'.1 41.2 -
21.1 JJ. J -
2L7 21,4 -
H.4 24.!: -
21.0 H,!: -
J0.7 )2. !I -
)1 , t Jl.l -
J4, 2 45. g -
".1 61. 8 -
0 . 2 o.o -
5&.l H.1 -
51,C io.a -
~o I n . 1 24,l -. - -·· ·-·- ·---------
VO!llon tio lloll'cnHc 
IJc,.~ntl rrko 
'·" -
7.1 --
'·' Jl l 
13.!I 2!19 
8,2 2U 
14.1 242 
21.G G2J 
24. 4 4 ll 
27.4 ~9) 
JG, II J9' 
n.2 l9J 
J2.0 JOG 
51.2 JO 
U.J J7() 
H.4 OJ 
44 ·' 
492 
H.4 4Jl 
0.1 JUO 
1:0,l 341 
5!1.4 346 
52.1 141 
50.0 l99 
5J,G 301 
(iJ. :z 319 
GS.J JU 
eo.o 357 
l00,9 JG.] 
111.0 676 
102.9 nn 
118.2 so 
05, 4 -
Tcn,r 
1955 
5G 
57 
59 
s~ 
GO --u 
u 
Gl 
" n - u 
67 
gg 
'9 
70 
71 
12 . 
7l 
74 
75 
u 
l'roducllott 
11~. J 
ll1 •• 
12'. 7 
lJ2.0 
H~.2 
149 •• 
151.7 . 
104.0 
215. J 
215.9 
235.9 
269.~ 
294,C 
219.l 
l09.9 
l08,, 
Jll. 4 
JSO,O 
329.l 
JH,1 
322.4 
uo 
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Table Al6 (continued) 
Japanese Supply and 
Demand for Zinc 
(thousand tons) 
llotncstlo 
l'"&'°rt. tKrort. l>c'"nnJ 
1.5 4.5 109.1 
11. 7 15.0 117., 
lD,J 11.7 lJl. 4 
H,, 7.2 lJS,11 
U,7 8.7 Ho.g 
9),0 5.9 195. 4 
102.9 l.J H7,. 
71,9 O.l 251. 9 
Ol,7 1.1 J00.9 
10.2 5.l l6l. 4 
142.9 ss.2 JH.t 
us. l 54.t 399,C 
241.. n.2 4G4.C 
Jl1.5 e!J.2 SH.• 
414,5 90.4 509.l 
Hl.2 52,6 g)9,4 
401. !I g),0 gH,t 
4GG,5 lOG.G 70G,4 
~H.7 , •• o Bll.9 
50.4 1u.1 704,C 
H7.4 52.1 553.0 
ltlOO uo 1.sco 
See Table A7 for notes and sources. 
Uo:ooutle llot ln".N•to~ 
I'd co lncr<>.icn • 
.. ... 
119 J.2 
114 7.C 
lJO ~ 1.1 
lOG J.5 
104 .--- 4. 4 
99 o.s 
93 1.• 
115 l.7 
uo --12.r; 
102 u.• 
102 - 11. 4 
95 O. l 
90 5,2 
119 4.9 
9) 24.t 
too 11. l 
107 21.4 
100 l.5 
129 - '·' 
201 51.1 
211 10•.o 
0 
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Table Al7 Aluminum Elasticities 
and Cross-Elasticity with Copper and Steel 
1912-38 
R2 = o. 869 
ln A = -32.79 + 3.77 lnY - 0.66 ln( PA/Py) 
(-10. 6) (12. 0) (-3. 4) o.w. = 1. 41 
1955-73 
R2 = 0 . 986 
ln A = -5.12 + 2.84 lnY + 1. 58 ln(PA/Py) 
(-3 .1) (7. 0) (2. 0) o.w. = 1. 27 
R2 = 0.993 
ln A = 1. 76 + 1.12 lnM - 0.24 ln(PA/Pc) 
(12 .1 ) (35.1) (-1. 9) o.w. = 1. 07 
R2 = 0.981 
ln A = -6. 90 + 1. 63 lnB - 1. 26 ln(PA/Ps) 
(-16 .1) (29. 7) (-1. 8) D.W. = 1.18 
A = domestic aluminum demand Y = real GNE 
aluminum price Py GNE deflator 
Pc copper price Ps steel price 
M machinery industry production in real t erms 
B construction expenditure in real terms 
Table Al8 Bauxite Sources 
1928a 1955 1965 19 75 
23 58 Australia 
51 29 17 Indonesia 
42 36 13 Malaysia 
38 USA 
16 Switzerland 
ll Germany 
JS 7 12 12 Others b 
Japan has always imported all of its bauxite. 
a Aluminum imports 
b Includes listt!d countries when they are not 
laorgest suppliers. 
one of the three 
Sources see t~ble AG. 
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OPTIONS FOR A RESOURCE-POOR COUNTRY -- JAPAN 
A COMMENT 
Hugh Patrick 
This is a very ambitious and provocative paper, with the broad 
perspective of a long time horizon, consideration of Japan's basic 
options in historical and future perspective, and indeed a blueprint 
for the creation of a new society and a new kind of man in Japan in the 
21st century. In addition, the paper traces Japan's evolving produc-
tion, domestic demand, and imports and exports of major minerals in 
their raw and refined forms -- with steel as the most extreme degree of 
refining . 
I focus my comments on the author's discussion of Japan's major 
policy options, rather than touching on a number of interesting issues 
of detail. My understanding of Mr. Murota's position is as follows. 
Japan as a nation selects a fundamental long-run objective, the 
desired national destiny as it were, which serves in general terms as 
the guiding framework of economic policy -- and indeed much more -- for 
some decades . Since the mid- 19th century the target has been to catch 
up with the advanced Western nations. For the first three-quarters of 
a century this was perceived in terms of the combination of economic 
and military power within a global context of imperialism -- Japan 
first resisting Western imperialism at home, and then itself engaging 
in the imperialist game abroad. Since World War II, with military 
power destroyed and rejected by Japan, and with colonialism coming to 
an end, Japan has pursued -- and achieved -- economic power through 
rapid growth . 
Japan now finds itself and the world in a transitional phase, with 
substantially less than the high degree of stability that had existed 
until the beginning of this decade. The world can no longer rely on 
the overwhelming leadership of a single nation , the United States , 
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because of the changes in relative economic power brought about by 
rapid economic growth in Western Europe, Japan, and many of the 
developing nations, especially those of the Pacific, as well as by the 
cartel power of the OPEC nations . Moreover, tremendous resource 
problems -- actual and especially potential -- make Japan all the more 
aware of its dependence upon, lack of control over, and hence vulner-
ability to, external sources of supply . Japan has caught up with the 
West in the economic power game, and the military power game has been 
rejected . Moreover, Japan is beset with a number of the domestic 
problems of affluence : pollution, excessive urbanization, young wor-
ker alienation, and a sense of lack of values . Domestic political 
stability as embodied in the twenty- year plus dominance of the Liberal 
Democratic Party has so eroded that political realignment appears 
inevitable . Japan has no transcendental vision -- or target -- to 
guide its future destiny. 
As Mr . Murata stresses very effectively in his paper, Japan now 
and in the future, as in the past, faces three basic options : to place 
emphasis upon fairly rapid economic growth and to obtain requisite 
natural resources through market arrangements of purchase and foreign 
investment; to use military power to obtain natural resources by force; 
or to sharply reduce foreign mineral and other raw material dependence 
by becoming essentially a steady- state economy with negligible GNP 
growth , and recycling of natural resources in an altered economic 
structure . 
Mr . Murata rejects the military option on very rational grounds . 
Historically it did not work , and is unlikely to work in the future . 
Moreover, any such attempt would be economically very expensive (the 
cost- benefit ratios are way out of line) . 
The most innovative part of the paper lies in the author ' s 
judgment that Japan should seriously explore the possibility of the 
third option as a long- run solution . He does not completely reject the 
first option of relatively rapid growth and active involvement in the 
Pacific and global economy, but he points to a number of problems : 
difficulties of raw materials supply, though he notes that the only 
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longer-run issues revolve around oil and energy, not other minerals; 
problems in earning foreign exchange for imports due to restrictions in 
export markets; the domestic external diseconomies of rapid growth 
already noted; and the lack of need to grow fast since catching up has 
been achieved . 
Mr . Murota sees slow -- or no - - growth as a feasible and also a 
desirable option . He recognizes it will take until the end of the 
century to effect the transition . However, projections of zero 
population growth in the next century provide one condition for a 
steady state solution. He suggests the economic structure would be 
based more on agriculture and small- scale handicrafts; I assume he 
means really a highly sophisticated technology, high degree of labor 
skills, and a large capital stock combined in some new forms of 
"handicrafts" rather than reversion to a simplistic Gandhian view of 
the world . 
How do I respond to this analysis? At first I rejected the idea 
of Japan having a simple, overreaching target since it sounds as if 
Japan is a completely planned, government-run economy . That is 
certainly not the case ; Japan has one of the most dynamic, competitive , 
market- oriented private business sectors in the world . Yet in a more 
subtle, looser sense Mr . Murota may be right about such targets as a 
broad frame of reference -- just as postwar the American "manifest 
destiny" has been to be Number One and to contain Communism, and that 
of the Soviet Union to bury capitalism . 
Most of this conference, and indeed most discussion generally , 
focuses, not only for Japan but for all Pacific nations , on variants 
and suboptions within the general market and growth oriented option . 
To what extent should Japan purchase mineral ores, and smelt, refine , 
and process in Japan? Or import smelted or even finished raw 
materials- based goods? How should sources of supply be handled : 
geographic and political diversification versus concentration ; foreign 
investment and ownership , spot purchase , or long- term contract? How 
about pricing , and stockpiling? Bilateral, regional , or global 
arrangements? Mr . Murota does not spend much time considering such 
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alternatives, in part because they are considered elsewhere. Though I 
was initially disppointed, I have come to the view that it is very 
appropriate to have at least one paper at this conference which lays 
out the broadest possible range of alternatives . And I welcome too his 
addressing these issues in a long-term perspective encompassing prewar 
Japanese experience and behavior; all too many Japanese analyses, as 
the author notes, assume the world began in 1955 or so. I do 
nonetheless wish he had explored more the trade-offs between options 
one and three . 
Will the long-run difficulties and problems of international , 
market-oriented rapid growth (the first option) be as severe as Mr. 
Murota i .mplies? Should the Japanese choose the third option of a 
steady state economy in the 21st century? Will they? If so, can they 
successfully achieve it without severe societal strife? 
I am an optimist where Mr. Murota is a pessimist, and vice versa . 
Because I am relatively optimistic that the nations of the Pacific and 
the entire world will be able to work out a new market- oriented 
international economic system whether by negotiation or the 
evolutionary process of market forces -- I regard the first option as 
not only viable but desirable for Japan and indeed for all nations . On 
the other hand, I am not so optimistic that Japan will be able to 
achieve the steady-state solution harmoniously and happily . When it 
comes down to it, I doubt that the Japanese will adopt this as their 
fundamental vision of the desired future for Japan . The inherent 
dynamism of the Japanese people and their society -- the strong work 
ethic, the pragmatic curiosity, the materialism -- will have to undergo 
radical transformation if zero growth is to be achieved without massive 
unemployment and social tensions . Moreover, it is always more diffi-
cult to reallocate resources to meet evolving private and social needs 
in a no-growth economy . 
The implications for the rest of the Pacific of a Japan transiting 
to no growth by the end of the century are enormous, politically and 
economically . The recent, and ongoing, recession has demonstrated 
that one thing worse than a fast-growing Japan is a slow- growing Japan . 
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While the developing countries of the Pacific -- and Australia as we l l 
might be happy to reduce their trade dependence on Japan, it would 
be at the great cost of loss of potential export markets and of 
reduction in the competitiveness of alternative sources of manufac-
tured imports . Certainly the United States and all countries reaping 
the benefits of specialization, trade , and international competition 
would benefit less from a no- growth Japan than a fast - growth Japan , 
despite the various adjustment problems that inevitably arise . Also , I 
have the vision of Japanese with so much leisure time that one-quarter 
of the population at any time will be traveling abroad, with all that 
implies . 
Why is Mr . Murata so much more pessimistic about the future --
intermediate and long-run -- than I? I doubt it is due to differences 
in personality ; we are both outgoing , nice guys . Nor is it due to a 
difference in views on long- run supplies of non- oil minerals : we both 
do not regard those as insurmountable , or even major , problems . Our 
real difference lies , I think, in our different perspectives on energy 
supplies between the mid- 1980 ' s and the end of the century . My guess 
is that Mr . Murata is much more worried than I that oil will run out , or 
that Japan will not be allowed to purchase as much oil as it needs , and 
that R and D and other investment will not create alternative energy 
sources sufficiently rapidly to avoid an energy crunch . I may well be 
too sanguine about future energy difficulties . I thus would like to 
ask Mr . Murata whether , if energy supplies should be made secure for 
Japan over the coming 25 years , will option three still be preferred to 
option one? 
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OPTIONS FOR A RESOURCE- POOR COUNTRY -- JAPAN 
A COMMENT 
Lawrence L.C . Chau 
Mr. Murota has written a stimulating paper in which he takes a 
historical sweep of the twentieth century in order to categorize 
Japan's resource strategy of the past and to prescribe a course for the 
future. It is done in the grand tradition of the "magnificent 
dynamics" which interpret history in economic terms. 
The underlying framework is quite straightforward . It is sug-
gested that, as a resource-poor country, Japan has three options with 
regard to securing natural resources: 
(1) by trade; 
(2) by military conquest; and 
( 3) by economizing the need for resources, i.e. by economic 
depression. 
In the 1930's Japan opted for the military solution, with cata-
strophic results both for herself and for her neighbors. Since the 
1950 ' s she has been pursuing Option 1 with admirable success . 
Since Option 2 is, hopefully, of historic interest only, for 
Japan or for other nations, we can confine ourselves to the other two 
options. It is somewhat disappoint i ng that Mr . Murota did not dwell on 
factors contributing to Japan ' s success in pursuing Option 1, parti-
cularly the role played by mineral resources, and to draw some lesson 
for other developing countries . But then the thesis of his paper lies 
clearly in the future options of Japan . Particularly, he advocates 
that "Japan should seriously consider pursuing a road of slower 
economic growth . " 
Such a policy of growth deceleration will take several forms : 
(1) more emphasis on recycling of used resources, (2) shift of invest-
ment to social capital or housing and away from plant and equipment, 
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and (3) a lowering of the economic growth rate . Though specific 
measures for bringing about these changes have not been spelled out , it 
is clear that the author has in mind public planning and policy . 
Supposedly, government can intervene through prices, credit and taxa-
tion to bring about a redirection of resources . 
Three sets of considerations are offered to support this parti -
cular policy recommendation . 
(1) Internal conditions . In view of the high living standard Japan 
has already attained, there will be less incentive for further 
growth; specifically, people would be less inclined to bear 
the increasingly heavy environmental cost of growth . 
(2) Changes in external conditions . The trading environment has 
become more unstable and less favorable . A continued heavy 
dependence on raw material imports will expose Japan to shock 
from outside . 
(3) Resources are more necessary and more profitable for use in 
developing countries . 
I would like to take up these issues in their reverse order : 
whether a deliberate go-slow policy will benefit developing countries; 
whether such a change is imposed by changed conditions in international 
trade; and the potency of domestic factors . I do not share the view 
that a slowing-down policy in the way the author envisages would 
benefit the economic growth of developing countries by releasing 
resources for their use. The direct result of a slower growth of Japan 
or an increase of recycling is a reduction of her demand for such 
resources . Indirectly, Japanese exports will be more expensive for a 
number of reasons : (1) with a smaller total output the scale economies 
will be less , (2) recycling is more expensive, and (3) Japan will have 
a smaller total demand for import so that her export volume will be 
smaller. In sum, there will be a decline in Japan's offer curve of her 
manufactured merchandises for raw materials . Both the price effect and 
the income effect will work against the welfare of the raw material 
exporting countries . In addition, Japan ' s ability to offer aid will 
also be impaired by a slower growth . To be sure , the raw material 
producing countries , or other developing countries can industrialize 
361 
and make use of these resources . But the fact that they have not done 
this before would suggest that they are less efficient users . Indeed 
it may take a long time for them to fully utilize such r esources , so 
that the short- run consequences are simply idle mines and idle workers . 
Secondly , is Option 1 still feasible in the fo r eseeable future? 
Or is it time that, as the author put it, " the necessary conditions for 
this choice are now collapsing" ? This hinges largely on the question 
of how real and serious is the impending raw material shortage . From 
discussions of yesterday and this morning, we can summarize that this 
is at best a debatable issue . The ability for resource- producing 
countries to improve their terms of trade through the forma t ion of 
producer cartels should not be overestimated . Most raw material 
producing countries have achieved a degree of economic development 
when the functioning of their economy is highly dependent on imports 
from developed countries . 
The remaining causes for a slowing down, namely a smaller incen-
tive for further growth and a growing concern over environmental 
quality, are very real . And such changes are in accord with economic 
theory . After all, leisure, environmental quality , and culture are all 
luxury goods , the demand for which will go up with income . This shift 
of consumer preference may well prevail in other developed economies 
which are major markets for Japanese exports , in which case it will be 
another braking force to Japan ' s growth . 
In sum, I am more optimistic than Mr . Murota about the options for 
Japan . Option 1 is still open to her to maintain a high rate of growth 
through trade . The road may be a bit more rough going, now that she has 
to spend as much attention in securing the supply of i mports as in 
cultivating her export markets . But then ingenuity is not exactly 
scarce in Japan . If a drastic slowing down did occur, it would likely 
be largely the outcome of her own discretion , the r esult of a reorien-
tat i on of national priorities ; and not something forced upon her by 
scar city of pr imar y resources or by the changing environment of 
i nternati onal trade . 
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I have two other comments to make, upon which I do not have time 
to elaborate . 
(1) The framework can be usefully extended in a number of ways . 
Within these three big boxes (labelled options 1, 2, and 3) 
are many smaller boxes of degrees and variations . Indeed some 
of these smaller boxes may be qualified for independent sta-
tus, raising the number of options. For example, regional 
cooperation, trade block, or economic union will be such an 
alternative . 
(2) The author has estimated a number of demand functions for major 
minerals for the period 1955- 73 . The relevance and interpre-
tation of such a relationship for an export- oriented country 
over a period of substantial structural changes are open to 
question . 
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OPTIONS FOR A RESOURCE- POOR COUNTRY -- JAPAN 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Catching up with the West for Japan has meant to a large extent 
adopting Western patterns . Japan ' s very success has now brought about 
a feeling of alienation and isolation leading to a craving for a return 
of some of Japan ' s own cultural traditions . These traditions are 
consistent with aspects of the third option . While several speakers 
feel the option is seriously considered only by intellectuals in Japan , 
one Japanese noted that there is in fact a broader segment of the 
population searching for a new value system, and the third option is a 
part of what is considered . 
It may be a rational choice for Japanese to opt for slower growth , 
especially insofar as high growth has come from a high savings rate . 
Not only is postponed consumption perhaps becoming less acceptable , 
the desired consumption bundle is not what Japan is currently producing 
-- which contributes to Japanese companies exporting . On the other 
hand , a Japanese noted there are population segments still desirous of 
obtaining the consumer durables the upper middle class has acquired . 
The third option discussion is not limited to Japan . In Europe , 
the British disease has become the British example , as growth is being 
rejected and new consumption patterns emerge . 
The implications of the option for Japan include higher taxes , 
since much of what the Japanese want is public goods . The biggest 
transition will be in the capital markets, and it is not clear how this 
will be done . There will also be a need for freer trade , meaning 
greater interdependence among nations . The catch is whether this will 
be accepted by Japanese and Europeans . 
Freer trade as a result of option 3 is certainly beneficial to 
other countries . Further , a number of participants from Asian 
developing countries said their countries would be happy to be free of 
Japanese competition for markets , and felt the resulting growth of 
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their economies would absorb the resources such countries as Australia 
have sold to Japan . However, none of them felt the possibility 
realistic enough to suggest development planning based on it . 
To most participants , option 3 cannot be seen as economically 
necessary . Some wondered if it was a pessimistic reaction to the 
energy cri s is . Many Japanese seriously advocated slower growth and 
other aspects of option 3 when it looked as though very serious 
constraints were being put on Japan ' s supply sources, including 
energy , and markets . However , economizing resources does not 
inherently imply slower growth . It does require structural change . 
While historically Japan has been able to handle such situations , it 
was in the context of overall growth . Things may not be so easy with 
no, or slow growth . 
"No growth" in Japan frequently is used to mean 5 to 6 percent, 
and while Murota means something less, indeed, ultimately zero growth, 
most participants do see Japanese growth slowing to the 5- to 6- percent 
level. 
While a useful starting point for exposition , many felt the 
options too starkly drawn , and saw a continuum between 1 and 3, with 2 
being recognized as improbable . 
One speaker suggested the paper was not at all realistic in its 
description of what Japan is now : it is not a country of wasteful 
consumers, it i s in fact high- technology intensive , and very protec-
tionist . What Japan needs to do is grow in a nice manner rather than 
elbowing others around . 
The difference between the prospects for Japan ' s home islands --
the physical Japan -- and offshore Japanese enterprise was noted . The 
latter enjoys positive development prospects even while the former is 
constrained . (The speaker saw immense growth in Japan ' s overseas 
investment position in the next generation.) Japanese firms have 
demonstrated the ability to act as brokers, wedding modern technology 
to cheap labor, and they have done this in a number of geographical and 
cultural settings . 
The question here is what happens to the rents . The Japanese 
firms may decide to keep them offshore to continue to satiate their 
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entrepreneurial desires. (One developing country participant had 
earlier noted option 2, while not done with armed troops, was in many 
ways being done with Japanese businessmen taking control of host 
country resources and markets . ) 
From -the standpoint of general equilibrium analysis, at least as 
seen at the University of Chicago, if there were truly resource 
constraints , a movement toward option 3' s slower growth would be an 
automatic adjustment. If a change of preferences is the reason for 
going to option 3, it follows that trade will be reduced, but there is 
not going to be more leisure, as implied . Only with a change in 
resource endowments such as mentioned above -- with the moving of some 
economic activities offshore -- is option 3 possible without a good 
deal of government intervention to make it happen . 
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ISSUES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESOURCE-RICH LDCs : 
COPPER IN CHILE* 
Ernesto Tironi** 
The debate about the pros and cons of natural resources- based 
development strategies is a very old one. It goes back to Adam Smith 
and his implicit development theory through free trade . The topic has 
become popular again as a consequence of the general price boom of raw 
materials in the early seventies, the success of the oil cartel , the 
renewed discussion about the world scarcity of natural resources and 
the relative frustration with development policies based on import 
substitution. 
Many less developed countries are rich in some natural resource, 
but not in a wide variety of them. Accordingly, raw materials account 
for a large proportion of their GNP and exports . This is probably the 
most important difference between underdeveloped and developed 
nations. The main consequence of that situation is the existence of a 
structurally unbalanced economy which is very sensitive to conditions 
prevailing abroad . 
"dependent." 
In this sense, at the least, they are more 
Hence, the large availability of natural resources has often 
been, and still is, a mixed blessing. This is not because economic 
development could have been higher without those resources,but because 
their exploitation may have prevented a more systematic and balanced 
*I am pleased to acknowledge comments from Ricardo Ffrench- Davis 
and his permission to borrow freely from his papers on copper in Chile. 
I am also grateful to all participants in the Ninth Pacific Trade and 
Development Conference -- especially to R. Bautista, D. Leipziger and 
H. Patrick -- for their helpful comments . 
**CIEPLAN, Corporacion de Investigaciones Economicas para Latino-
america, Santiago, Chile . 
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domestic development effort. A nation's at ti tu de towards work is 
probably less favorable when it sees that progress is not as much the 
result of its own productive effort, but rather of strong forces 
outside its control. 
The contribution of natural resources to a country's development 
obviously depends on the type of resource available, especially its 
value or price, its cost, factor intensity of production and forward 
and backward 11 linkages 11 with the rest of the economy. But it also 
depends very heavily upon their ownership pattern, on the conditions 
under which natural resources are exploited and on the use made of the 
revenues obtained from them. The latter two are critically influenced 
by the economic policies followed by the countries concerned. 
The purpose of this paper is modest. It seeks to highlight the 
problems and the importance of adequate economic policies in dealing 
with natural resources in a less developed country. It draws on the 
experience of Chile with copper only, and there is no attempt to imply 
that the lessons derived from it are applicable to all developing 
nations or to all natural resources. On the one hand, copper is an 
exhaustible mineral which is different in that sense from agricultural 
commodities. On the other hand, Chile is a semi- industrialized country 
with an income per capita significantly higher than most raw material 
exporting countries, it has a large public sector with relatively 
educated public officials, and a trained local labor force, techni-
cians and administrators who have been running the copper mines for 
many years. 
The more specific thesis of this paper is that, in the case of 
countries such as Chile, there is a relatively broad margin within 
which the contribution of natural , resources to development can be 
increased by the use of appropriate government policies . This is true 
whether fi.rms exploiting natural resources are foreign or domes tic, 
private or public . On the contrary, laissez faire or free trade 
policies can hardly maximize that contribution , and inadequate poli-
cies can considerably reduce it . 
S.ection 1 introduces the subject with a brief presentation of the 
debate about the general pros and cons of natural resources- based 
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development strategies as well as their limitations, on the one hand, 
and the main issues and problems that must be addressed in relation to 
natural resource development, on the other hand . Section 2 describes 
the characteristics and importance of copper in the Chilean economy . 
Section 3 analyzes the main copper mining policies followed in Chile 
since the early fifties and the lessons derived from that experience . 
Finally, Section 4 raises some of the main issues posed by a long-run 
development strategy based on the exploitation of a natural resource 
such as copper in the case of a small country like Chile . 
1 . Natural Resources-Based Development 
Until the Great Depression in the 1930s most less developed 
countries had based their development mainly on the export of natural 
resources , following a classical free trade pattern. The Depression 
dramatically showed how feeble that strategy was for small countries 
that depended too heavily on foreign trade. 1 
The General Debate 
Classical and neoclassical economists give considerable attention 
2 to free trade as a stimulus to development . They stress mainly the 
gains that result from better allocation of world resources, cost 
reductions as a consequence of economies of scale and greater competi-
tion . Free trade is considered to be mutually beneficial to all 
trading countries, except in very special cases of monopoly power in 
world markets (that may reduce a nation's terms of trade as exports 
become very large) and of infant industries.3 Free capital and labor 
movements are also mutually beneficial since they would tend to raise 
wages and lower interest rates in the borrowing countries . Finally, 
balance of payments disequilibriums can always be faced by relative 
price changes, even assuming no automatic gold movements . 
Aside from the Marxist critique of exploitation , many modern 
economists question whether the classical theory is relevant for poor 
countries and whether free trade is the best development policy they 
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can follow . On the one hand , they question the validity of basic 
assumptions of the classical theory in the case of less developed 
countries : that there is full employment , domesti c resources are 
perfectly mobile, private marginal products equal social marginal 
products, and that all prices are flexible . On the other hand , they 
maintain that the classical theory is a static theory in so far as it 
assumes given tastes, resources and technical knowledge . These 
assumptions imply that the essence of development problems are mi ssed . 
Accelerating development would not be so much a problem of 
achieving an optimum allocation of resources under static conditions 
as it is of increasing the supply of resources and allocating them 
under dynamic conditions . Thus, they conclude that , under free trade , 
the gains from trade go mainly to the developed countries , and that 
development requires basic structural changes and deliberate public 
policies influencing trade patterns. 
The "structuralist theory" of development - - advanced by Pre-
bisch (1950), Singer (1950) , Myint (1954) , Lewis (1955) , Myr-
dal (1956) and a few others - - bases its criticism of free trade , and 
i ts new policy recommendations, on three empirical arguments . First , 
less developed countries " freely " opened up to world markets become 
"dual economies" : exports are concentrated in one or a few natural 
resources which form an enclave, isolated from the rest of the economy . 
Hence, they do not contribute much to the development of the latter, 
since there is no large demand of inputs from the local economy (few 
"-backward linkages" ) , little domestic processing of output ("forward 
linkages"), there is not much contribution to the domestic supply of 
entrepreneurship nor imitation of techniques used in the export sec-
tor.. The main linkage of the domestic economy with the export sector 
is through taxes . Finally , the economy becomes unstable through the 
transmissi-0n of large external fluctuations in demand and prices that 
produce pressures on the balance of payments . 
The second argument has been t-hat free international factor 
movements are not entirely beneficial. Under "laissez- faire " condi-
tions they tend to concentrate in natural resources for exports with 
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little positive effects on the rest of the economy for the reasons 
mentioned above. This is especially true when natural resources 
exploited through foreign capital are minerals rather than agricul-
tural commodities . In these cases, capital flows are not as much 
accompanied by the immigration of labor - - which has been the main 
vehicle for transferring technical know- how to developing regions in 
the last century -- as had been the case in the US and Australia. 4 
The third major argument against free trade development policies 
has been the contention that there has been a secular deterioration in 
the developing countries ' terms of trade. Prebisch, for instance , 
argued that the benefits from technological progress had gone pri-
marily to the advanced countries that exported manufactured products 
and not to the developing countries exporting raw materials in 
exchange . 
The main implication for development derived from these arguments 
in the early fifties was the decision to use commercial policies in 
order to grow by substituting imports of manufactured products . These 
policies were widely implemented, especially in Latin America , as a 
consequence of both the popularity of Prebisch' s ideas transmitted 
through the United Nations ' Economic Commission for Latin American 
(ECLA) -- headed by him in the late 40 ' s and during all the 50 1 s -- and 
of the experiences of the Great Depression and The Second World War . 
The main shortcomings and criticisms of the import substituting 
development strategy have been sufficiently analyzed in the modern 
li terature5 , so there is no need to review it here . The way to 
overcome those shortcomings during the last decade, however, has been 
mainly to promote exports of manufactured goods rather than expanding 
6 natural resource exports . 
As a consequence, since the Second World War the natural resource 
sector has not been a high priority area in most developing countries, 
and certainly not in Latin America . There has seldom been any explicit 
policy at all for its development , except for an erratic nationalistic 
general trend seeking to gai n more control over multinational corpora-
tions exploiting natural resources . 
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The classical and neoclassical theories -- being based on assump-
tions of little relevance for LDCs -- can hardly provide meaningful 
policy orientations for an effective development through the exploita-
ti on of natural resources . The structuralist theory, on the other 
hand, although much more realistic and accurate in its diagnosis of the 
problems involved, has not been able to provide effective policy 
orientations to overcome those problems. Its followers tend to present 
solutions in simplistic "all or nothing" terms without paying suffi-
cient attention to problems of specific policies and public sector 
organization for implementing them . Thus, for instance, the answer to 
terms of trade reduction was to support the substitution of any 
imported manufactured product, with little regard for social costs, 
and implicitly to discourage all production of natural resources, 
without considering their specific varieties and costs . 
Finally, development theories have paid little attention to the 
problem posed by the instability of natural resources revenue and the 
means to cope with it . The problem has become more urgent recently as 
a consequence of the nationalization of many former foreign enter-
prises. 
The rest of this section considers some crucial issues about 
natural resources development which have not been sufficiently con-
sidered, but we will reserve the analysis of the instability problem 
for the last section . 
Strategic Issues in Natural Resources Development 
There are several general issues that must be addressed by a 
country in relation to the development of its natural resources . Three 
of the major ones are : (a) the sector's role vis a vis other sectors in 
the economy ; (b) whether to have foreign or domestic ownership of firms 
exploiting them ; and ( c) the organization of the public sector to 
regulate that economic activity . 7 
Aside from a country's factor endowments, or the purely technical 
efficiency with which it can produce, the position of its natural 
resources sector in the economy as a whole is determined, first , by the 
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global economic system and the ownership structure of the country 
involved ; and second, by the specific government policies followed 
within that system . If all of the sector is publicly- owned and a 
direct or centralized planning system is used, natural resource 
development will depend on the targets set by government authorities . 
In a normal market economy, development will depend mainly on the 
indirect or "market" policies used by the government, aside from the 
signals . provided by markets alone. 8 In a "mixed" economy, or one with a 
nationalized sector operated mainly by public enterprises, the 
sector's position vis a vis the rest of the economy will depend on both 
a set of direct and indirect policies and on market forces . 
In this paper we shall concentrate principally on the use of 
market or indirect economic policies in the context of a "mixed" or 
market economy in which independent producers operate in the natural 
resources sector, the reason being that such a context has been more 
common in LDCs, and Chile's experience with indirect policies is more 
illuminating. 
Government policies affecting the position of the natural 
resources export sector relative to the rest of the economy include 
differentiated production or export taxes , tari ffs or other restric-
tions on imports, and exchange rates. Those are normally the instru-
ments through which governments affect the relative market rate of 
return on investment in different sectors . Specific export subsidies 
on manufactures have also become popular recently as a means to 
diversify exports or reduce dependence from exports of one or a few raw 
materials . 
But within the natural resources sector it may also be important 
to differentiate taxes, subsidies, and tariffs en various products, 
which implies defining explicit criteria on which to base those 
differentials . There is often a variety of forms in which natural 
resources may be produced and exported . Most of the time the tendency 
has not been to apply differentiated export taxes according to the 
domestic value added of each product variety or other relevant criteri a 
for the .country, 9 but according to its total value of price . In thi s 
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matter there is scope for a substantial increase in natural resource 
contribution to national development by implementing more adequate 
policies . 10 Similarly, natural resource export sectors have usually 
been exempted from tariffs on all their imported inputs . This has also 
had unfavorable effects on the sector ' s contribution to national 
development. 
A second strategic issue is whether the natural resources sector 
should be opened to investment by foreign firms or reserved only for 
national producers . The former certainly increases a country's 
dependence on foreign conditions, but that negative factor may be 
compensated by the foreigner's contribution of technology, markets 
and/or capital. Two additional aspects must be considered in this 
respect : i) a sector controlled by foreign firms will normally tend to 
operate large units with highly capital- intensive technologies, com-
pared with the smaller and more labor- intensive domestic firms; and 
ii) subsidiaries of large transnational corporations with worldwide 
investments, and often diversified along product lines, behave 
differently from domestic firms facing the same host country policies . 
Hence, ownership structures must be considered carefully in order to 
design optimal policies . 
Finally, a third strategic issue in natural resources development 
is the organization of the public sector to deal with it . Generally 
speaking, three levels may be distinguished . First , there are deci -
sions which are of such importance and impact on national economic 
activity -- of a macroeconomic nature -- that they should be adopted in 
a centralized form . These include investment decisions and programs to 
expand production , technological development and marketing (especially 
of strategic products or those in which the country enjoys monopoly 
power) • 11 At a second level, specific economic policies should be 
designed for the sector; e . g . exchange- rate policy for returned 
values, profit taxes, tariffs on imported capital goods and inputs , 
output taxes and others . The third level is related to the degree of 
autonomy to be assigned to enterprises in order to carry out their 
productive operations efficiently . 
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In the case of domestic enterprises, either private or public , the 
first two levels provide the framework within which the maximization of 
the firm ' s profits (or the minimization of costs) enables a greater 
contribution to development, at the same time providing the appro-
priate quota of financial resources to the government's treasury and of 
purchases from the national ind us tries . In the case of foreign 
enterprises, an additional control -- such as borrowing from the 
domestic economy or from abroad-- may be crucial in order to maximize 
their contribution to development . As Ffrench-Davis (1974a, p. 48) 
has stated however: "It is not enough , to define a policy, enact a 
decree or make a law about those matters . Too many times laws passed 
or policy definitions have fallen through for lack of will, knowledge 
or organization on the part of Government officials to persevere in 
following their implementation . 11 This requires, among other basic 
things, development of a sys tern of information and collection of 
appropriate statistics on which to base key decisions . 
The following sections will concentrate mainly on the experience 
of Chile with government policies towards its main natural resources 
sector: copper . Emphasis will be placed, however, on sectoral 
poli,cies and ownership, rather than on the role of the sector vis a vis 
the rest of the economy and on macroeconomic policies about investment 
of surpluses in the economy as a whole. 
2 . Copper in Chile : 1950- 1975 
The copper mining sector in Chile is not homogeneous . It has an 
internally dualistic structure, in the same way that many less 
developed countries as a whole have dual economies. On the one hand, 
there is what in Chile is called the large-scale copper mining (LCM) 
sector, formed by four firms that exploit the nation's largest ore 
deposits . Those are the firms formerly owned by Anaconda (that 
exploited the Chuquicamata and El Salvador mines) and Kennecott (that 
exploited the El Teniente Mine). Today, all those firms , plus a former 
medium-size company (Sociedad Minera Andina), are divisions of the 
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State- owned corporation CODELCO- CHILE . The LCM sector produces an 
average of about 80 percent of Chilean copper output , but since it is 
much less labor- intensive than the rest of the copper mining sector it 
employs only about 60 percent of the workers engaged in copper mining . 
On the other hand, there is the small- and medium- scale copper 
mining (SMCM) sector, which is internally very heterogeneous . About 
half of the sector ' s output is produced by five medium- size firms, most 
of which were owned by foreign investors . All except one of these also 
were nationalized between 1971 and 1973 . The rest of the SMCM sector ' s 
output is produced by a large number of small independent miners, 
almost all of them selling their minerals to a State enterprise that 
owns several smelter plants and two refineries . This enterprise is the 
Empresa Nacional de Miner.£ a (EN AMI) which also markets most of the 
copper produced by small scale mining . The SMCM mining sector as a 
whole has increased significantly its share of total Chilean copper 
production -- from about 10 percent in the late 50s to over 20 percent 
in the late 60s and about 16 percent in the mid- 70s (see Table 1) . 
The analysis in this section concentrates mainly on the LCM 
sector , but something should be said about the SMCM sector because it 
has been excessively disregarded in the natural resources literature , 
both in Chile and elsewhere . The importance of the latter in terms of 
production has been variable , since output appears to be more respon-
sive to price variations . The price boom during the 60s seemed to be 
one of the main explanations of the SMCM output increase during that 
period , which has receded after the price fall during the 70s . The 
SMCM sector , however, generates much less government revenue per pound 
of copper produced than the LCM sector . Rents and profits are lower as 
a consequence of less efficiency in production and the exploitation of 
lower grade ores, except in the case of a few relatively large firms . 
Finally, the SMCM sector generates proportionally more employment than 
the LCM sector, but wage rates are lower . 12 
The Copper Sector in the Domestic Economy 13 
Chile is not a country particularly rich in natural resources in 
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general, except for copper . It has approximately one third of the 
world ' s known reserves, although during the last two decades the 
14 country has produced only about 12 percent of world output . Copper's 
importance for the domestic economy far exceeds its relatively small 
share in GNP (about 10 percent during the period under study) and in 
total employment (less than 2 percent) . 
The copper mining sector has a dominant place in the Chilean 
economy for several other reasons. First, it constitutes the largest 
individual item in national product in exports (and in private capital 
services in the balance of payments until the nationalization) . In the 
second place, copper has been the center of foreign investment and 
control in the Chilean economy . In the third place, even before 
nationalization (between 1952 and 1970) copper generated about one 
fourth of tax revenues, and in several years it was the single most 
important source of fiscal revenues . Finally, copper mining has been 
the main source of economic instability in the country . 
The relative importance of large- scale copper mining in GDP shows 
no definitive trend between 1952 and 1971, but it does exhibit notori-
ous instability, mainly stemming from price fluctuations . In this 
sense, at least, the exploitation of its rich copper sources has also 
caused difficulties for Chile . This is not something unavoidable 
(i.e ., a consequence only of the characteristics of this natural 
resource), but has been to a large extent the result of the short-
comings of Chile's copper and development policies . 
During the two decades before nationalization (1952- 71) , copper 
exports represented an average of 70 percent of total exports , but 
deviations from that average have been substantial due to price 
fluctuation . By the middle of the current decade that fraction had 
fallen as a consequence of the low copper prices of 1975 and 1976 and 
the recent expansion of non- traditional exports . 
Capital services -- foreign profits and depreciation - - in the LCM 
sector amounted to approximately 2 percent of GDP . In other words, 
they created a difference of two percent between the gross domestic 
product and the gross national product . Foreign capital remittances 
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r epresented between 6 and 18 percent of Chile's total exports . On 
average, one- fifth of the value of LCM exports remained abroad in the 
form of profits and capital depreciation . 15 
Capital services fluctuations have been much more intense than 
those of exports, because year- by- year changes in capital services are 
proportionally more directly linked to copper prices . But , in addi-
tion government policy changes have also modified that value on 
1 . 16 severa occasions . 
Taxes levied on large-scale copper mining have constituted a 
sizable item in the fiscal budget, but they have also been a source of 
instability in year- to-year fiscal revenue . Direct taxes on the LCM 
sector represented an average of 23 percent of fiscal revenues before 
nationalization (1952-70), and fluctuated between a minimum of 
12 . 5 percent and a maximum of 48 percent of total tax revenue . As a 
consequence of nationalization (in 1971) that share should probably 
end up increasing in the long run , although complete statistics are not 
available . In 1976 , for instance , the LCM sector contributed 23 per-
cent of fiscal revenues, although the real price of copper was approxi-
mately two thirds of the average obtained in the 1952- 70 period . 
Fluctuations in copper tax revenues have also been substantial as 
a consequence of both changes in copper prices and in government 
policies . There is no clear overall trend during the period in the 
share of copper taxes on total fiscal revenues, but there are several 
short- run changes that will be analyzed later . 
Production , Markets and Prices 
In 1976 Chile produced about one million tons of copper . This is 
the country ' s all- time production record, and amounted to about 
13 percent of world output . Since the end of the Second World War , 
however, Chile ' s share in world output had been falling due to low 
expansion of production . In the period 1945- 70 foreign enterprises in 
the LCM sector increased output at a rate of only 2 percent per year 
compared to a 4 percent annual i ncrease in world production . The SMCM 
sector , however , expanded significantly all during that quarter cen-
tury (at a r ate of almost 17 percent per year) , compensating somewhat 
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for the fall in the LCM sector . By the late 60s, the Chilean share in 
world copper mining output had fallen from about 20 percent in 1944- 46 
to 11 percent in 1968-70 . But during the 70s, production was expanded 
considerably, especially in the LCM sector (see Cols . (2) to (4) in 
Table 1) . 
The output of the LCM sector comprises three varieties of copper : 
electrolytic , fire - refined and blister . 17 Although these three types 
are practically pure with more than 99 percent of copper content , there 
are notorious price differentials among them because of their di f -
ferent uses and costs . Electrolytic is the purest form of copper . 
The structure of production shows significant changes during the 
last two and a half decades . In the 50s, the output of fire- refined 
copper dropped drastically and production of electrolytic copper was 
maintained, while blister production absorbed the fall of fire - refined 
copper and captured all the expansion of total output . During the 
following decade , however , expansion was concentrated in electrolytic 
copper, as a result of the enlargement of refining capacity in Chuqui-
camata. In addition , part of the output of blister began to be refined 
in Chile at the Ventanas Refinery, owned by the State Mining Enterprise 
( ENAMI), which went into production i n 1966 , and which also refines 
copper from the SMCM sector . 
With regard to export markets, a notable change appeared after 
1954 . A significant proportion was diverted from the United States --
the predominant destination until then -- to Western Europe . During 
the 1960s various other markets were opened , such as the Japanese, 
18 although on a small scale . By the end of that decade a quarter of LCM 
exports were sold outside the United States and Western Europe , and 
this distribution has been maintained until the mid- 70s . 
Sales for the domestic market have amounted to less than 2 percent 
of total output . An additional one percent , on the average , is bought 
by some copper manufacturing firms located in Chile for exports in the 
form of wire rod , profile , tubes and alloys . These exports , however, 
do not have a high domestic value added , and have at times been a 
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disguised form of reaping the differential between the domestic copper 
price and that in some particular foreign market . 
There is n~ single or unified world copper market . There are two 
main markets: the US Producer's (USP) market and the London Metal 
Exchange (-LME). Both are linked -- mainly through US exports and 
imports - - but not very closely . The latter is much more unstable than 
the former . 19 Until 1965 Chile sold most of its output at the USP 
price. In 1966 the Government decided to shift the LCM sales to the 
LME price or, more precisely, to quote its sale at the LME price . 
Table 1 shows the evolution of copper prices in the period 1952- 76 
and their wide instability . During the period 1952-70 the real price 
received by LCM exports (i . e . , deflated by an index of Chile's external 
prices) suffered an average year-by- year absolute variation (indepen-
dent from its sign) of 12 percent . Between 1971 and 1975 - - a period 
of great instability in the world economy - - those variations increased 
to an average of 17 percent. Yearly averages, however, underestimate 
the intensity of fluctuations since they were also large within each 
year. 
After elimination of the effects of world i nflation, an 
i ncreasing trend may be observed in the real price of copper throughout 
the 60s wh i ch was interrupted at the beginning of this decade . 
Column (7) contains a series of copper ' s "long-run" price, after the 
elimination of both world inflation and short- term fluctuations . 20 
This estimate shows an upward trend until 1956, a downward trend until 
1960, then a strong positive trend again throughout the last decade and 
a systematic downward trend during the 70s . 
A comparison of Chile's effective annual (short- run) export pr i ce 
and the "normal" (long- run) price in the world market (Columns (6) and 
(7) in Table 1) gives an indi cation of the incidence of short-term 
fluctuations on the fiscal budget and on the balance of payments . 
During the last five years, the annual differential between the two 
averaged 14 cents, or 17 percent of the average long-run price . 
These data enhance the importance of action aimed at reducing the 
instability of the international copper market and also at designing 
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i mproved foreign trade and fiscal policies so that the fluctuations in 
prices, which may continue to exist in the future, do not spread 
towards the domestic economy . 
Cost Structure and Rates of Return on Capital 
Dur i ng the 1952-70 period (before nationalization) the average 
nominal cost of production per pound of copper for the LCM sector was 
about 43 .cents (at 1976 prices) . Before- tax profits amounted to 
approximately 42 cents . Direct and indirect taxes plus dividends on 
government shares represented an average of about 30 cents per pound, 
so after-tax profits amounted to a little over 12 cents . 21 
Costs per pound increased very slowly from the early 50s until the 
mid 60s . Since 1965 they started increasing relatively fast , 
especially during the 1970- 73 period , but there are no reliable figures 
available because costs are distorted by the exchange rates used . 
CODELCO information indicates that operating costs were reduced sub-
stantially, and this seems to be the case indeed . 22 According to 
CODELCO ' s balance sheets corresponding to 1976, production costs in 
Chile ' s largest mines did not exceed 45 cents per pound, approximately 
the same as the average for the whole 1960 decade . 23 
The various components of production cost have changed con-
siderably during the last 25 years . Even before nationalization there 
was a general trend towards greater expenditures in Chile , both i n 
domestic inputs and in labor . Imported inputs as a share in tot al 
costs decl i ned from about 20 percent in 1952 to 10 percent in 1970 . 
Depreciation costs increased substantially from 1952 to 1966 because 
firms were granted accelerated depreciation schemes; since 1967 they 
started to fall . 24 
Disbursements in local currency to pay for domestic inputs and 
labor have represented between a third and a half oi total costs . 25 
Costs paid in dollars include not only imported inputs, but also : 
(a) marketing, freight and refining costs abroad (whi ch represented 
about 10 percent of total costs in 1970) ; (b) depreciation costs , 
which were dollars not returned to Chile by the foreign firms ; 
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(c) other expenditures in the country, such as some salaries paid in 
dollars to executives and supervisors and, as of 1966, payments to 
ENAMI for refining services; and (d) interest on foreign loans (which 
were very small until "Chileanization" in 1967). 
The rate of profit on capital for the foreign firms in the LCM 
sector (net profits divided by book value of capital) averaged almost 
20 percent between 1952 and 1970 . 26 That rate was highly unstable but 
always positive : it fluctuated (from a minimum of 7.4 percent in 1953 
to 33 . 4 percent in 1956) as a consequence of changes in both copper 
prices and government policies . There were only five years with profit 
rates under 12 percent, all of them before 1965 , and five years with 
profit rates over 28 percent, three of them in the years 1967 to 1969 . 
3. Chile's Experience with its Copper Pol i cies 
There are three basic lessons derived from the Chilean experience 
with the exploitation of its main natural resource . First, the gains 
obtained from raw materials exploited by multinational corporations 
(MNCs) can be substantially altered -- in favor of or against the host 
country -- by appropriate domestic policies . This occurs notwith-
standing that those corporations are large vertically and horizontally 
integrated conglomerates which maximize world-wide interests and not 
necessarily only profits . Second, well planned and gradual policies 
can increase the country's control over natural resources and achieve 
complete nationalization of the firms exploiting them without the 
transition costs usually associated with that action . Moreover, if 
such policies are followed during a reasonable period of time -- in 
which domestic personnel learn how to run key aspects · of natural 
resources' exploitation there is a high probability that the country 
can become as efficient as the multinationals in producing and selling 
copper . Third , a nationally operated natural resource sector requires 
an important reorganization of the public sector to deal with that 
activity . Public control and discipline must be reinforced to avoid 
such new problems as a negative tendency towards independence of the 
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sector from the rest of the economy, and labor pressures that seek to 
capture for themselves a large part of the increased surplus resulting 
from nationalization. 
Policies Towards Multinational Corporations 
The key issue in a framework in which natural resources are 
exploited by MNCs is to design policies that will maximize the present 
value of the surplus obtained by host countries in the long run . There 
is an unavoidable conflict, however, between the fraction of total 
surpluses captured by the host country that owns the mineral deposits 
and the level of production that determines the total value of those 
surpluses. A higher fraction for the host country -- after some point 
- - implies that net profits for the MNCs become so low that investment 
and production in the long run is reduced . But, on the other hand, 
below that optimal point the host country may not gain more from a 
higher production level if it earns a smaller fraction of the gains 
from production, as the Chilean experience with the "New Deal" copper 
policy after 1955 shows . 
(a) Ownership policies 
Three phases can be distinguished in the ownership structure of 
the Chilean copper sector during this century . The first goes from the 
1920s to 1966, in which production was dominated by three subsidiaries 
of two large US corporations : Kennecott and Anaconda . The second goes 
from 1967 to 1971 in which joint ventures were established between 
those subsidiaries and the State . The third phase , from 1971 to 
present, is characterized by the exclusive operation of public-owned 
enterprises in the LCM sector . 27 
During the first phase, however, the State acquired an increasing 
but not necessarily continuously increasing -- control over the LCM 
sector . During the first sub- phase, until 1955, income tax rates went 
up steadily but the main surplus extraction mechanism was by fixing an 
undervalued exchange rate on foreign currency used to pay for local 
expenditures and an implicit overprice tax (i . e ., a surtax on copper 
sales above a base price). These policies increased the share of 
returned value as a percentage of the total value of production from an 
average of approximately 50 percent in the 30s and 40s to 92 percent in 
28 1952-54. The absolute value of returns to Chile also increased, but 
net investment decreased and output fell from a record of 475 thousand 
tons during the war (1944) , to 374 thousand tons in 1951 and 323 thou-
sand tons in 1954. The Chilean share in world production fell from 
almost 20 percent in 1944 to 13 percent in 1954. 29 
The government's reaction in those circumstances was to offer 
substantial new concessions to foreign enterprises. This inaugurated 
the second sub-phase in this period known as that of the "New Deal" 
( Nuevo Tra to) • The surtax and the special exchange control were 
abolished and the variety of income taxes was replaced by a much lower 
basic tax of 50 percent and a variable surcharge of zero to 25 percent 
that decreased as output increased in excess of a "-basic production 
level. 1130 The aim of that mechanism was to provide incentives for 
investment and output . 
The negotiated basic production level, however , represented a 
sizeable underestimation of installed capacity . Hence, with no extra 
investment, the firms were able to produce 20 percent more than the 
basic level. 
Accelerated depreciation of up to 20 percent per year was granted 
to new companies under the Nuevo Tra to Laws . Thus, al though gross 
investment increased from an average of 30 million dollars a year 
between 1952 and 1955 to 64 million dollars in the period 1956- 60, 
amortization increased so much (from 20 to 44 million dollars) that 
average net investment increased only from 19 to 20 million dollars . 31 
Expansion of production capacity was modest. Output in 1960 
reached an apparently high level compared to the all- time low produc-
tion of 1955 (see col . (3) in Table 1), but was less than one percent 
above production in 1943- 44 . Government revenues, however , fell from 
an average of 288 million dollars per year in 1952- 54 to 240 million in 
1955- 60 , while company profits soared from 56 to 120 million dollars 
per year between those two periods . 32 
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Hence, additional investment was ultimately financed by sacr ifice 
of government revenues, while the companies were reaping most of the 
benefits . It was not surprising then , that after a short time the 
Chilean government , and especially the Congress and general public 
opinion , became highly frustrated with the companies' reaction to the 
New Deal policy . Negotiations were opened in 1960 to modify the 
previous agreement , but they broke down in 1961 , and additional income 
surtaxes were imposed that year as a substitute . 33 
No new initiatives could be started until the election of the Frei 
Government in 1964 . Frei ' s copper policy contemplated two main 
elements: the formation of joint ventures between the foreign com-
panies and the State (the "Chileanization" of copper) and an investment 
program that would almost double production in a five- year period . 
Intense political controversies delayed the implementation of that 
policy until 1967 . 
The companies had retreated from their positions of the early 60s 
and Kennecott offered 51 percent of the shares of its subsidiary 
(Braden Copper Co . ) for some US $80 million , thus forming the Sociedad 
Minera El Teniente . Anaconda offered to form a new joint company , 
Exotica, with 25 percent State participation, but refused to sell part 
of its shares in the subsidiary exploiting Chuquicamata . A similar 
agreement was reached with the Cerro Corporation to form the new 
Sociedad Minera Andina (a medium- size venture) . 
A new tax system was es tablished with Chileanization . The income 
tax rate for Sociedad Minera El Teniente was drastically reduced : a 
44 percent duty replaced the basic 50- percent rate , the surtax of the 
"New Deal" Law, and the two surcharges established in 1961. The tax 
concessions granted were so considerable that prior to the increase of 
production deriving from the expansion program, and with a price of 
only 29 cents per pound (about 60 cents at 1976 purchasing power), 
Kennecott's 49 percent share of profits exceeded its earnings when it 
possessed the entire capita1 . 34 It is interesting to note that the tax 
rate on profits was appreciably lower than that affecting corporations 
in the United States , so ultimately Kennecott had to pay taxes on that 
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difference in the US . Thus the Chilean Government essentially granted 
a free transfer to the US Treasury . The tax situation of the two 
subsidiaries of Anaconda underwent no significant change; in the case 
of Anaconda ' s subsidiary exploiting Chuquicamata there was a slight 
tax reduction, and in the case of that exploiting El Salvador , there 
was some increase , due to a tightening of accelerated depreciation 
clauses . 
As Ffrench-Davis (1974a , p. 40) has summarized this experience : 
"When this negotiation took place, a phenomenon of a nature similar to 
that of 1955 appeared, but this time it was more intensive and longer-
lasting . There was again an increase in copper prices. The combina-
tion of tax reductions and the large excess of the real copper price 
over that assumed by Chilean negotiators meant that the annual earnings 
obtained in Chile by Anaconda and Kennecott more than doubled their 
1965 level . Thus, the same errors were being repeated , despite the 
experience of the ten previous years and the distinctively more 
favorable c9nditions for Chile ' s negotiating position ." 
The excessive profits obtained by Anaconda and Kennecott gave a 
new impulse to public opinion in favor of nationalization . Negotia-
tions were opened in May 1969 and an "Agreed Nationalization" was 
reached in July . The Chilean State acquired 51 percent of Anaconda's 
subsidiaries for US $197 million (51 percent of the book value of their 
capital) payable in 12 years with 24 semi- annual promisory notes 
carrying a 6- percent interest . The first payment was made on Janu-
ary 1, 1970 . In addition, Anaconda was compelled to provide the option 
to sell its remaining capital in its Chilean subsidiaries after 1972 . 35 
Finally, an overprice tax was imposed, with the excess above a base 
price of 40 cents per pound (about 80 cents in 1976 dollars) retained 
partially by the State on a sliding scale that reached 70 percent of 
the overprice above 60 cents (120 cents in 1976 dollars) . 
The period 1968-71 was one of very high prices . Therefore, the 
government obtained a record level of surpluses : in 1969 it obtained a 
record $353 million ($711 million in 1976 dollars) from the LCM sector 
(see col . (8) in Table 1) . A share of 76 and 81 percent of before-tax 
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profits went to the State as dividends or taxes in 1969 and 1970 , and 
still the rate of return on the foreign companies ' capital reached 
31 and 26 percent. 
Production, however, still remained almost constant at around 
525 million tons a year . The investment programs were delayed and 
there was a general sense of frustration in Chile with the way the 
foreign copper companies had behaved. 
Thus, during the Presidential Election of 1970 two of the candi-
dates - - who obtained almost two thirds of the votes - - included 
complete nationalization in their platforms. Only a little over a 
month after taking office, President Allende sent a Nationalization 
Bill to Congress . It was supported by all political parties in the 
country and was approved in July 1971. This inaugurated the third 
phase in the Chilean copper history : that of a nationally (State) 
owned LCM sector . 
(b) A brief analysis of surplus extraction policies 
Traditionally Chile used three ma.in devices to extract surpluses 
from the large-scale copper sector, sometimes in an implicit form . The 
first , and generally the most important, was taxation of profits . 36 The 
second policy was either an explicit overprice tax, or an implicit tax 
resulting from the purchase of copper by the State at a given price and 
its sale at a higher one . The third mechanism to extract revenues from 
the LCM sector consisted of imposing a special exchange rate artifi-
cially undervalued, 37 forcing the companies to return a larger frac-
tion of their foreign exchange earnings to the country in order to pay 
their expenses in national currency (especially national inputs and 
labor).38 
The Chilean experience shows that the latter policy was much less 
efficient than the former two as means of increasing the country's gain 
from natural resources, because it had negative effects on costs of 
production and their composition, as well as on output . 
Available studies show that the discriminatory exchange policy by 
itself did not bring about an increase in government revenue from the 
large-scaie copper sector in the long run . 39 The main reason was that 
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technical substitution between imported and national inputs in copper 
production was high . Hence , the fall in the relative price of imported 
inputs, as a consequence of a fall in the real exchange rate, generated 
an increase in the use of imported inputs that replaced those of 
domestic origin . Al though the dollar expenditures needed by the 
companies to pay each peso of domestic costs may have been greater with 
a lower exchange rate, the total costs in pesos -- and consequently 
foreign exchange returning to the country on that account -- was only 
slightly greater . Moreover, the higher total costs implied lower 
profits and, therefore, smaller government tax revenues and produc-
tion . In the final analysis total foreign exchange .income for the 
country did not increase as a result of only using the exchange rate as 
40 an instrument to increase Chile's share of copper revenues . 
Income and overprice taxes were much more successful . They 
pointed more directly to extracting the true economic rent from ore 
deposits that belonged to the country, while maintaining a predeter-
mined minimum rate of return on capital for the companies . 
It is true that effective income tax rates on the LCM sector in 
Chile were high, but company profits have also been high . In the 
period 1955- 70 income taxes averaged approximately 56 percent of the 
before- tax profits of foreign firms . Income tax rates in Chile were 
higher than in other countries of the world, 41 but Chilean mines are 
42 considerably richer too, a fact reflected in the volume of net profit 
earned by the corporations . Recall that the companies ' rate of return 
on capital averaged almost 20 percent during that period . 
The experience with an explicit overprice tax since 1969 was also 
very successful. Government revenues increased considerably without a 
fall in production, while the companies' rate of return fell but still 
remained above a minimum level that would have even made reinvestments 
attractive . The 1953- 54 experience with the implicit tax resulting 
from the direct sale of copper by Chile was not successful due to the 
lack of knowledge and organization needed at that time to sell copper 
in world markets . 
Finally, a word must be said about the stability of surplus 
extracting policies . Discouragement of new investment and only small 
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increases in production may have been much less the consequence of the 
country's policies per seas of their instability . Too low taxes, or 
high tax concessions -- which imply a relative loss to the country 
will not spur production if the companies do not expect them to remain 
low. Too favorable or unfavorable policies towards foreign companies 
are intrinsically unstable; and unstable policies neither stimulate 
investment in the host country nor bring about a higher surplus from 
the exploitation of natural resources. 
Domestic Control of MNCs in Natural Resources 
Some control or supervision over production and exports of 
natural resources is not only a matter of national pride, but of 
necessity in order to secure an economic gain for the country that 
possesses them. Natural resources earn rents which are not normally 
fixed in perfectly competitive markets. In addition, there are many 
ways in which companies may take these rents out of the countries in 
disguised forms. The country that owns natural resources must seek the 
means to share part of those rents and use them for its development 
purposes. 
The key aspects that a country should try to control vary for 
different natural resources. The Chilean experience with copper shows 
that, aside from accounting control, imports and marketing were criti-
cal aspects . In addition, a specialized government agency was needed, 
which could also serve as a technical staff for the negotiation with 
foreign investors. 
Until 1955 control of the operation of the LCM sector was exer-
cised by the Central Bank. The experience with the application of 
special exchange rate policies and with the independent marketing of 
copper in the early fifties taught the need for trained personnel to 
handle those issues . 
Probably the main positive aspect of the "Nuevo Trato" law of 1955 
was the formation of the "Departamento del Cobre," the forerunner of 
CODELCO. Its principal task at that time was to promote the integra-
tion of the LCM sector with the rest of the economy, mainly through the 
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substitution of domestic for foreign inputs. As a consequence of its 
direct action and better foreign exchange policies, domestic inputs, 
as a fraction of the total, increased from 40 percent in 1955-57 to 
72 percent in 1970- 71 . 43 Thus, dependence on foreign sources of supply 
was reduced . In addition, the first systematic statistics about costs, 
profits, production, stocks, prices, etc . were collected . 
The Frei administration that took office at the end of 1964 
granted more power to the Departamento del Cobre which started con-
trolling sales opera ti:::ms and di versifying markets . In 1966, it 
decided that Chile would start selling at LME prices rather than the 
much lower US producers ' prices . By the late 60s, CODELCO had a 
marketing division with top level personnel who had acquired the 
expertise to sell copper in world markets as efficiently as the sales 
agencies of Kennecott and Anaconda . 
Finally, the knowledge of the Chilean LCM sector and the world 
copper industry accumulated in CODELCO, in specialized divisions at 
the Central Bank and in the Ministry of Mines, was paramount for the 
success of the negotiations that led to the "Agreed Nationalization" of 
1969 and to complete nationalization in 1971. 
The Challenge of Nationalization 
On the whole, the Chilean experience with nationalization has 
been clearly positive . The common fears that the country and the State 
would not administer the LCM sector efficiently did not prove real . 
The latter was to a large extent the consequence of having followed a 
gradual policy of increasing State control over the sector, of training 
local personnel and building up the appropriate administrative agen-
cies. 
The expropriation procedure had some shortcomings that could have 
been avoided and from which all less developed countries could learn . 
The Nationalization Law -- which, on the whole, responded to the 
accepted norms of "International Law" -- had two presumably question-
able clauses which proved to be very important . 
First, The Nationalization Law restricted the competence of the 
Chilean judiciary system to rule on some appeals by the companies . 
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This opened up the possibility for the companies to appeal before 
foreign courts to the currently most accepted "International Law. 1144 
This was the argument used by Kennecott before some European courts 
which resulted in the embargo of some copper shipments . 
Second, the Nationalization Law simply suspended payment of the 
promisory notes that had been issued by the Chilean Government in 1969 
for the payment of 51 percent of the shares of Anaconda's subsidiaries . 
Anaconda went to court and obtained another embargo of CODELCO proper-
ties in the US . These actions did not have any important consequences 
on the copper sector as such, but were matters of concern for the 
Chilean Government as a whole. 
CODELCO, which took over the administration of the nationalized 
firms, did not have much trouble in maintaining the levels of produc-
tion reached in the past and in finishing the expansion program. There 
was a delay in the latter, presumably due to some major technical 
errors in the original plans and the lack of interest on the part of 
the foreign companies because they had expected nationalization since 
the late 60s . The expansion of capacity was finally completed by 1973 . 
There were no major technical difficulties with the operation of 
the mines . Foreign executives and technicians were not very important 
in the LCM sector before nationalization. But many Chileans left the 
country to work in other Anaconda and Kennecott subsidiaries, 45 a trend 
abetted by an ill- defined policy of implicitly reducing the salaries of 
supervisors and technical personnel at that time. 
Paradoxically, the worst problem faced after nationalization 
related to labor relations . This occurred notwithstanding the fact 
that labor unions had traditionally supported the leftist coalition 
that controlled the government between 1970 and 1973. They were 
presumably conscious also of the importance of copper revenues for the 
transformation program intended by President Allende and the adverse 
external conditions faced . 
Absenteeism increased 42 percent in Chuquicamata in the second 
half of 1971 (the firm had been nationalized in July) compared to the 
first half. Partial work stoppages in different divisions still 
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remained high. There were 37 in 1971, down from 80 in 1970 , but they 
increased sharply again in 1972 and 1973 . In El Teniente there was a 
3- month- long strike in 1973 with serious economic and political conse-
quences . 46 
Labor unrest was partially a result of the overall political 
situation in the country during 1971- 73 . But the situation was 
worsened by improvised labor relation policies within the sector, the 
appointment or promotion of personnel based more on their political 
affiliation than technical competence, and lines of authority weakened 
or distorted by political loyalties. 
The importance of labor discipline became apparent when the 
military took over the government and controlled the mines on Septem-
ber 11, 1973. Within a few months, production increased substan-
tially; output in 1974 was 24 percent greater than in 1973 and in 1976 
it reached a record of 850 million tons in the LCM sector alone . 47 To 
the extent, however, that labor discipline has been lately obtained 
through limitations of workers' rights, there is no guarantee that the 
problem has been adequately solved in the long run . 
With respect to the organization of the public sector to admin-
ister the State- owned LCM sector , it appears that on the whole an 
appropriate combination of centralization and decentralization has 
been reached . At the beginning there was an excessive tendency towards 
the former, but it did not reach a high level of bureaucratization. 
Recently, however, the tendency to decentralize may have gone too far 
with respect to marketing. A country that has some oligopolistic power 
in an imperfect market, such as copper, should try to centralize all 
sales, especially to negotiate in world forums for the stabilization of 
prices. 48 
The results of nationalization can be summarized in gross terms by 
the comparison of a single figure. 49 Fiscal revenues and profits for 
Chile in 1976, with an effective copper price of only 67 cents per 
pound, reached about 500 million dollars. This exceeds by at least 
60 percent the average government income obtained in the fifteen years 
before nationalization (1956- 70), although the real price of copper 
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was much lower during the latter period : In 1976 dollars prices 
averaged 82 cents during 1956-70. 50 The average annual fiscal revenue 
for the period 1956-70 was only US $312 million dollars at 1976 
purchasing power . Correcting further for the difference in the price 
of copper, the payment for the capital expropriated from foreign 
companies and changing production levels, the net copper revenue for 
Chile in 1976 per pound of copper produced was twice that obtained in 
the period 1956- 70 . 51 Provisional estimates show that the net surplus 
obtained from the LCM sector amounted to about 25 cents per pound , 
compared to less than 12 cents that could have been obtained in the 
period 1956-70 with a price as low as that of 1976 . In other words, if 
copper had not been nationalized, Chile would probably have received 
about US $200 million less in fiscal revenues from the LCM sector in 
1976 with the low real prices of that year . 
4 . Natural Resources and Development 
There are several questions one would like to answer with respect 
to the relation between a country ' s exploitation of natural resources 
and its overall development . Two of the most relevant ones are dealt 
with here . First , how much could and should development of small LDCs 
be based on natural resource exploitation? Second, what are the basic 
conditions that must be satisfied in order to secure the maximum 
52 contribution of natural resources to a country's development? 
In the case of Chile, technically speaking, copper could have 
contributed and can contribute more to economic growth . Chile pos-
sesses the richest and most economic ore deposits known today in the 
world : they represent over 30 percent of world copper reserves . 
Notwithstanding, the country produces only about 13 percent of total 
copper output . Chilean output has increased less than in the rest of 
the world during the last quarter century, so its share in world 
production has fallen •. Thus, technically, there are no impediments for 
Chile even to double its production in a reasonable period of time --
say , 8 to 12 years . 
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From a world- wide perspective , there is under- explotation of 
Chile's main natural resource; there is an inefficient international 
allocation of the world' ~ factors of production used in copper produc-
tion . Therefore, a decision by Chile to move towards an "open economy" 
with free trade and free capital movements - - under normal conditions 
- - j_mplies that market forces would very probably lead to a signifi-
cantly greater specialization in copper production . A very important 
question from a social national point of view , however , is whether a 
country like Chile should become specialized in exporting natural 
resources . Since in practice a free-market policy is the one being 
followed by the present Chilean government, the previous question is 
not a hypothetical or trivial issue, but a very relevant one . 
Trade liberalization will clearly result in more exports by all 
sectors . But , in addition , we are suggesting that it will imply more 
specialization in copper . Although exports of other (non- traditional 
or other mineral) sectors may also increase rapidly , especially in the 
short run, there are indications that copper exports would increase 
faster . Space limitations preclude discussing the indicators that 
support this hypothesis , 53 and complete studies on the subject have not 
been made . But aside from the technical considerations discussed 
previously , the LCM copper sector appears to be one of the relatively 
more profitable activities within the Chilean economy . CODELCO -- the 
enterprise which operates the mines in that sector - - had a rate of 
after tax profits on its capital of about 26 percent in 1976 , which was 
a year of exceptionally low prices . If COD ELCO ' s profitability is 
estimated at a more normal price --- for instance, the average price 
during the last 20 years -- that rate increases to over 40 percent . It 
is hard to find other exporting sectors even based on natural 
resources like forestry, paper pulp, fruit or wine -- which may have 
such a high rate of return in the long run . 
Also if foreign direct i nvestment is to enter massively into 
Chile , it is most likely to go into copper production . If investment 
has not materialized yet, it i s not mainly because of economic 
inconveniences , but because the country ' s political climate is not 
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attractive and its long run stability is not guaranteed . 
The convenience of specialization in copper under laissez- faire 
conditions from Chile ' s national point of view is not at all clear . 
The main reasons are that a large expansion of copper relative to other 
s ectors would : (a) worsen or at least postpone the solution of the 
important unemployment problem suffered by Chile ; ( b) increase the 
country's external dependence; (c) significantly raise the country's 
economic instability; and (d) in general, probably weaken to some 
extent the i mpulse towards an integrated national development effort 
whose benefits will be the result of the sacrifices and support of all 
Chileans . Certainly these global factors should be considered in 
addition to a careful evaluation of the purely economic convenience of 
copper output expansion . 
The former considerations do not imply that copper mining should 
not be expanded at a faster rate than in the past, but that it should be 
done in an efficiently planned or regulated form, rather than in a 
laissez- faire framework. The former means that expansion should be 
carried out within a policy framework that corrects the price distor-
tions usually existing in less developed countries and that takes into 
consideration the "externalities" generated by that expansion, or 
should be carried out directly by the public sector. 
The copper sector is relatively very capital-intensive, and Chile 
is very labor- abundant with a serious unemployment problem. With the 
present productive structure , a doubling of copper output would not 
generate more than about 3 percent additional direct and indirect 
employment op port uni ties, with copper exports representing around 
20 percent of GNP . 54 Capital investment requirements would be huge --
on the order of 4 . 5 to 6 billion dollars -- suggesting the possibility 
of depending again on foreign capital. In addition, the backward and 
forward linkages of copper mining are relatively minor . 55 It would not 
stimulate the rest of the economy considerably through purchases of 
domestic inputs or help to expand automatically the copper manufac-
turing industries . 
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Again , the answer in these circumstances is not simply to avoid 
expanding copper production . One could choose, however, whether to 
expand as in the past (and to concentrate only in extracting economic 
surpluses from the LCM sector in order to have funds to invest in other 
more labor- intensive sectors), or to take into consideration the 
different factor intensity of production within the copper sector, and 
expand more those varieties of copper that are relatively more labor-
intensive and have more forward and backward linkages . There are 
indications that in a country such as Chile both criteria should be 
considered : not only should the copper sector be expanded to extract a 
sufficient surplus , but also all the country ' s resources should be used 
in a socially efficient form . 
issue . 
But more research is needed on this 
Excessive emphasis seems to have been placed on producing as much 
refined copper as possible . 56 But refining is much more capital-
intensive than mining while value added by that process is not as 
great . Chile has a clear comparative advantage in the latter, while i t 
costs approximately the same to refine a ton of copper concentrate 
(which has about a 30- percent copper content) in Chile as in Japan or 
almost anywhere else . Today , both the "pure" (or Marshallian) as well 
as the oligopolistic rents on this natural resource are obtained at the 
mining stage . The refining industry as such is quite competitive at 
the world level. 
Some additional considerations should be made in the design of an 
appropriate structure of copper expansion . Forward linkages are very 
important . Chile's development of a copper manufacturing industry has 
been restricted to some extent by tariffs and quotas imposed by the 
industrialized importing countries and by multinational companies that 
operate in the latter . Therefore, Chile could try to use its oligo-
polistic power in order to negotiate the selling of its additional 
copper output in the form of concentrates, in exchange for easier 
access to the market for copper manufactures . Similarly , the access of 
MNCs to the exploitation of the country ' s natural resources can be 
conditioned by reciprocal participation in their manufacturing activi-
ties . This is particularly important because the price of copper 
396 
manufactures is much more stable than that of refined copper, so this 
is an efficient way to stabilize the exporting country ' s revenues . 
Probably the most crucial condition that must be satisfied if a 
country such as Chile were to base its development on copper production 
is the stabilization of price or the design of means to compensate for 
the effects of that instability on the rest of the economy . 57 
Instability has a social and political cost for the country , aside from 
a purely economic cost, which, in addition, is normally higher for 
society than for individual investors in copper . 58 Unregulated expan-
sion of production would increase all those costs, because it generates 
some negative externalities that must be considered . 
During the twenty- year period before nationalization the real 
price of copper (i.e ., deflated by the purchasing power of the dollar) 
each year went up or down an average of 12 percent compared to previous 
years . Fiscal revenues in the form of profits and taxes -- which 
represent most of the net surplus obtained by the country from the 
exploitation of its main natural resource -- fluctuated an average of 
28 percent in the same period . These rates have increased in the last 
6 years due to the greater instability of world markets . Copper prices 
fluctuated an average of 17 percent per year between 1971 and 1976 . 
Since in small countries such as Chile those surpluses finance 
most new investment, the rate of growth of GNP becomes quite unstable 
and unpredictable if no compensatory measures are adopted . Copper 
exports in Chile are equivalent to the capital goods sector in 
developed countries, because over 75 percent of investment goods are 
imported . 
In addition, export fluctuations have a strong inflationary bias . 
Balance of payment surpluses tend to expand the money supply and the 
price level rises . But the downward rigidity of public expenditures 
and wages does not allow deflationary economic policy in periods of 
lower copper prices to reduce the price level again . 59 
The export instability problem can be tackled either by 
stabilizing prices (and/or output) or by compensating the effects of 
instability on the rest of the domestic economy, or both.60 
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The former is clearly the first best policy, but in the case of a 
product such as copper there is very little that can be done by an 
isolated country such as Chile . Producing countr ies must act together, 
even forming a cartel if possible . Even the latter may not be enough, 
however, when instability originates from demand fluctuations . There-
fore, consumers must be included in a scheme seeking to stabilize 
prices . 
In copper there is a Council of Copper Exporting Countries 
( CIPEC), but its monopoly power is significantly smaller than OPEC ' s 
(Tironi 1974b , · sec . l; see also the paper by Switucha in these Proceed-
ings) . Copper exporting countries do have some oligopolistic power, 
however, which could be used more effectively for trying to stabilize 
prices rather than trying to obtain permanent price increases . Up to 
now, the copper-exporting countries have been excessively passive in 
accepting the inherited practices of price determination . UNCTAD is 
now seeking means to reach agreements for price stabilization of raw 
materials -- with the partici pation of consumers - - but the difficul-
ties involved are so great that those mechanisms alone can hardly solve 
61 the whole problem . 
Some additional international mechanisms to stabilize revenues 
from natural resour ces should be also considered . A very interesting 
proposal has been put forward by Lessard 0977) , using a financia l 
intermediation mechanism based on commodity- linked contracts . But 
these types of proposals requir e even more study and negotiation . 
At a domestic level three main pol i ci es have been suggested in 
Chile to cope with the impact of export fluctuations on the domestic 
economy . The first is to di versify exports, expanding more rapidly 
exports from other sectors such as agricultural commodities , forestry , 
cellulose and others . But as mentioned , this has a cost in terms of 
not using fully Chile ' s considerably greater compar ative advantage in 
copper production . 
The second policy is to have a completely flexible exchange rate 
determined in t he " free market ." This is strongly favored by many of 
today ' s government policy- makers, who presume that an efficient 
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futures' market would be created automatically to stabilize the 
exchange rate . This policy is suggested mainly in order to eliminate 
the inflationary pressures caused by money supply expansions created 
by the government's purchases of foreign currency at a fixed exchange 
rate . 
The limitations of such a policy are several and quite obvious . 
Its three main problems are : (a) The foreign exchange market would 
still be dominated by the State, which would account for about 60 to 
80 percent of foreign exchange supply and demand . (b) A stable futures 
exchange market requires a stable futures copper market . If the latter 
has not been developed at a world level by the expert operators in that 
market in London and New York, there is no reason to expect that 
Chilean foreign exchange operators would be able to predict (future) 
copper prices more accurately . (c) Although under a flexible exchange 
rate system the money supply would not be directly related to copper 
prices, fiscal revenues would still be tied to them, with similar 
consequences on the rest of the economy . 
In fact, contrary to what is expected by "monetarist" policy-
makers, a free exchange rate policy would be the best way to transmit 
the structural instability of copper export prices to the domestic 
economy . The effects of such a policy on the productive sector and on 
development is not so obvious, but has important negative implica-
tions . The rate of return on investment in many tractable goods sectors 
will always depend on unstable exchange rates . How will an investor 
decide whether to produce an import substituting project with a 5- or 
10- year maturity if the exchange rate typically can be expected to vary 
over at least a 12- percent range every 2 years depending on the price 
of copper? 
The third alternative policy is to accumulate high foreign 
exchange reserves to cope with export price fluctuations . This is a 
much more sensible policy for a country facing unstable external 
prices . But by itself it involves high costs (there are cheaper 
alternatives) for the country because the amount of revenue that would 
be needed is considerable . The core of the problem, however, is how to 
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maintain those reserves or to avoid the temptation of every government 
to use immediately all the transitory income obtained in periods of 
high copper prices . 
Regulation of the use of copper surpluses , therefor e , involves a 
deep political problem. The economic history of Chile shows that in 
the great majority of cases in which there has been an increase of 
prices - - even when obviously temporary -- the additional revenues have 
been spent rapidly by the government due to the latter ' s almost 
permanent fiscal deficits . 62 Thus , copper income has served to post-
pone necessary efforts to increase domestic savings or taxes requir ed 
to finance long- run investment . 
The fluctuating nature of copper income calls for the spending of 
government revenues in the fiscal budget according to the expected 
long- run copper price . This is easy to say, but hard to implement ; the 
problem is how to enforce politically such a type of government 
behavior . I want to suggest that a signifi~ant step in that direction 
can be taken by creating a specific institution explicitly responsible 
for the problem and by setting publicly known and agreed upon guide-
lines according to which copper revenues should be distributed over 
time . 
The latter propositions require, first , educating policy- makers , 
public officials , politicians and the general public about the 
importance of copper revenue instability and of using a "normal " or 
long- run copper price in development planning . In this sense , the 
contribution of the Ricardo Ffrench- Davis book (1973) in introducing 
the latter concept and us i ng it in policy making and in the analysis of 
Chile ' s eonomic policies has been substantia1 . 63 
In the second place, an autonomous "Copper Stabilization and 
Investment Fund" should be established and administer ed with some 
independence from the central government and the copper companies . A 
commission in charge of its management should be elected for suffi-
ciently long periods of time to avoid political interference , similar 
to the manner in which the heads of Central Banks are chosen in most 
developed western countries . In nations with a significant natural 
resources export sector, regulati ng the use of revenues coming from 
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those resources is as important as regulating the money supply; in 
fact, the former determines to a large extent the changes in the 
latter . 64 The managers of the Copper Fund should have explici t 
authority to invest in short-term securities at home and abroad, and to 
make loans or buy public and private sector bonds . 
In the third place , the fiscal sector by itself could also seek 
compensating taxes to stabilize its revenues . The first - best policy in 
this context would be to set "variable tariffs" on a small set of 
imported consumer goods not produced domestically which are inversely 
related to copper prices . Automobiles are an example of a good that 
should be included in that set . When copper prices are low, tariffs 
would increase, thus reducing imports and increasing fiscal revenues 
to compensate for the fall in copper final revenue . But the higher 
tariffs should be explicitly temporary and increased discretely within 
a previously determined optimal range . The maximum rate should be such 
that it would not encourage domestic production, nor reduce the 
quantity imported so much as to reduce fiscal revenues from tariffs . 
When copper prices rise again -- so the country as a whole becomes 
"richer" -- tariffs can be reduced and citizens may have the chance to 
buy new durable goods. 65 The scheme would have to operate with a small 
set of goods chosen by taking into consideration not only the fact that 
they should never be produced domestically, but also their impact on 
income distribution, their demand elasticities and the fiscal revenues 
66 that they could generate . 
If, instead of the tariff change on a few commodities, the 
exchange rate were to be allowed to rise or fall as a consequence of a 
temporary copper price change, that instability would be transmitted 
to many other sectors in the economy, and many import-substituting or 
exporting productive activities would absorb or release resources 
erroneously . The main advantage of the variable-tariff formula is 
precisely that the exchange rate would not be affected by short- term 
copper price fluctuations . Thus, the rate of return on investment in 
other sectors of the economy would not be affected by the latter . 
Also, since there would be no domestic production of the goods subject 
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to the "variable compensating tariffs" , the pressures from national 
producers and workers to maintain high tariffs can be avoided . 
Capital goods s hould probably be excluded from the set of variable 
tariffs precisely to avoid having their prices fluctuating with those 
of copper . The basic concept is for investment to be independent of 
short- run phenomena , especially considering the cost of having 
projects stopped before they are completed due to lack of funds in 
periods of low copper prices . This has been a situation often faced in 
Chile, with considerable indirect effects on employment and overall 
economic activity, but would not be the case with the "non- essential" 
imported consumer goods suggested in the formula proposed here . 
The latter proposition implies a new criteria for determining the 
whole structure of foreign trade and tariff patterns . Traditional 
discussions about free trade , zero tariffs or high indus trial protec-
tion between neo- classical and structuralist economists assume homo-
geneous economies . We need to imagine new schemes for structurally 
unbalanced economies . 
The problem has become more urgent for countries which have 
nationalized their natural resources . Now a larger fraction of their 
income comes from an unstable source, while they have added a fixed 
expenditure i tern in their balance of payments (the sum to be paid 
annually for the foreign capital purchased) . Multinational corpora-
tions formerly transferred their income instability to their share-
holders or reduced that instability through product diversification . 
Shareholders, in turn , avoided much unstability (or risks of 
fluctuating dividends and capital gains) by diversifying their port-
folio of securities . Small country governments cannot resort as easily 
to those procedures . Therefore, countries accepting foreign investors 
in their natural resources sector should try to obtain part of their 
surpluses as a fixed rent to be paid by the companies . In practice 
they could " lease" their ore deposits, opening auctions for their 
exploitation, or set a fixed tax sum based on a long run or normal 
copper price . In these ways, a larger share of instability would be 
transferred to the foreign investors which have more means to compen-
sate for it. Foreign companies may be able to compensate for the 
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effects of copper revenue instability at a lower cost than the host 
country , leaving both better off by using that kind of surplus extrac-
tion policy . 
The decision concerning which of the above stabilizing mechanisms 
to choose requires further study . Probably all of them can be used 
complementarily in some appropriate degree . At this stage , however , 
one of the most important contributions that can be made in order that 
LDCs may take advantage of the mixed blessing of possessing rich 
natural resources, is to propose and analyze policies to cope with the 
effects of their serious price instability . 
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FOOTNOTES 
1see Pinto (1973) . 
2For a modern simple view on the problem see Johnson (1962). 
3For a simple general presentation of the arguments by classical 
economists, see Meier and Baldwin (1961), pp . 78- 81 . 
4Nurske ( 1954) . 
5see especially, Scott and Scitowsky (1970), Bhagwati (1977) and 
Krueger (1977) . 
6Ffrench- Davis and Pi~era (1976) . 
7At a different but related level, a country must decide how to 
use the revenue or surplus obtained from the exploitation of natural 
resources . We shall not concentrate on this topic in this section, 
however, because it is more a matter of overall development policy in a 
country with rich natural resources . 
8of course a country could have a completely laissez- faire market 
economy which implies the absence of government policies or interven-
tion in favor of or against any particular sector in comparison with 
the others . In that framework, production and investment in the 
natural resources sector would be determined only by the market ; that 
is, by presumable independent entrepreneurs comparing private produc-
tivities and market prices in different sectors . We do not need to 
discuss the implications of that type of policy option : practically no 
LDC that depends heavily on natural resources follows such a laissez-
faire policy today . 
9such as, for instance, the instability of products' prices or 
employment generated in their production, whose importance is analyzed 
below. 
10Notice that the same could be done by. directly fixing the 
adequate targets in the case of a planned economy . The crucial point 
is determining the social criteria on which to base the production 
decisions . 
11 In addition, investments to develop new natural resources in 
LDCs are usually so large compared to the rest of the economy, so 
discontinuous in time and involve so many externalities, that they 
should require direct public evaluation and supervision. 
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12For details about the SMCM sector, see Tironi (1974a). 
13This secti on is based on Ffrench-Davis (1974a) . 
14 , 
Corporacion del Cobre (1975), Table XVIII, Annex 1. See also 
Statistical Appendix Table A-1. 
15Accounting depreciation contains an element of net earnings, due 
to the system of "accelerated depreciation" which has been applied to 
this activity. Ffrench-Davis (1974a), p. 33. 
16see Section 3, 1 and 2 below . 
17 All statistics about production refer to the copper "content" of 
output, although it is different for the various forms in which the 
product may be sold. 
18see Statistical Appendix Table A-2 . 
19For an analysis of how the copper market operates see Banks 
(1974) and Bentjerodt (1974) . 
20This is Ffrench-Davis' "normal" copper prtce obtained as a seven 
year moving average. All the figures are in 1976 dollars which are 
deflated by an index of Chile's external prices. See Ffrench-Davis 
(1973), Tables 47 and 27, pages 282 and 238. 
21 Estimated by the author on the basis of data provided by CODELCO 
(1975, Table 1, page 17) and Ffrench-Davis (1974a, Table 4) . The 
figures about costs are not very reliable because of several hetero 
geneities in the definition of costs used by the different enterprises . 
Costs per pound include the :i_mplicit exchange rate-tax (which 
represented an average of about 6 percent of total costs) but excludes 
an imputed interest rate on the enterprise's own capital . 
22see statements by the Chairman of the Board of CODELCO in El 
Mercurio, March 26, 1977. 
23since the price of energy has increased substantially in this 
period that result implies that costs not related to petroleum must 
have increased less or even may have fallen in real terms. 
24 All these data are also from Ffrench-Davis (1974a, Table 4) 
obtained from CODELCO and the Banco Central de Chile. 
25 Those disbursements were inflated during some periods due to an 
implicit exchange-rate tax which resulted from the obligation imposed 
on the firms to sell their dollars in the Central Bank at an exchange 
rate (pesos per dollar) lower than that applicable to the rest of 
foreign trade. That tax was particularly significant in the 1952- 55 
period. In some of those years it amounted to more than 50 percent of 
local expenditures . 
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26obvi ously the rate of profit underestimates the true return on 
investment for the companies since they enjoyed accelerated deprecia-
tion allowances . But there are no indications that, in addition, they 
transferred profits abroad through transfer pricing . 
27since 1973 there has been an attempt to attract foreign investors 
again in order to open new mines. Only as recently as July 1977 the 
first mixed enterprise was formed between the State and a Canadian 
firm . 
28 Reynolds (1965) col . 81, p . 378 . 
29corporacion del Cobre (1975) Annex 1 . 
30The basic level was equal to 95 percent of the average annual 
output registered in the period 1949- 53 . The initial phase of the 
period chosen coincided with crisis years in the international copper 
market; towards the end of this five- year period , world demand was 
increasing, but Chile had difficulties in selling its production, and 
this had negative repercussions on the use of the installed capacity of 
the sector. 
31All these figures are expressed in dollars with 1976 purchasing 
power, and are based on Ffrench- Davis (1974a, Table 6) . 
32Ibid, Table 4 . 
33For accounts about the negotiations during this period, 
Baklanoff (1965) . On the companies ' behavior see Girvan (1974) . 
34Ffrench-Davis (1974a), p . 29 . 
35corporacion del Cobre (1969) . 
see 
36 rncluding an income tax on company profits and additional tax on 
dividends remitted abroad . 
37Recall that in this paper the exchange rate i s defined as peso 
per dollar . 
38 A fourth implicit policy followed by some gover nments was a 
favorable attitude towards higher wages for workers in the large mines . 
Their earnings were much higher than those of other workers within the 
country, but that implied a larger proportion of foreign exchange 
returned to Chile . Thus, they captured part of the rent generated in 
copper production . 
39Ffrench-Davis (1974b) and (1975) . 
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40The policy of supporting or allowing excessively high wages and 
salaries in the large-scale mining sector and the concessions that 
reduced capital costs (such as accelerated depreciation and tariff 
exemptions) probably had a similar, although smaller effect. It may 
have discouraged employment by the companies , hence collecting more 
foreign exchange for the country on that account, but to a lesser 
extent because the substitution between labor and capital seems to be 
lower than between imported and domestic inputs . 
41 see Mikesell (1970), p. 370 . 
42The content of pure copper of the Chilean mines is between 1 . 2 
and 1.8 percent compared to one percent at the world level and only 0 . 3 
to 0.5 percent in the United States . See "Open Pit Mining in the 
Seventies" in Engineering and Mining Journal (quoted by Moran (1971) 
p. 24-25) . The Chilean mines have other advantages too, such as their 
proximity to ports, which reduces transportation costs considerably . 
According to recent statements by CODELCO officials, the investment 
costs of opening a new mine in Chile are approximately half of those in 
the rest of the world. See El Mercurio, March 26, 1977 . 
43Ffrench-Davis (1974b), Table 3. 
44For details see Vargas (1974) and Novoa (1973) . 
45 rn El Teniente, an average of 16 supervisors left the enterprise 
per month between September 1970 and June 1971, compared to a rate of 
8 per month in normal times. For more details, see Tironi (1972) . 
46 rt is important to note, however, that workers' attitudes were 
more positive in some minerals that in others, depending on their 
political affiliation, on the training they had received and on their 
particular occupations . For an interesting analysis about workers' 
behavior see Bitar and Pizarro (1974) . 
47Productivity also increased from about 19 metric tons per worker 
in 1973 to 27 metric tons in 1976. Back in the late sixties (before 
nationalization) labor productivity amounted to about 24 tons per 
worker (ODEPLAN (1977, Table 14) and Ffrench-Davis (1974b, Table 2)) . 
48see Tironi (1974b) sec . 1. 
49 obviously , a more complete evaluation of nationalization would 
involve comparing the trends in production, fiscal revenues, etc . 
before that event with the actual results in the whole period after 
nationalization . But we are not interested here in a complete evalua-
tion of nationalization . 
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50The surplus that could have been obtained from the LCM sector in 
1976 if price had been equal to the average of the previous 20 years 
(82 cents) would have reached almost 800 million dollars. 
51 These estimations assume a payment of 45 million dollars to 
Anaconda, Kennecott and Cerro in 1976, and all figures were deflated by 
the index of external prices for Chile, which was 98 percent higher in 
1976 than in 1969 . Thus, a 60- cent copper price in 1976 is equivalent 
to about a 30-cent price in 1969 measured in 1969 dollars . The source 
of data for the 1956-70 period is Ffrench- Davis (1974a) and those for 
1976 were obtained from CODELCO's balance sheets (also published in El 
Mercurio, March 30, 1977) . 
52An excellent account of other issues on natural resources and 
development is provided in Garnaut's (1977) paper in this volume . 
53The only economic study of that sort is that of Foxley and Clark 
0972) which uses a linear programming global model of the Chilean 
economy . Their results indicate that output expansions on the order of 
50 percent would be justified for real copper prices similar to those 
of the late 60s and early 70s. 
54rt is of great interest to observe that in Foxley and Clark ' s 
(1972) model when copper output is increased 45 percent over the 1975 
expected level, rather than only 10 percent, the unemployment rate 
increases from 6 . 6 percent to 7 . 2 percent because domestic resources 
are pulled away from the other more labor- intensive sectors of the 
economy . Obviously the model contains a restriction of national and 
foreign savings . 
55The coefficient of indirect to direct employment opportunities 
created by copper mining is 0 . 7 compared to 1 . 4 in the manufacturing 
industry (Marfan, 1977) . 
56This may not have been always negative in the past; conditions 
change depending on refining and transportation costs . But during some 
periods refining was over-subsidized. For instance, the New Deal Law 
in 1955 authorized the foreign companies to charge directly as a cost 
one cent per pound for refining based on additional capacity . Since by 
that time value added in refining was about 1.2 cents per pound, 
assuming a 60-percent income tax rate, the Government was granting a 
125 percent effective subsidy to refining in Chile. Ffrench-Davis 
0974a), p. 39 . 
57Note, however, that this is a valid problem for most LDCs with a 
high fraction of exports of natural resources . According to a study by 
Grunwald and Musgrave ( 1970 , Table B- 2), 8 out of 15 major primary 
commodities exported by Latin America had a price fluctuation higher 
than that of copper in the period between the Second World War and 
1964 . The literature about problems of export instability is rela-
tively scarce . The classical contributions are those of Wallich (1950 
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and 1961). Other useful studies are those of Coppock (1962) and 
MacBean (1966) . 
58This topic is difficult to study but there are non- trivial 
relations between economic and political instability in Chile . See 
Tironi 0974c) . 
59These considerations gave rise to a whole theory of inflati on in 
Latin America known as the "structuralist" theory . See especially 
Sunkel (1960). 
6°For a brief survey of the microeconomic theory of welfare effects 
of price instability, see Comision Chilena del Cobre (1977) . 
61 UNCTAD 0976) . 
62 A notable excep-tion occurred in the period 1966- 70, when a large 
share of the abnormal copper revenue was saved in the form of foreign 
exchange reserves at the Central Bank . The latter were not spent 
notwithstanding that there was a very close presidential election in 
1970 , with the candidate of the governing party losing to President 
Allende . 
63Recall that Ffrench- Davis ' normal price is defined as a seven 
year moving average centered in the 4th year , i . e . , that includes a 
prediction of the prices during the next three years . 
64Chilean exports are three times greater than the domestic money 
supply and most of the former correspond to one product, while in the 
U. S. , for instance, exports are only one third of the money supply. 
65Tariff changes should be discrete , although not necessarily with 
fixed dates at which they would be varied again in order to avoid 
expectations making those changes i neffective . For i nstance, the 
rules could be that if the copper price is below 65 cents per pound , 
tariffs on cars would be 150 percent ; if that price is between 
65 and 75 cents, tariffs fall to 100 percent; if the former exceeds 
75 cents the latter would fall to 60 percent. The build-up of car 
stocks on the part of car dealers would not necessarily make the system 
fail , but would only implici tly trans fer to the latter the accumulation 
of some fore i gn exchange reserves in the form of automobiles . 
66wi th automobiles alone, the scheme would be feasible . Today 
Chilean purchases are about 25 thousand units a year and tariffs are 
120 percent . Hence , at an average CIF price of 4 thousand dollars per 
car , they would generate fiscal revenues of 120 million dollars . A 
5 cent per pound copper price reduction i mplies today about 100 mil-
lion dollars less in fiscal revenues, so an increase of tariffs on cars 
from 120 percent to 170 percent would compensate half the fall of 
copper revenues if price elast icity of demand for automobiles wer e 
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equal to one, and it would help to reduce the balance of payments 
deficits by 20 million dollars as a consequence of the fall in the 
quantity of cars imported. 
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ISSUES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESOURCE-RICH LDCs: 
COPPER IN CHILE 
A COMMENT 
Romeo M. Bautista 
In this very interesting paper, which is relatively short by the 
standards of the present conference, Dr . Tironi discusses the issues 
and problems of mineral resource- based development using the postwar 
Chilean experience as a case study . A brief survey of development 
theories relating to the role of mineral resources is f i rst presented , 
followed by a description of the structure and performance of the 
Chilean copper industry since the early 1950's. The paper then 
discusses, in a well-organized way, the nature of policies affecting 
the industry and evaluates their effectiveness . The last part of the 
paper takes on a more normative character, examining specific policies 
that could lead, it is argued, to a greater contribution of the copper 
industry to Chile ' s economic growth . 
Before commenting on the policy aspects, which constitute the 
more substantive part of Dr . Tironi ' s paper, I would like to raise a 
few minor points relating to the earlier sections . We are told of the 
heterogeneity of the copper industry in Chile, distinction being made 
between the large- scale copper mining (LCM) sector consisting of the 
four firms that exploit the country ' s largest ore deposits and the 
small- and medium-scale (SMCM) sector which was able to double its 
share of total copper output over the period from the late 1950 ' s to 
the early 1970' s. It would have been very useful to know the 
characteristics of the SMCM sector and the underlying reasons for its 
rapid growth, which could perhaps be tied to the later discussion of 
both the descriptive and normative aspects of Chilean policy towards 
the copper industry . For instance, the presumably higher labor 
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intensity of the SMCM sector has implications for the capacity of the 
industry to generate additional employment . While we are given a 
reference for details about the SMCM sector , no discussion is provided 
on the desirability of possible changes in industry structure induced 
by appropriate policies . 
I am somewhat doubtful of the reliabil i ty and usefulness of the 
rate-of-return figures given towards the end of Section II . The ratio 
of net profits to book value of capital is not particularly meaningful 
under conditions of transfer pricing and accelerated depreciation 
policy . Also, without adjusting for the discrepancy between market and 
shadow prices of resources (including foreign exchange) caused by 
market distortions, any measure of the rate of return is not likely to 
reflect the social desirability of investment in developing countries . 
In his discussion of policies toward multinational corporations , 
Dr . Tironi draws attention to the difficulty experienced by Chilean 
policymakers in formulating an optimal policy that would insure the 
maximization of the present value of the surplus obtained in the long 
run . The description of ownership and surplus extraction policies and 
their effects on government revenue is very illuminating . One specific 
policy lesson concerns the observed ineffectiveness of domestic cur-
rency overvalua ti on (his terminology is "artificially undervalued 
exchange rate" ) due to the high degree of substitutability between 
imported and locally- produced inputs in copper production . (Whether 
this is also t r ue in other LDCs less industrially developed than Chile 
needs to be checked . ) It is also noteworthy that as early as 1955 the 
Chilean government had begun to train technical per sonnel for the 
regulation of MNC accounting practices , imports and marketing , 
resulting in , among other things , a subs t antial decrease in the import 
component of the industry ' s input structure (from 60 percent in 1955-
57 to 28 percent in 1970- 71) . By the end of the late 1960s it would 
appear also that the marketing expertise of this technical staff was· on 
a par with that of the MN Cs . This facilitated in no small way the 
movement towards nationalization of the copper industry , which could 
easily have been a traumatic experience without such a degree of 
prepar edness by the government staff . 
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Dr . Tironi infers the effect of the nationalization policy on 
government revenue to be about US $100 million from a comparison of the 
calculated net surplus per pound of copper produced in 1956-70 and in 
1976. I think that the basis for the inference is questionable; 
instead of using the 1956-70 average, he should have extrapolated the 
trend in determining what the surplus would have been in 1976 without 
nationalization . 
Dr . Tironi describes some external diseconomies of increasing the 
importance of the copper mining sector in the national economy in terms 
of the country ' s exposure to external instability, low employment 
generating capacity and weak inter- industry linkages . On these 
grounds he argues for the efficient planning and regulation of the 
industry, which may entail a lower degree of specialization in copper 
production than that resulting from free trade. Also, he advocates 
investment of the economic surplus into relatively labor-intensive 
sectors both inside and outside the copper industry . (Promotion of the 
small- and medium-scale copper mining sector could have been examined 
in this part of Dr . Tironi's paper . ) 
It is rather surprising that he would prefer to have Chile move 
out of the production of refined copper and specialize more in exports 
of copper concentrates. Even if it were possible in exchange "to 
negotiate an easier access to the manufacture's market" and quite apart 
from the comparative advantage in the production of the two commodi-
ties, I cannot imagine the Chilean authorities shutting down existing 
copper refining plants . Perhaps what might be considered would be to 
simply stop expanding refining capacity in the future. 
As a final policy issue, the instability problem is examined by 
Dr. Tironi in some detail. Copper prices have been fluctuating 
significantly in the postwar period (by an average annual change of 
12 percent, relative to the purchasing power of the U.S . dollar), a 
problem which the CIPEC is not expected to solve in any significant 
way . The paper discusses some ~omestic policy measures designed to 
alleviate the problem, but in the end it is acknowledged that a certain 
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degree of fiscal discipline is necessary to be able to adhere to a 
policy of re la ting annual government expenditures to the expected 
long-run copper price . (Why not also quantity?) Assuming that it is 
not impossible to get a consensus on such a price level (unfortunately, 
not precisely defined in the paper), Dr . Tironi recommends the estab-
lishment of an autonomous institution, the "Copper Stabilization and 
Investment Fund," empowered to allocate and invest copper revenues 
under certain well - publicized guidelines . In addition, it is also 
suggested that some form of "structural adjustment" should be built 
into the country's tariff system, specifically a variable tariff 
schedule for inessential consumer imports related to the actual levels 
of the copper price . This would automatically adjust tariff revenues 
in the opposite direction of the change in copper export price . In 
view of their temporal character, the higher tariff rates at times of 
depressed copper prices are not supposed "to encourage production, nor 
reduce the quantity imported so much as to reduce fiscal revenues from 
tariffs ." I think this is unrealistic . Moreover, capital goods are 
not subject to variable tariffs "to avoid having their prices fluc-
tuating with those of copper" and "to make investment independent of a 
short-run phenomenon." Drawing from the effective protection litera-
ture, it would seem to me that a bias in the incentive structure and 
attendant inefficiency in resource allocation will result from the 
implementation of the suggested variable tariff policy . 
But I should not end my comments on a critical note. . Overall I 
find Dr . Tironi's paper most informative and interesting . Personally 
I wish that policy managers in Asian and African countries with less 
experience in mineral resource development could have access to infor-
mation on the Latin American experiences, such as this paper by 
Dr. Tironi, and learn the policy lessons the easy way . 
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ISSUES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESOURCE- RICH LDCs: 
COPPER IN CHILE 
A COMMENT 
Danny M. Leipziger* 
Let me say first that I found Mr . Tironi ' s paper to be an 
excellent case study and , given my lack of particular expertise in the 
copper industry , I certainly woul d not quarrel with any of the detailed 
arguments in the paper . 
My major criticism of the paper -- indeed my only cr iticism -- is 
that the copper sector is analyzed pretty much in isolation rather than 
as an integral part of the economy . There is some discuss ion of 
government revenue linkages , but it would seem to me that to propose an 
expansion of copper as the leading sector in the economy ' s growth as is 
done towards the end of the paper , without a discussion of a develop-
ment strategy, is a throwback to a dualistic economy . I think this 
could easily be accomplished with a discussion of how to use the 
additional foreign exchange generated , and how development targets 
such as employment and income distribution can be affected . Admit-
tedly, copper exports account for 75 percent of total exports , but 
wouldn ' t a plan for Chile in the year 1987 involve a lesser dependence 
on copper? 
My second point is one of re 5- nforcement -- I think it is terribly 
impor tant to stress the role of commodity export earnings in public 
expenditure policy . This :Ls where the short-term instability issue 
confronts us once again . We know t hat t r ansitory income tends to be 
spent often, as I mentioned yesterday , on wage incr eases in the public 
sector wi th fall cut effects on general wage levels , prices of non-
*These comments do notnecessar ily reflect the policy or views of the 
Agency for International Development . 
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traded goods and the structure of production . A recent study on Ghana 
demonstrates that changes in cocoa earnings are almost perfectly 
correlated with changes in government spending . I therefore liked 
Tironi ' s point about spending an average of long- run expected earnings 
or entering into long-term supplier contracts where the risk can be 
transferred (at a price, of course) to companies which are more 
diversified and better able to absorb such fluctuations . 
A more formal treatment of optimal government policy would 
require a discussion on the rate- of- time preference, the price of 
purchasing certainty, the costs and benefits of earnings fluctuations, 
and the probability of their occurrance . 
Now we come to minor questions : (1) Tironisuggests that costs in 
the 1960s and 1976 were equal in real terms which I find curious unless 
copper mining is not energy- intensive; (2) the argument that copper 
production should be expanded does not include any discussion of 
opportunity costs, which might be relevant, especially if either 
foreign exchange or budget revenues are involved; ( 3) in the final 
section of the paper I think Tironi wants to consider not only average 
price changes but also the variance of prices; (4) and lastly , I was 
very interested in Tironi ' s point that Chile has no comparative 
advantage in refining (and this relates to Mr . Switucha' s earlier 
comment on Canada) . I would like some elaboration of the relative size 
of value-added, employment, stability of earnings and long- term demand 
prospects in processed copper , because perhaps the Group of 77 (and 
UNCTAD) are off on the wrong tangent . 
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ISSUES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESOURCE-RICH LDCs : 
COPPER IN CHILE 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Tironi opened the general discussion with several clarifications . 
First , small- and medium- sized firms in the copper sector were more 
involved in processing copper concentrate than in refining . Since the 
former was more labor- intensive, this sector could be easily expanded 
without foreign investment or foreign firms . No detailed studies on 
value-added have been made of this sector , partly because of variations 
due to innovations in transport. Second, he estimated the long-run 
copper price by a seven- year moving average, which was reasonable in 
view of econometric evidence which indicated that copper prices fol -
lowed an eight- year cycle . The establishment of an independent agency 
to tie copper-export revenue expenditures to the long-term price was 
important because undisciplined fiscal spending of export revenues , 
which amounted to approximately half the domestic money supply, was 
destabilizing . Third, the variable-tariff scheme was realistic in the 
sense that politicians could be educated on its importance. It would 
not have negative resource allocation effects since it would only be 
tied to a few specific goods which were not domestically produced . The 
whole purpose of the scheme was to offset domestic allocation effects 
of fluctuating copper prices . 
Participants received favorably the proposal to keep copper 
revenue expenditures on a long-term path . Application of excess copper 
revenues to domestic stabilization policy was dangerous . However , the 
proposal would work only if the copper market behaved according to 
historical patterns . If the variance of copper prices was outside the 
normal experience , as it was recently, then a copper revenue fund could 
be bankrupted . Hence some second- string support policies, such as the 
variable- tariff scheme, were needed . 
The variable- tariff proposal was received more skeptically . 
Tariffs are politically difficult to manipulate , since high tariffs 
421 
generate political pressures to keep them high . Als·o variable tariffs 
may not be acceptable to trading partner countries . More funda-
mentally, if economic agents expect tariff changes to be temporary, 
then they will simply adjust inventories and the tariff policy will be 
ine.ffective. Monetary policy would be a more effective stabilization 
tool . Tironi replied that a tariff policy was preferable to monetary 
policy because it imposed smaller macroeconomic adjustment costs . 
There were problems with a tariff policy , particularly concerning 
expectations, and details needed to be worked out . He stressed · that a 
variable tariff policy was strictly a second- best solution . The first-
best solution was the external stabilization of copper prices . 
A participant thought that Tironi was too pessimistic about the 
possibility for external price stabilization. Progress had been made 
on an agreement for an international price stabilization scheme 
financed from common funds . Such an agreement was certainly in the 
interest of both consuming and producing nations . Another participant 
warned that complexities of the copper market defied ready solution and 
that proposals would have to be elaborated considerably , 
Another participant warned that any price stabilization scheme 
should be combined with domestic financial stabilization policies . He 
proposed that a resource- exporting country should accumulate net 
foreign financial assets in an upswing, and decumulate them in a 
downswing . These investments should be channeled through newly-
created third- world capital markets . 
In general , developing countries should pay more attention to the 
relationship between development and financial planning . Another 
participant warned that segmentation of capital markets was both 
unnecessary and undesirable . It was unnecessary because established 
capital markets were becoming increasingly efficient . It was 
undesirable because the riskiest investments would be channeled 
through the third world markets . 
An alternative Chilean viewpoint was that the importance of the 
copper sector must be understood in the context of overall development 
and trade policies . Chile is rich in other natural resources, 
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including other minerals , forests, fisheries , and agricultural lands . 
But high effective tariffs imposed by government import substitution 
policies created a bias against non-copper exports , and this is the 
main reason why copper provides 80 percent of export earnings . More 
relaxed trade policies have provoked a boom in non- copper exports , and , 
as a result , four years from now copper will probably contribute less 
than 50 percent to export earnings . Thus , export diversification is 
one benefit to Chile of opening up its economy . Tironi replied that 
trade policies did not have distortive relative price effects, because 
of large investment discontinuities in the copper industry, and 
restated his opinion that laissez- faire policies would lead to more and 
not less copper specialization. 
Some participants thought that the pros and cons of nationaliza-
tion needed further discussion . Government mining operations have not 
been trouble free . Some objective indicators of the success of 
nationalization were clearly needed . Tironi countered that Chile had 
reached a point of technical skill where domestic management of the 
copper industry was possible . Foreign investment created political 
problems, instability, and other costs and was therefore undesirable . 
The fears of disrupted production following nationalization were 
exaggerated al though there were some problems resulting from labor 
disputes and political struggles . Today Chile has demonstrated that it 
can mine copper efficiently , which is evidenced by the fact that the 
real mining costs are approximately at 1970 levels . 
A participant argued that Tironi underestimated the impact of 
copper industry expansion on employment by looki ng only at direct 
linkages . The indirect effects were in general insufficiently 
treated . Another agreed that Chile had no comparative advantage in 
copper refining , but thought that an expansion of concentrate exports 
was inadvisable since trade in these had peaked . There were , however , 
advantages in developing forward linkages, and this was an obvious 
direction for export diversification . 
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NATURAL RESOURCE PROBLEMS IN A RESOURCE- POOR DEVELOPING COUNTRY : 
THE KOREAN CASE 
Wontack Hong 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the natural resource problems in a 
resource- poor developing country on the basis of Korea ' s experience . 
The paper concentrates on the problem of non-oil mineral imports which 
have risen fairly rapidly in Korea since 1974 and are expected to rise 
even more rapidly in the future. An overview of aspects of growth and 
trade and resource dependency of the Korean economy is followed by an 
investigation of the domestic industrial structure and the need for 
mineral resources for economic growth . Inflation in mineral prices and 
associated problems will also be examined . 
2. Growth, Trade and Resource Dependency 
The population density of Korea was 365 persons per square kilo-
meter in 1976, which was the second highest in the world (next to 
Bangladesh) if one excludes such city states as Hong Kong and Singa-
pore . Total population increased from about 21 million in 1953 to 
26 million in 1962 and to about 36 million in 1976 . As a result, the 
land endowment per person declined from about 4 , 700 square meters in 
1953 to 3,800 square meters in 1962 and to about 2,700 square meters in 
1976 . Since about 20 percent of the total land in Korea is currently 
arable, the per capita arable land amounted to only about 540 square 
meters in 1976 . 
However, due to a successful export- oriented growth policy, Korea 
was able to achieve one of the highest growth rates in the world during 
1962- 76, which covers the First, Second and Third Five- Year Plan 
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periods . Over that period, per capita GNP in 1976 dollars rose from 
about $245 to about $700, for an average annual growth rate of nearly 
1 8 percent . The average annual growth rate of GNP exceeded 10 percent . 
Korea ' s exports, which amounted to less than $0 . 1 billion before 1962 , 
increased at an average annual rate of more than 40 percent (about 
35 percent in 1970 constant prices) from 1962 to 1976 and totalled 
nearly $8 . 0 billion in 1976 . The ratio of merchandise exports to GNP 
increased from about 2 to 30 percent . By 1976 about 35 percent of GNP 
originated in manufacturing (12 percent in 1962), and manufactured 
products constituted more than 90 percent of total merchandise exports 
which had never exceeded the 20 percent level between 1953 and 1961 . 
The major manufactured exports in the 1960s were textiles , wearing 
apparel, plywood and various miscellaneous manufactures . In the early 
1970s, electronic products, steel and metal products were added to the 
list of major export goods . It is planned , and also expected, that 
Korea will be exporting a large amount of electrical and non- electrical 
machinery and transport equipment (such as ships and parts for motor 
vehicles) by the end of the Fourth Five-Year Plan period (1977- 81) . 
Since 1973, more than one third of total workers in manufacturing 
have been employed in production for exports. The total number of 
employed persons increased from about 7 . 7 million in 1963 to about 
13 . 0 million in 1976 while the number of persons employed in manufac-
turing increased from about o . 6 million in 1963 to about 2 . 5 million in 
1976 . 
The target for merchandise exports in 1977 was $10 billion (and 
was achieved) , that of service exports (such as construction , trans-
portation, tourism, etc . ) was $2 billion, and the target GNP growth 
rate for 1977 was 10 percent , which was also accomplished . The Fourth 
Five Year Plan aims at achieving a per capita GNP of about $1,500 and 
merchandise exports of $20 billion in current dollar prices by 1981 , 
but this export target is regarded as too conservative by the World 
Bank experts . Quite a few people have added up all such major economic 
indicators and have concluded that Korea has been one of the most 
successfully growing economies in the world since 1962 . 
427 
And yet, perhaps as a result of this successful growth, the Korean 
people are becoming more concerned about the nation's future survival 
prospects because of international competition. The major question 
seems to be whether a (natural) resource- poor country like Korea can 
survive the seemingly aggravating tyranny of resource-rich wealthy 
) 
countries. Constantly increasing prices for natural resources, 
increasing protectionism, and the 200-mile fishing limits are but a few 
readily identifiable sources of concern . This paper, however, will 
limit its focus to a discussion of mineral resource problems of Korea . 
According to Table 1, in 1974 goods and service exports in 
1970 dollar prices were very close to goods and service imports in 1970 
prices and, in 1975, the former exceeded the latter slightly, implying 
a balance of payments surplus in the current account. However, in 
current dollar prices, the balance of payments deficits amounted to 
$2 . 0 billion in 1974 and $1.9 billion in 1975, which were mostly 
attributable to the oil crisis and the associated inflation in raw 
material prices. 
In the 1950s, mineral ores and concentrates accounted for close to 
half of the total annual merchandise exports . However, their share 
steadily and rapidly declined in the 1960s, and it amounted to only 
about one percent of total exports in 1975 . In the 1960s, minerals 
were still among the major export items from Korea . With the contin-
uous rapid expansion of manufactured exports, however, mineral exports 
became insignificant by the 1970s . 
Imports of mineral ores and concentrates were negligible during 
the colonial period (1910-45) and in the 1950s . Even in the 1960s, 
mineral imports amounted to only around one percent of total commodity 
imports . On the other hand, the imports of crude oil steadily 
increased from about 3 percent of total imports in 1964 to 6 percent in 
1973 and then, due to the oil crisis, jumped to 18 percent in 1976. 
Therefore, Korea did not experience serious problems associated 
with mineral imports until very recently. In its previous stage of 
industrialization, Korea's demand for mineral products could be satis-
fied by directly importing processed mineral products, such as non-
metallic mineral products, iron and steel products, ferrous and 
428 
nonferrous metals and finished metal products . These amounted to 
around 5 percent of total merchandise imports during 1953- 61 and 
around 10 percent thereafter . Although there was a steady increase of 
imported crude oil from 1963 to 1973, it did not reach crisis propor-
tions until 1974 . 
Before 1962 annual exports amounted to only around $20 to 40 
million . During 1953- 57 , minerals made up between 51 and 99 percent of 
total exports and during 1958- 61 between 34 and 44 percent , while the 
balance was mainly made up of fishery products and miscellaneous 
primary goods . 2 Imports of minerals , on the other hand , were negligible 
because of the backward state of the mineral processing industry and 
amounted to less than one million dollars per annum during 1954- 60 . 
Annual commodity imports amounted to about $300 to $400 million during 
1953- 61, and were financed mostly by U. S. grants- in- aid . Manufactures 
of minerals such as nonmetallic mineral pr oducts , iron and steel 
products , ferrous and nonferrous metals and finished metal products 
constituted 5 to 7 percent of total commodity imports before 1962 . 
Since 1962 t he share of mineral exports in total merchandise 
exports has declined rapidly, from 22 percent in 1962 to 9 percent in 
1967, to 2 percent in 1972 and to less than one percent i n 1976 , 
although there was a slight increase in the absolute amount of mineral 
exports . Minerals , together with other pri mary goods such as fishery 
and agricultural products , made a negligible contribution to the rapid 
expansion of Korea ' s exports which has occurred since 1962 . 
Exports of mineral manufactures such as plates and sheets of i r on 
or steel, steel t ubes and pipes , and various other iron and steel 
products have steadily increased in absolute terms . They maintained a 
constant share (4 t o 5 per cent) of the rapidly expanding exports during 
1967- 71 and began t o increase their share in total exports to 9 percent 
in 1972 and 15 percent in 1974 . The absolute amount of miner al 
manufactures exports amounted to about $1 . 5 million in 1962, $17 mil-
lion in 1966, $55 million i n 1971 , $146 million in 1972 and nearly 
$700 million in 1974 . However, until 1972 , there was no matching 
exp~msion in mineral ore imports , reflecting the fact that mineral 
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manufactures exports depended mostly upon imported intermediate input s 
such as hot coil, and depended very little on domestic mineral pro-
cessing. 
Between 1961 and 1971 mineral imports increased steadily in 
absolute terms from about $5 million in 1961 to about $33 million in 
1971, but their share remained at around one percent of total imports . 
However , since 1972 imports of minerals have increased fairly rapidly , 
amounting to about $160 million in 1974 which represented about 2 per-
cent of total imports for that year . The construction of a million ton 
capacity steel mill in 1972- 73 contributed greatly to the expanding 
mineral imports . On the other hand, imports of manufactures of 
minerals amounted to around 6 percent of total imports before 1962 . 
Due to the rapid growth of the Korean economy since 1962 and the 
increasing demand for intermediate inputs for export production, the 
share of their imports increased to around 10 per cent between 1962 and 
1976 . Although their relative share did not increase continuously , the 
magnitude of imports has rapidly expanded since 1962 and the absolute 
amount of mineral manufactures imports has also rap i dly increased . 
There were no imports of crude oil in the 1950s . However , wi th 
the construction of several oil refineries , imports of crude oil 
increased from about $12 million i n 1964 to about $40 million in 1967 , 
to $275 million in 1973 and, due to rising oil prices , to nearly one 
billion dollars in 1974 and to about $1 . 6 billion in 1976 . The share 
of crude oil imports in total merchandise imports steadily increased 
from about 3 percent in 1964 to 7 percent in 1971 . A number of people 
predicted that the share of crude oil imports would stabilize at around 
7 to 8 percent of total imports , but the oil crisis in 1974 raised 
their share to as much as 14 percent of total imports in 1974 and to 
18 percent in 1976 . 
Other than crude oil , Korea ' s major mineral impor ts include : 
(high grade) iron ore and concentrates, bituminous coal and coke for 
steel mills, phosphate for fertilizer manufacturi ng, asbestos , sul-
phur , copper ore , crude salt , manganese ore , titanium ore , tin ore, 
bituminous coal , and coke . There were also large imports of scrap and 
4 31 
waste iron, copper, aluminum, zinc, lead, and nickel. 
As of 1976, total mineral exports amounted to only about $60 mil-
lion, while imports of minerals amounted to nearly $300 million and 
those of crude oil amounted to about $1, 600 million . Imports and 
exports of mineral manufactures amounted to around $500 million 
respectively . Although one cannot be sure whether imports of mineral 
manufactures and crude oil will grow more rapidly in the future, it is 
safe to expect a more rapid increase in imports of various mineral ores 
and concentrates . 
Korea's endowment of coal and water for energy needs is very 
limited . The government has therefore undertaken construction of two 
atomic power plants and will construct several more plants in the near 
future. When they are completed it is hoped that atomic energy will 
replace a significant portion of crude oil imports . The Fourth Five-
Year Plan envisions a significant expansion of exports of various 
mineral manufactures. However, these products can use either imported 
or domestic intermediate inputs . On the other hand, the plan to 
promote various mineral processing industries such as steel mills and 
ferrous and nonferrous metal refineries will certainly increase import 
demand for minerals substantially. 
3. Industrial Structure and Need for Mineral Resources 
for Economic Growth 
According to the Korean Input- Output Tables prepared by the Bank 
of Korea, slightly more than one percent of total intermediate inputs 
for all Korean industries consisted of minerals in 1963, while about 
4 percent of total intermediate inputs consisted of mineral manufac-
tures such as nonmetallic mineral products, iron and steel, steel 
products , ferrous and nonferrous metals , and finished metallic 
products . In 1973 , minerals still shared only about one percent of 
total intermediate inputs, but crude oil took another one percent and 
mineral manufactures took about 6 percent . The import dependency of 
the entire Korean economy (total imports divided by total demand) was 
432 
about 7 percent in 1963, increasing to about 11 percent in 1973 . 
This leads to the observation that , while the relative share of 
non- oil minerals in intermediate inputs changed slightly during 1963-
73, the share of mineral manufactures in total intermediate inputs 
increased by 50 percent (from 4 to 6 percent) . 
The total import dependency of minerals including crude oil 
(i . e . , imports of minerals divided by total intermediate and final 
demand for minerals) was about 6 percent in 1963, but became about 
60 percent in 1973 . Even if we exclude crude oil, the total import 
dependency of minerals increased from 6 percent in 1963 to 19 percent 
in 1973 . 3 
In 1963, about 15 percent of the imported minerals were allocated 
to SOC and service sectors (mostly coal for transportation and electri-
city) and the rest were allocated to.manufacturing (i . e ., 63 percent to 
nonmetallic mineral products, 11 percent to steel and metal products , 
7 percent to the chemical sector and 3 percent to machinery) . In 1973 , 
however, only 3 percent of imported minerals were allocated to SOC and 
service sectors while the balance was allocated to manufacturing . That 
is, 29 percent of the total imported minerals were allocated to the 
nonmetallic mineral product sector , 52 percent to the steel and metal 
product sector, and 12 percent to the chemical sector. The proportion 
of imported minerals allocated to SOC and services and the nonmetallic 
mineral product sector has decreased substantially, while that to the 
steel and metal product sector has increased nearly five times (from 
11 percent to 52 percent). 
In 1963, only one percent of coal imports and 54 percent of 
metallic ore imports were used in steel and metal production. However, 
in 1973, about 95 percent of coal imports and 92 percent of metallic 
ore imports were used for these purposes. 4 It can be concluded, 
therefore, that imports of coal and metallic ores are intended almost 
entirely for the steel and ferrous or nonferrous metal product sectors 
while those of nonmetallic minerals are intended primarily for the 
nonmetallic mineral product and chemical sectors. Obviously, the 
demand for imported coal, metallic ores and nonmetallic minerals will 
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Table 5 . Fourth Five-Year Plan on Output and Exports by Industries 
GNP 
Primary Sectors 
SOC & Service 
Manufacturing 
Heavy & Chemical 
Iron & Steel-~/ 
21 Nonferrous Metals--
Machinery 
Chemicals 
Light Industry 
Total Commodity Exports 
Primary Goods 
Heavy & Chemical 
Steel & Metal 
Machinery 
Light Manufactures 
Source: Economic Planning Board. 
1975 1981 
(In Billion 1975 Won) 
9,080(100%) 16,214(100%) 
2,419 (27%) 3,193 (20%) 
4,080 (45%) 6,586 (41%) 
2,581 (28%) 6,436 (401:) 
1,094 (12%) 3,184 (20%) 
58 (1%) 200 (1%) 
9 (0%) 36 (0%) 
383 (4%) 1,554 (10%) 
644 (7%) 1,394 (9%) 
1,487 (16%) 3,248 (20%) 
(In Million 1975 Dollars) 
5, 081 (100%) 14,165(100%) 
770 (15%) 1,130 (8%) 
1,492 (29%) 6,515 (46%) 
367 (7%) 1,040 (7%) 
836 (16%) 4,265 (30%) 
2,819 (56%) 6,520 (46%) 
Av. Annual 
Growth Rate 
(1977-81) 
9% 
4% 
8% 
14% 
17% 
22% 
13% 
12% 
16% 
11% 
24% 
16% 
26% 
11% 
Notes: 1. The gross output value of iron & steel is planned to increase from 
351 billion won in 1975 to 1,214 billion won in 1981. 
2. The gross output value of nonferrous metals is planned to increase 
from 66 billion won in 1975 to 256 billion won in 1981 . 
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depend on the demand for various mineral manufactures such as steel and 
metal products, nonmetallic mineral products , and chemical products . 
In 1963 , the demand for mineral manufactures was mostly for 
intermediate inputs for SOC and services ( 37 percent), steel and 
metals (19 percent) and for machinery (12 percent) . In 1973 , the 
demand for steel and metal sectors increased significantly ( 30 per-
cent) , while that for SOC and service sectors experienced a relative 
decline (28 percent) . A notable structural change in demand is that 
export demand had increased to 16 percent of total demand in 1973 . The 
import dependency of intermediate input demand for manufactures of 
minerals increased from 31 percent in 1963 to 38 percent in 1973 . 
Since the Fourth Five- Year Plan emphasizes structural changes in 
output and export patterns toward so- called heavy and chemical 
industries , the output and demand for chemicals, nonmetallic mineral 
products , iron and steel , steel products, ferrous and nonferrous 
metals, and finished metal products ar e expected to grow more rapidly 
than those for light industrial products such as processed foods , 
textiles , clothing , wood products , and various miscellaneous manufac-
tures. Since the heavy and chemical industries use a relati vely large 
amount of minerals , total demand for minerals is expected to grow more 
rapidly than before . Furthermore , since the domestic supply of 
minerals is expected to grow more rapidly than before . Furthermor e , 
since the domestic supply of minerals is rather limited, import demand 
for minerals is expected to grow fairly rapidly in the future . 
The Economic Planning Board ' s (EPB) projection of raw materi al 
jmports for steel production in 1981 amounts to about $0 . 8 billion in 
1975 prices (about 6 percent of total commodity imports), comprised of 
about $150 million of iron ore , $280 million of bituminous coal and 
coke and $400 million of scrap iron . In 1975 the total cost for these 
imports was less than $100 million . Projected imports of crude oil in 
1981 will amount to about $2 . 5 billion in 1975 prices (about 18 percent 
of total imports) , which may be an under- estimate . This implies that 
nearly a quarter of total commodity imports in 1981 (about $14 billion 
in 1975 prices) will consist of two major types of minerals-- crude oil 
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and minerals for steel production . 
Of course the demand for imports for other minerals such as 
phosphate, asbestos, sulphur, copper ore, manganese ore, titanium ore 
and tin ore, as well as the demand for scrap and waste copper, 
aluminum, zinc, and nickel, is also expected to grow rapidly. This 
increase is anticipated because the output of iron and steel is 
expected to rise 3. 5 times during 1975-81 while the output of non 
ferrous metals should rise 4 times. 5 In 1975, imports of these other 
minerals and scrap amounted to about $140 million. Hence a crude 
extrapolation indicates a magnitude of non-oil minerals and scrap 
imports on the order of $1 . 4 billion by 1981. 
Imports of crude oil amounted to less than 10 percent of total 
imports and imports of other minerals and scrap never exceeded the 
4 percent level until 1973 . The share of crude oil, which amounted to 
18 percent of total merchandise imports in 1975 , is expected to 
increase to more than 18 percent of total imports by 1981 and the share 
of other minerals and scrap, which amounted to 5 percent in 1975, is 
expected to account for around 10 percent of total imports by 1981 . 
Although the absolute volume of iron and steel output and nonfer-
rous metal output is expected to increase nearly four times, wh i le 
exports of steel and metal products are expected to grow nearly three 
times during 1975-81, their relative share in total exports (7 percent 
in 1975) is not expected to expand, and their share in total output 
should only increase from 0. 7 percent to about 1 . 5 percent. The 
structural shift toward heavy and chemical products is expected to be 
achieved by expanding the share of machinery such as electrical and 
nonelectrical machinery, electronic products, ships and other trans-
port equipment and parts, and not through an extensive expansion of 
basic metals and chemicals . Therefore, the increase in imports of 
crude minerals would have less effect than a full scale import substi-
tution of basic metals and chemicals and a greatly expanded relative 
share of those products in GNP. As a result, a continued large volume 
of mineral manufactured imports can be expected in the foreseeable 
future . 
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4. Mineral Price Inflation 
The trend in "domestic " price inflation for minerals since 1961 
has been similar to that of total commodity price indexes. The 
wholesale price i ndex for all commodities was 38 in 1962 (1970: 100) and 
increased to 265 in 1976 . The wholesale price indexes for coal, 
metallic ores, and nonmetall i c minerals were ar ound 41- 45 in 1962, 
increasing to around 225 - 250 in 1976 . The only exception was the trend 
in prices for petroleum products which has increased from 70 in 1962 to 
726 in 1976 reflecti ng the doubled crude oil price in 1973 which 
tripled thereafter . 
Between 1960 and 1973 "international" prices were fairly stable 
for Korea ' s major mineral imports including iron ore , asbestos , copper 
ore , crude salt, manganese ore, and titanium ore . The price of Korea ' s 
most important export mineral , tungsten ore, has been fluctuating 
wildly and it has therefore become an unreliable source of foreign 
exchange . While Korea ' s other major mineral exports, including zinc 
ore, talc , lead ore , silver ore and graphite, have experienced a steady 
and significant increase in their international price , the absolute 
volume of these exports was rather small . 
There has been a fairly rapid increase in (non- oil) mineral prices 
since 1973 (especi ally in 1974) , which seems to have been reflected in 
rising prices for metals and metal products . The prices of imported 
metals and metal products rose by 33 percent in 1973 and 47 percent in 
1974 . However, the export prices of those products also increased by 
32 percent in 1973 and 51 percent in 1974 . In otter words , the 
inflation in minerals was reflected in both imported mineral manufac-
tures and exported mineral manufactures from Korea . 
The impact of this inflation in mineral prices has spread to all 
commodity production in Korea . However, as long as Korea can shift a 
significant portion of the increased raw materi al costs to export 
prices of their manufactures , the effect on the balance of payments 
will be small and the growth rate of the overall economy will not be 
adversely influenced . The Korean economy can handle inflation in 
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mineral prices simply as one of the never- ending fluctuations in 
exchange rates among various products . 
The unit value index of Korea 1 s exports was only ll 7 in 1975 
(1973=100), while that of its imports was 160 . Apparently , Korea was 
able to shift a very small portion of increased oil prices and 
associated raw material price inflation to foreign countries through 
mark-ups in its export prices during 1973- 75 . In 1976, however , the 
export unit value index was 131 compared to 157 for imports . The net 
barter terms of trade, which deteri orated to 73 in 1975, improved to 83 
by 1976 , while the income terms of trade were 153 due to the 52 percent 
increase in exports in 1976 in curr ent dollar prices . The growth rate 
of GNP jumped from about 8 . 5 percent in 1974 and 1975 to 15 . 2 percent 
in 1976 . 
One can observe that although Korea cannot completely shift the 
impact of international price inflation to other countries through 
international trade, it can fai r ly successfully offset the adverse 
impacts of such inflation . A resource- poor developing country such as 
Korea, which has to depend heavily on imported raw materials for its 
own consumption and export production, can survive and even prosper if 
it cultivates the ability to adapt quickly to changing circumstances ; 
for example , the ability to shift inflation in imported raw material 
prices to its export prices . 
It seems highly unlik€ly that the type of inflation exper ienced in 
1974 will be repeated in the near future . While the price of crude oil 
and other minerals may keep rising in nominal or real terms , the price 
increases should not be as sudden or as drastic in absolute magnitude 
in the future . However, as long as the Korean economy continues to 
enhance its ability to increase the value-added portion in its interna-
tional transactions (as it has been doing since 1962) , it is not overly 
optimistic to expect Korea to survive and even prosper regardless of 
the future trends in mineral prices. 
Korea has imported crude oil from the Middle East , and most of its 
mi neral ore, scrap and waste from the United States, Canada , Australia , 
Japan and several other Asian countries including Indonesia and Malay-
sia . In order to enhance stability in its raw material trade, Korea 
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must diversify its sources of imports to include Latin America and 
Africa. 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
Due to a successful export-oriented growth policy, Korea was able 
to achieve one of the highest growth rates in the world during 1962-76 . 
Previously, the stage of industrialization in Korea was such that most 
of the demand for mineral products could be satisfied by directly 
importing processed mineral products, such as non- metallic mineral 
products, iron and steel products , ferrous and nonferrous metal 
products and finished metal products . Hence Korea had never experi-
enced any serious problems associated with mineral imports until very 
recently . 
Since the Fourth Five- Year Plan (1977- 81) emphasizes structural 
changes in output and export patterns towards so- called heavy and 
chemical industries, and since these industries use a relatively large 
amount of minerals , total demand for minerals is expected to grow more 
rapidly than before . Furthermore, since the domestic supply of 
minerals is rather limited, the import demand for minerals is expected 
to grow fairly rapidly in the future . Nearly a quarter of total 
merchandi s e imports in 1981 may consist of two major types of minerals : 
crude oil and minerals for steel production . Of course the import 
demand for other minerals such as phosphate, asbestos, sulphur, copper 
ore, manganese ore, titanium ore and tin ore, as well as the demand for 
scrap and waste copper, aluminum, zinc and nickel, is also expected to 
increase rapidly . 
Korea was able to survive the 1974 oil crisis and achieve a 
10 percent average annual growth rate in GNP and more than 20 percent 
real growth in merchandise exports per annum (1974- 76) . A resource-
poor developing country like Korea, which has to depend heavily on 
imported raw materials for its own consumption and export production , 
can survive and even prosper if it continues to enhance its ability to 
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adapt quickly to changing circumstances . Since the share of minerals 
in total commodity imports has been steadily increasing and is expected 
to increase further to around 30 percent by 1981 , it would be much more 
difficult for the Korean economy to adapt itself to another round of 
drastic oil and mineral price increases . However, if the resource- rich 
countries such as the United States, Canada and Australia avoid self-
centered trade policies which exploit resource- poor developing coun-
tries , and if other advanced countries maintain their position as 
rational and dependable leaders of the free world by refraining from 
ultra- protectionist policies , there would not appear to be any immi-
nent danger for the South Korean economy, other than a possible direct 
invasion from North Korea . 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 Applying the current exchange rate of 48 3 won per dollar to 
current won value of GNP in 1976 which implies that 1 . 638 U. S. dollars 
in 1976 are equivalent to one 1970 U. S. dollar . The U. S. wholesale 
price index was 166 in 1976 (1970=100) . 
2The major minerals exported from Korea were tungsten ore and 
concentrate, granite , zinc ore , quartz , kaolin, talc, lead ore , silver 
ore, graphite, gypsum, agalmatolite, and low- grade iron ore . 
3The import dependency of the intermediate input demand for 
minerals increased from 7 percent in 1963 to 23 percent in 1973 . Since 
there is no direct export demand or domestic final demand for imported 
minerals except those for the sake of variation in stock level , the 
increased total import dependency was entirely due to increased import 
dependency of intermediate input demand . 
4rn 1963 about 46 percent of total mineral imports were coal 
(mostly for SOC and service sectors and nonmetallic mineral products) , 
46 percent were nonmetallic minerals and only 8 percent were metallic 
ores . In 1973, however, coal represented only 25 percent of total 
mineral imports (exclusively for the steel and metal products) while 
30 percent were metallic ores for the steel and metal products . The 
share of nonmetallic minerals , which was allocated mostly for non-
metallic mineral products and the chemical sector, did not change . 
5output of zinc is to increase from 21 , 000 MIT to 80 , 000 MIT , that 
of copper from 28 , 000 MIT to 117 ,000 MIT and that of lead from 8, 000 
MIT to 58,000 MIT during 1977- 81 . See the Government of the Republic 
of Korea, The Fourth Five- Year Economic Development Plan : 1977- 81, 
December 1976 . 
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NATURAL RESOURCE PROBLEMS IN A RESOURCE- POOR DEVELOPING COUNTRY : 
THE KOREAN CASE 
A COMMENT 
Francis K. Chan 
Hong begins his paper with a quick run down of some of the 
economic indicators to show that the Korean economy is "one of the most 
successfully growing economies in the world since 1962 ." The high 
growth rate has paradoxically aroused concern among Koreans about the 
nation ' s prospect of future survival in the face of perceived changes 
in the international economic environment, as exemplified by the 
increased bargaining power of resource- rich countries on the one hand 
and the rising protectionist sentiment among some important developed 
countries such as the U.S . and the E. E. C. on the other . The message 
was brought home, so to speak , by the quadrupling of petroleum prices 
in 1973- 74 with drastic consequences in balance of payments adjustment 
for the economy, which was already aggravated by in fl a ti on in raw 
material prices . For Korea the problem was getting worse , for while 
its share of export value of minerals in total annual commodity exports 
fell to insignificant proportions by the 1970' s , that of mineral 
imports rose rapidly and is expected to rise even more rapidly in the 
future . 
To maintain its high annual growth rate of better than 10 percent , 
Korean imports of minerals and oil increased absolutely and relatively 
to total imports through the strategy of raw material imports and 
export of manufactures . This greatly worsened the nation's dependency 
on imports of many basic materials from 6 percent in 1963 to about 
60 percent in 1973, or 6 percent in 1963 to 19 percent in 1973 if crude 
oil is excluded . In the case of Korea, unlike that of Japan , imports 
of minerals consist mainly of processed minerals . 
How did the Korean economy manage to pay for the tremendous 
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increase in the import bill for both minerals and oil resulting from 
the greatly increased volume of imports, as well as from the price 
inflation of the early 1970's? The answer is, in part, through passing 
on some of the increase of price inflation onto the importers of Korean 
manufactured products, especially after 1976, in the form of higher 
export prices . But presumably, a substantial deficit still remained to 
be financed somehow, though this matter was not pursued further in the 
paper. 
Given the traumatic experience of the early 1970's, Hong remains 
fairly optimistic about the ability of the Korean economy to survive 
and even to prosper provided it is able " to adapt quickly to changing 
circumstances, for example, the ability to shift inflation in imported 
raw material prices to its export prices." The solution may become 
more difficult as the economy becomes more and more dependent on 
imported minerals and oil . Reduced dependence on imported oil is being 
sought through the construction of more nuclear power plants. The rest 
probably has to be handled the way it was (successfully) in the past, 
through export price inflation . Hong seems more concerned by the self-
centered trade policies of developed resource-rich countries such as 
the United States , Canada and Australia . Presumably there are tariff 
and other trade policies to protect the domestic market against foreign 
imports from labor- abundant but resource- poor developing countries 
like Korea. 
What lessons can resource- poor developing countries learn from 
the Korean experience? How much of the experience is peculiar to the 
Korean situation? Have all the crucial issues and problems of 
resource- poor developing countries, in the context of increasing 
dependence on imports of minerals and other raw materials needed for 
their economic growth, been raised? It seems useful to have such 
questions raised and answers provided and I am disappoi nted that the 
paper did not do this fully . 
To the extent that Korea is typical of resource-poor developing 
countries , Hong ' s paper may be interpreted as implicitly saying that 
the role of these countries is one of more or less passively adjusting 
their economic development to the changing relative scarcity of 
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resources . The ideal situation is one in which the accidental and 
uneven resource endowments of countries can be compensated for effec-
tively by free international trade. This is more likely to be true if 
the long- term prospects of resource supply are optimistic . In such an 
international economic order , the resource- poor developing countries 
will be relieved of an effective external constraint on growth and 
growth can then proceed by pushing hard on the comparative advantages 
of these countries, importing the necessary and needed resources from 
the cheapest source as they would in the case of other commodities in 
which they do not have comparable advant~ge . 
If the prospects of resource supply are more pessimistic and there 
exists a tendency to control the free flow of resources through 
competitive markets, then resource-poor developing countries have to 
be worried by the additional external constraint on growth . In this 
respect, the resource- poor developing countries stand in a less advan-
tageous position compared to the resource-poor developed countries , 
such as Japan . The increased vulnerability of the resource-poor 
developing countries is not balanced by factors which tend to streng-
then the bargaining power of the resource- poor developed countries, 
namely the size of the domestic economy as a market for resources and 
the ability to devote R and D to look for technological solutions to 
the resource constraint . This use of technological capability by the 
developed countries as a substitution for international trade in 
resources has been pointed out by Magee and Robins . The resource- poor 
developing countries cannot effectively threaten to withdraw or cut 
back on imports (as Japan , for example, can) since each has an 
insignificant share of total world demand, nor do they . have the 
technological capability to develop synthetics or resource-saving 
methods . 
Unlike the three options discussed by Murota for long-term 
Japanese prospects, only one option exists for d~~e~~ping countries --
to buy resources in world markets -- which is not an attractive option 
in the context of our discussion . This does not imply that the 
resource-poor developing countries have no other options, because the 
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Murota framework is too restrictive . It has been suggested that 
resource- poor developing countries can resort to larger regional 
groupings or form an appropriate global bloc of similarly minded and 
disadvantaged countries . If the international order becomes frag-
mented i nto economic blocs or becomes dominated by giant economic 
units , these resource- poor developing countries may have to look for 
ways of gaining countervailing power to buttress their bargaining 
power in international transactions . Otherwise, they will lose out 
because they need the resource- rich countries or the technologically-
sophisticated developed countries more than the latter need them and 
they have very few attractive options compared to the terms of exchange 
dictated to them . Because of this lack of bargaining power in the era 
of impending resource scarcity , the burden of having to make difficult 
and unpleasant adjustments to international economic disequilibrium is 
shifted to the resource-poor developing countries, who are usually 
least able to bear the costs of such adjustments . If this is Hong ' s 
fear, I share his concern . It is to be hoped that through sound 
policies and wise leadership by those best placed to have significant 
influence, the international economic order would not come to such a 
pass . 
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NATURAL RESOURCE PROBLEMS IN A RESOURCE-POOR DEVELOPING COUNTRY : 
THE KOREAN CASE 
A COMMENT 
Yashichi Ohata 
Hong's paper presents a very optimistic picture of the present 
Korean economy and its future prospects. 
The size of the Korean economy is about one- tenth that of the 
Japanese economy. The absolute quantity of demand for natural 
resources by the Korean economy is proportionately low compared wi th 
the Japanese economy. Consequently, the national security problems 
concerning the procurement of natural resources have not become too 
serious as yet. The Korean economy, as a result, has been able to grow 
in the international market without diverting its attent i on to the 
national security problem. Korea has been one of several developing 
nations which has successful export-oriented growth and is beginning 
to show some characteristics of a medium- sized industrial nation . Its 
pattern of development will, in fact, serve as a good example for other 
developing countries. 
Accor ding to Hong, Korea was able to survive the 1974 oil crisis 
with a 10-percent average annual growth rate in GNP, and more than 
20 - percent real growth in commodity exports per annum from 1974 to 
1976 . However, the price of natural resources and the balance of 
payments may begin to present serious problems to Korea in the near 
future as its economy continues to expand, and Korea may soon be 
required to reorganize its trade structure. 
According to Hong, Korea has made its adjustment by maintaining a 
high level of economic growth in its export-oriented industries . 
However, would it be an exaggeration to say that the rapid and strong 
export-oriented industrialization will inevi tably lead to an excessive 
bias in the domestic economy? In resource- rich countries it is 
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possible to promote export- substitution growth using domestic 
resources. A resource- poor country, on a similar course of export-
oriented growth , will have to i ncrease i ts dependency on impor ted 
natural resources . _ In short , this excessive emphasis may cause a 
serious di.stortion in domestic economic s tructure . Korea has been 
experiencing a gradual decline in its agricultural sector, conspic-
uously indicating the faults of export-oriented growth . Is i t feasible 
f or Korea, as a r esour ce-poor nation, to mai ntain '.ts present course of 
export orientation and, at the same time , foster balanced growth in its 
agricultural sector < 
The most i mpor tant problem for countries with limited natural 
resour ces i s to secure a dependable supply of resources and to maintai n 
stable prices . Japan achieved a high level of growth and development . 
Major reasons for this have been price stability of natural r esow0 ces 
and strong dependability of supply . However, since 1974 , Japan has 
been experiencing a depress i on and is still suffering from a low level 
of economic growth . There are two distinctively different types of 
industries in Japan : the internationally competitive i ndust r ies such 
as automobiles and television , and the internationally weak industries 
such as petr ochemicals and textiles . The Japanes e economy is greatly 
dependent on imported petroleum , and there is a wide gap between oil -
dependent industries and non oil- dependent industr i es i n competit i ve 
strength . In general , the problem has been the lack of dependable 
supply and stable prices of natural resources . The count ry is now 
facing the prospect of large- scale industrial restructuring . If Korea 
cont i nues to promote rapid export- oriented ~ndustrialization , the 
probabilities are that it will eventually experience similar diffi-
cult i es . 
On the other hand , accor di ng t o Hong Korea has had the ability to 
pass the increased cost of imported raw materials on to its export 
prices . At the same time , however, the Korean wage level has gradually 
risen in recent years , and shifting the increased export prices will 
soon become near ly impossible . Also as a resource-·poor nation Korean 
dependency on imported raw materials has been increasing sharply 
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during the period of rapid expansion. How, then, should Korea adapt to 
the new condi tion of increasing instability in raw materials trade? 
It is very important for Korea to assume a posit i ve role, as a 
resource- poor nation, in its relationship with its trading partners. 
Hong emphasizes that r esource-rich countr i es , such as the U. S., 
Australia, and Canada, should avoid self- centered trade policies which 
exploit resource--poor developing countY' ies . Other advanced nations 
should maintain their position as rational and dependable leaders of 
the free world by refraining from ultra-protectionist policies . 
Korea, on the other hand, should develop a viable trade policy toward 
resource-rich nations . At present , Korea is able to import natural 
resources from resource- rich nations while maintaining high levels of 
exports to the U. S. and Japan But if Korea continues its high level 
of growth , it will have to depend, to a much higher degree , upon the 
supply of raw materials as well as upon its export markets . Accord-
ingly, Korea must consider not only the resource-rich advanced coun-
tries, but also the resource-rich developing countries . 
To support my argument, I emphasize two aspects of Japanese 
resource trade . Imports of primary goods in Japan consist of several 
types . The country must depend on Australia for 13 pri mary goods , 
Canada for 8 , and the United States for 7 . On the other hand , Japan 
depends on mineral resources and crude oil from Southeast Asian and 
Middle Eastern countries . Southeast Asia exports nearly all of their 
resources to the Japanese market . Accordingly , there are two dis-
tinctly separate trade policies in Japan . One is the policy based on 
the principles of free trade toward resource- rich advanced countries , 
and the other is based on the non- begger- thy- neighbor trade policy 
toward resource-rich developing nations . 
Korea will soon face the same situation as Japan . The question is 
what would be the best stretegy for a resource-poor developing nation 
in negotiating with resource- rich or resource-poor developed countries 
or resource- rich developing countr ies . The answer to this question , in 
my opinion, lies in the diversification of trade markets for Korea . 
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NATURAL RESOURCE PROBLEMS IN A RESOURCE- POOR DEVELOPING COUNTRY: 
THE KOREAN CASE 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
As a small economy, Korea has little impact on aggregate trade in 
minerals, and recognizing this, has decided not to fight reality . 
There is some implication in the paper that no resource policy is 
needed, as the market will solve everything . So long as resources are 
only partly politicized, having a small share in demand is probably a 
good thing -- but if the markets become highly politicized, possessing 
a larger share would be more advantageous . 
However, from a more cosmic viewpoint, it was observed that 
possessions are a curse, and it may be better to be resource- poor than 
resource- rich (at least beyond one's own needs or capacity to develop) . 
In the long run the consuming nations probably have more control over 
resource development than the producing countries . Moreover, human 
capital in addition to mineral resources, might be an inflation hedge 
in its capacity to create new techniques adapted to changing factor 
availability . 
The question of whether a small country is better off in spot 
markets or long-term contracts was raised , as well as whether such 
countries have sufficient access to information to know if they are 
dealing on reasonable terms . Korea buys most of its raw materials 
under medium-term ( 3- 5 yr . ) contracts from di verse sources . It was 
pointed out that price volatility causes spot markets to be very risky, 
so most manufacturing firms prefer contracts . The relative price 
certainty also has advantages where exchange controls mean dealing 
with government bureaucrats to obtain foreign funds as more long-range 
planning is possible . 
Korea ' s rapid growth, together with that of other Asian coun-· 
tries, means that while singly their impact on resource trade may be 
small, in 15 years they will represent , in the aggregate, demand 
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comparable to Japan ' s today . 
Korea has, at times, been lucky and resourceful : in 1974 , faced 
with worldwide inflation and disrupted markets, it expanded output and 
paid for its higher- priced energy and other imported inputs with real 
resources , aiming particularly at the Middle East . As a result, while 
totally dependent on that region's oil, Korea has a positive trade 
balanqe with the oil-producing countries . 
Korea also gained an edge by devaluing its currency before Taiwan , 
its principal competitor, did . Recognizing itself as a price- taker in 
world markets , through internal structural changes and price adjust-
ments, the price increases of imports were passed through to Korea ' s 
own consumers . 
Domestic inflationary pressures have not been handled as well as 
they might have been and the recent trade surplus has had an especially 
strong impact on the domestic money supply . It was suggested that the 
paper ought to consider other factors which caused Korea's inflation 
other than increased raw material prices . Import tariffs have not been 
reduced as quickly or as much as they should have been, given Korea ' s 
trade surplus . There has been very tight control of trade and capital 
markets in Korean development . 
In Kor ea ' s development, many items were first produced princi-
pally for export and then were sold at home as the domestic economy 
grew, and consumers became more affluent . 
strategy . 
This has been a good 
Economic growth has been rapid in part because of changing export 
composition . Policy measures such as product diversity have been used 
to achieve this in addit i on to the obvious export- promotion schemes . 
In the early 1960s entrepreneurs got rich on labor-intensive exports . 
The government ' s control of loanable funds meant that many firms 
switched to heavier industries when the decision was made to develop 
them. Thus the entrepreneurs have a very broad outlook , rather than 
each being tied to a few products . 
Not all government planning decisions have been rational , and one 
current project in particular seems, ~ ante, marginal at best : the 
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decision to expand zinc, copper, and lead production . It was suggested 
that Korea may end up with inefficient nonferrous capacity as Japan 
did, and have a vested interest in maintaining it. 
The issues involved in trade in world minerals include restricted 
accessibility by producers (which has been done with food), and 
relative prices and the terms of trade -- but these are within the 
context of total trade . The nature of the special problems faced by 
resource-poor developing countries is not made very clear. 
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-oMMODITY TRADE FROM A NORTH- SOUTH PERSPECTIVE* 
Jose Pinere. 
Commodity trade i. s an mportant component of inte ·~national 
economic relations . It represents around 35 percent of world trade and 
i s the source of 80 to 85 percent of less developed countries (LDCs) 
export earnings . Trade in commodities can be conducted under different 
"rules of the game" - - or trade :negimes -- whi ch will entail various 
degrees of accomplishment of the several goals of an international 
economi c or der : efficiency , :i. ncome redistribution both among and 
within countries, stability and economic security . Thus we will trace 
out the consequences , in terms of these goa ls , of four broad categor ies 
of commodity trade arrangements : free markets , cartelized markets, 
controlled markets , and a fourth "prefer red " regime 
1 . The Free Market Regime 
Thi s "' egi.me i s the one that most closely resembles the condit i ons 
of today ' s commodity trade . In fact, until 1973 most commodity trade 
was conducted i n markets that were called f r ee in the sense that they 
were not subject to major direct governmental intervention . With the 
exception of oil trade that is now conducted i n cartelized markets and 
other commodities subject to mild interventions (tin, coffee), free 
markets cont i nue to be the dominant form of organization of commodity 
trade . 
;' This paper is part of a research project on commodity trade that 
I am conducting for the 1980s Project on the Council for Foreign Re-
lations . I would like to acknowledge very useful comments by the Pro-
j ect staff and collaborators, and by Professors Lawrence Krause and 
P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan . 
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We will first discuss to what extent an -- deal system of 
competit i ve markets will achi eve t he goals of the international 
economic order . Then we will contend that the present markets are, in 
fact , quite far from thes e !.deal conditions . We w.'cll point out the 
main imperfections of these markets and trace their consequences in 
goal - accompl i shment . 
Competit i ve Free Markets 
The theoretical literatur e has dealt extensively with the 
optimality characteristics of a system of competitive (atomistic 
competition, absence of exter nal i ties, absence of mar ket power, etc . ) 
and complete markets . The most important conclusion refers to the 
proposit i on that such a system will allocate sca·-·ce wor ld r esources in 
the most efficient way and lead to a Pareto optimal situation, that i s 
one in which no one can be made better off without making someone worse 
off . The existence of a full set of futures markets , perfect 
information, and stabilizing ar bit•0 age and speculation would mini mi ze 
(not necessarily eliminate) price fluctuations around the long- term 
price trend and thus i nstability in spot markets . 
In the case of exhaustible r esources , 1 the nter temporal 
optimality of market allocations requires, moreover, that the market 
discount future profits at the same rate as soci ety would wish to 
discount the welfare of future inhabitants . Otherwise , if private 
discount rates are systematically hi gher than the correct social rate 
of discount , resources will be exploited too fast and exhausted too 
soon. Moreover , an optimal competitive ma:0 ket solution requires the 
absence of myopic decisionmaking . Some agent must always be taking the 
long view and -be willing to arb i t r age between present and future i n 
ways that will push the current price toward the "right" long- term 
path . Otherwise the effici ency conditions will not be fulfilled and , 
moreover , instability will be heightened if the economic agents 
concentrate too heavily on spot or flow decisions and not enough on 
future or stock dec i sions . 
These cons -- derations emphasize the need for adequate information 
about reserves , technology , cost and demand conditions , not only in the 
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present but also in the future . 
The distribut i ve impact of an ideal competitive mar ket, both 
among and within nations , will depend on the original distribution of 
property r i ghts over resources and on the prices that those resources 
command in the market . In the case of exhaustible resources, those 
competitive prices will include a scarcity r ent for the owner of the 
resource deposit . Therefore, there is no presumption whatsoever that 
the market- determined di str 0 bu t i.on of the gains from commodity trade 
will accrue to individuals and nations according to a domest i c or 
inter national social welfare funct i on that .i.ndi cates the desfr ed 
distributive situation 
For commodj ties traded in world markets , the terms of trade' 
obtained in competitive markets will determine the distribution of the 
gains from trade among the tradi ng nations. So the terms of trade play 
an important role in determining the relative share that each country 
obtains from trade . The terms of trade deter mined in a competitive 
trade equilibrium will lead to a Pareto optimal situation . However , an 
interesting featu r e of the trading system should be noted : in the 
presence of multiple Pareto optimal equilibria , a situation discussed 
by Marshall , many different terms of trade fulf'.ll these conditions and 
imply an arbitrary division of the gains from trade . 2 
Market Distortions 
At least two major departures from the conditions of competitive 
free markets that are crucial to the result of allocative and dynamic 
efficiency can be observed 5.n today 1 s commodity r egime : major 
distortions created by government intervention and imperfect 
competition . 
Developed countr i es place impor tant barriers to commodity tradeo 
These include protection of domestic producers of agricultural 
commodi ties , tariffs , quantitat i ve r estrictions , excis e taxes . state 
trading monopolies, stockpiling policies and so on . These barriers 
cr eate effici ency losses that r educe world r eal income vis-a vis a 
situation without these distortions . They are usually justified in DCs 
by domest i c distributive considerations (such as the program to 
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support agricultural prices). However, some of them, such as the 
import and excise taxes on non- competitive agricultural products 
coming from LDCs, resemble more an exploitation of monopoly power and 
thus provoke international redistributive transfers from exporter to 
importer nations 3 
The non- competitive nature of several commodity markets has not 
been so readily acknowledged nor its efficiency and redistr i_buti ve 
impacts duly assessed . Many mine:Aal resources are cont " olled by a few, 
vertically integrated, transnational corporations (for example , 
bauxite and uranium). This, together with the fact that the demand for 
commodities is generally inelastic, creates the potential for non-
competitive behavior in order to capture ol i gopsony- oligopoly rents . 
Besides the important redistributive effect of these actions , they 
create efficiency losses associated with non- competitive markets . 
Moreover, they tend to restrict production and investment below its 
optimum amount from a global welfare perspective . 
Note that in the case of exhaustible resources, these non-
competitive industry structures tend to "conserve" the scarce resource 
longer than a competit i ve market . If a competitive market solution 
coupled with lower social than private rates of time preference, tends 
to exhaust the resource too fast vis- a- vis the opt .imal rate of 
exploitation, the production restrictions created by the oligopolistic 
market slow down the rate of exploitation . If .it does not restrict 
production below the optimal level, it clearly generates efficiency 
gains . 
Stability is not a feature of today's commodity markets. Rather 
they are subject to wi de price fluctuations as a result of demand and 
supply shifts in the presence of low short run elasticities of demand 
and supply . Price fluctuations originating in demand shifts -- a 
common case in minerals -- destabilize export earnings more than if 
they originate in supply shifts. 
Private arbitrage and speculati on have been unable to reduce 
these price fluctuations to manageable size . Furthermore, there is the 
possibility that private speculation , if based too much on flow rather 
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than stock indications , may even be destabilizing. Private buffering 
activity, limited to storable commodities, is influenced by storage 
costs, information costs and i nterest rates . Social values may well be 
below private values for these variables in the presence of 
indivisibiliti es, externalities, etc . , and, if so , social gains will 
exceed private gains from buffering activity . Moreover, it has been 
suggested that private price stabilizi.ng activity is depressed due to 
the likelihood that governments will intervene when prices are 
unusually high, preventing the private holder from capturing the full 
value of maintained stocks . 4 
In a very interesting paper, J . M. Keynes addressed this problem 
as follows: 5 
"It is an outstanding fault of the competitive system that 
there is not sufficient incentive to the individual 
enterprise to store surplus stocks of materials beyond the 
normal resources required to maintain continuity of 
output ••• which should be no matter for surprise because the 
competitive system is in its ideal fo~m the perfect 
mechanism for ensuring the qui ckest, but at the same time the 
most ruthless , adjustment of supply and demand to any change 
in conditions, however transitory . It is inherently opposed 
to security and stability, though, for the same reason , it 
has the great virtue of being also opposed to stabil i ty in 
the sense of stagnation . " 
Price fluctuations allocate the existing supply in the short run 
through a price mechanism , but complicate the investment , production 
and consumption processes related to the commodity and sometimes even 
induce the wrong responses . To some extent, producers and consumers 
may insulate themselves by appropriate i nventory accumulation and 
depletion and hedging in forward markets . 
Note in this respect that vertically- integrated firms operating 
in commodity production may well reduce price fluctuations as a result 
of price- fixing arragements and allocat i on rules . 
The main concern with instability in commodity trade has not been 
the impact on private produce ~s or consumers but on the for eign 
exchange availabilities of those countries whose export receipts from 
one or two commodi ties account for an important proportion of their 
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. 6 total export earnings . 
Southern countries are the most vulnerable in this respect . 7 
These countries find it very difficult to cope with fluctuations of 
export earnings through the holding of a large amount of costly 
international reserves . They cannot afford to rely solely on short-
term bor rowing in international capital markets to cover the large 
expo~t earnings shortfalls . Possibly they will have to pay expensive 
interest rate premiums to compensate for their deteriorated 
creditworthiness position as a result of their extremely weak 
bargaining posit i on in such eventualit i es . Multilateral financing 
through the compensatory facility of the IMF may ease the burden 
somewhat but the amounts are generally insuffi cient and the conditions 
too stringent. 
Even though there are views to the contr ary , ther e is enough 
evidence suggesting that export instability creates substantial damage 
to the developing countries economies by disrupt i ng the flow of imports 
essential both to the investment (capital goods) and production (non-
competitive inputs) process . Moreover it greatly complicates both 
private and public planning, interferes with sound trade and exchange 
policies and , given the widespread price rigidities present in LDC ' s 
economies, may even exacerbate inflation . Furthermore , export -- and 
thus economic -- instability in certain countries creates serious 
social and political disruptions . 
The North-South redistributive impact, if any, of alternative 
commodity regimes will depend on whether Southern or Northern nations 
are the main commodity exporters and importers of those commodities 
subject to a given trade regime . 
It is generally acknowledged that , in fact , Northern nations are 
the mai n , although by no means the only , importers of commodities . 8 On 
the other hand, LDC ' s are the main exporters of some minerals such as 
tin, bauxite, manganese and copper . So , even though no general 
statement can be made asserting that Southern nations are the dominant 
exporters of all minerals , there are large asymmet r ies in the expor t 
share of South and North nations in some of these commodities . 9 
Therefore , in those commodit i es expor ted mainly by the South and 
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i mported mainly by the North, the terms of trade will be an important 
determinant of the North-South income distribution situation given the 
weight of commodity trade in North-South economic interaction. 
Today's regime, in contrast to a purely competitive situation, 
may tend to bias the terms of trade against Southern exports. The 
oligopolistic, vertically integrated transnational firms that operate 
in commodity production and distribution have the market power to 
depress the prices received by producer nations in order to capture 
ol i gopolistic rents. 10 Informat ' on technology also allows these firms 
to capture quasi-rents in the marketing and distribution processes . 
Transfer pricing practices exacerbate the loss to exporter countries 
by tax evasion. Moreover, some governments of importer countries 
exercise monopsony power by i.mposing import and excise taxes on 
commodities facing inelastic demand, increasing the prices paid by 
consumers and lowering those received by producers 
So today ' s ~egime does not seem to be neutral with regard to the 
competitive solution but rather entails redistributive transfers from 
Southern exporters to Northern importer nations. It may also involve, 
of course, transfers from Northern exporters to importer nations but, 
since transnational companies are owned by citizens of the North, they 
remain transfers within the North. 
The free market approach does not accept the idea of accomplishing 
redistributive transfers through commodity trade. Rather it reaffirms 
that if there is any need for changing the world distribution of 
income, it should be done by direct financial transfers, even if the 
viability of such flows seems to be jeopardized. 
In the midst of real or perceived resource scarcity, and supply 
interruptions threats, importer countries would like to have 
guaranteed and reliable access to raw materials to enhance their 
economic security. Otherwise, they would have to incur costly policies 
to insulate themselves from the threat of supply interruptions and 
embargoes, policies that range from stockpiling of raw materials to 
drastic decoupling measures designed to relieve the DCs from undue 
dependence on mineral imports. 11 
Today's regime lacks export control rules and mechanisms to 
insure access to resources and thus heightens instability. Importer 
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countries are following a two track policy developing costly domestic 
substitutes and at the same time emphasizing the need for investment in 
resource production in exporter countries , thus making more unlikely 
the possibility of supply interruptions 
2 . Price Raising Schemes 
Southern commodity expo·,ters do not accept as fair or legitimate 
the present distribution of the world income . If these nations 
consider as unfeasible the possibility of North- South income transfers 
through other mechanisms in the international economy , they may turn to 
commodity trade as a transfer channel .
12 
Redistributive transfers can be accompl i shed through changing the 
terms of trade in commodity trade. The exporter countries can increase 
commodity prices to the competiti.ve levels (in the case in whi ch 
original prices were below competitive levels as a result of 
oligopolistic markets) or above the competitive levels (when they 
exploit their actual or potential monopoly power) . They should do so 
only when it is possible to do it without reducing exports to such an 
extent as to make this action prejudicial to their own interests . 
The emphasis in exporter country demands has been on raising 
prices as if the original prices were in fact comeptitive ; thus , export 
restr i ction has been a fundamental goal . The important, yet almost 
ignored , possibility of raising producers ' prices and simultaneously 
increasing exports, an action that is possible when the original prices 
are below competitive levels, will be discussed in the section devoted 
to the preferred regime . 
Both the cartel and the redistributive commodity agreement (as 
opposed to the stabilization commodity agreement) will aim at 
transferring real resources from importer to exporter nations through 
monopolistic pricing of primary commodities brought about by some form 
of price-raising scheme (PRS) . They wi.11 differ in that the cartel is 
an attempt by the exporting countries to implement PRS unilaterally . 
This will possibly lead to higher price increases and the emergence of 
a confrontation atmosphere . The redistributive commodity agreement is 
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an attempt to convince importer countries to collaborate with exporter 
nations to devise and implement jointly a PRS, an analysis that will be 
valid both for cartels and redistributive commodity agreements l3 
The theory of international trade demonstrated long ago that a 
country can increase its real income by imposing, in the absence of 
retaliation, an "optimum" tariff on its exports when it has some degree 
of monopoly power in international trade . 
In today ' s politically fragmented world, no nation cont r ols the 
whole supply of a given resource but, by geographical accident, a few 
nat i ons do control a large proportion of world exports in ce r tain 
commodities . This export concentration creates the possibility of 
collusive arrangements to implement PRS . 
The exercise of monopoly power in the commodity market will 
produce a result equivalent to the imposition of an excise tax on that 
commodity in the sense that a wedge will be introduced between consumer 
price and marginal cost, thus producing an efficiency cost (similar to 
the excess burden of an excise tax or to the welfare loss from 
14 monopoly) to the world a.s a whole but also a transfer of real 
resources from one group of countries to another. 15 
There are two basic prerequisites for a PRS: first restriction 
of exports must be beneficial to the exporting nations; second, these 
nations must be able to bring about this export restriction . 
Beneficial Export Restriction 
If the exporting countries aim to maximize foreign exchange 
earnings, a given percentage of export reduction will increase prices 
in a higher percentage, and thus earnings, only if the (excess) demand 
facing them is inelastic (a price elasticity lower than one). 
The condition is less difficult to meet if the exporting countries 
aim to maximize real income gains, since in this case we must add as a 
benefit the value of the resources liberated by the restriction on 
production. 16 The excess demand may be elastic, implying that foreign 
exchange . earnings fall, and yet the country experiences a real income 
gain. 17 
The elasticity of this excess demand is a function of three 
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crucial parameters: the elasticity of world demand for the commodity, 
the supply elasticity of non-member countries and the share of world 
production controlled by the members of the PRS. In the short- run, 
demand elasticities for many of the commodities exported mainly by the 
South are lower than one. 
A few Southern producers control a substantial share of world 
production and much larger share of world exports. However, in many 
commodities this · share is not large enough if the PRS is restricted to 
LDC exporters . It is not unlikely that, in some commodities, important 
DC exporters such as Canada, Australia and South Africa may, if not 
actively join, at least tacitly follow policies consistent with those 
of a PRS (production restriction, etc.) thus benefitting themselves as 
large commodity exporters . Note that what is important is not the 
share controlled by the explicit members of the PRS but the total share 
composed by the PRS members plus those countries that follow policies 
similar to those of the PRS but do not join formally the PRS for non-
economic reasons . We will assume hereafter that the PRS includes only 
Southern nations . 
The supply elasticity of minerals of non-member countries may 
also be quite low since known reserves limit possible entrants, even 
though this elasticity may be higher in those DCs that can re-open old 
. 18 mines . 
The massive investments necessary to develop new reserves will 
not be so easily forthcoming if these new deposits are profitable at 
the high monopolistic pri ce but unprofitable at the competitive price . 
Since the price that makes them profitable i s not a result of 
structural changes in supply and demand conditions but rather a policy 
action by the PRS members , reversible if need be, the usual supply 
elasticity estimates may not be relevant since they would overestimate 
supply response . Uncertainty of expected returns may hold back non-
member country i nvestors, unless guaranteed by their government a 
fixed market or a minimum price irrespective of the future development 
on the PRS price . 
Long- run elasticities, both of demand and supply, are generally 
higher than short- run ones . This means that the optimum PRS price may, 
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after the initial increase over the competitive one, decrease with 
time. However, even if the price at a future date goes down to a level 
that is lower than the one that would have prevailed if the PRS had not 
existed , the PRS option may still be a preferred one for the exporting 
nations . It will depend crucially on the rate of discount that the 
exporting nations apply to future income . Exporting nations try to 
maximize the pr esent value of a stream of commodity earnings (or 
profits); if the rate of discount is very high , a strategy emphasizing 
short- term gains at the expense of long- term prospects may be a 
rational choice . 
A fully optimal commodity PRS should ensure that the export 
quantity of each product consistent with the optimum price is produced 
by the South at the mi nimum cost in domestic resources . A PRS that 
utilizes an export tax to create the wedge between the consumer price 
and the marginal cost and to allocate the production shares among 
Southern producers , will establish a uniform world producer (marginal 
cost) price and a higher world consumer price . 
The key requirement for havi ng production efficiency with such a 
scheme , once the uniform producer pri ce is obtained , is that of 
separating the price or revenue received by the exporting country from 
that received by the individual producer . This can be done by not 
relating in any way the domestic distributi on of the monopoly gains 
obtained from the cartel to the output decisions of the individual 
producer s . In this way there will be no overproduction since the 
individual producer will equalize its marginal cost of production to 
the price net of tariff, thus producing the quantity consistent wi t h 
the world demand price . 
Now, if every exporting country imposes its own taxes and 
subsidies on the export of this commodity , the uniform world producer 
price will not entail a minimum resource cost of producing this 
commodity since each indi vidual producer will equalize the world 
producer price with its private marginal cos t (including taxes or 
subsidies) . However , a cartel that utilizes a global quota to create 
the wedge between the consumer price and the marginal cost and 
allocates production within the South by quota shares will not minimize 
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the resource cost of producing the global quota since presumably the 
marginal cost of generating additional output will differ among 
producers unless the quota shares are marketable and there is a 
competitive market among Southern producers . 
Potential for Export Restriction 
The intra-nation distributive impact of the PRS in each Southern 
nation will determine whether it is politically feasible to bring about 
an export restriction that, even though it may inc~ease national 
welfare, will surely not entail equal gains for the different pressure 
groups in that country. The distributive impact will depend crucially 
on how the contraction of production is brought about . If it is done 
by imposing an export tax thus lowe~ing the producer's price so as to 
discourage production, the government tax revenue will be larger than 
the international resource transfer, since it will include part of the 
original producer's surplus, while the loss in producer's surplus on 
the contraction of production will not reduce the tax revenue; only in 
the case of constant costs will the South's tax revenue equal the 
resource transfer . Since the tax revenue enters the budget, the final 
distribution of the gains from the PRS will depend on the distributive 
incidence of the government's budget . 
If the contraction of production is obtained by allocating 
domestic quotas, the producers will receive the resource transfer as a 
windfall which could be taxed away partially or totally by the 
government. In this case, the gains distribution, prior to any 
government taxation will affect the income distribution situation in 
each country depending on the production characteristics of the 
commodity, whether it is labor-intensive or not, foreign or 
domestically owned, etc . Generally resource- based commodities will be 
produced by large firms, either foreign- owned or government- owned, 
since economies of scale may be important. 
It is important to point out that even though on production 
efficiency grounds an export tax is superior to a quota, distributive 
considerations within the exporting country may render an export tax 
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unfeasible. In fact, the producer's price consistent with a high 
export tax may be so low as to entai l producer's incomes below 
subsistence levels; so, it may not be desirable or feasible to limit 
production in this way and export quotas can be preferred. Note that 
the producer's price will be even lower than the equilibrium price in 
the absence of the price-raising scheme . Thus, a PRS implemented 
through an export tax is likely to find resistance among the producers 
since their income will be reduced, unless compensated by the 
government with lump- sum transfers unrelated to production levels (as 
opposed to higher prices that would encourage production); this 
centralized compensatory mechanism may be very difficult to operate in 
a less developed country . 
Benefit Sharing among Southern nations is a very important issue 
affecting the probability of agreement to bring about a concerted 
export restriction . We must distinguish between benefit-sharing among 
the nations that are exporters of the commodity, a problem that will 
affect the feasibility and stability of the PRS, and benefit- sharing 
among all Southern nations, an ethical and political problem but not 
directly related to the implementation of a PRS in a given commodity . 
The benefits of a PRS , when an export tax is used, would be shared 
according to the relative efficiency of the individual producers of 
each country . The more (less) favored will be those countries with the 
lowest-cost (highest- cost) producers that will increase (decrease) 
their share in the market. If the participant exporting countries do 
not agree in sharing the benefits according to production efficiency, 
but on efficiency grounds prefer to use an export tax to restrict 
production, a system of compensatory payments is required . If the 
equity criterion is to distribute the gains according to the initial 
market share of each country, while actual production shares change 
according to production efficiency, side-payments will be required 
from the lowest-cost to the highest- cost producer countries . 
Alternatively, the criterion could entail using the PRS gains to 
improve the relative position of the poorer countries among the 
producing countries; in this case , the need for and direction of side-
payments will depend on the relation between efficient production and 
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level of income per capita, and may require more substantial side-
payments if the lowest- cost producers are also those countries with the 
higher level of income per capita . 
Side- payments among the exporting nations may be an unfeasible 
compensatory mechanism. In this case, a norm for the distribution of · 
the PRS gains among the part i cipant countries can be incor porated 
automatically into the agreement by using export quotas , instead of a 
uniform export tax , to restrict product i on . Quotas can be used without 
losing production efficiency , and thus decreasing the magnitude of the 
gains to be distributed, hy giving the participant countries 
marketable export quota r i ghts . 20 The export rights , required in order 
to export the commodity and adding to the exports consistent with the 
higher world price , are allocated among the countries according to the 
agreed equity criterion . For instance , they can be given to each 
country in proportion to their initial market shares (keeping the 
status-quo criterion) or according to thi s share but with certain 
adjustments so as to allow an increase in the shares of new producers . 
In this way, both the low- cost countries will be on the buyer side and 
the high- cost countries on the seller side ; the compensatory payments 
are accomplished, in an implicit way, through a market operation . 
Whatever the compensatory mechanisms , it should be realized that 
there are several complications that render very difficult the 
defi ni tion of the "fair " share of each ·participant country i n the 
distribution of the PRS gains . Thus, for instance , second- order 
impacts will have to be assessed whenever t he commodity is an input i n 
the production of goods or services that a r e imported by t he 
participants; the relevance of these feedback effects to benefit-
sharing will depend on the importance of this input to those product 
costs and the relative asymmetry in imports of these products by t he 
par ticipant countries . In a dynamic context , different r ates of time 
preference among the participant countr ies will lead to different 
desired patterns of benefits (and thus production levels) over time . 
So , if the urgency for obtaining additional resources for investment or 
consumption is correlated with some measure of welfar e, like income per 
capita , it would seem that the stability of a PRS will be higher when 
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the participant countries have a similar degree of development . 
Moreover, relat'vely new producers will challenge any proposal to 
distribute gains according to some status quo rule, and so a " fair" 
benefit- sharing "path" will have to be defined to accomodate these 
countries . Note that a dynamic ver sion of the optimum tax rate --
according to which growth in the exporting countries shifts their 
export supply curve to the right over time and assuming a low income 
elasticity of demand (so that it does not shift to the right over time) 
__ will entail an increasing optimum tax rate since the price 
elasticity of the demand for exports will decline as one moves down the 
21 
curve . 
Apart from the problem of benefi t - sharing among the PRS-
participants , there is the fact that the ability to produce commodities 
with potential monopoly power is unevenly distributed among Southern 
nations and , of course, with no correlation to the level of income per 
capita . So, a PRS in a certain commodity by a subset of Southern 
nations will , unless the rest of the Southern nations are not net 
importers of this commodity or of goods in which this commodity is an 
important input , provoke income transfers within the South that may be 
regressive, that is, from low- income Southern nations to high- income 
Southern nations . 
These intra- South reve ~se redistri butive transfers probably do 
not affect directly the feasibility of the PRS unless, in the case of a 
PRS brought about by a cartel , the political support of all Southern 
nations is required either to avoid stronger retaliatory actions by the 
North or to prevent the possibility of the importing Southern nations 
joining the North in attempting to create a countervailing monopsony 
power . However, the existence of this situation may introduce 
destabilizing forces inside the cartel so l ong as there is no consensus 
among the participants on the desirability of avoiding these intra-
south reverse t r ansfer s and on the mechanisms to prevent them from 
taking place . 
Two mechanisms to prevent this situation are : (a) two (or 
multiple) part pricing, that is , price discrimination among the 
consumers according to their per capita income level , pr ovided 
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effective barriers to reexportation can be imposed, and (b) refund of 
the reverse transfer implicit in the higher price of the commodity by 
lump-sum payments . If these payments take the form of softloans , only 
the grant component of them constitutes the effective refund . Note 
that both these mechanisms will only prevent the first - order transfer, 
that is, the cartelized commodity higher import bill but not the 
second-order transfer implicit in the higher prices of other imports ; 
if the commodity is an important cost element in some processed goods, 
due to the increased price of the cartelized commodity . To estimate 
this second-order effect is a difficult task due to the imperfections 
that may exist in the markets of these other goods . 
3. The Cartel Regime 
Southern exporters controlling a substantial share of world 
exports of a given commodity may be able to join and form a cohesive 
group possessing some degree of monopoly power in the world trade of 
this commodity. 22 As already discussed, they must be able to agree on 
the necessary measures to restrict exports and distribute the monopoly 
2' profit among themselves . ~ The real resource transfer thus generated 
from Northern (and from Southern) importers will obviously not 
constitute an aid-transfer by the North since it will not be a 
voluntary transfer . However, Southern nations must be aware that the 
North can adopt countervailing policies designed to prevent the 
cartels success and minimize the damage to the North ' s economies. 
North's Countervailing Policies Within the Commodity Area 
When the South's commodity cartel generates such gains to the 
South and such losses to the North that the resulting real income 
levels of both blocs are not acceptable to the North, then the North 
will try to adopt countervailing policies designed to improve its 
.welfare . We may distinguish between countervailing policies in the 
short-run, and in the long-run . 
In the short run the North has a limited capacity to adjust its 
production and consumption structure to the new relative prices, even 
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though losses as a result of the commodity cartel can be, under certain 
circumstances, somewhat reduced by stockpiling, recycling processes 
and conservation measures. However, the North may try to improve its 
position by retaliatory measures. These measures must be such as to 
increase the expected value of the North's real income . We are not 
considering, then, retaliatory measures that entail a reduction in the 
North's real income beyond the one provoked by the cartel and that are 
undertaken with the purpose of inflicting damage on the South; this 
behavior may be possible in a framework emphasizing power relations, 
since they depend on relative, and not absolute, income levels . 
The case when retaliation takes the form of the imposition by the 
North of an optimum tariff, on the assumption that the South ' s tariff 
24 will remain unchanged, has already been analyzed by Johnson . He 
proved that a country may gain by imposing an optimum tariff even if 
other countries retaliate by following the same policy and it has 
investigated the conditions under which it will gain for a group of 
special cases . So, the mere possibility of tariff retaliation by the 
North will not necessarily induce the South to abstain from operating a 
commodity cartel . This analysis assumes, of course, that the Northern 
nations are able to exercise a monopoly-monopsony power of their own 
beyond that which was being exercised anyway; this may prove to be 
difficult for the same reasons that apply to the formation of commodity 
cartels, esepcially given the dispersion of manufactured goods 
producers . 
The North may also respond in the short run , tryi ng to bribe the 
South into dismantling the cartel, if costless lump-sum payments can be 
accomplished . Since free trade is Pareto optimal for the world as a 
whole, the North may pay the South a bribe and still be better off, by 
the whole gain in world real income originating in the return to free 
trade, but the South may .share in this gain . Note that the South, when 
it accepts a bribe for not imposing the optimum tariff, may even be 
better off than with the optimum tariff, depending on whether its 
bargaining power is such as to be able to elicit a bribe higher than 
the real income loss that will entail moving from an optimum tariff 
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equilibrium to a free trade equilibrium . However, if the North can 
only obtain tax revenue by incurring some deadweight loss, it is not 
certain that it can bribe the South and still be better off; the 
classical postulate continues to hold when the deadweight loss 
associated with securing bribes is smaller than the efficiency cost 
incurred by the world economy when the South imposes an optimum tariff . 
The above analysis refers to attempts by the North to retaliate 
against the cartel as a whole . However, it may be more convenient, if 
possible, for the North to pursue a discri minatory retaliation policy, 
focusing its countervailing policies on the weaker in the sense of less 
committed , par ticipant nations compos ing the cartel. Because of 
economic as well as political reasons, the payoff from partially 
breaking the cartel is (a) not uniform among the participant countries 
since their production costs and rates of time preference are 
different , and ( b) very high , since large gains will accrue to an 
individual country by not restricting production to the stipulated 
amounts . So, discriminatory tariffs or bribes by the North may render 
largely ineffective a commodity cartel , unless the degree of cohesion 
among the participants ~s ve~y strong . 
In the medium and long run , the North's flexibility of response is 
heightened and the space of feasible policies is enlarged . Thus , the 
North may undertake effo~ ts to change dramatically its structure of 
production and consumption by accelerating the search for substitutes 
and new sources of production . As discussed, commodity cartels are 
restricted to commodities in which the South has, at least potentially, 
a certain degree of monopoly power, and we have emphasized the crucial 
role of the elasticity of demand in determining the feasibility of 
cartels . The strength of substitutability relations between 
commodities will largely determine their price elasticity of demand . 
The South, however, may neutralize to some extent the competit i on by 
some substitutes if able to form "super- cartels," that i s, joint 
cartels of commodities that are substitutes , or are important inputs of 
substitutes, and that are exported largely by the South . In this case, 
a super-cartel can be devised so as to maximize the joint gain in real 
income . The problem of benefit-sharing will arise, and it may be even 
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more difficult to agree on fair shares in the case of more than one 
commodity, partly from the fact that the viability of the cartel is 
inversely correlated to the number of participants. 
The absence of synthetics or other substitutes to a given 
commodity will generally entail a low price elasticity of demand. 
However, this situation should not be regarded as exogenous in 
considering cartels, since the emergence of new substitutes is, at 
least partly dependent on the amounts of resources devoted to research 
in synthetics and new production processes; and more resources would be 
allocated to research the hi gher its expected profitability. That is 
clearly dependent on the prices that the cartelized commodities 
command in the market. 
The search for new sources of minerals is conceptually equivalent 
to 
the search for substitutes . 25 Advances in technology may allow very 
soon the commercial mining of sea-bed resources, allegedly containing 
in the so-called manganese nodules minerals such as nickel, copper. 
d 
26 T · t" f d f cobalt an manganese. his ac ion may worsen the terms o tra e or 
some less developed countries. 
Whenever multinational corporations operating in the South are 
engaged in the production and marketing of a commodity susceptible of 
being cartelized it may be convenient both for the governments of the 
host countries and the companies to ally themselves in the pursuit of 
higher profits that can be distributed between them. The companies may 
obtain an insurance against total expropriation and the government may 
use, not only the technological, managerial and marketing know-how of 
these companies, but also their transnational character, thus making 
the collusion among the exporting countries easier. The role of 
multinationals engaged in commodity production may be, if they choose 
or are dr ' ven to ally themselves with the exporting countries, no"t only 
one of "tax collectors" for the exporting nations, 27 but also one of 
increasing the viability of commodity cartels. They will perform an 
even more essential role if super-ca · tels are intendect. 28 
Those directly affected within the North will be the consumers, 
but their loss in real income will be spread among a large number of 
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in di vi duals compared to the gain accruing to a few multinational 
companies; the capacity of the North's governments to react strongly in 
the face of commodi.ty cartels will be compromised by two domestic 
forces pressuring in opposite directions. The South will exchange part 
of the real income gain for a powerful ally that will enhance the 
viability and stability of the cartel. However, the cartel will 
probably have a regressive distri.butive impact within the North while 
transferring, at the same time, income from the Nor th to the South . 
Although there are indicat ~ons - not conclusive empirical 
evidence -- that commodity cartels may transfer substantial amounts of 
resources from the Northern to the Southern nations, there are several 
opposing forces in operation that render their feasibility an open 
question . Moreover the possible regressive income transfers among 
Southern nations pose a disquieting ethical problem and a challenge to 
the solidarity of the commodity-- rich nations On purely technical 
grounds these transfers can be easily prevented from taking place. 
However, in the tense atmosphere in which cartels would prevail, two-
part pricing to avoid these regressive transfers may be very unlikely 
since they will enhance the opportunit i es for breaking the ca "tel . 
The Path Toward Confronta tion 
The cartel option may lead to events surpassing the pure 
redistributive nature of a price-raising cartel. Non-economic goals 
of Southern exporters, t he North ' s countervail i ng policies, or even 
the political dynamic that may lead to irrational acts in either bloc 
may engage the South and the North in an unstable and unpredictable 
confrontation path . 
Perhaps a crucial issue is whether the South or the North chooses 
not to restrict their actions to economic responses within the 
commodity trade area The linkage of the commodity struggle to other 
economic areas or even to non-economic arenas contains the seeds of an 
explosive situation . 
The South may adopt or threaten supply j_nterruptions and 
embargoes to improve its bargaining position in other areas . Even 
more, the South may choose to discriminate among Northern nations in 
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·ce increases or supply embargoes. prl The North may respond, either to 
the original purely redistributive price-raising cartel or to the non-
redistributive threats, exercising its power where it finds itself in a 
stronger position (food exports, market access, financial flows) in 
order to compensate the power asymmetry in the commod ' ty or it may even 
go further and escalate the struggle to the political and military 
arenas. Such actions would trigger Southern responses that could 
comprise debt moratorium or even, as has been proposed, collective 
default by Southern nations in their debt stock, massive expropriation 
without compensation of direct foreign investment located in Southern 
nations, and so on. 
The dangers and possible negat i ve r epercussions of such actions 
in the fabric of the world economic and political system are, of 
course, tremendous . Such possibilities would strengthen the position 
of those that propose a decoupling or disengagement of the North and 
the South . 
Apart from rational concern over controlling interdependence in 
order to allow it to reach the optimum level at a certain trade- off 
between the economic gains of interdependence and the restrictions it 
places on national sovereignty and independence, there a ·-e advocates 
of drastic decoupling strategies both in the North and the South . 
Northern proponents argue that the North has much to lose from erratic 
Southern policies and little to gain from economic interaction with the 
South . They propose large-scale "Projects Independence" to make them 
self-sufficient i n raw materials and a r etreat to economic intercourse 
only within the industrialized world. 
calculations of the possible substantial 
They seldom make explicit 
economic cost of such autarchic measures nor do they discuss the 
implications of such a strategy on the attainment oP such goals as 
world peace and a global society . 
Radical Southern advocates generally emphasize political reasons 
and "dependence" theories to propose a "general disengagement from the 
internati onal capitalist system" and regard the cartel option as a 
transitional strategy "to be employed in the interim period while 
exports to the Centre are being phased out and mineral production is 
being oriented towards domestic use."29 Such disengagement strategies 
would seriously compromise world efficiency to such an extent as to 
produce a joint loss situation 
Summary Evaluation 
The cartel r egime may provoke especially in the short- run, 
substantial resource transfers to Southern commodity exporter nations. 
However, it may provoke non negligible regressive transfers from poor 
Southern importer nations to richer ones . It will involve world 
efficiency costs, but in a moderate and well des i gned price- raising 
cartel they may not be very large in view of the inelasticities of the 
system in the short run . 
The real threat is the escalation of the conflict that retaliatory 
measures may provoke, especially if the conflict is not limited to the 
commodity arena but is extended to other areas . Such a confrontation 
scenario would heighten instability and would not fulfill the goal of 
economic security. Decoupling strategies will be too costly and will 
lead to a further fragmentation of the world. 
4 . The Commodity Agreements Regime 
The dissat · sfaction of Southern commodity exporters with the 
operation of the present market system has led them to advocate 
controlled forms of trade in ~aw materials through commodity 
agreements (CAs) with participation of both importer and exporter 
countries . 
CAs have been associated with multiple objectives and this has 
confused the discuss i on of their merits and weaknesses. 30 We can 
distinguish, on the basis of their primary purpose, two main 
categories: redistributive CAs devised primarily t o transfer real 
resources from DC importers to LDC exporters, and stabilization CAs 
designed to smoothen short-run price fluctuations around the long- run 
trend but without affecting this trend . 3l 
It i s very j mportant to draw a clear line on whethe~ any 
agreements especially buffer stocks will serve only a 
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stabilization goal or whether they would include redistributive 
elements (that is change the level of the long- run price trend). Their 
negotiation will be complicated and their chances of implementation 
reduced if they are meant not only to stabilize prices around the trend 
but also to provoke a disguised transfer from importing to exporting 
nations . 
It should be borne in mind, however, that some of the proposals 
that are generally made for arrangements designed to stabilize either 
the foreign exchange earnings of LDCs or the prices of certain critical 
commodities include features that also produce a regular transfer of 
resources from DCs to LDCs . 32 
The reduction of price instabil t ty may have mutual advantages for 
both importer and exporter countries, regardless of whether DCs or LDCs 
are subject to more export instability . 33 Since the several methods to 
stabilize export prices have been discussed at length elsewhere,34 we 
will concentrate our analysis on redistributive CAs . 
A redistributive CA can operate through a price-raising scheme 
(PRS), as discussed in the former section , in which both exporter and 
importer countries would sustain the mechanism to increase the price 
above the competitive level . It will include an "aid" component if 
there is a partial or absolute inability by the LDCs exporters to 
operate unilaterally an effective commodity PRS provoking a resource 
transfer to th.em from the DCs . The successful implementation and 
operation of the arrangement should require the agreement and 
collaboration of the developed importing nations . In certain 
commodities the North ' s explicit collaboration with Southern nations 
may be necessary for the exporting countries to keep prices above 
competitive levels through export restrictions . DCs can cooperate 
with LDCs by abstaining from retaliatory measures that could mprove 
the DCs position. Also they can help LDCs in any phase in the process 
of reaching and operating a CA such as in the discussion stages as 
arbiter of conflicts , in the mplementation stage, or in the 
enforcement stage providing the sanctions for misbehavior . If these 
actions generate a transfer of real resources from the former to the 
latter and DCs do not ask any direct economic compensation or 
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reciprocity for them, then this one-way transfer can be considered an 
aid-transfer. It should be noted that the magnitude of the aid-
transfer in a CA is not necessarily equal to the total transfer that 
the agreement produces because the developing exporting nations, or at 
least some of them and for some time, could have obtained some fraction 
of the monopoly profit acting unilaterally . 
There is a pervasive tendency in the discussion of CAs to attach 
intrinsic values (rationality, equity, etc . ) to some commodity prices . 
LDCs claim that commodities should command "equitable prices," which 
mean higher prices than those prevailing in the market . DCs argue that 
raw materials should be available at "reasonable" prices, which mean 
lower prices than those obtainable by supply manipulation . 
Once the possibility of multiple transfer channels is recognized, 
it is at the least misleading and at the most inadequate to attach 
equity connotations to commodity prices. This approach can be 
misleading because prices cannot be fixed independently of demand and 
supply conditions '-n the market of a given commodity and thus a 
mechanism should be specified to explain how the "equitable" or 
"reassonable" price is related to the prices that clear the market for 
different supply restrictions that can be imposed. And it can be 
inadequate because, apart from the fact that an equity criterion based 
on ethical grounds should be made explicit, equity has a more adequate 
meaning as a characteri stic of the existing distribution of the world ' s 
income and weal th or of the outcome of the global transfer process 
rather than of the commodity price structure itself . 
Thus it seems to me a clarifying approach to distinguish , within 
the category of market clearing prices, between competitive and non-
competitive prices of primary commodities that are associated with 
different degrees of supply restirctions. If LDCs exporting primary 
commodities are able to secure by themselves non·-competi ti ve prices 
higher than the competitive ones and their real income is increased as 
a result of this action then they should do so in their own interests, 
unless bribed by the DCs to do otherwise, and, in a world divided in 
sovereign nation-states, the DCs should accept this as a legitimate 
economic option of the LDCs . 35 
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But if the LDCs are not able to exploit unilaterally their latent 
monopoly power and they need and obtain the collaboration of the DCs to 
impose non-competitive prices, then it is better to recognize this 
action for what it is, an "aid" operation, in order to be able to plan 
an informed and rational strategy for increasing their real income with 
due consideration to the reality of economic facts. The only argument 
for not recognizing explicitly the real nature of such an operation is 
that of political and bargaining convenience, so long as this disguised 
transfer is not perceived for what it is inside the transferor nation. 
It should be noted that a basic characteristic of a PRS-CA arises 
from the fact that the price-quantity configuration reached through 
the scheme will be a point lying on the demand curve facing the 
exporting country. Thus, PRS-CA do not require explicit international 
subsidy payments and the consuming-transferor nations do not need to 
appropriate any fiscal revenue in order to implement the scheme. The 
resource transfer is being accomplished directly from the consuming 
units within the developed-importing nations to the authority 
collecting the "revenue" of the implicit excise tax. This authority 
could be the government of the less developed-exporting country or, if 
an international levy is imposed in the trade of the commodity, an 
international authority would become the recipient of the "revenue" in 
a first instance and later would transfer it partially or totally to 
the exporting countries. If the developed-consuming nations impose a 
tariff on the commodity imports, and later refund the tariff proceeds 
to the exporting nations, the transfer encompasses a fiscal dimension 
requiring what is essentially an explicit international transfer 
payment. 
PRS commodity agreements must comply with all the prerequisites 
already outlined for an export restriction to be beneficial to the 
exporting countries. They are very difficult to operate since they 
require the consensus of two groups with opposing interests, the 
exporter and importer nations. 
An International Su'bsidy Scheme is another type of CA that can be 
used as a device to transfer real resources from DCs to LDCs. These 
schemes have an intrinsic requirement for international transfer 
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payments. They can be operated through a price-fixing arrangement in 
which the DCs bind themselves to buy a given commodity at a price 
higher than the equilibrium or free market one. If there is no output 
contraction, there will be overproduction and the governments of the 
DCs will buy and accumulate stocks of the commodity, thus making 
explicit payments . They can also be operated through production 
subsidies such that the consumers' price is lower than the free trade 
price but the price received by the producer includes a direct subsidy 
paid by the DCs. In this case output is higher than the free market 
one, although there is no overproduction in the sense that the price-
quantity configuration is a point on the demand curve. In both cases, 
the changes in resource allocation generate efficiency costs and the 
transfer operation is really a result of direct transfer payments 
rather than of a manipulated market outcome. 
These schemes require then, appropriation of fiscal revenue by 
the DCs, with the increased efficiency cost that this will imply if tax 
revenue cannot be raised with neutral taxes. Moreover, they do not 
require any specific demand elasticity and can be operated in any 
commodity exported by the LDCs. Consequently, these international 
subsidy schemes conceptually belong more to the financial aid transfer 
channel, although entailing higher efficiency costs if they result in 
resource misallocations, than to the commodity arrangements transfer 
channel. Furthermore, even though these schemes are used in DCs to 
accomplish domestic income transfers, it is unlikely that they could be 
adopted in the international scene, especially the producer subsidy 
version. The financing of buffer stocks has been considered by the 
DCs, but more as a stabilization device than a resource transfer 
channel . 
Summary Evaluation 
Redistributive commodity agreements in those c0mmodities 
susceptible of being cartelized may lead to a reasonable ~ompromise 
among the exporter and importer countries in a price between the 
optimum monopolisitc price and the competitive long-run marginal cost 
price . However, they involve protracted negotiation processes and the 
same goal can be obtained, probably with lower efficiency costs , by 
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direct grant aid. Both actions involve the willingness of DCs to 
produce an aid-transfer from the North to the South . 
Stabilization commodity agreements may perform a mo r e useful 
function. In any case , redistributive and stabilization features 
should be clearly distinguished in negotiating and implementing a CA . 
The proposal of gener alized commodity agreements will lead to a 
highly visible manipulation of markets whose attainment of goals will 
depend crucially on how technically well designed are the CAs - - a 
difficult task -- and on the political will of the DCs to redistribute 
income through this transfer channel . 
5 . Towards a Preferred Regime 
The present distorted free ma r ket regime does not fulfill 
adequately the stability and redistributive goals and it involves 
inefficiencies when markets are not competitive . The ca~ telized 
regime may redistribute income but not necessarily always in the right 
direction and may lead to gross instability and to confrontation . The 
commodity agreement regime may produce non-negligible resource 
misallocation costs and will substitute impersonal nature of the 
market for highly protracted political negotiations . 
However , these r egimes contain elements or blocks of elements 
which, if integrated in a consistent way and added to new ones, could 
structure a superior regime . 
It may be useful to make explicit some of my views which will 
permeate the perspective of the preferred regime . 36 
A basic assumption is that there is general interest i.n the 
construction of a "moderate " international order . The North needs the 
South ' s cooperation to manage global interdependence without having to 
incur in the short r un substantial costs of confrontation tactics or to 
insulate itself in the long-run from the possibility of these actions 
by reducing the degree, and the benefits , of international economic 
interaction . I believe that the option of actively joining in the 
construction of a moderate international order which includes, among 
other things, the r eduction of perceived i nequality in the world 
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distribution of income, is the best for the North even if it tries to 
maximize its own, but interdependent, welfare function. 
The South cannot achieve its aim of a more equitable world order 
by imposing it on the North. Whatever power Southern nations may 
harness in the short run from their control of natural resources would 
be better employed as a weapon to negotiate rather than to impose new 
rules of the game in the international economy. The South's producer 
power is asymmetrical: it can provoke substantial damage to the North 
in the short run through supply interruptions, but it may not be able 
to assure, if used unilaterally, a superior position for itself in the 
long run . This results in a situation where the threat is stronger 
than the execution, and thus a scenario more suited to negotiation than 
to confrontation . 
th We live in a second (or n ) best world . This originates an 
important methodological requirement . The benefits and costs of 
alternative raw materials regimes should be assessed with reference to 
the status quo numeraire instead of being compared to the non-existent, 
and maybe non-viable, ideal situation . Thus the conclusions will 
depend on the original nature of the commodity markets . So, for 
example, a movement from a strongly oligopsonistic toward a mildly 
oligopolistic market (or towards an imperfect commodity agreement) may 
entail a gain to world efficiency . If the latter situation is 
evaluated vis-a- vis a free-competitive-efficient market the conclusion 
will be different . 
The non-Pareto optimal nature of the world economic order entails 
the existence of "slack" in the system, which, if ways are found to 
reduce it, could generate a variable-sum game or joint-gain situation 
with gains to all or, at least, gain to one party without damage to the 
others . A new commodity regime must be built on the basis of joint 
gain situations to both exporter and importer nations . The charity of 
nations would not lead toward stable situations . 
In a situation in which multiple object.ives are pursued and the 
available instruments are often exogenously constrained 
(institutionally politically, etc . ) , solutions that rigidly assign to 
each instrument the attainment of only one objective may be neither 
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feasible nor optimal. Thus, for example, the classical first best 
solution to any international distributive problem would be free trade 
and capital movements , coupled with the appropriate international 
lump-sum transfers . These unbounded lump-sum transfers do not exist , 
even though grant aid approximate such flows . However, grant aid is 
constrained by non- economic elements (protr acted legislative 
appropri ation within the North, etc . ) and generates costs such as thos e 
associated with the welfare cost of taxation or expenditure- switching 
required to free those resources . The conclusion relevant to this 
paper is that commodity markets can usefully be organized with a view 
to fulfill , to some extent , the objectives of efficiency, equity, 
. . d " t 37 stability an securi y . 
Changes With i n the Existing Regime 
Improvements can be made to the existing regime along the 
following lines: 
(a) Reduce or eliminate those barriers to commodity trade imposed 
by the governments of import i ng countries . This is essentially a 
domestic political issue . Efforts to i mprove adjustment assistance 
and, in general , to create mechanisms to compensate those groups who 
lose with the reduction of trade barriers are steps in the right 
di rection . 
(b) Retain i mport taxes on commodities (or substitute 
international levies for them) and hand the proceeds to multilateral 
institutions, which would reimburse partially the exporter country and 
give some aid to other poor countries on the basis of per capita 
income . 
(c) Strengthen private buffering activity by encouraging 
organized futures trading . 38 Futures contracts would have to be much 
longer- term than is usual in existing futures markets . Make greater 
use of long- te r m contracts as substitutes for missing futures mar kets . 
This activity may even be subsidized since information -- a crucial 
requirement for futures tradings has some public good 
characteristics and may not be available in optimal amounts . 
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( d) Improve and enlarge schemes for earnings stabilization . 39 
Instead of intervening directly in the commodity market , have these 
schemes attempt, through the provis i on of compensatory financing, to 
stabilize overall export earnings . 
Although these schemse could serve only stabilization purposes, 
they generally include features than produce an income transfer from 
the importers to the exporters . Thi s entails transfers in direct 
proportion to the fluctuations in commodity earnings, a rather 
arbitrary basis for redistributive transfers . 
(e) Eliminate the barriers to the exports of processed raw 
materials implicit in the phenomenon of tariff escalation, that is, 
nominal tariffs increasing with the degree of processing and having the 
effect of escalating effective protection . This would increase world 
efficiency and the benefits to exporting countries. 40 
Changes Requiring a New Balance of Power 
The analysis of the present regime and its alternatives lead me to 
prefer a regime in which commodity trade is conducted in competitive 
markets . Whenever the present market is characterized by a few, 
vertically integrated, oligopolist multinational firms, a movement 
toward competitive conditions will entail a gain in world efficiency 
(increased production and investment), an increase in the price 
received by exporting nations and a price reduction to consumers . Of 
course, the crucial question is whether in fact the present trade 
regime in those commodities important to world trade and to LDCs is 
characterized by such potential power and whether such power is 
actually absued . There are studies that demonstrate or suggest that 
this was the case in oil (with the "seven sisters" dominating oil 
production and trade) and uranium, 41 and that it today is in bauxite , 42 
nickel, phosphates, and others . 
Diaz- Alejandro has pointed out that "commodity trade under steady 
multilateral rules of the game, and in open and competitive markets , is 
a possible arena of economic interaction between LDCs and DCs offering 
arrangements that are economically efficient while maintaining 
desirable characteristics of unintrusiveness, reversibility and 
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decomposibili ty. Historically such an arena has never existed . 
Northern countries just developed their LDCs sources of primary 
products under colonial or neocolonial circumstances, and throughout 
have manipulated rules of the game in international commodity markets 
. t th . d 1143 mostly to sui eir own nee s ••• 
However, I would like to emphasize that such a system cannot be 
reached without a more symmetrical structure of power in commodity 
trade. Since today there is a power asymmetry between the few 
multinationals and the fragmented exporting countries, a prerequisite 
for a change may be the creatjon of producer associations that would 
increase their power to bargain for improving the markets . Since 
technical aspects of commodity production may preclude competition 
among many small firms -- or render it very inefficient -- a near 
competitive solution may be the result of bargaining between the large 
multinationals and the governments of the producer countries. 
An objection to this strategy is that it encourages producer 
associations that may turn into cartels. My reading of the current 
events is that the question is not whether LDCs exporting a given 
commodity will try to unite in producer association, because they will 
inevitably do so (if only because of the OPEC example), but whether 
they will lean toward creating a cartel regime, with all the dangers 
already discussed, or whether they can be persuaded that they should 
not "execute the threat" (create cartels and be liable to success or 
failure) but rather use it to bargain for improved mar kets . Producers' 
associations may even help to stabilize prices in the short run . 
These new rules of the game should include also a negotiated 
access- to- resources for access-to- market arrangement corresponding to 
the interest of the DCs for guaranteed access to supplies and the 
interest of the LDCs for improved access to markets of DCs for their 
manufactured exports. 
In some commodities trade is now conducted in competitive 
markets. The "slack" provided by non- competitive markets does not 
exist. Higher incomes for LDC exporting nations will require prices 
above competitive levels unless lump sum transfers become viable . The 
best alternative for the few commodities which have inelastic demands 
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2nd are unimportant in the import bill or consumer budgets of DCs Will 
be efficient, well designed, redistributive commodity agreements . 44 As 
discussed earlier, the best mechanism will be to impose an 
international levy on the commodity trade since it will minimize 
production inefficiencies and the tax collected can be allocated in a 
discretionary way (refunded to LDCs ' mporters, reimburse only 
partially "rich" LDCs exporters, etc . ). However, it must be pointed 
out they they are very difficult to operate in an efficient way and 
that, moreover, they are highly imperfect substitutes for direct lump-
sum transfers by the North while requiring the same political will to 
redistribute income. 
On the stabilization goal apart from the improvement in futures 
markets already mentioned, I think that generalized buffer stocks 
merit further study but it must be considered that they will involve 
resource costs to operate and that their operation will be complicated 
by the attempts to influence the long-term price trend. In some 
commodities with special production characteristics that make for 
cycles of shortages and over-production because of a lagged response to 
price fluctuations, the price fluctuations must be reduced, possibly 
with adequate buffer stocks. For the rest, I would prefer a drastic 
enlargement of earnings stabilization schemes (in the direction of the 
US proposal at the UN in 1975) together with mechanisms to facilitate 
LDCs access to short-run international financial markets in reasonable 
conditions. 45 
6. Conclusion 
Thus, I propose a movement toward more competitive markets in 
commodity trade through a balancing of the bargaining power of both the 
North and South (meaningful earnings stabilization schemes, mild 
international intervention to stabilize prices , and new rules to 
heighten economic security) . But to be acceptable to Southern 
countries, this commodity regime should be complemented with a 
substantial increase in the volume of lump-sum transfers from rich to 
poor nations, maybe in the form of an escalated international income 
489 
tax. 
I believe there is a commodity threat that, dependent upon the 
Northern response, may turn either into a cartel threat or even a 
cartel regime, or into a desire to change the rules of the economic 
game. These rules were agreed after WW II in Bretton Woods in a very 
different international scenario . The North should not react to this 
threat seeking decoupling strategies but rather should try to 
construct a meaningful "structure of cooperation1146 that will have to 
involve all the areas of North- South economic interaction , especially 
commodity issues, and be responsive to both Southe"'n and Northern 
aspirations . 
Whatever power Southern nations may harness in the short run from 
their control of natural resources should be employed as a weapon to 
negotiate a new liberal and equitable international economic order . 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 This discussion of exhaustible resources i s based on Solow 
(1974) . 
2rn trade theory, this situation is studied when discussing the 
stability conditions of the competitive solution ; the classic 
presentation is in terms of the Marshallian "shoe- lace" diagram whi ch 
depicts three equilibrium points , two of which are stable wh i le one is 
unstable . See Marshall (1930) . 
3The nature, importance and efficiency impact of these barriers 
are described in Johnson (1967) , pp . 84-94 . 
4see McCulloch (1975) . 
5see Keynes (1975), p. 312 . 
6A similar problem would exist i f, for certain countr i es, imports 
of a given commodity represented a large proportion of total imports . 
This does not happen. Commodity impor ts , with the possible exception 
of oil, represent a small proportion of total imports of the importer 
countries. 
7For the following developing countr i es, mineral exports account 
for more than 20 percent of total export earnings (main export 
commodity shown i n parenthesis) : Bolivia (tin) , Chile (copper), 
Guyana (bauxite- alumina), Jamaica (bauxite- alumina), Jordan 
(phosphates) , Mauritania 1 iron ore), Morocco (phosphates), Peru 
(copper) , Sier ra Leone (diamonds) , Togo (phosphates) , Tunisia 
(phosphates) , Ziare (copper) , Zambia (copper) . 
8At least four groups of nations can be identified within the 
North according to their degree of dependence on commodi ty imports : 
(a) Japan is highly, and :l.ncreasi ngly, dependent on raw material 
imports; (b) the EEC is very dependent on oil and non-fuel mineral 
imports ; (c) the USA is an i mportant exporter of commodities 
(especially grains) but depend ':' on imports for the supply of s ome 
critical commodities ; (d) Canada , Australi a and South Africa , though 
importers of some commodities, are important exporters of non- fuel 
minerals. 
9rt should be pointed out i n this connection that for certain non-
fuel minerals only three Northern nations (Canada , Australia and South 
Africa) represent a large shar e of Northern exports . Thus , the South 
plus these three nations represents a dominant export export share in 
several othe commodities . 
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100f course the extent of the actual use of ma~ket power is an 
ropirical question. Even though there is some evidence that will be 
:iven later, this point clearly merits further study. 
11 see Cooper (1975). 
12A pioneering study of Commodity Arrangements as a means of 
transferring resources to LDCs through monopoly- pricing is that of 
J. Pincus (1965). 
13There are t wo studies devoted to the discussion of trade 
arrangements in primary products that are extremely useful in 
understanding the subject : G. Blau (1964) and H. Johnson (1967) . For 
a pre-UNCTAD study of international commodity agreements, covering the 
period from the decade of the 1920's, when interest in multi - nation 
commodity schemes first became evident, through the Havana Charter of 
1948, until late 1962, see L. Baranyai and J . C. Mills (1963) . See also 
UNCTAD (1964), UNCTAD (1968), J . E Meade (1964) and M. J . Hooft-
Welvaars (1964). 
14As A. Krueger (1974) has shown, competitive rent seeking leads to 
the operation of an economy inside its transformation curve . So, if 
South nations devote resources to compete for monopoly rents in 
commodity markets, additional deadweight losses in world real income 
will be generated. 
15of course , there are also redistributional consequences both 
within the exporter and importer countries which will be discussed 
later. 
16Note that a horizon long enough to obtain value form the 
resources liberated by restriction on production is likely to lead to 
more elastic demand and alternative supply curves. 
17 The approach to resource transfers that focuses on maximizing 
foreign exchange earnings of the exporting countries is consistent 
with an objective of maximizing their income only when the social cost 
of the resources involved in the production of exportable commodities 
is zero. 
18Tis last possibility was drawn to my attention by Anthony Scott . 
19The PRS wi ll also affect current versus future generation income 
distribution . However, even though this may be an important ethical 
issue, it has a minor effect on today's feasible political options . 
The PRS also changes income distribution within importing countries 
since it is similar to an indirect tax, probably regressively. The 
impact on the issue d"scussed is remote. 
20 
According to Mohamed Ariff . this was done for some time in 
Malaysia to restrict tin exports . 
21 Th . . t d W M C (196 ) is poin was ma e by • • orden 5 • 
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22This is the case of the oil exporting countries united in OPEC . 
They have increased substantially their real income by what i s 
essentially an exploitati on of their monopoly power in oil supplies to 
the rest of the world . The crucial aspect determining their success so 
far has been the cohesiveness that they have achieved in reaching and 
implementing their price- quantity accords . However, it is outside the 
scope of this paper to analyze the case of oil 
23see Bergsten 0973) fo'" a waming that the commodity cartel 
threat i s "real . " Also see Krasner (1974) and Be~gsten (1974) . 
24see Johnson (1953) . 
25Besides compromisi ng the stability of the cartel , this type of 
technological progress, al though reducing the North ' s dependence on 
the South , may be detrimental to the world as a whole . On this see the 
interest ; ng paper by A. O. Hirschman (1959) . 
26see UNCTAD (1973) , R. Branco (1973) , H. L. Fabian (1973), as well 
as the paper by M. Gorham in these Proceedings . 
27see Adelman (1972-73). 
28Note that the multinational fi r m i s an entity within the 
sovereign control of the importer country , and thus exposed to counter 
pressures . 
29see Girvan (1975) . 
30 An UNCTAD ( 1972) report lists fou r teen objectives : "stable 
prices, remunerative and equitable prices , exports earnings , better 
balance between supply and demand , adequate supplies for consumers , 
increasing consumption of the commodity, development of productive 
resources, i nternational trade , dealing with burdensome surpluses , 
employment and labor questions , international collaborati on, marketing 
policies and access to markets, disposal of non- commercial stockpiles 
and negotiation of additional provisions " 
31of course , it may be qui te difficult to distinguish these two 
elements in the pri ce movements of some commodities 
32 A recent proposal in the commodity arena is that of the Secr etar y 
General of UNCTAD who has proposed an "integrated" program for 
commodities according to which uniform principals will be negotiated 
to control commodity exports important to LDCs (See UNCTAD 
TB/B/C . 1/189 and TD/B/C . 1/184) . The bas i c elements of the program ar e 
the establishment of international buffer stocks, the creation of an 
international fund to finance the buffer stock arrangement , an 
improvement of compensatory financing schemes to stabilize export 
earnings , the negotiation of long-run supply and purchase agreements 
between exporter and importer countries, and the elimination of tariff 
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escalation in DCs to allow an expans _. on of raw mate,.,ial processing 
activities in LDCs . What are new in the integrated program are not the 
individual elements of the plan but the links that are established 
between all those elements both on the technical level -- common buffer 
stock fund, complementation between buffer stocks and compensatory 
financing etc., - - and the political level negotiation of the basic 
pri nciples of the program for all commodities and then implementation 
on a product-by~product basis . In my view, the crucial point in the 
agreement will be the price setting mechanism . 
33This latter issue has been very much discussed . See McBean 
(1968) and J.D. Coppock (1962) . Note that even comparable instability 
generates higher costs to the economies of the South, given the 
rigidities of their adjustment processes and their difficulty to 
compensate them by holding adequate levels of international reserves. 
34see H.G. Johnson (1967). 
35This position also entails that LDCs should regard as legitimate 
-- even though not necessarily rational -- the efforts by DCs to reduce 
consumption and search for substitutes of those key imported 
commodities that they consider in unreliable supply . 
36This sect !. on only draws a sketch of the preferred regime . 
Further work in this direction is obviously required to build a 
consistent and comprehensive commodity regime. 
37See J . Pinera (1974) . 
38It has also been proposed that governments of importing nations 
should keep larger commodity stocks and perform a buffer function by 
holding international reserves in commodities instead of having them 
only in monetary assets . 
39The IMF has a compensato>"y financing scheme available to Fund 
members which experience export earnings below their trend value. 
Recently, the EEC countries and 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
developing nations signed the Lome Convention, a far - reaching 
agreement covering many aspects of trade and aid . An' earnings 
stabilization scheme called STABEX was created, according to which ACP 
exporters of twelve commodities are protected against fluctuations on 
the proceeds from exports to the EEC on a commodity-by- commodity 
approach . 
40This measure would also help to channel in the right direction 
the desire of some LDCs for more industrialization, that is to sectors 
with comparative advantage at social prices. 
41 
Apparently a uranium cartel existed from 1972 to 1975 (during 
that period uranium prices rose from US$6 a pound to more than $40) 
encompassing the governments of Canada, France , Australia and South 
Africa, several major uranium- producing companies in those countries , 
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Gulf of the United States and an English-based mining company , Rio 
Tinto- Zinc . According to documents of a House Commerce Subcommittee 
the cartel was highly organized with a paid secretariat in Paris and 
detailed rules for rigging bids, allocating markets and driving up 
prices . 
42witness the following description of the industrial structure in 
aluminum industry : "Six major producers dominate the international 
aluminum industry . They control 80 percent of western-world primary 
aluminum capacity, about one- half of world trade in bauxite alumina and 
aluminum , and a large share of fabrication capacity . The six are all 
fully integrated from bauxite to metal and are active in mining and 
processing throughout the world, often through joint ventures with one 
another and with smaller companies . Substantial potential thus exists 
for monopoly and monopsony rents from Caribbean mining activi ties . " 
Gillis and McLure (1975) . 
43Diaz-Alejandro (1975) , p. 226 . 
44see Kravis (1968) . 
45rt should be mentioned that the basic source of ' nstability of 
minerals prices is the business cycle in DCs, i ts length , depth and , 
sometimes , syncronization. Perhaps the best service to LDCs by DCs is 
to find ways -- technical and political as long as it involves 
government coordination -- to dampen this cycle . 
46 See Bergsten (1973) 
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A COMMENT 
COMMODITY TRADE FROM A NORTH-SOUTH PERSPECTIVE 
Seiji Naya 
The paper is a scholarly presentation of various aspects of the 
market structure that governs commodity trade . The author examines how 
different market structures meet or do not meet goals of a new 
International Economic Order, namely efficiency, income re 
distribution, stabilization and economic security. Adopting "posi-
tive" economic analysis, many important issues are evaluated, although 
the analysis does not give a sense of empirical reality . 
He begins by consi dering the market structure that r esembles most 
"Closely today ' s trade, namely the free market . His conclusion is 
negative on several grounds. First the present free marke t system is 
made inefficient and non- competitive because DCs impose tariffs and 
other important controls . Also mineral trade is l a rgely controlled by 
a small number of vertically-integrated transnationals . 
Second, primary products are subject to wide fluctuations due to 
demand and supply shifts . Export instability causes a great deal of 
hardship as it complicates inves tment , production and consumption 
processes . Third, today ' s regime tends to bias the terms of trade 
against exporters as the oligopolistic and vertically- integrated 
transnational firms tend to depress the prices received by producer 
nations . His summary of today ' s market is that the stabilization 
objective can be achieved , but to meet other objecti ves of efficiency 
and distribution, a change in the bargaining power is needed . 
A considerable portion of his paper deals with how price can be 
raised by cartel or cartel - like arrangements . A wide range of topics 
is discussed i ncluding export taxes, quota , elasticity conditions 
required to effect price increases , retaliation , bribery by DCs , and 
adverse impacts on commodity-importing LDCs . The important message 
one can draw from his analysis is that such price- rais i ng schemes are 
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not only extremely difficult to implement but also may have adverse 
effects on some LDCs . Furthermore, as he points out, there is a real 
threat of all-out economic war due to the likely escalation of the 
conflict between producini LDCs and consuming DCs. 
It is surprising that the author does not even cite any of the 
historical record of commodity agreements such as the tin agreement. 
The paper does mention the UNCTAD's Integrated Commodity Programme in 
connection with the stabilization problems. 
He points out that the UNCTAD proposal of buffer stocks does not 
draw a clear line on whether it is intended to stabilize or change the 
long-term price trend . He states that if a change in the long-term 
price trend is intended, chances of successful negotiation are less. 
He is correct to worry about the vagueness of this distinction . On the 
other hand , means suggested by the proposal indicate that the objective 
is to reduce fluctuations rather than change the terms of trade . 
Buffer stocks, if operated skillfully, can possibly reduce ins ta 
bility. But t o maintain the price above the trend it will be necessary 
to engage in the continuous accumulation of stocks . 
Furthermore , LDCs ' sales to DCs account for only about 30 percent 
of the value of world production of items on the UNCTAD list . Hence, 
there is a possibility that most income transferred by price support 
would be transferred among DCs . 
My understanding of the Programme is that the buffer stock fund 
would not replace existing commodity agreements . Rather, by providing 
a ready source of financing for the operations, the fund is des igned to 
encourage the negotiation of commodity agreements for ten to eighteen 
individual commodities on a product-by-product basis . In his 
analysis, a number of questions are left untouched . For example , why 
would there be no merging of all buffer-stock funds into one pool? 
Also, what is the probable magnitude of the common fund that is likely 
to meet the objective of stabilization? Although 3 billion dollars is 
often mentioned, a few references I have seen suggest that the amount 
is not likely to be sufficient to stabilize prices of even a few 
commodities, e . g ., tin and copper . Also, some emp i rical studies have 
not supported the contention that export instability has a retarding 
influence on investment or on growth. None of these possibilities is 
mentioned i n his presentation. 
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A COMMENT 
COMMODITY TRADE FROM A NORTH-SOUTH PERSPECTIVE 
Norman I. Robins 
Dr . Pinera begins his paper by saying that international com-
modities trade can be conducted under various rules of the game and 
that these regimes can be analyzed along the dimensions of efficiency, 
income redistribution within and among countries, stability, and econ-
omic security . He analyzes the free market, the price raising, the 
cartel and the commodity agreements regimes . He concludes by sug 
gesting a superior regime compri sed of the better elements of the f i rst 
four regimes and meeting his goals of efficiency, income distribution, 
stability, and economic security . 
My cr i ticisms of the contents of the paper are few; it i s an 
excellent paper . My criticisms are rather of its omissions . These 
four dimensions, namely efficiency, stability , income redistributi on, 
and economic security constitute only a partial analysis . I would 
rather see the paper more eclectic, address i ng also physical capital 
formation, human capital formation, and technology t ransfers . 
Pinera points out the exi sti ng ineffici encies under the free-
market regime . These are caused by barriers to trade and oligopolis t ic 
behavior of transnational corporations . Further, in the case of 
exhaustible resources, oligopolists may exploit the resources too 
slowly , and a competi tive mar ket may exhaust them too quickly . 
He also points out t he vulnerability of LDCs who depend on one or 
two commodities for their foreign- exchange earnings and thus the i r 
development . As we all know. commodity prices do fluctuate heavi l y. 
Multinationals , oligopolistic and vertically integrated , are able to 
bias terms of trade in favor of the developed countries . Furthermore , 
today ' s free market regime is unstable . 
Pinera then goes on to analyze price-raising schemes . While a 
price- raising scheme has an efficiency cost to the world, it can 
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ns fer real resources to the exporting country . t ra At this point, 
Pinera touches on the notion that if a scheme is instituted, then such 
a scheme must be workable . He then analyzes efficiency, intra-nation, 
and inter- nation benefit sharing . His comments on benefit sharing 
expose its very , very delicate nature . To work, a price- raising scheme 
as reported 9Y Pinera must have the precision and quality of craftsman-
shiP that simply cannot be produced . 
We are then shown the DCs' possible retaliatory strategies 
against the LDCs when they are formed up as producer cartels . Retalia-
tion may be against the cartel or against a member of the cartel . Here 
Pinera comments that cohesion is necessary . Thus, he hints at a 
possibility of a profound weakness . In the long run, the DCs have more 
flexibility open to them such as substitutes and more sources of 
production . 
Probably the most viable cartelization Pinera discusses occurs 
when LDC governments ally themselves with multinational corporations . 
Additionally, although Pinera does not touch on it , this alliance opens 
up sources of capital to the cartel members . It may be that the 
alliance militates against technology transfers to cartel members, and 
it may be that it enhances technology transfers . This question needs 
further research . Certainly, the technology transfer will exceed the 
expropriation case . 
Pinera distinguishes two types of commodity agreements, those 
designed to transfer resources and those designed to smooth short- run 
fluctuations . He recognizes that attaching equity connotations to 
commodity prices can run from "misleading to inadequate ." It amounts 
to aid, pure and simple . 
importing country . 
The aid is paid by the consumer in the 
In stabilizing commodity prices Pinera implicitly assumes un-
stable prices are bad . If instability holds supplies down and supply 
and demand are both inelastic , instability may be good; the exporter 
might keep on collecting rents he would otherwise lose with the passage 
of time . 
The author then touches on the various buffer stock, stock 
funding, and compensatory financing schemes extant . 
Pinera then goes on to synthesize his preferred regime from the 
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desirable components of the others. He assumes that there is universal 
interest in a moderate international economic order. I think he 
assumes too mcuh. The developed countries may not at all be interested 
in order. Instability in commodities may have benefits that accrue to 
the developed countries: Buying only what one needs and at depressed 
prices is stabilizing to the profit stream of the purchaser. He 
further and correctly assumes that a new regime must be built on the 
basis of some gain to everyone . Last, he assumes, again correctly, 
that i n politicized situations, normally optimal solutions may be 
neither feasible nor optimal. 
The recommended changes are to reduce or el i minate barriers to 
trade. One can only praise that recommendation . Second, developed 
countries should redistribute their tariffs as a form of aid . This is 
a laudable solution · to a number of problems and should be pursued 
vigorously . Third, strengthen futures trading as a buffering device. 
This is a good idea, but a blueprint is needed. Fourth, institute 
earnings stabilization . Fifth, eliminate tariff escalation . 
In summary, I feel that what is missing from Pinera's paper is an 
analysis of whether various price- raising schemes can work . Except in 
very special circumstances, I think they will not. They require too 
much cooperation from too many competing interests. They are difficult 
to police, and they bring noncompetitive and ineffi cient producers 
into production . 
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COMMODITY TRADE FROM A NORTH-SOUTH PERSPECTIVE 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Pinera defended his moderate approach on the grounds that 
reactionary solutions often involve tremendous costs and no progress 
at all. He disagreed that his "prefer red regime" slighted distributive 
goals . The recommendation for producers associations to bargain for 
more competitive markets would have positive redistributive effects, 
since current producer prices are suppressed below competitive levels . 
The relation of the preferred regime to other goals needed elaboration . 
He agreed with Rob i ns that it was in practice difficult to distinguish 
between between long- and short- run prices . This was a particular 
problem for Chile with respect to copper pri ces . 
A participant opened the discussion by reminding that certain 
givens should be interjected into the discussion . First, the issue of 
commodity markets has been politicized. Second, one-sided proposals 
were politically irrelevant, since nations would reach agreement only 
on a basis of mutual self- interest . Third, technical aspects of 
commodity markets made achievement of competitive markets, with many 
small micro uni ts , unrealistic . Producer countries with superior 
monopolistic pos i tions would more likely be an overwhelming than a 
balancing force . He went on to suggest that redistributive goals be 
conceptually distinguished from stabilization goals . The first step 
is to design a desirable normative scheme . Price stabilization brings 
world efficiency gains, but does not guarantee income (export- earning) 
stabilization . So income stabilization schemes should supplement, not 
replace, price stabilization. Also, since capital markets are not 
perfectly efficient an investment fund should be established . 
Another participant was not sure that it mattered that commodity 
markets were politicized, since this should not change the economic 
analyses of the problems. Governments could and would intervene in 
markets whenever they wished . The task of the economist was to clearly 
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separate policy goals, and to analyze the impacts of alternative market 
arrangements with respect to them. Another participant thought that it 
was important for economists to remind politicians that in the long run 
free trade was the best policy. Monopolistic prices for commodities 
will inefficiently divert research and development from beneficial 
improvements in industrial technology, and towards development of 
substitutes for high-priced commodities. Still another participant 
thought the politicization of commodity markets was partly the fault of 
economists who, ignorant of the structural problems associated with 
development, made policy recommendations which were irrelevant and out 
of context. 
Robins' argument that price instability may have benefits both 
for multinational corporations and commodity suppliers provoked much 
discussion. Price instability lowers long-run supply, which in the 
face of inelastic demand, increases export earnings. This conclusion 
i s contrary to that of Drysdale's paper which found adverse distri-
butional consequences for developing nations. Participants agreed 
that there may be offset ting distributional benefits to efficiency 
losses for some. But distributional consequences were uneven and 
depended on whether the source of the instability was demand or supply, 
and whether a country was a net importer or exporter of the commodity. 
Instability created problems for development planning and trade 
liberalization policies, and discouraged investment in developing 
countries. There was an asymmetry in instability impacts between 
suppliers and purchasers, since multinational corporations have 
greater opportunities for diversification. One participant concluded 
that the schemes which transferred risks from suppliers to multi 
national corporations entailed benefits to the former which outweighed 
the costs to the latter. Instability also creates problems for 
developed countries, such as inflation ratchet effects. But this might 
not be true if there was no underlying inflation, in which case lower 
commodity prices might very well succeed in lowering the domestic 
general price level. Price instability generated domestic and inter-
national political instability, in particular the possibility of 
serious confrontation between developed and less developed countries. 
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A participant thought that the goals of stabilization and 
distribution were too narrowly expressed . It was mutually desirable to 
stimulate growth in developing countries , and to insure adequate 
supplies of commodities to industrial countries . North-South agree-
ments should not be based on resource distribution schemes, but rather 
on a principl~ of mutual advantage . 
Participants agreed that stabilization and distribution goals 
should be distinguished . One argued that a buffer stock instrument 
should be assigned to the stabilization goal , and that lump-sum 
transfers be devoted to redistribution . Pinera agreed that lump-sum 
transfers were a first best solution, but questioned their relevance in 
view of the fact of their present negligible importance . 
Pinera's proposal for strengthening organized futures markets was 
also discussed . While desirable , private long-term buffering was 
risky, and so futures markets worked on a shorter- term basis in which 
traders had more confidence in their expectations . Risk aversion by 
the world community as a whole was less than that for private traders 
and this should be incorporated into the analysis . Nevertheless, 
stabilization schemes aimed at reducing risk seemed more realistic 
than those aimed at shifting it . 
A participant remarked that more attention should be paid to 
stabilizing the demand side of commodity markets, but wondered how 
confidently business cycles could be dampened . In the case of oil 
there were linkages between price-raising schemes and demand insta-
bility, and thus may or may not be true for other commodities . 
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JAPAN'S RESOURCE SECURITY AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PACIFIC: 
A CASE STUDY OF BILATERAL DEVICES BETWEEN ADVANCED COUNTRIES 
Kiyoshi Kojima 
1. Introduction 
The Japanese economy has depended and will continue to depend on 
the import of huge amounts of resources from abroad . Japan processes 
these and turns them into manufactured products, earning foreign 
exchange through the export of part of the resulting output. There 
remains no other choice for Japan than to expand this processing trade 
to raise the incomes and welfare of her people. The oil crisis in 
October 1973, followed by the commodity boom and the American embargo 
on soybean exports, together with the changes likely in connection with 
the Law of the Sea, and the strong claims of developing countries for a 
new international economic order, all mean securing access to resource 
goods at reasonable prices (or at the same price as other industrial-
ized countries) has become a very serious concern for Japan, creating 
something of a crisis mentality . A serious concern for resource 
security is also evident in the U. S . A. , Australia and Canada. Although 
all are resource-rich countries, each has certain specific shortages. 
As to the developing countries of the Pacific, some are rich in 
particular mineral and fuel resources , but most are poor and look to 
industrialization for economic development following the Japanese 
model of processing trade . The need for cooperation in the development 
of potential resources in Pacific developing countries together with 
the need for assured supply are the primary concerns of nations in the 
Pacific region. While the five advanced Pacific countries (the United 
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states, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and Japan) must assume a leading 
role in solving these problems, an intergovernmental, consul ta ti ve 
organization in the area is needed (see Kojima, 1976, and Drysdale) . 
Resource security will be one of the most important concerns for such 
an organization . 
Japan has prompted a method of development for trade under long-
term contracts in order to satisfy a rapidly increasing demand for 
primary products . In Section 2 this is contrasted to the American and 
European multinational corporations ' method of captive development 
with vertical integration . The merits of the Japanese approach are 
illustrated in Section 3 by the successful case of the iron ore trade 
between Japan and Australia . This method brings about dominant buyer-
major supplier relations discussed in Section 4 . How the five Pacific 
advanced countries, especially Japan and the U. S. A. , have secured ores 
and ingots from among themselves and the rest of the Pacific region is 
covered in Section 5 using 1973 as an example . In that year more than 
go percent of the required resources (except oil) were available 
within the region . 
2 . Securing Resources 
Historically the U. S. A. and major European countries have secured 
resources through multinational corporations, usually through captive 
development with vertical integration . That is , a corporation obtains 
a large area of deposits as a concession and undertakes exploration , 
development and production through wholly- owned subsidiaries . Not 
only upstream operations but also such downstream ones such as trans-
portation, processing , distribution and sales throughout the world are 
integrated . This method has been very efficient and profitable for a 
number of multinationals ; and for many - - oil and copper for example --
oligopolstic domination of worldwide sourcing and worldwide sales has 
resulted (see Sampson for the oil case) . 
Japan ' s case is quite different . Until the 1960s Japan ' s resource 
requirements were satisfied through spot purchase on the world market . 
Quantity was small compared to total world supply . However , by the 
60s, rapid heavy and chemical industrialization created a large growth 
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in demand . Production of steel ingots, for example, increased 3.s 
times from 1962 to 1972, with an average annual increment of more than 
6 million tons . This made possible almost annual establishment of ne~ 
integrated mills, instead of patchwork remodelling of old ones, and 
resulted in dramatic improvement in productivity . In the same period, 
import demand for iron ore quintupled, with an average annual increment 
of 7 . 6 million tons . The quantum steps as new mills came on stream 
meant a large , lumpy demand not easily filled through spot purchase in 
the free world market. The story is more or less the same for such 
important resources as crude- oil , coking coal , bauxite and alumina, 
copper and so on . 
The point is that the Japanese economy was a latecomer in heavy 
and chemical industrialization and in the mineral resources market, 
and developed a large demand for natural resources largely controlled 
by western multinationals . 
Fortunately for Japan , at this time huge deposits were being 
discovered , and the new suppliers were interested in seeing them 
exploited . There was a willing buyer -- Japan - - and willing sellers, 
but how to bring them together? The t raditional captive deve l opment 
method was out : the suppliers have been resource- nationalist i c, and 
they and Japan generally lacked sufficient capital , technology , and 
managerial skill (as to the last , see McKern for the Australian case) . 
These the western multinationals have . Japan ' s primary concern has 
been simply to assure adequate quantities for downstream operations at 
reasonable prices without fear of del i very interruptions. Long- term 
contracts provide this and mitigate the risk to the western firms 
investing in the actual mining operations , which , to satisfy the host 
country , have tended to be joint ventures with domestic majority 
ownership (see Adam for a discussion of worldwide sourcing and Smith on 
long- term contracts) . Japan has promoted development for trade f or 
virtually all raw materials -- minerals , foodstuffs , fish and timber . 
Development for trade means offshore sourcing through low levels of 
trade- oriented direct foreign investment . Japan participates to some 
extent in the development and improvement of productivity of primary 
products with technological , financial, and sometimes broader economic 
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assistance in order to import the products to Japan . Financing j_s 
limited, taking the form of loans for development with assurance of 
supply quota or production sharing . Examples are maize in Thailand and 
oil in Indonesia . Japanese investment in manufacturing in developing 
countries follows a similar model . (see Kojima 1977, chs . 4 and 5) . 
Japanese ·participation in development projects is usually by 
trading firms . Also, governmental or semigovernmental organizations 
such as the Japan Export-Import Bank, Overseas Economic Cooperation 
Fund, and several resource development promotion corporations assist 
overseas development projects with low- interest loans, technology and 
information . Japan ' s development investment in mineral resources 
increased tremendously in the late 1960s as shown in Table 1 . 
What kind of role is left for multinationals if the operation of 
resource production is taken over totally or partially by a resource-
owning country? The multinationals' role and their captive develop-
ment with the vertical integration method have been greatly modified 
and come closer to the Japanese- type development for trade under the 
long-term contract method (see Smith and Wells) . It is said explora-
tion for resources and establishment of new mines are still difficult 
for developing countries , but this can be done by use of development 
contracts, management contracts , or joint ventures . Also marketing , 
distribution and sales are difficult for the developing country and 
multinationals still play an important r ole , but the key element i s the 
long-term contract and Japanese trading firms can do this more ef-
ficiently and economically . 
3. The Role of Long- term Contracts 
Given the large scale, ca pi tal- intensi ve nature of efficient 
exploitation of mineral deposits , it is preferable to have a guaranteed 
market for a large proportion of the expected output before production 
commences . Long- term contract arrangements have substituted for ver-
tical integration as a means of doing this . The extent to which the 
relationship between Australian mining companies and Japanese metal 
manufacturers provides a satisfactory substitute for vertical integra-
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tion is of fundamental importance for the future development of 
Australia-Japan trade relations. 
In the case of iron ore, the sources, principally Hammersley and 
Mt. Newman, trade with Japan under long-term contracts concluded with a 
consortium of Japanese steel mills for which Nippon Steel acts as the 
negotiating agent. 
Contracts have been for given quantities delivered in a specified 
pattern, generally over 10 to 16 years . While annual base tonnages are 
specified, buyers usually have a~ 10 percent margin . The intention to 
exercise this option requires the producer be notified 3 months before 
commencement of the contract year . Where contracts are on a fixed-
quantity basis, variations from specified annual tonnages are made up 
later, sometimes by extending the original period. Where contracts are 
on a fixed period basis, exercise of quantity options may reduce or 
increase the total contract quantity . All contracts have specified a 
fixed price for a number of years, with provision for negotiating a new 
fixed price to cover additional years . However, the contracts general-
ly specify the range within which the price can be varied (~ 7 . 5 per-
cent is usual) and often specify that the price remains unchanged if no 
agreement is reached (Smith, p. 21) . 
Incidentally, given the importance of Japan as a market for 
Australian minerals , it is surprising Japanese direct investment in 
Australian minerals projects is so small. In iron- ore mining only 
three of seven major projects have involved Japanese participation, 
and it is limited : Mitsui Bussan and C. Itoh (trading companies) have 
iO percent of Mt . Newman ; Mitsui , 30 percent of Robe River; and Mitsu-
bishi Shoji and Sumitomo Shoji (trading companies) 50 percent of 
Savage River . In 1976 , Japanese steel mills purchased 6. 2 percent of 
the equity in Hammersley from Kaiser . In Brazil , since 1962 Japanese 
steel mills have arranged four long-term contracts with Rio Doce 
Company . In 1970, a contract with Mineracao Brasileiras Reunidasi 
provided 10 percent equity participation . Also in 1970 a joint-
venture pelletizing mill with 49 percent equity was established with 
Rio Doce . 
Economies of scale and reduced costs of production are influenced 
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bY several factors . Hitherto, a mine producing 5 million tons a year 
was considered profitable, but the required output is now 
10 to 20 million tons per mine (Hama, p. 86) . Rich iron- ore deposits 
are generally in remote virgin areas, often 400 to 1,000 km inland . 
This necessitates huge investment in such infrastructure as towns and 
railways . 
Because of the assured and large- scale trade, it is possible to 
use specialized vessels with resulting economies in transportation 
costs. Frieght costs for iron ore between Australia and Japan using a 
160 thousand ton vessel are 19 percent lower than for a 60 thousand ton 
ship . The distance to Brazil is the longest, and it was thought 
earlier that its iron ore would never prove to be comeptitive . But 
development of triangle transport (oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe, 
then in ballast to Brazil for iron ore to Japan), lowered frieght costs 
significantly (Hama, pp . 84-86) . Highly effieicnt loading and landing 
machines, and other improved harbor facilities have helped to decrease 
handling costs and vessel turnaround time . 
Other transaction costs such as the negotiation of contracts, 
customs clearance, sorting of carriers, settlement of payments, etc ., 
are reduced because they have become standardized transactions, in 
part because of the involvement of Japanese trading firms . 
Almost all the output of an Australian mine is destined for 
Japanese users who can specify the quality of iron ore and pellets most 
suitable for them . While an additional advantage for the Japanese 
steel mills, it involves some disadvantages for the mines, as it makes 
market diversification more difficult and they consequently bear the 
entire impact of Japanese demand fluctuations . This has been a source 
of Australian complaints . 
Gains under long-term contracts may be illustrated by an econo-
mies of scale model. In Figure 1, QPw shows the open market world 
price (CIF) of iron ore, which Japan and European countries pay in the 
absence of long- term contracts . A curve CC shows the cost curve over 
time of an Australian mine developed under long- term contract with 
Japanese mills . Average production cost is high at the beginning, but 
decreases rapidly as output increases, then remains at a low constant 
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level. Transportation and other transaction costs (the vertical 
distance between CC and TT) are added to production costs (CC) to get 
total average costs (TT) . All cost components experience economies of 
scale for the reasons mentioned. The kink of the two curves on the 
same vertical line is just for simplification and is not necessary . 
To make the description simple, consider the low constant-cost 
situation . The maximum price (CIF) a buyer needs to pay without long-
term contracts is QP (the world market price), whereas the minimum 
w 
price a seller is able to offer is QT. The difference (TP per unit of 
w 
iron ore) represents gains the buyer and seller can share from develop-
ment of a new mine . 
Historically, in the case of captive mines, almost all such gains 
have gone to the multinational corporation undertaking the venture, 
leaving only small concession fees to the host country . How the gains 
are divided depends on the contract price fixed, and thus on relative 
bargaining power . Assume a contract price (CIF) is fixed at QPJ . In 
this case realized gains are TP. per unit of iron ore for the supplier 
J 
and PjPw for the buyer. The range within which the contract price is 
determined becomes narrower than TP because there are alternative 
w 
buyers and suppliers. 
First , assume the mine annually delivers the quantity OQ at a cost 
of QC per unit . Remember this is the case when the mine has reduced 
costs to a minimum, which was made possible only by the guaranteed 
demand of the contract buyer . 
The mine may sell part of its output to others by decreasing 
deliveries to the contract buyer . In the Japan-Australia case, added 
profit to the mine from doing this is normally limited since transpor-
tation and other transaction costs are greater due to smaller-scale 
trade and longer distances than for contract trade with Japan . There-
fore, the profit for the Australian selling to Japan, TP. per unit, 
J 
should be larger than the expected alternative profit from European 
trade. In other words, the lower limit of the FOB contract price 
becomes higher than QC by the amount of the alternative profit . 
Japan has undertaken a national policy of diversification of 
supply for important resources to avoid as much as possible the risk of 
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disturbance inherent in the single- source situation . In the case of 
i ron ore, Japan has developed mines in India, Australia and Brazil 
under the development for trade under long- term contract method . Since 
onlY large- scale developments are economical , Japan ' s opportunities 
for diversification have been limited . Japan ' s demand is so large that 
all three supply a major portion of their output to Japan . In this 
way, dominant buyer- major supplier relationships have been establish-
ed. Japan has a favorable bargaining position as a dominant buyer and 
has been able to negotiate a CIF price similar , and at the lowest 
possible level , with each of them . In other words , a competitive 
supply price from the other contracted sources sets a ceiling contract 
price in Japan- Australia iron ore trade less than Pw . 
There is some evidence, although indirect, concerning gains from 
trade under the long- term contract model . Figure 2 shows the arrival 
price of iron ore in Japan from various sources in 1971 . Australian 
ore has the lowest CIF and highest FOB price, indicating both countries 
share gains from a mutually advantageous trade . Freight on Indian and 
Chilean ore has yet to be economized significantly (Hama, pp. 87- 89) . 
Figure 3 shows the average price (CIF) of iron-ore arriving in 
Japan . After a big fluctuation around 1957 due to the Suez Crisis, the 
price declined steadily from 1961 to 1972, which may be interpreted as 
a gain to Japanese mills from large- scale development and trade in iron 
ore under long- term contracts . From 1972 to 1975, the price rose 
rapidly due to inflation in the producing countries and exchange rate 
changes . These are sources of difficulty in long-term contractual 
arrangements . Table 2 shows how favorable the Japanese situation has 
been compared to others . 
4 . Dominant Buyer- Major Suppliers Relations 
Based on development for trade under long- term contract, Japan 
has been constructing dominant buyer-major suppliers relations to 
obtain ores, concentrates and ingots. Japan ' s situation is seen in 
Table 3 and for comparison, that of the United States is provided in 
Table 4. When more than 50 percent of a supplying country ' s total 
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exports are to Japan (A= the ratio of exports to Japan), Japan is the 
dominant buyer and may be able to exercise monopsony bargaining power, 
When the share of Japan's imports from a given country is greater than 
50 percent (B = Japan's dependency on the country), the supplying 
country is the dominant supplier and can manifest monopoly bargaining 
power . This rarely occurs since there are at least three different 
countries supplying most items. When the bargaining power index C (A 
divided by B) with a country is above one, it means the Japanese 
bargaining position is stronger in determining and changing long-term 
contract prices. When the index is less than one, Japan's position is 
weaker . 
The above characteristics are also applicable to the resource 
security of the United States. What policy implications can be derived 
from Tables 3 and 4? Close examination is needed for each product and 
concerning each host country. However, I have summarized in Table 5 
the general trend for Japan and the United States. 
In the case of Japanese imports of ores (iron, coal, copper, 
nickel, bauxite, lead, zinc, manganese, chromium and tungsten), the 
existence of dominant buyer- major suppliers relations is remarkable. 
That is, in 20 cases out of 32, Japan is the dominant buyer, and there 
are three of four major suppliers in 8 out of 10 cases. Therefore, in 
28 out of 32 cases, Japan's bargaining power is stronger. 
Concerning the import of ingots, there are few cases where Japan 
is a dominant buyer (this is applicable only when she imports ingots of 
aluminum (alumina mats) from New Zealand, Bahrain and Australia). 
Therefore, Japan's bargaining position is weak compared with the case 
of imports of ores . This is because Japanese investment abroad for the 
development of the refining industry is much less extensive than in the 
case of ores. 
In most cases, the majority of Japanese imports of metal ingots 
are from American and European multinational corporations which have 
usual~y established an oligopolistic market structure . Whether Japan 
should promote refining abroad through direct investment is an im-
portant policy issue. To do this, it would be inevitable for Japanese 
firms and government to tie up with American and European multinational 
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enterprises . 
For the United States there is not so much difference between the 
situation for ores and ingots . For both, the United States is 
generally not a dominant buyer and so her bargaining power is weaker . 
This is simila~ to the situation in Japanese import of ingots . How-
ever, what differs from the Japanese case is that specific supplying 
countries often have stronger monopolistic positions, as indicated by 
higher figures for Index B. Typically the dominant supplier is Canada 
and the resource in question is obtained from American companies in 
that country under the captive mines with vertical integration method . 
The United States also produces many of the resources itself, and the 
rate of growth of imports of these products is low , so the seemingly 
weak position is not a major problem. 
In addition to advancing Japan ' s resource security , the long- term 
contract approach has certain advantages for the stability of world 
trade in natural resources . If Japan is a dominant buyer in the world 
market as well as being a dominant buyer from the major suppliers , the 
long-term contract pr ices Japan sets and maintains wi ll be prevalent in 
the world market and will contribute to stabilizing world market 
prices . When, as is now the case , Japan can secure more than three-
quarters of the necessary ores form about three major suppliers , the 
remaining quarter is purchases on the world free market . This portion 
can be related to buffer stock operations . When the world market is a 
buyer ' s market and the free market price is lower than that of long-
term contracts , spot purchases increase , with some portion kept as 
inventory . Under the reverse conditions, when the market price exceeds 
that of long- term contracts , spot purchase and inventories are r e-
duced . This can stabilize short- term fluctuations in world free market 
prices . It can also intr oduce greater competition into the management 
of long- term contracts . Japan should carry out this buffer stock 
operation , for only a dominant buyer is capable of doing it success-
fully . 
While on balance Japan has benefitted from the creation of 
dominant buyer- major suppliers relations through long- term contracts , 
there are also limits and difficulties in t his system. As mentioned 
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before, there is a problem as to whether exploration and development or 
new mines can be stimulated and promoted sufficiently by the Japanese-
type arrangement . Japan ' s enormous demand for resources is surely a 
great incentive , but alone is not sufficient to ensure development, 
because capital, technology and active entrepreneurship are also need-
ed . These factors belong to giant European and especially American 
multinational enterprises , and Japan is obliged to promote new de-
velopments in close cooperation with them . Since the sovereignty and 
nationalism of resource owning countries ought t o be respected , the 
ideal method of resource development is to establish an international 
joint venture with each party bringing in its own advantageous factor . 
It should be remembered that the successful development of the Austral-
ian iron- ore mines originated from this kind of joint venture . 
Though Japan has established favorable dominant buyer- major sup-
pliers relations for the import of the major ores , in case of the 
import of ingots the relations are much weaker . Processing out side 
Japan should be promoted in t he future , from the point of both desire 
for development by the resource- owning countries , and conditions on 
the Japanese side such as the problems of environmental pollution , the 
exhaustion of domestic ores (copper) , the high cost of electricity 
(aluminum) and so on . Japanese smelting of copper and aluminum abroad 
has actually started . There i s now an important question as to when 
and to what extent the steel industries should develop production 
centers abroad (see Kojima 1977 , pp . 140- 43) . Over seas processi ng may 
make the Japanese posit i on of dominant buyer of ores weaker . Moreover, 
it requires much greater capital and higher technology that the 
development of mines, so Japan will be obliged to get assistance and 
cooperation from oligopolistic European and American multinational 
enterprises to a greater degree than in the case of the ores . 
For some ores and almost all ingots (and oil) , Japan is not a 
dominant buyer in the world market . In these cases , the proposed 
stabilization of world market prices through buffer stock oper ations 
cannot be effectively implemented by Japan alone . Under such ci r-
cumstances , closer cooperation with other buyers such as the Uni ted 
States becomes desirable and inevitable . 
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What kind of primary products are most suitable for the applica-
tion of development for trade under long-term contract? There are two 
prerequisites for this method to be applied successfully : Japan's 
demand must be sufficiently great to justify large-scale development 
with its substantial economies of scale, and Japan's demand in the 
world market must be sufficiently dominant that the world market is 
stabilized by the contract method . 
The long- term contract has been perfectly applicable to iron ore 
and coal . However, where Japan has only a small share of world trade 
and a weak buyer position (as in ingots and ores such as nickel and 
zinc from Canada, and bauxite from Australia) , the merits of this 
method cannot be fully realized . Moreover, in the case of oil, Japan 
is facing a difficulty . 
How about foodstuffs , agricultural raw mateirals, and forestry 
products? The application of the contract method is rather complex and 
the advantages seem small . As Japan purchases only a marginal share in 
world markets, the method's application does not so easily lead to the 
stabilization of world prices . However , there do exist some products 
such as timber, maize , beef , and cultured fish where development is 
advantageous to certain host countries . Economies of scale can be 
expected when enormous Japanese demand is guaranteed and in these cases 
development for trade is worth promoting, although long- term contracts 
fixing both quantity and price should not be made . If a long- term 
contract is made on quantity , delivery should be at world free market 
prices . This kind of loose arrangement may also be desirable for some 
ores and ingots where the position of Japan as a buyer i s weak . 
One example of the trouble Japan is facing because of a long- term 
contract is sugar between Japan and Australia . In total wor ld trade in 
sugar , Japan ' s imports were about 13 percent in 1973 , and the export 
share of Australia was 11 percent . Japan takes 29 percent of Austral-
ia's sugar exports and Japan ' s imports from Austral ia are 26 percent of 
total imports , so bargaining power is almost equal . In this kind of 
bilateral trade , which is rather marginal in the world market , if the 
price as well as the quantity are fixed fo r a long term , it can cause 
difficulties for both parties . As neither country has the power to 
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influence the world market price, complaint occurs on the buyer's side 
if the contracted price greatly exceeds the free market price as at 
present, while complaint on the supplier's side arises if conditions 
become the opposite . Therefore, the contract should have been limited 
just to the quantity . A quantity assurance alone will stimulate new 
production, rationalization and economies of scale in the Australian 
sugar industry . 
Needless to say, whether or not the development for trade under 
long- term contract is applicable must be examined in detail on a case-
by-case basis . Since the development for trade under long- term 
contract involves bilateral arrangements between private enterprises, 
it is also necessary to relate it to such multilateral arrangements as 
international commodity agreements, the Integrated Commodity Scheme 
(Colea Plan) of UNCTAD, resource producers ' cartels such as OPEC, 
CIPEC, etc., resource consumers ' association such as the International 
Energy Agency, and to the Council for International Economic Coopera-
tion . To survey them here is too cumbersome, and I will make just two 
observations . First, I believe it is necessary to stabilize short- term 
cyclical price fluctuations of primary commodities, and I do not think 
buffer-stock operations with the limited aim of price stabilization 
necessitate large- scale costs . Such buffer-stock operations must be 
differentiated from those for emergency or other strategic situations. 
Second , what is lacking in all these multilateral arrangements are 
positive measures to develop new sources of natural resources which are 
expected to be in short supply . For this purpose the development for 
trade under long- term contract is more useful and preferable to the 
captive mine with vertical integration method of oligopolistic multi-
nationals . 
5 . Resource Security in the Pacific Area 
Let us examine next how it is possible for the five Pacific 
advanced countries , the United States , Japan , Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand, to secure resources . I have worked out the 1973 matrices 
of trade for each of the major metal products imported by the five 
519 
(Table 6) . Canada and Australia are big suppliers of resources . For 
them and New Zealand , all with quite small imports , resource security 
is not an import ant problem. Therefore special attention is given to 
Japan and the United States . There are many items Japan imports 
relatively .more than the United States . This is particularly true of 
four ores : iron , coal , copper and nickel . Only in the case of bauxite 
are American imports absolutely large than Japan ' s . 
Except for nickel , U. S. ingot imports are generally much larger 
than Japan ' s , al though there is not so much difference in copper , 
aluminum and tin ingots . Most ingots imported into the United States 
have been processed by American firms, while there is very little 
offshore Japanese production . Japan imports more crude oil than the 
United States, but both import an enormous amount . 
The implications are that for ores , although Japan can be a 
dominant buyer alone (except in the case of bauxite) , Japan ' s position 
is strengthened if the United States cooperates, and for ingots, 
especially from owned smelters , and crude oil , Japan is cooperation 
with the United States can achieve the position of dominant buyer . 
Looking further at ores , Japan can satisfy 52 percent of its 
demand for iron , 91 percent for coal , 47 percent for copper, and 
62 percent for bauxite from other Pacific advanced countries . From the 
region as a whole , both Japan and the United States can obtain more 
than 90 percent of their needs . That Japan is able to secure something 
over half the needed ores from the other four advanced Pacific coun-
tries is important, for as these countries are not likely to join 
resource cartels , Japan can hopefully be guaranteed at least some 
resources by keeping cordial relations with them . Moreover, if 
solidarity and cooperation is strengthened in the region , Japan and the 
United States will be able to secure almost all of their ore needs . 
This is one of the reasons why establishment of an organization such as 
the Organization for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development (OPTAD), is 
long- awaited . 
As for ingots, the amount Japan is supplied by the other four 
Pacific advanced countries is much smaller than in the case of the 
ores . The highest ratio is aluminum and it is only 49 percent . If 
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extended to the Pacific area as a whole, tin reaches 98 percent but 
other ingots remain at low levels . There are many reasons why Japan 
has had to look outside the region for ingots . American and European 
oligopolistic firms dominate the area -- the United States secures 
72 percent of its nickel and more than 80 percent of other ingots from 
the Pacific region . New supply sources have been in other areas , 
However, Japan can probably secure more ingots from the Pacific area if 
closer cooperation with American multinational corporations is pur~ 
sued . Such cooperation should be realized as soon as possible . 
In the case of crude oil , mentioned as a reference , the supply 
ratio from the area is low for both Japan and the United States, i . e., 
18 percent for Japan and 57 percent for the United States . Both depend 
overwhelmingly on the Arabs . Crude oil is different from other natural 
resources in that it will be exhausted within the forseeable future, 
which explains OPEC ' s present success . It is also exceptional since it 
is the only resource difficult to secure in the Pacific area for Japan, 
the United States , Australia and New Zealand -- perhaps only Canada is 
self- sufficient in this area . The problem of petroleum should be 
examined more broadly . Japan and the United States need to cooperate 
in approaches to the Arabs (especially to Saudi Arabia) and to foster 
new development in the Mid- East through the Japanese-type development 
for trade under long- term contract system. Both Japan and the United 
States are still in a weak bargaining position vis- a- vis Saudi Arabia 
(see Tables 3 and 4) • Japan and the United States should also 
participate actively in developing oil fields in the U. S . 5.R ., China 
and other Asian and Latin American countries through international 
joint ventures . 
While petroleum will be exhausted in the near future , we do not 
need to be concerned with the exhaustion of other mineral resources. 
Japanese resource policy has the following four objectives : diversify 
supply sources to reduce risks, undertake direct investment in 
processing abroad, build buffer stocks , and transform and upgrade the 
Japanese industrial structure to economize use of energy and other 
natural resources . Among these , the fourth seems somewhat question-
able . For environmental reasons, to achieve higher value added in 
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manufacturing, and to decrease import dependence, economization of 
energy and natural resources can be dealt with on the same footing . 
But while it is obvious we should economize the use of oil , this does 
not lead to the conclusion we should reduce consumption of mineral 
resource which are still quite abundant . Rather, there are many 
nations wishing to develop new mines to earn foreign exchange for 
economic development . The large Japanese market is an important outlet 
for them . 
6. Conclusion 
This paper shows why the Japanese- type method of development for 
trade under long-term contract should be highly valued and used as the 
roost important policy for Japanese resource security . The method has 
been considered a weak policy which Japan was obliged to adopt because 
of lack of capital and being a latecomer as a buyer and developer of 
resources. On the contrary, it is a unique policy for resource 
security that can be promoted in the new world political environment . 
Similar conclusions have been reached by Ozawa . 
However, in order to insure the resource security of Japan and the 
Pacific area by the long- term contract method, Japan should respect the 
leadership of the resource holding countries and, at the same time, 
recognize that international joint ventures with western multination-
als is the ideal form . Here, cooperation among the three parties --
Japan, multinational, and host country -- is indispensible . A cooper-
ative relationship such as this ought to be established. 
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JAPAN'S RESOURCE SECURITY AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PACIFIC : 
A CASE STUDY OF BILATERAL DEVICES BETWEEN ADVANCED COUNTRIES 
A COMMENT 
Michael Keran 
I would like to start my discussion by let ting you know the 
direction I come from in making my remarks. All I know about raw 
material trade issues I have learned at this conference . Thus, I am a 
new boy on this particular street . My approach will be general rather 
than specific. 
We have come to expect from Professor Kojima's fertile mind the 
kind of paper he has given us today. It is in the mainstream of 
positive economics . He observes a phenomena in the marketplace, in 
this case the existence of long-term raw material contracts; he applies 
considerable imagination and insight to providing an explanation for 
the phenomena; then he describes public policy implications . His 
interesting blend of theory and institutional detail provides a fresh 
new view of the process and its implications for the future . As usual 
in such an individual effort, the analysis is both thought-provoking 
and provocative . 
The core of the paper contrasts the long- term contract approach of 
Japan versus the multinational corporation approach of the United 
States in "providing secure sources of raw materials." Professor 
Kojima concludes that because of the rise of what he calls "resource 
nationalism" the Japanese model of long-run contracts is becoming 
increasingly superior to the U.S . model and will become the dominant 
model for future acquisitions of raw materials . 
I have two general comments to make on the paper which are more in 
the form of elaboration and possible extension rather than criticism. 
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1 1) The economic role of long-ter m cont r acts ; 
(2 ) some ques t ions regardi ng the nature of the difference between 
the long- term contract and the multinational corporate 
models for del i vering raw mate r ials . 
Why Long- Term Contracts? 
With regard to the f i rst i s s ue , we might be asked why Japan would 
choose to buy its raw material needs via long- term contracts rather 
than via the s pot market at wor ld prices . Economic theory tells us 
that the spot market price for commodities incorporates information 
not only on current costs and demand but also on future costs and 
demands implicit in the currently available information , If one is 
risk-adverse and wishes to have assured prices and quantities in the 
future , there are well - established "futures markets" in most commod 
ities. Thus a combination of spot and futures markets would seem to 
provide all of the protection a buyer or a seller could expect in this 
uncertain world . 
The problem is that futu r es mar kets extend only for one or two 
years . This suggests that futures contracts for delivery beyond that 
period are so expens i ve that most market par ticipants are not prepared 
to pay the price . Beyond a year or so the worldwide potential for 
political and economic uncertainty apparently rises substantially and 
thus raises hedging costs to a prohibitive level . 
The role of long- term cont racts can be seen , in effect , as the 
extension of futures markets beyond the one- to two- year time horizon . 
Why is it profi table fo r a buyer and seller to engage in a bila teral 
ten-year contract when it is prohibitive for them to do so through an 
organized futures market for ten years? The answer , I suspect , is tha t 
the cost of acquiring bilateral information is lower than for acquiring 
multilateral i nformation . Long-ter m contracts are negot i ated between 
countries with a relatively high degree of political and economic 
stability, s uch as Japan and Australia , where the perceived uncertai n-
ties are much less than in a mult i lateral world setting . 
What explains the timing of long-term contr acts which Ko j ima 
dates from the early to mid- 1960 ' s? As the Japanese economy grew its 
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demands became a progressively larger percent of the world demand for 
certain raw materials . Thus, Japan gradually moved from being a price 
taker to a price maker, not as a monopolist but as a monopsonist . In 
this context, individual Japanese corporate purchasers may continue to 
be price takers . However, each firm increased its demand for raw 
materials at the same time as all other Japanese firms, because each 
was subject to the same business cycle demand for its final output . As 
a result, individual firms would observe that when their demand went up 
the world price of the product would tend to increase, and when their 
demand fell the world price of the product fell . On balance, this 
would lead to higher average prices for purchases of raw materials . 
Bilateral long- term contracts, by smoothing out these cyclical fluctu-
ations, provide a method of reducing the average cost of raw materials 
to Japanese firms . 
The problem with long- term contracts in general is that, while 
fixing the price and quantity at the beginning of the contract period 
reduces uncertainty by providing known prices and quantities, it can 
also lead to windfall gains and losses . If the spot world price should 
rise, the host supplier country will have suffered a windfall loss, and 
if the world price should fall, the Japanese consumer of the raw 
material will have suffered the loss . Thus, long- term contracts with 
fixed price and quantity conditions require a high degree of confidence 
about the low variance of world prices as well as a low variance in the 
world bus i ness cycle . 
The experience of the 1970 ' s has been , of course , just the 
opposite . World prices for raw materials have been sharply higher in 
level and variance and the world business cycle has been much more 
volatile than in the past . As a result , host countries have demanded 
renegotiation of contract prices upward , and Japan has demanded 
renegotiation of contract quantities downward . Parallel with this 
there is a strong move toward reducing the length of long- term con-
tracts . This , of course , collapses the long- term contract into an 
instrument which is indistinguishable from a standard contract in the 
futures market . 
Two general observations regarding the long- term contracts 
emerge . 
525 
(1) The greater the degree of uncertainty about the future, the 
shorter will be the average length of long- term contracts; 
(2) Institutional ar~angements to anticipate i ncreased 
uncertainty about the future must be symmetrical between the 
interest of the buyer and seller. For example, Ben Smith in 
his _paper suggests a method of dealing with price uncer 
tainty by indexing bilateral long-term contracts for the 
relative inflation rate and exchange rate changes in the two 
countries . In retrospect, if Australia had in fact had such 
a clause in its long- term contracts five or ten years ago , it 
would have been substantially better off today, at least in 
the sense of not using the "begging bowl" approach to 
renegotiation of its long- term contract . However, Japan 
would have been worse off . To provide a symmetrical protec-
tion for both parties a method would ~ave to be found to deal 
with both price and quantity uncertainty . In the Japanese 
case, their derived demand for raw materials could be linked 
with the demand for their output . This could be done 
relatively easi ly, I suspect, by having contracts with con-
stant shares rather than in absolute values . 
These i nstitutional dev i ces are designed to maintain constant 
relative prices and quantities over the contract life in the face 
of increased variance in underlying economic conditions . They 
are designed to prevent changes in relative prices or quantities 
demanded which would distribute wi ndfall gains or losses in a way 
which was not related to economic efficiency . For example , if the 
spot price of the commodity under contract should rise because of 
an increase in world inflation , the relative price in the long-
term contract would, in fact, fall, leading to an excess demand 
for the product and perhaps the necessity of inefficient non-
price rat i oning devices . 
Distinction Between the Japanese and U. S. Models 
My second comment is related to the distinction being made between 
the Japanese long- term contract model and the U. S. multinational 
corporate model. Kojima sees the Japanese model as the wave of the 
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future in the new era of rising resource nationalism which will tend to 
preclude the further advancement of the multinational corporation . 
The author may be right in this forecast, but I would like to 
suggest an alternative interpretation of the evidence he presen.ts. 
First, in regard to the reasons the Japanese chose the long-term 
contract route and, second, with regard to the differences between the 
two models . 
Kojima argues that because Japan was a latecomer to the raw 
materials Big League, it was forced to go the long-term contract route 
because U.S . multinational corporations had such a head start on them. 
An alternative explanation is that Japanese exchange controls, speci 
fically restrictions on capital exports in the 1960's, acted as a major 
constraint on direct investment abroad. Related to this explanation, 
there was undoubtedly in some potential host countries a continued 
resentment toward Japan from World War II, which would have made them 
resist Japanese direct investment. Thus, I would argue that these 
institutional factors and not primarily economic factors explain why 
Japan did not go the route of the multinational corporation . 
If the Japanese had been free to choose that route, would they , in 
fact, have taken it? That type of "what if" speculation is not 
fruitful. However, it would be useful to consider what are the bare-
bone distinctions between the two approaches to acquiring raw 
materials . 
Consider first the multinational corporation approach . Their 
incentive toward vertical integration is related to improving the 
internal rate of return of the corporation . In the case of raw 
material deposits, an important element would be internalizing the 
rental value of high-grade deposits. In the 1950's and 1960's when the 
prices of raw materials were relatively low and the commercial risks of 
exploitation were relatively high, the opportunities for profitable 
exploitation were not considered great and many host countries needed 
to provide incentives to encourage multinational corporations to come 
in . A good example are the subsidies and tax forgiveness which 
Australia provided . 
In the current situation when the relative price of raw materials 
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i S high and , with i mproved information and marketing skills , com-
cl.al risks are relatively low, multinational corporations could mer 
ant icipate high rates of return from natural resource investment . In 
this context, the negotiating position of host countries is strong, and 
subsidies are turned into taxes and increased royalties, thereby 
allowing the host country to share in the higher returns . 
Now consider the case of the long-term contract. When world 
prices were relatively low in the 1950 ' s and 1960's, the contract price 
and quantity arrangements would tend to favor the buying country , in 
this case Japan. Conversely, in the current situation where world 
prices of raw materials are relatively high, the contract arrangement 
would tend to favor the host country . 
The point to be made is when both parties have the same percep-
tions about the future, the long- term contract and multinational 
corporation approaches wi ll lead to rates of return for both parties 
which would be approximately the same . In this context they represent 
different institutional arrangements to accomplish the same economic 
goal and division of the gains from trade. 
The difficulty arises when the long-term or the multinational 
corporate agreement is made in one environment, say relatively low 
world prices, and that environment changes to one of relatively high 
world prices . That is the circumstance we have faced over the last 
four years . In this context, the rise of resource nationalism is 
primarily the reflection of the recent higher relative price of raw 
materials . 
I would argue that the question of which model is superior relates 
to which one is more adaptable to the resolution of conflict . In the 
case of the multinational corporation, the act of abrogating their 
arrangement through nationalization , expropriation and other legal 
devices is treated far more seriously in the international community 
than renegotiating of a long- term contract . However, it should be 
recognized that the present value loss could be the same in each case . 
The loss to the multinational corporation of nationalization is ob -
vious ; however , the holder of a long- term contract who is forced to 
raise the contract price 20 percent from that originally agreed upon 
has also suffered a real present value loss . 
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On balance, therefore, it probably is true that the costs of 
changing long- term contracts are lower than the cost of changing the 
property rights of the multinational corporation 
This conclusion is close to that of Professor Kojima but for 
different reasons . The validity of this conclusion should be tested by 
a much deeper political and economic analysis than is possible here to 
determine which institutional framework is the most favorable to the 
resolution of conflicts. 
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JAPAN'S RESOURCE SECURITY AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PACIFIC : 
A CASE STUDY OF BILATERAL DEVICES BETWEEN ADVANCED COUNTRIES 
A COMMENT 
Kuo-shu Liang 
Professor Kojima 's paper contrasts the Japanese-type "development 
import .£!:!!!! long- term contract" method to the American and European 
multinational cor poration's "capti ve development~ vertical integra-
tion method . " It is stressed that the Japanese method, as evidenced by 
Japanese participation in Australian iron- ore mining, provides assur-
ances for lumpy market conditions and encourages large-scale develop-
ment of mineral resources which results in significant economies of 
scale as well as reduction in transportation costs. The method also 
meets and satisfies the resource nationalism of the host produc i ng 
country, because Japanese interests do not lie in profits from upstream 
but in securing resource needs at reasonable prices . Professor Kojima 
further points out that the multinationals' role and their "captive 
development cum vertical integration" method are greatly modified as 
host countries assume more control and right to make basic policy 
decisions . Their rule has actually become closer to the Japanese type . 
I am very happy to have this opportunity to comment on Profes sor 
Kojima's excellent paper which sheds light on major questions involved 
in Japan's resource security and foreign investment in the Pacific . My 
brief comments raise a few questions for further discussion . 
(1) The establishment of dominant buyer-major suppliers relation-
ship under the Japanese-type "development import .£!:!!!! long-term con-
tract" method will make the price theoretically indeterminate within 
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the "bargaining range . " Japan ' s bargaining position, resource 
securitY, and economic efficiency appear to be Professor Koj i ma• s 
major concerns. However, Japan should go beyond conventional yard-
sticks in making investment decisions . A further study may be required 
on the strategy of mineral-sector development in the host country so as 
to maximize its contributions to national well-being on a broad scale, 
for example, by encouraging conservation, training of nationals, and 
reinvestment of profits in productive activities . 
(2) Professor Kojima suggests that the Japanese-type "development 
import~ long- term contract" system coupled with buffer stock opera-
tion will contribute to stabilizing world market prices. Japan, as a 
dominant buyer, should carry out buffer stock operations with concern, 
responsibility, and liability . However, I do have some reservation on 
the proposed responsible buffer-stock opera ti on as was evidenced by 
the overacting and destabilizing behavior of the Japanese trading 
companies in 1973 and 1974 . 
(3) It is said that : 1 
Japan's vast and expanding need for raw materials and her 
policy of diversifying the sources of supply induced her not 
to overlook small projects and benefitted many small 
countries in Africa . The pressure of Japanese competition 
jolted the generally conservative European investors into 
action and shortened project appraisal and investment de 
cision time in some cases . The relative security of markets 
provided through long-term contracts was instrumental in 
attracting co-investors . 
However, Professor Kojima stresses that the Japanese-type "development 
import cum long- term contract," though it is favorable to Japan, should 
have its own limits, and cooperation with other big consumers of 
resources and the American multinational corporations is i nevitable . 
It may be very effective to make a joint effort for resource discovery 
and exploitation with capital, technology, entrepreneurship and manag-
ement skills, and markets being jointly provided, but this type of 
cooperation may have to be carefully carried on without inducing the 
sentiment of neocolonial exploitations . In addition to the challenge 
facing these firms in the short run to smooth dangerous cyclical 
movements , they have to ensure a much-needed expanded flow of invest-
ment in the long run . The problem of investment has to be investigated 
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further from the points of view of the size of investment, fluctuation, 
and distribution of the gain. 
(4) Professor Kojima's paper l imits the anlaysis to nonfuel 
minerals and only briefly refers to the major objectives of Japanese 
resource policy . It wi ll be very informative if the strategies to be 
adopted by the Japanese government to attain some of these objectives 
are described iri some detail. 
FOOTNOTES 
1R. Rosson and B. V Th M" · I d t aron, e ining n us ry and Developing 
Countries. (New York : Oxford Univers i ty Press, 1977), p. 94. 
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A CASE STUDY OF BILATERAL DEVICES BETWEEN ADVANCED COUNTRIES 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Does Japan Inc. exist as a minerals buyer or are negotiations 
on contracts among companies? It is important to remember that, with 
few exceptions, minerals are being handled by private firms rather than 
countries . Thus one cannot speak of true diversity of sources merely 
because a mineral is obtained from three countries if the same supply-
ing company is involved . 
Long-term contracts have been better for Japan than direct in-
vestment would have been, and this result needs to be tied to the 
Hymer/Kindleberger theory of direct investment. (See, Peter Drysdale, 
ed . Direct Foreign Investment i n Asia and the Pacific . Proceedings of 
the Third Conference on Pacific Trade and Development (Canberra: 
Australian National University Press, 1972) 
Despite this success, and the probable accompanying cost savings, 
the Japanese government apparently is now subsidizing direct invest 
ment in minerals, probably for strategic reasons . The bureaucracy has 
thus missed the point that direct investments are not particularly 
secure, and that contracts involve much less political trouble . (It 
was also suggested the investment was to reduce foreign exchange 
reserves and thus delay yen revaluation . ) 
In general, long- term contracts probably are more advantageous to 
buyers than sellers. In the Canadian case , there is a need for market 
access for output-induced acceptance, with the result that specific 
projects are overly dependent on specific markets . This view was 
challenged by two other participants . In the Canadian case , specifi-
cally, the projects were marginal in the first place and thus are poor 
examples . 
As to how bargaining should be characterized , in the long- term 
both sides can turn to third parties . What is important is what will 
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be lost by failure to reach agreement, and how the loss can be stood . 
Japanese do tend to act as consortia when buying, and sellers typically 
do not. Before the agreement, the buyer is generally in a stronger 
position, but once the developer has made an investment, it can in 
effect be held hostage by the host . 
Smaller countries such as Korea are worried Japan might monopo-
lize long-term contracts and discriminate against them . A most-
favored term clause, or at least ljmits on deviation, might be used to 
alleviate this . Korea and others have benefitted from the excess 
output of projects developed to fill Japanese contracts . 
Business cycles make long- term contracts risky . However, it was 
noted the parties probably expected renegotiation of "fixed prices" 
would be mutually acceptable over the life of the contract . As 
observed several times in other discussion, contracts are a commitment 
to cooperate and protect each other from real threats, with some 
expectation of renegotiation if conditions should change markedly . 
Stabilization was felt by some to be hurt by contracts, and by 
others to be promoted . Quantities committed under contracts are not 
available on the open market , and this will affect the price of what 
does trade openly . However , only a small share of total mineral trade 
is done in the spot market , and the thinning effect of contracts is no 
more distorting than direct investment for captive sources . It was 
also noted that future markets involve speculators with no stocks of 
minerals and no desire to hold any , so there are real risks in dealing 
in futures as a source or outlet for supplies . 
A possible disadvantage of contract commitments is the fi xing of 
production patterns in the producing country , making structural 
changes harder . However , this is not unique to long- term contracts . 
The existence of buffer stocks does not mean they will be used in 
a stabilizing way , and it was asked if examples can be cited . Pro 
ducers may be reluctant to deal with monopsonistic buffers , especially 
where they are already dependent on only a few buyers . 
The mechanisms financ i ng new projects have increased the number 
of suppliers, and this has led to price depression and destabilization . 
In his reply to comments, Mr . Kojima pointed out some contracts 
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fix both price and quantity, while others fix only the quantity . 
The rationale for long- term contracts relates to the long lead 
time in resource projects -- and this pertains to agriculture as well . 
The guarantee of a market for output makes planning of projects at an 
optimal scale easier , and the resulting scale economics can be shared , 
Mr . Kojima suggested prices need to be fairly firmly fixed during at 
least part of the initial period to recover development costs . 
Finally, it was mentioned that long- term contracts can also avoid 
such problems as transfer- pricing tax evasion . 
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THE WIDER CONTEXT OF BILATERAL RESOURCE 
EXPLOITATION ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE LDCs AND THE DCs 
Miguel S. Wionczek 
1. Introduction 
I submit that the future shape of bilateral arrangements covering 
exploration, exploi ta ti on and international trade in mineral 
resources, between the resource-rich LDCs and the major resource-
1 consuming DCs, can be perceived with certain clarity only if and when 
answers are provided to some questions of deep concern to many people 
in the developed countries . These key questions are: 
a) Does the world at large face a period of growing mineral 
resource scarcity? 
b) In what sense does the problem of DC access to LDC 
mineral resources arise? 
c) Are the LDC demands regarding the future use of thei r 
mineral resources conflicting with the general objective 
of world economic expansion; in other words, what is the 
"new international economic order" with respect to non-
renewable resources? 
d) What is the actual state of the contractual relations 
between the LDC resource-holders and the DC resource-
users and are the present tens i ons between the two 
parties a temporary or a permanent feature of interna-
tional economic relations? 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests the following 
answers to these four questions : 
a) There is no growing global mineral resources scarcity. 
b) The problem of access to the LDC mineral resources can be 
meaningfully discussed today only in terms of changing 
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condi ti_ons of access and not of free unconditional 
access . 
c) The future external use of the LDC mineral resources as 
postulated by LDCs is not in conflict with the needs of 
an expanding internati onal economy ; moreover, the pro--
posals in that respect incorporated into the agenda of 
the "new i nternational economic order" are hardly 
revolutionary . 
d) The contractual relations between most LDC resource-
holders and DC resource-users as actually practiced have 
undergone very substantial changes over the past twenty 
years; these changes started long before the concept of 
the "new international economic order" was coined by the 
LDCs in 1974. 
Consequently, along with the changing patterns of international 
political and economic relations between the LDCs and the DCs , the 
future bilateral resource arrangements will be the result of the 
continuous process of mutual adjustments interwoven with momentary 
conflicts of interest. These conflicts will not degenerate however, 
into a "resources war" unless, of course, political and economic 
relations between these two sectors of the world economy degenerate 
into a series of bitter confrontations. 
2. Mineral Scarcity 
In spite of the fact that both the planet and its resources are 
finite and exhaustible it is impossible to marshall any serious 
evidence in support of a position that the world at large faces a 
period of growing mineral resources scarcity. Not only were the 
alarmist theses of the briefly famous Limits to Growth satisfactorily 
disposed of by the subsequent wave of political, economic and tech-
nological criticisms, but they have been also contradicted by the 
findings of two recent inquiries into the longer-term prospects for the 
world economy undertaken by two Nobel Prize laureates , Jan Tinbergen 
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and wassily Leontieff .
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According to the Tinbergen study, while the fear of exhaustion of 
natural resources, together with the measures taken by the OPEC 
countries, has started international discussions on natural resources 
in general and on non-renewable resources in particular, an overall 
shortage of minerals in the near future does not appear a real danger. 
The quantity of metals, minerals and other useful elements contained in 
the first 1,000 meters of the earth's crust and in the seas represents , 
with the exception of oil, several million, or even several hundred 
million, times the world's present annual consumption. 3 
In the opinion of the Leontieff study, the availability of mineral 
resources -- even under relatively conservative estimates of resources 
endowments and the uncertainties associated with long-run supply-
demand balance - - should not create physical obstacles to the sustained 
growth of the world economy at least for the next 25 years. Neither 
are obstacles of a technological nature to be expected . On the other 
hand, the Leontieff group believes that far-reaching internal social, 
political and institutional changes in the LDCs and significant 
adjustments in the world economic order would be of considerable help 
in assuring the world economy a rate of growth comparable to that of 
the first post-World War II quarter of a century. 4 
In the absence of more competent experts on the world economy than 
Tinbergen and Leontief~the first of the questions may be considered as 
answered negatively. 5 Thus the world does not appear to be facing a 
period of growing mineral resource scarcity. 
It is sometimes argued that while in an absolute, physical sense 
worldwide resource depletion is not forthcoming and hence may seem 
reassuring for the medium-term growth of the world economy, it ignores 
the cost dimension that has important implications for both the 
combination of factors used in the production of intermediate and final 
goods and the total cost of producing these goods . Furthermore, it is 
argued that at least some literature dealing with mineral resources 
problems suggests that in recent years resource costs increased in real 
terms because the cost reducing effects of technological change in 
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mining were unable to offset both rising scarcity rents and the 
increased costs of exploiting more inaccessible and poorer quality ore 
bodies . In fact, however, the evidence in respect to rising cost 
trends not only is still very sketchy but also it is based upon the 
unproven assumption that most -- if not all -- easily accessible and 
high-quality mineral resources have already been located, have entered 
into production stream, and are approaching depletion . Recent dis-
coveries of extremely rich deposits of sulphur and copper in Central 
Europe, natural gas in France, iron ore in Australia and oil in Mexico 
(parts of the planet presumably well - surveyed geologically) strongly 
suggest that the world economy is still very far from the stage in 
which only inaccessible or poorer quality mineral resources are left 
for exploitation at increasing costs . On the other hand, in the cases 
when this might occur technological innovation would accelerate, 
resulting in the substitution of "cheaper" resources for those showing 
constantly increasing costs . Such phenomenon has been occurring even 
in the "very special" case of petroleum. 
3. DC Access to LDC Minerals 
Does t he lack of DC access to mineral resources represent a major 
obstacle to the growth of industrial economies? It seems that the deep 
concern with thi s issue may be due to some ignorance of the dynamics of 
resource availability and of the imperative needs for growth in the 
LDCs . Moreover , some do not realize that political realities have 
changed from the first half of the present century when the DC 
resource-consumers used to enjoy the "di vine right" of free uncondi -
tional access to the LDC resources under traditional concessions . 
The lack of clear definit i on with respect to what the right of 
access should and should not mean may underlie the wider confusion 
arising from the popular concept of resource scarcity that erroneously 
equates resources with reserves . Contrary to the popular impression, 
in part created by the term "nonrenewable r esources," mineral 
resources are not fixed quantities but change over time . Reser ves 
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re fer to the subset of total resources which are identified (proven , 
probable or possible), and recoverable in a given period in the context 
of existing economic and technological conditions . Consequently , the 
magnitude of recoverable reserves is constantly changing . Reserves 
are reduced by downward price changes , i ncreases in costs , expanded 
availability of substitute materials and by public restrictive 
regulati on . They are at the same time constantly enlarged by new 
discoveries and by new political , economic and technological develop-
ments that make it possible to produce from depos i ts that could not be 
exploited before . 
The meaningful appraisal of the access to mineral resources at the 
global or national level is made particularly difficult by information 
limitations. The only source of detailed data about mineral resources 
stock (i . e . , reserves recoverable at a given point of time) is the 
resources industry, which has an incentive to propagate the image of 
resource scarcity and to magnify barriers to the entry into resource 
exploitation . The exclusive holding of such i nformation i s a 
prerequis ite for successful participation in the oligopolistic game of 
exporting and internationally trading mine r al resources . 6 
Except for a portion of the ocean floor, and this is true only 
temporarily judging by the slow but steady progress of the 
U.N . Conference on the Law of the Sea , 7 there is not a "no man ' s land" 
left on the planet . The issue of free access to the world ' s non-
renewable resources stopped being relevant with the end of the politi-
cal decolonization phase that closed in 1975 with the disappearance of 
the Portuguese colonial empire in Africa . Discussion of the condi-
tions of access must take into consideration both global resources 
availability and the changing modes of resource exploitation i n the 
LDCs . 
Among the factors that have a direct bearing upon the security of 
supply for resource- deficient DCs and the barriers to entry into 
resource-rich LDCs, of particular relevance are (1) the expansion of 
geographic limits to recoverable resources , ( 2) the emergence and 
proliferation of independent enterprises ready to provide services to 
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the LDCs, ( 3) the growing LDC resource policy sophistication, and 
(4) the increased domestic resource use by the LDCs themselves. 
Despite rapid post- war rates of industrial growth, resource 
availability has more than kept pace with the increase in global 
consumption . Both political changes (decolonizaUon) and the tech-
nological revolution in exploration techniques are responsible for 
increased resource availability . This expansion has occurred practi-
cally everywhere . In Africa the myth of the resources concentration in 
temperate parts of that continent (Eastern and Southern Africa) was 
destroyed by the important discoveries in tropical West and Central 
Africa and in the desertic sub- Sahar a region. In Asia the enormous 
mineral wealth of Soviet Siberia and China, practically unknown only 
20 years ago, was confirmed. Similar occurrences were registered in 
the polar and subpolar parts of the Northern Hemisphere (Canada and 
Alaska) . Other instances of changes in resources availability 
occurred in South America, Southeast Asia and even in Europe (Poland, 
both Germanies and France, among others), a continent supposedly more 
than fully explored over the past several hundred years . 
Many new exploratory techniques which or i ginated directly or 
indirectly from the space program became common knowledge, as they were 
developed not by private industries but by the governments of major 
powers . In the case of some particularly sophisticated and costly 
exploration methods, a proliferation of technical supply sources fol-
lowed . Practically anyone in charge of resources management policy, 
not only in the DCs but in semi-developed resource-rich nations, is 
cognizant by now of this important development . The rapidly expanding 
availability of exploration technologies has been just as responsible 
as any nationalistic pressures for the decline of the traditional 
package of exploration cum exploitation ~ export trade of un-
processed resources, that characterized the private mineral resources 
industry until the 1950s . 
Then came a fairly recent extension to the LDCs of the concept of 
mineral resources development . Only a few officials responsible for 
mineral development in the LDCs are still unaware of the important role 
these resources can play in the national economy . The potential 
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tribution to be made by mineral development in providing employ-con 
t in contributing revenues through royalties and taxes, and in men , 
providing foreign exchange through mineral resources export is 
generally better understood in LDCs than it may be thought. Nor does 
it escape ~he LDCs' attention that the infrastructural aspects of 
mineral exploitation have an important bearing upon the general 
economic and social modernization process. The associated develop-
ment of communications, townships, public utilities, medical and 
educational services follows on the footsteps of major discoveries and 
of the development of important non-renewable resource deposits in 
relatively virgin and underdeveloped areas . 
The "discovery" of the resource management concept led the LDCs 
one step further . As even the poorest LDCs want to break from the 
patterns of agricultural underdevelopment and to diversify their 
economies, they started appreciating that mineral resources develop-
ment can hardly be left to accidental foreign initiatives. Many of 
them realize that the domestic capacity to manage resources is neces-
sary not only for the purpose of striking more advantageous deals with 
foreign private interests, but also to make mining a major sector of 
the economy. To help develop a domestic resource policy capacity, the 
LDCs have a number of relatively new alternative sources of informa-
tion, knowledge and ass i stance: (1) DC independent consulting firms, 
(2) survey missions from the socialist bloc and (3) technical 
assistance programs of the U.N . agencies. 8 In addition, missions from 
international financial organizations for development of improved tax 
systems, and advisers from the former metropolis (keen upon 
diminishing the ex-colonies' dependence upon bilateral financial aid) 
were of important indirect assistance. In this way, the external !12.!:!.= 
private participation in the early operational stages in LDC mineral 
development (basic mapping, exploration for and evaluation of poten-
tial resources) and also in the establishment of an institutional 
framework for development of the mining sector (geological and mining 
bureaus, state mining corporations, training of professionals, etc .) 
became the increasingly important external input into the formation of 
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mineral resources development policy in LDCs . This factor hardly 
receives any attention among those in the DC's who are preoccupied with 
the theory that barriers to "free access" to LDC mineral resources 
arise from simple "irrational" nationalism. 
The next factor to be considered is the growing operational 
management capacity developed locally in the LDCs through the long 
presence of foreign private mining enterprise . That capacity has been 
generated by : ( 1) the supervisory activities of local authorities 
over foreign mining ; (2) the LDC rest r ictive policies on skilled labor 
imporation; and (3) the large and increasing gap between the cost of 
expatriate and local personnel. Consequently, with the possible 
exception of such places as Zaire or perhaps Papua New Guinea, local 
participation in operational and , to a growing extent, administrative 
and financial management of mining operations have increased dramati-
cally within the past two decades. One example may suffice here . At 
the time of the Mexican oil nationalization in 1938 the number of local 
engineers employed by foreign compani es hardly exceeded twenty and 
even the majority of foremen were foreign . When, in 1976, Venezuela 
bought out foreign oil companies no more than 50 top executives were 
foreigners in the third largest LDC oil set- up in the world . The 
presence of the local resources management capacity at the enterprise 
level, and the well-founded belief of most LDCs that new mining 
development pr ojects of such capacity can be established in the medium 
term , play a major role in shaping the new relations between the LDC 
resource- holders and the DC resour ce- users . 
Finally , it must be kept i n mind that some of the resource-richest 
LDCs such as Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia and Malaysia have advanced 
considerably on the road to industrialization. Thus their attitudes 
towards resource exports is becoming conditioned by longer- term 
industrialization objectives that include manufacturing of industrial 
goods for export . 9 
International mining enterprises have responded to these new 
factors in the world resource scene by making a conscious effort to 
loosen thei r ties with some more advanced LDCs in favor of mor e remote 
543 
but less politically sophisticated LDC's . The future history of the 
post-war mining in the colonial or the post-colonial parts of the 
pacific region may discover some interesting patterns of that search 
for new politically neutral mining resource locations. But the 
developments reviewed here extended rapidly all over the LDCs during 
the 1960s. Consequently, it is possible to argue that the "new 
international resource order" started emerging long before the OPEC --
with the helping hand of oil transnationals - - did what it did i n 1973 . 
In the face of the accumulated evidence it is not now possible to 
defend the proposition that the DCs have exclusive control of tech-
nology, capital and markets, while LDCs have only raw materials to 
dispose of . International mining corporations seem to be more aware of 
the changes occurring than the DC governments and academic theorists. 
This is why some corporations adopt much more accomodating postures 
vis-a-vis the LDC resource-holders, than do their own DC governments . 
4. The New Economic Order 
Previous observations lead to the question of the rationale of the 
"new international economic order" in respect to the resources sector, 
and its compatibility with the needs for international economic expan-
sion. Many volumes have been written lately on this subject by both 
the "new order" proponents and its enemies . No agreement is in sight 
as yet . But perhaps the best resume of the political and economic 
rationale of that "new order" has recently been provided by an African 
public figure in the following words: 
The New International Economic Order is about distribution : 
the distribution of world production, the distribution of 
the surpluses derived in any country and the distribution of 
economic power . 
It is about the distribution of production because unless we 
in the poor countries can produce more of what we need 
ourselves and play a greater role in processing our raw 
materials into manufacturing goods before exports and unless 
the industrialized countries are prepared to admit our manu-
factu r es , we will remain unable to meet the basic needs of 
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our people • • • 
•• • (It) is also about distribution of surpluses, because, 
unless we can retain the surpluses earned on the goods we 
produce, then we will remain poor and dependent no matter how 
much we produce . • • 
Further, a New International Economic Order is about distri -
bution of power. At present there are almost no significant 
formal or informal decision-making forums in which the Third 
World has an effective enough voice for its interests to be 
taken iq0o serious account when decis i ons are formulated and agreed . 
This statement contains a clear message to the DCs in respect to 
the "new international resources order . " First, LDCs are aware of 
their power to control physically a large part of the world's natural 
resources . Second , the domestic use of these resources and their 
processing before export should have priority over their export in an 
unprocessed state . Third, the LDCs aim at increasing their participa-
tion in the resource rent -- in the Ricardian sense - - from resources 
exploitation and trade . 11 Fourth, the LDCs have strong preference for 
negotiating the new international framework for future resource 
exploitation multilaterally rather than on a country- by- country or 
commodity-by-commodity basis . 
Such messages should neither be surprising nor treated l i ghtly as 
irresponsible nationalistic aberrations . These are messages of the 
rightful holders of an important and sometimes singular asset, willing 
to engage in negotiations about the form of its disposal taking into 
consideration their national interests . Giving priority to national 
interests over those of foreign parties is the primary rule of behavior 
applied by the DCs for some time . If the demand for general applica-
tion of this rule feeds the image of scarcity and the sense of 
insecurity because it comes from the LDCs, then that is another story. 
Reactions are much calmer when the same position is taken by the 
countries such as Australia or Canada. As a matter of fact , resource 
nationalism originated in resource- rich but otherwise less opulent DCs 
and not in the LDCs , which are only late comers to the game. 
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Perhaps for all there is much more to the "new international 
resource order" than the search for a more equitable distribution of 
gains from resource exploitation and trade. If it had that single 
objective, the situation could easily degenerate into a very difficult 
zero-sum game . The LDCs posit, however, that the more equitable 
distribution of mining rent and profits would make sense for them only 
in a context of the dynamic expansion of the worldwide resource economy 
and of the reasonable stability of international resource trade condi-
tions. Such a context changes the nature of the distributional issue 
into a non-zero positive sum game . Such games are played interna-
tionally all the time . 
On the basis of their own historical experience the LDCs believe 
that the market alone cannot resolve the issues of international 
distribution of gains, economic expansion, and trade stability to the 
satisfaction of LDC policy makers . The "once-and-for-all" character 
of mineral exploitation , the presence of two different actors (a 
national state and usually a large foreign enterprise), the distinct 
locations of the asset and of its " final" disposal, imperfections of 
markets with a strong tendency toward oligopoly, and vertical and 
horizontal integration patterns of the resources industries are just a 
few of many elements that call into question the "fairness" of the 
market solution . The issues of steady resource output expansion and of 
price and income stability for the LDC resource holders can be resolved 
only be introducing some elements of international governmental action 
into the resource market . 
Leaving aside the controversial issue of the secular trends in the 
12 terms of trade, anyone cognizant of the problems of LDC social and 
economic management knows that the difficulties arising from seasonal 
and cyclical fluctuations in demand for exportable resources make such 
management extremely difficult, especially during the downswing of the 
cycle. Recent international agency attempt at financial compensation 
schemes for primary producers have not proven beneficial because such 
schemes not only are of limited magnitude but also act ex- post. 
Under the "new international economic order" the LDCs would like 
to see the early establishment of the ex- ante price and incomes 
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stabilization schemes along the lines of the Keynes 1942 commodity 
plan . 13 The LDCs believe, and are not alone i n this respect, that 
there is a need for a world- wide long- run stabilization policy in the 
field of resource production and trade that would take into considera-
tion conflicting interests of producers, traders and consumers . 14 Such 
policy could be implemented , however, under real life conditions only 
if its designers and implementers -- governments and not private 
parties -- kept in mind that conflicts arise not only among producers, 
traders and consumers but among the objectives of growth, stability and 
efficiency as well . 
Thus, the LDCs posit that a realistic global resource policy - -
whether renewable or unrenewable -- would not substitute international 
public intervention for market allocation, as some people may think . 
but it would have to try hard to conciliate them. Such policy would 
not be able, as others believe, to assure the optimal achievement of 
any one of the three major overall objectives of growth, stability and 
efficiency in the mineral sector of the world economy . Clearly, it 
woul d not be even the "second best" policy . But as Solow wisely 
observed, with the "first best" policies absent from real life and the 
"second best" functioning in the resources field quite inefficiently, 
the risks involved in the attempt to implement what is possible are not 
too great . 15 
These are exactly the limited objectives pursued by the UNCTAD 
" integrated commodity program" supported by the LDCs . 16 While it 
covers major foodstuffs and other agricultural commodities, some key 
world- traded minerals (bauxite, copper, iron ore, manganese, tin and 
phosphates) form its kernel . A growing number of DC policy makers have 
reached the conclusion that "the market for exhaustible resources 
might be one of the places in the (world) eonomy where some sort of 
organized indicative planning could play a constructive role. 1117 As a 
result there is room for cautious optimism about the future of the 
UNCTAD scheme . Since its adoption depends upon the political will to 
reach a compromoise and not upon technicalities, it may alleviate at 
least some of the tensions that characterize DC/LDC resource rela-
tions. The DCs concerned with access to resources should keep in mind 
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that many measures taken by the LDCs in the past two decades to 
increase their share in resource rent and profits originated from fear 
of the insecurity of markets and from concern about price and revenue 
fluctuations ., 
It is worth noting that the initial hostility towards the UNCTAD 
"integrated commodity program" and its central support piece, the 
common stabilization fund, has been fading away in the DCs perhaps more 
rapidly than expected . Only three years ago the UNCTAD scheme was 
considered in many places either as some sort of "idiot's delight" or 
as a grandiose hoax that the LDCs wanted to perpetrate on the DCs for 
the purpose of destroying the "free market forces" through "financial 
subversion ." Except for the indexation of commodity prices the subject 
is discussed seriously now both by DC scholars and policymakers . 18 
5. Contractual Resource Relations Between DCs and LDCs 
While the DC concern with the worldwide extension of "resource 
nationalism" received strong stimulus from the so- called oil crisis of 
1973 resulting in the subsequent debate on the "new international 
economic order," this in no way represented the watershed between the 
traditional and the innovative approach to the external exploitation 
of LDC natural resources. The departure from traditional practices had 
already started in the 1950s , accelerated in the 1960s and got the 
upper hand during the present decade . While old colonial forms of 
resource exploitation agreements still survive, they were gradually 
replaced all over the LDC world by new types of concessions . The most 
innovative aspects of these concessions consist of provisions , first , 
for the host country's participation in the ownership and , second, for 
its increasing management role in most phases of the resource industry 
including, in a few cases, marketing of the output abroad . 19 
The appearance of the modern resource exploitation concession was 
the result of a long sequence of slow and gradual changes in the nature 
of the traditional concession, based originally upon the grant of 
practically unrestricted rights (for half a century or more) to exploit 
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mining enclaves in a foreign territory . Under the "old order, 11 
royalties accrued to the LDC in accordance with the physical output 
volume or its estimated export price (a primitive production tax), 
accompanied sometimes by nominal land tax on the permanently leased 
mining property . 
Even prior to the appearance of discussions in the DCs on such 
topics as the structure of international resource markets, the econo-
mic consequences of vertical and horizontal integration, transfer 
pricing and the like, the LDCs progressively abandoned the practice of 
relying on royalties as the main source of their resource income . This 
departure from past practices became quite extensive by the mid- l950s, 
It was a response first to the LDC growing realization that special 
characteristics of mineral resource development made it an economic 
activity considerably different from either export agriculture or the 
first stage of (consumer goods) industrialization. Empirical observa-
tions of di fferent operational stages of the resource sector (from 
exploration to marketing abroad of final product), together with the 
growing awareness of microeconomic and technological implications of 
mineral development for the local economy, led to the emergence of 
policy measures aimed at progressive integration of the foreign owned 
and export directed resource industry enclaves into domestic develop-
ment. 
The measures taken -- individually or in packages -- at the speed 
commensurate with differing degrees of LDC skills and bargaining power 
included: 
(a) replacement of royalties by export taxes and/or income 
taxes, combined later in some countries with special 
"resource" taxation; 
(b) revision and tightening up of traditional incentives - -
tax holidays, accelerated depreciation and depletion 
allowances; 20 
(c) local equity participation; 
(d) regulation of export-oriented resource infrastructure 
(railways, roads and port facilities); 
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(e) contracting, management and marketing agreements; 
(f) joint processing facilities; 
(g) provisions for employment and training of local person-
nel, and 
(h) extension of local multi plier effects through local 
purchasing . 
It is sometimes stated that production sharing and contracting 
arrangements originated in the early 1960s in Indonesia through the 
initiative of the European socialist countries and Japan to engage in 
production of agricultural commodities for export, and that only later 
they started covering nonrenewable resource exploitation . Recent 
studies suggest, however, that they appeared more or less simulta-
neously in many parts of the LDC world, including Latin America . 21 They 
responded not only to the "resources nationalism" but also to tech-
nological changes in resources exploitation and to institutional 
changes in the structure of markets for final mineral products . 22 
Most of the measures that appear in the modern contractual 
arrangements between the LDCs and the DCs may be broadly divided into 
financial provisions (such as increased royalties) and economic 
development provisions (such as promoting linkages with the rest of the 
local economy). Others, particularly those aimed at capturing an 
increased share of the resource rent, are being, tried, often with 
considerable success. Such is the case of the tax measures applied by 
the Caribbean countries in 1975 to aluminum transnationals within the 
framework of International Bauxite Association whose world-wide mem-
bership accounts for two- thirds of world bauxite reserves and mine 
output . 23 
The implementation of the "new resource order" has been 
accelerated, not initiated, by the 1973 OPEC oil price action because 
that action in itself was a part and parcel -- albeit particularly 
visible -- of the long process of change and adjustment in the patterns 
of resources arrangements between the LDCs and the DCs . The OPEC 
success has inevitably brought to the forefront of the attention of 
mineral - producing nations other possible forms of cooperative action. 
550 
Its demonstration effect led to setting up the bauxite and the iron ore 
associations . These were looked upon prematurely by the DCs as the 
beginning of the new period of "resource cartels" that would bring 
havoc to the "free working of market forces" in the resource sector of 
the world economy . 
The nervousness of the DC reaction was due to their lack of 
appreciation of a number of important facts . First, assuming 
generously that the "free market forces" did once operate in the 
resource sector they ceased to operate in the interwar period when 
world production and trade of key minerals became dominated by large 
oligopolistic corporations, in many cases substantially controlling 
not only supply but also demand . The most recent so-called resource 
cartels represented only the LDC countervailing response to these 
long- established oligopolistic situations . Their purpose was not to 
confiscate but to transfer an increasing share of the economic rents 
from these corporations to the LDCs . Second, while the patterns of 
global resource availability offer the base for only a few LDC mineral 
cartels, 24 these cartels - - if successful in raising prices above long-
term market price trends -- would create a danger of encouraging 
exploitation of new or marginal deposits and in the longer run would 
defeat the cartels' objectives. 25 
These producer associations are performing an extremely useful 
function from the viewpoint of the LDCs . These associations strengthen 
and make permanant earlier informal LDC information networks not only 
with respect to general world market conditions in specific resource 
industries but also with respect to the characteristics of individual 
production .£!!!:!. export arrangements in different countries . As men-
tioned earlier, the increased flow of economic and technological 
information from the DCs to LDCs through non-private channels prior to 
1973 was largely responsible in the 1960s for the emergence of the 
resource development policy concepts in the LDCs and for their growing 
resource management capacity . While the post- 1973 producer associa-
tions have been of limited use in cartelizing resources, they have been 
of considerable assistance in standardizing the LDC positions vis- a-
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vis i nternational corporations and the DC resource consumers. The role 
of information as the decisive input in policy formation, long appre-
ciated by the DC private resources industry, has become recognized also 
by many LDCs . 
Thus, the dynamics of the world resource situation, multiple 
factors underlying the LDC demands for the "new international economic 
order" in sear ch for better equity, stability and expansion of the 
international resource economy, and the important micro changes 
occurring in individual arrangements and agreements between the LDC 
resource- holders and the DCs provide substantial evidence -- albeit 
still largely ignored in the DCs ··- that the "new international 
resource order" has been more rapidly implemented than it may appear on 
the surface . Perhaps the continuous progress of its implementation has 
in part been responsible for the LDCs ' pressure for accelerating the 
rate of change . 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper suggests that the traditional division of production 
factors in the resource sector with the DCs having exclusive control of 
capital, technology and markets and the LDCs having only non- renewable 
resources, has become progressively transformed, thus significantly 
altering the relative bargaining power of the parties involved in 
resource exploitation and marketing . This is particularly true with 
respect to technology (assuming technology covers all kinds of know-
how) and markets . In the special case of oi l the same can be said about 
capital. 
This newly arising situation may complicate somewhat mutual 
adjustments between the LDC resource- holders and the DC resource- users 
but it will not make them impossible . Even under the conditions of the 
increasing technological capability and the LDCs growing domestic 
demand for resources, the LDCs cannot follow extremely conservationist 
policies. Since they badly need resource export proceeds for financing 
economic growth and sometimes also for participating in the interna-
tional power game , the LDCs are little interested in a zero growth 
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strategy. 
Throughout the present debate about the "new international econo~ 
mic order" the LDCs have demonstrated great interest in trading access 
to their raw materials -- under the new conditions of co-participation 
in most stages of resource development -- for access to DC markets. A 
competent observer of the world economic scene, sympathetic to the LDC 
position, remarked recently: 
Outside a few possible special cases, such as oil, LDC bargaining 
power could best be employed in broadening and improving existing 
international resources markets; DC commitments regarding freedom 
of access to their markets and a gradual end of their protec-
tionism must 2s the necessary price for their gaining access to 
LDC supplies. 
Other observers expressed the belief that the necessary quid .£!:.Q 
guo might be found on a lower and less politicized level. Thus, a 1974 
U.N. report asserted that, in · view of the desire of the non-oil 
exporting countries to achieve substantial and lasting improvements in 
the prices of their primary commodity exports, and in view of the DC 
need for an assured supply of essential raw materials and foodstuffs at 
reasonable and relatively stable prices, "there should be a common 
interest in broad supply commitments by exporters and purchasing 
commitments by importers" under a general commodity stabilization 
scheme. 27 
Given the DC refusal to accept the principle of indexation, the 
trade-off between the access to resources and the access to markets 
does not seem possible. But the possible establishment of a weakened 
version of the UNCTAD "integrated commodity program" might be of 
considerable help in smoothing out the bilateral resource negotiations 
at the country or the enterprise level. What is hardly likely, 
however, is the acceptance by the LDCs, without changes of the 
Japanese schemes for resource development ~ imports under long-term 
contracts. In inflationary times, such arrangements make little if any 
sense to the LDC resource holders, even if the contracts were to 
incorporate ex-ante the indexation clauses to which for obvious 
reasons Japan continues to be opposed. The lack of enthusiasm in the 
LDCs for such long-term schemes can be better understood if one recalls 
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recent remarks of a well-known U. S. authority on international trade 
that while "the fear of losing access to raw materials led some DCs to 
dream of reviving the special relationship with selected LDCs," the 
LDCs "have to gain from a multilateral market free of neo-colonial 
28 overtones ." 
Assuming the relatively speedy adoption of the integrated com-
modity program and some relaxation of quantitative trade restrictions 
applied to LDC manufactures and semi-manufactures under special pre 
ferential schemes, the question of the future shape of the bilateral 
resource exploitation arrangements between the LDCs and the DCs can be 
raised . In general terms they will follow the trends of the past 
20 years, which were described aptly in the following terms: 
.• • the new structures have broken the tight link between 
ownership, control, and financial risks and benefits that 
was inherent in the traditional concession . Arrangements 
have been negotiated that have repackaged these elements in 
ways not feasible under the old structures . Because owner-
ship and control have become important political symbols in 
most developing countries, new contractual forms have been 
created to allow greater freedom in allocating ownership, 
control, and financial risks and benefits in ways that 
satisfy both the economic and new political imperatives . 
Where a foreign firm is considered important for its finan-
cial, technological, or marketing contributions , the new 
structures permit the negotiation of agreements that grant 
control and financial arrangements reflecting the bargaining 
powers of the parties . Ownership can be allocated in a way 
that makes the presence of t~ foreign firm politically 
acceptable in the host country. 
Considering the relation hetween LDC resource holders and DC 
resource users, it is quite probable that major changes will take place 
in both ~esource exploration and in the marketing of the output . 
The LDCs will pursue to an increasing degree the objective of 
putting resource exploration and evaluation in the hands of indepen-
dent enterprises through the use of service contracts. The world-wide 
proliferation of sources of such know- how provides the LDCs with 
considerable opportunities ; n that field . Moreover, independent 
exploration represents the most convenient, and sometimes the only, 
road to obtain information needed by the LDCs for negotiating eithe~ 
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exploitation service contracts or jo int exploitati on arrangements. 
Decisions correct from the resource-holder's viewpoint on the terms of 
service contracts or on the equity participation in the exploitation 
~ export stage depend to a gr eat extent upon the availability of 
correct information on the size, wealth and geological characteristics 
of new resource assets subject to bilateral negotiations. 
There are two reasons for the insistance by the LDC resource-
holders on local processing. First, the increased degree of local 
processing t r anslates itself into balance ·of-payments gains and 
savings -to the domestic economy if it contributes to economies of scale 
in the domestic manufacturing ind us try. Second, it expands taxable 
profits through higher value added . The LDC demand for increased 
processing of resources at home may be met relatively easily by foreign 
mining corporations . Not only do they often have ownership links with 
the LDC industrial sectors but the trend towards a major degree of 
processing at source responds to their own interests in saving on labor 
and transportation costs . 
Although the continuation of the trends in the LDCs toward joint 
ownership and/or management of nonrenewable resources for export can 
be expected, it is difficult to speculate about the concentrate 
formulae with respect to the degree of LDC financial involvement . 
While on political grounds the LDCs may continue to insist on majority 
capital participation, they are becoming more and more aware that 
capital ownership does not lead automatically to the real control of 
the enterprise . Capital scarcity together with other considerations 
may thus lead some LDCs towards tripar tite arrangements involving the 
co- participation of local public and private capital along with that of 
foreign investment . In the more advanced LDCs, a limited financial 
presence in resource development may become attractive to local pri-
vate industry, whether domestically or externally owned, both because 
it offers direct profits and also because it is the place in which 
important pricing decisions affecting the domestic industrial sector 
are made . 
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Of course, it is not easy to answer in advance whether the 
management of such complicated joint ventures will be easy . Their 
success will depend upon a satisfactory solution of numerous problems 
that arise with respect to management, technology, and the distribu-
tion of · profits . The history of conflicts that arose within the joint 
u.s.-Japanese industrial ventures, established in Japan in the 1967-
!975 period, suggest that most of them can be solved . 30 
An increasing number of LDCs have lately adopted the position that 
technology transfers taking place exclusively through the foreign 
enterprise -- whether in resource industries or elsewhere - - do not 
offer a satisfactory basis for the establishment of domestic tech-
nological capability because they are unduly expensive i n many cases 
and contain many clauses that restrict the use of that technology . 
Consequently, the LDCs will continue searching i n all resource 
exploitation stages for unpackaged technology available from foreign 
private and public sources through alternative channels . This trend 
will be facilitated by the growing number of such alternative tech-
nology sources. With respect to pricing technology acquired in 
packages with foreign investment involving captive import of all 
capital goods, the major LDCs will press for the unpackaging of these 
transactions for negotiating purposes and for separately pricing dif-
ferent parts of the package in accordance with the market condi tions 
prevailing in the DCs . The long- term objective here is to acquire 
technology from the DCs under the most favored- nation clause, that is , 
not to pay exorbitant premiums due to ignorance of international 
technology market conditions . 
Finally , one can expect that all future bilateral resource con-
tracts involving the LDC resource- holders will have to contain clear, 
unequivocal and fairly detailed general review clauses for the purpose 
of periodical adjustments to changing resource industries conditions , 
particularly in light of other subsequent agreements entered by the 
parties involved. These clauses may provide for periodical reviews 
every three to five years, and/or for emergency reviews in the case of 
pertinent world-wide or local developments . Moreover, the agreed 
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clauses may list all specific issues due for revision . The acceptance 
by the DC resource- users of such review clauses in all resource 
exploitation arrangements with the LDCs would go a long way toward 
minimizing conflict . Some internationally acceptable guidelines with 
respect to the behavior of international resource enterprises in the 
LDCs might be of help in getting rid of many conflicts that have 
characterized this sector of the world economy over the past 20 yea r s . 
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THE WIDER CONTEXT OF BILATERAL RESOURCE 
EXPLOITATION ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE LDCs AND THE DCs 
A COMMENT 
Romeo M. Bautista 
Miguel Wionczek' s stimulating paper cons j_sts of four connected 
parts, discussing major issues that underlie mineral resource exploi-
tation arrangements between resour ce-rich less-developed countr ies 
(LDCs) and resource- deficient developed countries (DCs) . The perspec-
tive taken is principally long- term and gener al, whic~ I think has both 
advantages and limitations . 
The first question raised - - whether the world economy faces a 
growing scarcity of mineral resources -- is only briefly discussed , the 
author relying on the highly optimistic findings of the recent Tinber-
gen and Leontief studies for- his unequivocally negative answer . 
The i s sue of access by DCs to LDC mineral resources is given 
historical interpretation in the paper . Wionczek draws attention to 
the rapid expansion of resources availability in the postwar period 
attributable to political and technological changes, the growing 
awareness among LDC governments of the potential benefits of mineral 
development for the national economy, the accompanying i mprovement in 
economic sophistication by resources pol :. cy managers in dealing with 
foreign private interests , the increasing capacity over the years of 
host countries to manage the f i nancial and administrative aspects of 
mining operations, and the increasing scope for domestic use of mineral 
resources for processing before they are exported . The di scussion is 
at once eloquent and forceful . 
Coming from a country which has not yet attained the level of 
maturity in mineral resource development as some of the Latin American 
countries, I hesitate to accept the contention in this part of the 
paper that LDCs have at this time effectively taken the upper hand in 
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bilateral resource exploita tion arrangements with DCs . In var i ous 
countries in Asia and Africa today , one finds the situation perhaps 
si milar to what Brazil , Chile and Mexico were experi encing two decades 
ago. The evolutionary pattern may turn out to be the same, j n which 
case one could afford to be optimistic, but perhaps only in the long-
term context . In the meantime there are problems , natural and artifi-
cial, faced by a LDC seeking to optimize the development of its mine r al 
resources in collaboration with the large foreign enterprises . 
Also, for some of these countries , the net benefits to t he 
national economy of mineral resource development are not clear- cut . 
The inherent instability of mineral expor t prices (and hence earnings) 
is well known . The high capital intensity of mining operations seems 
incompatible with the capital scarcity and hi gh level of labor force 
underutilization prevailing in the LDCs . While there are ways of 
overcoming the problem of obtaining capital , it is not necessarily good 
policy to invest it in mineral development projects, as investment in 
other areas involves much lower capital costs for each j ob created . 
The importance to the "general economic and social modernization 
process" of the "infrastructural aspects of mine al exploitation" 
emphasized in Dr . Wionczek ' s paper may also be questioned since 
minerals are usually found in remote areas and their development does 
not involve much interaction with the rest of the LDC economy . Thus , 
even for a resource-rich LDC, exploiting its comparative advantage in 
mineral development needs to be justified in terms of the extent to 
which the country ' s development inte~es ts are bei ng advanced . 
On the capital intensi veness of mining operations , it seems t o me 
rather paradoxical, given the increasing control of LDCs in mineral 
exploitation (relati ve to the fore i gn enterprises) , that l i ttle effor t 
has been devoted to the development of alternative technologies that 
could have created more jobs . The economic viability of less capital-
intensive mining processes merits serious investigation , in view of 
the favorable findings o~ past ILO studies on the cost effectiveness 
(based on shadow pricing of inputs) of labor- intensive techniques in 
road construction and other public works . Perhaps this is one area in 
which the growing influence of resoure-rich LDCs in mineral develop~ 
ment could be brought to bear. 
In the discussion of what he calls the New International Resource 
Order, Wionczek rightly emphasizes the need for a continuing expansion 
and reasonable stability on international resource trade, even as LDCs 
strive for a greater share of the gains from resource exploitation. 
For various reasons having to do with market imperfections, these 
objectives could best be served, according to Wionczek, by interna 
tional governmental action through the UNCTAD "integrated commodity 
plan." While I share his cautious optimism about the future of the 
UNCTAD scheme, my feeling is that it will be implemented , for better or 
worse, in a substantially modified form. Perhaps Wionczek, who is 
probably the most knowledgeable in th:i.s group on the recent NIEO 
negotiations, could share with us "academics who are one year behind 
current developments" (quoting from his earl i. er oral rema .0 ks) more 
detailed information than has been provided in this paper. 
The succeeding sections in the paper give an excellent survey of 
the rapidly changing contractual arrangements in mineral exploitation 
and trade worked out by resource-rich LDCs with foreign enterprises in 
the last two decades. As old agreements come to end, or more often 
were renegotiated, new terms much more favorable to the host countries 
tended to replace the orginial arrangements. These concessions mainly 
took the form of increasing LDC participation in ownership and manage-
ment of the resource industry. The discussion gives convincing 
evidence that long before the 1973 OPEC action there have been conerted 
efforts in the past by major LDC mineral producers to promote their 
common interest . Again, one wishes that Wionczek had been less general 
in his assessment of the effectiveness of LDC mineral cartels which 
certainly varied across different groups. 
On the increasing flow of economic and technical information 
facilitated by the establishment of producer associations, I fully 
agree that such access to information is most important to policy-
making, in view of the alternative opportunities ·racing the host 
country with respect to prospective foreign contribution to the finan-
cial, technological and managerial requirements of its mineral indus-
tries . It is only when the LDC policymaker has knowledge of the 
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various options available that confidence could be acquired in taking 
decisions and dealing with the individual elements of private foreign 
interests . For LDCs relatively less experiencec in mineral resource 
development, a very high payoff attaches, I think, to a close relation-
ship with the more mature LDCs, such as the Latin American countries, 
that could provide such information channels . 
Related to this, it seems reasonable to state that the principal 
cause of the inability of LDCs to obtain a fair share of the benefits 
from mineral resource development in the past has been thei r lack of 
knowledge about their collective bargaining strength and available 
options in policymaking . As Wionczek ' s paper demonst r ates, the situa-
tion has changed substantially over the years . The burden now is on 
LDC governments to insure that policy formation concerning mineral 
resources is geared to the promotion of national development objec-
tives . 
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THE WIDER CONTEXT OF BILATERAL RESOURCE 
EXPLOITATION ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE LDCs AND THE DCs 
H. Edward English 
Miguel Wionczek asks four questions: 
1. Is there a growing mineral resource shortage? 
2 . Is access to mineral resources a problem for developed coun-
tries? 
3. Are LDC demands in conflict with general objectives of the 
world market. 
4 . Are present contractual relations likely to lead to continu-
ing tension? 
The answer is a qualified "NO" to a l l these questions but mo e 
conditional access is likely to be characteristic of the future, and 
changes that are underway already a ·e hardly revolutionary . Even 
Wionczek sounded more revolutionary a few years ago at the Sixth 
Conference on Pacific Trade and Development i n Mexico City . But after 
all the New International Economic Order was and is mainly a means of 
attracting the developed countries' at ~ention to the needs of the third 
world . 
One must then proceed to examine the basis of the answer s Wionczek 
gives to the questions . 
To deal with the first quest i on . he calls on the Leontieff (1977) 
and Tinbergen (1976) reports . Although Leontief f, being the coordina-
tor of a U .N .-sponso ;"ed study , t akes a more "Club of Rome" ish stand 
than Tinbergen , both leave little doubt that non- renewable resources 
are likely to last us a l ong wh.ile yet. And Wionczek th ,,,ows in the 
"U.S. Society of Economic Geologists" symposium of 1972 to add further 
confirmation of the posit i ve resource fo recast 
Turning to the second question, what changes are occurring in 
conditions of access to non- renewable resources, the centra l issue is 
what changes are occurring in the market for such resources? Is there 
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still a demand curve a supply schedule, and is there mo r e or less 
competition in the way demand and supply are brought together? As an 
industrial organization economist, I have watched with a mi xture of 
amusement and impatience as the macro-economists and even interna 
tional trade economists have slowly learned over the past thirty years 
that in some important markets there are now and always have been 
substantial departures from pure competition . That is why one can be 
impressed with the brevity but not the originality or precision of the 
quotation f r om Solow in Wionczek's footnote (from the Ely lectures of 
1973) . "Our actual oligopolistic politically-involved , pollution-
producing resource industry is not exactly what the textbook or de r ed . " 
That depends, in part, whether one · s referring to Samuelson (first few 
editions) or to Pigou and Bai n (which date from the 1920 ' s and 1950's) . 
What is not new is the exi stence of oligopoly or pollution . They 
existed in approximately the same sectors in the 1950's as they do now . 
The only important changes in the last thirty years relate to (1) the 
recogniti9n by more gover nments that social costs and benefits must be 
taken fully into account - - thus leadi ng to greater participation by 
states !mainly developed states) i.n setting the terms on which 
resources may be produced; and (2) the creation of developing 
countries out of coloni es leadi ng to new definit i ons of soc j al priori-
ties no longer based on those of a few i.mperial power s or the 
enterprises that they foster . 
Wionczek also places great s tress on the prolifer ation of 
resource development and of channels for its dispersion . I think he 
places somewhat too much emphas i s upon this factor . However , the 
existence of the LDCs as independent countries , and their greater 
stress upon acquiring and di spersi ng managerial skills , has led to 
their greater capacity to define their interests in the development of 
these non- renewable resources and to bargai n more effectively wi th t he 
enterprises that previously had a greater advantage in know-how . In 
sum then , on the second question , the conditions of access are changing 
but they are basically related to a higher and more dependable price 
for the LDC s. 
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This leads to the third question : How if at all are the ne\./ 
conditions likely to be in conflict with the general world economy 
objectives? Since the objects of the N. I . E. O. are redi stribut i ve, the 
answer in principle is simple: "not at all" unless the redistribution 
critically reduces incentive or di storts the patte ~n of incentives. 
But there is a confusion in the interpretation of the redistributive 
principle . It is often stated as the distribution of production , or of 
surpluses, and of economic power . " ••• unless we in the poor countries 
can produce more of what we need ourselves and play a greater role i n 
processing our raw materials into manufacturing goods before exports 
and unless the industrialized countries are prepared to admit our 
manufactures, we will remain unable to meet the basic needs of our 
people • •• " It becomes apparent that there is a r eal danger that 
equitable distribution of the world's income can be lost in national-
istic r ivalry, even among development countries, to retain contr ol of 
the full value added . This statement could lead to much ineff ' ci ency 
in resource allocation since the efficiency of processing of every 
resource must be assessed on its merits (with a view to long- term 
comparative advantage prospects) for each individual developing 
country . 
The discussions of di stribution of surpluses and of distribution 
of economic power are also less than precise . However, ; t is possible 
to r ecognize a number of changes in market conditions that are compa-
tible with both legitimate redistribution and efficiency- promoting 
objectives, e g . , the equal access t o processing know- how , the elimin 
ation of DC trade restrictions that discriminate against processed 
forms of natural resour ces, the improvement of multilateral, regional 
and product- specific commercial institutions . 
I do not reach quite the same judgements that Wionczek does . He 
speaks of LDC awareness of their power, "to control physically a large 
par t of the world's natural resources " I see little evidence ye t of 
the reality of that power , except in OPEC . Again, I do not think one 
should generalize about the priority of processing . I am not sure that 
the LDCs have or should have a strong preference for negotiating the 
new r esource sector deals on a multilateral basis because the~e are far 
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t oo many of them to form a strong front as a collectivity. Regional or 
commodity groups or package deals are at least as likely to produce 
results favorable to the LDCs , as OPEC surely demonstrates. 
A key statement which Wionczek makes is the following: "giving 
priority to national over external interests is the primary rule of 
behavior applied by the DCs fo r quite a time . " This applies also t o 
the LDCs, especially the larger ones . The recognition of overriding 
group interests is only strong where the members are very small or the 
group interests are very substantial, again citing OPEC as an example. 
Moving to the specific forms of bilateral institutions, Wionczek 
places emphasis upon price and income stabilization schemes . He makes 
a rather ambitious generalization on this point: "Such policy could be 
implemented, however, under real life conditions only if its designers 
and implementers -- governments and no t private parties -- kept in mind 
that conflicts arise not only among producers, traders and consumers 
but among the objectives of growth, stabi lity and efficiency as well." 
The UNCTAD, " integrated commodity program" is his prime example of a 
bilateral acceptance in DCs . However, it is not yet certai n whether it 
is practical to move ahead on as many as six commodities at once. 
Provided that one does not undermine the long- term allocation process 
with indexation, there is no harm in trying for a six- commodity deal 
(bauxite copper , iron ore, manganese, tin and phosphates). The ma j or 
disadvantage of such an approach is that it substantially enlarges the 
number of producing countries that must coordi nate their efforts, and 
the possibility of di visions among them becomes greater, weakening 
their bargaining power relative to the more common consumer groups . 
When Wionczek turns to a discussion of the financial and economic 
development provi sions of the individual bilateral mineral development 
deals that involve LDCs as suppliers, he rightly identifies as a 
gradual evolution the growi ng acceptance of host country participation 
in ownership and an increased managerial role . Furthermore , he notes 
the gradual shift away from financial terms that reflect the uninformed 
and competitive bidding for investment by LDCs -- token royalties , tax 
holidays, accelerated depreciation and depletion allowances . 
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Among the development provisions he highlights regulation or 
export- oriented infrastructures previously built and controlled in the 
interest of the private i.nvestor alone, and also the unbundling of ~he 
managerial package, and the specification of arrangements for manage~ 
ment and market i ng services, joint processing facilities , training of 
local personnel , etc . I see this process as an essential probing to 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of the developing country• s 
capacity to manage its affairs . I do not think it should be criticized 
if i n the short run it results in less eff '.cient operation of the 
industries concerned, provided that there are means of assuring that 
local capabil i ties are bei ng developed and skills dispersed . That 
often depends most of all on the capacity for evolution of local 
political and social i nstitutions and the condi tions that constrain 
access to nat i onal elites . 
Wionczek rightly identifies the problems that can and do ari se i f 
this evolutionary process leads simply to more cartels. Apparently the 
part i cipation of government enterpri ses is no guar antee to the stabi 
lity of copper prices or the limiting of excessive incentives to 
marginal producers . 
It would have been helpful to have in the paper a systematic 
review of bilateral arrangements so that we could make judgements on 
the r elative importance of the problems that emerge in the new phase of 
bilateral bargaining , but it is unfair to expect Wionczek to produce 
such a compendium in what i s already a comprehensive and very useful 
paper putting a much needed perspective on the faddish notion that the 
new economic order i s the source of all acceptable ideas about the 
betterment of mineral and other resource development contracts . Such 
ideas were already rooted in the events of earlier post-war year s . 
As Wionczek also emphasizes , the best guarantee that the LDCs will 
not be unreasonable is the fact that they are the "last group of 
countries interested in the zero growth stretegy ." 
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THE WIDER CONTEXT OF BILATERAL RESOURCE 
EXPLOITATION ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE LDCs AND THE DCs 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The discussion began by one participant noting that perhaps one 
way to get a picture of the developing countries ' position with 
developed countries is to combine the views of someone from a Latin 
American developing country with those of a person f r om an Asian LDC 
and divide by two 
Despite relatively greater earni ngs stability , stabilization is 
more an issue to Latin American than to Asian mineral producers . The 
question of just how important stabilization is compared to other . 
issues was raised . There is some controversy as to its economic 
benefits, even if it were politically accepted . Partly this per tains 
to costs of approaches : the use of buffer stocks was said to be a 
fraction of the cost of more direct stabilization even if swings were 
allowed in the 10 to 15 percent range . 
If stabilization is felt to have such a large payoff to developing 
countries , the question was asked what they might trade off for it 
since all LDC demands are unlikely to be met . Indexation of the 
moving- peg variety was suggested with major market changes being 
reflected in the real price , rather than a rigid relative price system. 
It was suggested mineral suppliers have not actually increased 
the real costs of access to industries using the mineral . Histori 
cally, access costs accrued to some imperial power ; now they go to the 
producing country . Perhaps too much is being made of developing 
countries having had much impact on markets from what is called tougher 
· bargaining . 
On a r elated note , the use of the terms r ents and profits was 
questioned . Since it was felt the author does not mean host countries 
should take equity positions and reap profits therefrom , but rather 
should simply obtain all the rent they can , it might be better to speak 
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of rents and partial rents . 
It was pointed out the standard resource- availability studies do 
not use an appropriate methodology for the task : input- output tabl es 
are static, and the environmental impact is not typically considered, 
The author is optimistic about long- run resource availabil ity, 
yet is also concerned about i nvestment being made to exploi t minerals 
Whether mineral producing countries should obtain exploration 
expertise provoked some disagreement . It is the highest r i sk part of 
the miner al exploitation game, and as such it is bette" to leave it to 
private multinationals who can spread that risk over many projects 
internationally, especially since there are some differences in tech-
niques and requisite expertise for different minerals . On the other 
hand the author noted such firms do not always disclose their findings 
fully, placing the host country at a bargaining disadvantage . However 
this is not necessarily a real problem since rents forgone from lack of 
initial information can be recovered as the resource is mined ; it is 
more difficult to misrepresent output than still- unrecovered minerals . 
It was observed that long- term supply cont r acts are really simply 
agreements to continuing negotiations as conditions change , and i n 
that sense are like direct investments . Another speaker wondered why 
the author specifically labelled Japan's long-term contract proposals 
as "hardly in the cards ." 
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INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY CONTROL -- THE TIN EXPERIENCE 
Mohamed Ariff 
The world has so far witnesse c' eight international tin agreements, 
four in the pre-war period beginning in 1931 and four in the post-war 
period since 1956. The fifth post-war international ti.n 2greement has 
been provisionally in force since July 1, 1976 . The objective of the 
present paper i s to examine the nature and functions , scope and 
limitations, and practical difficulties and outcomes of these interna-
t i onal tin control schemes . 
The paper consists of thr ee sections . The first section provides a 
brief historical sketch of the tin agreements as a prelude to the 
discuss j on that follows. The se cond section evaluates the preformance 
of tin control schemes, while the third section analyzes some of the 
issues associated with tin control and draws some poli cy i mplications . 
Sect i.on 1. 
Pre- wa r Agreements 
The first international attempt at tin control was made in 1921 
when the tin prices were rapidly declining as a result of a recession 
in industrial countries, exacerbated by the huge stocks accumulated 
during the First World War due to shipping difficulties. The situation 
was serious enough to lead the British and the Dutch governments to 
form the Bandoeng Pool with the aim of removing the surplus stocks from 
the market . The stock pool successfully withdrew about 19,000 tons of 
tin from the market, thereby raising the prices above 165 per ton, and 
it was only in 1923 that the pool began to release the stocks gradually 
without upsetting the price level. 
By 1922, wor ld tin consumption had not only recovered, but also 
begun to overshoot production leading to soaring prices which reached 
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£321 per ton in 1926. Excessive opt i mism caused an investment boom in 
the industry, and overproduction unfortunately coincided with the 
world depression at the end of 1929 . 1 The average tin price fell from 
£142 in 1930 to 118 in 1931. The Tin Producers' Association made two 
unsuccessful attempts at voluntar y restructions i n Malaysia : n 1930 to 
reduce output by shutting down half the industry for two months . The 
pani c caused by the deteriorating s i tuation led the governments of the 
main producers (the Federated Malay States, the Netherland East 
' ndies, Nigeria and Bolivia )2 to sign what became the first Interna-
tional Tin Agreement (ITA) which came into operation in March 1931. 
The ITA sought to restr j ct exports through an i nter-governmental quota 
system . Each member country was allowed a percentage production quota 
based on the 1929 standard tonnage . The expo· t quota was initially 
fixed at 78 percent of the standard tonnage but was soon lowered to 
33 . 3 percent . Severe restrictions helped the ITA maintain tin prices 
above the 1930 level . 
The scheme was :' enewed in 1934 to r un for an additional three 
years . Aiming at greater monopoly control, the second Agreement 
offered lavish quota incentives for new entrants.3 The entry of the 
Belgian Congo, Cornwall, French Indo-China and Portugal raised the 
monopoly power of the ITA from 74 . 9 percent to 84 6 percent . The 
objective of securing "a fair and reasonable equilibrium between 
product :' on and consumption with the view of preventi ng rapid and severe 
oscillations of price" was retained , but the Agreement was apparently 
committed to ma i ntain tin prices above £200 per ton . 
The third ITA was from 1937 to 1941 . During 1936-37, tin prices 
rose and export quotas were relaxed and kept at 100 percent of the 
standard, with restriction being virtually removed in 1937 . However, 
by mid- 1938 when tin prices fell rapidly, export quotas were re ;_mposed 
at 35 percent of the standard . The fourth ITA, which was supposed to 
have run for another five years, was interrupted by World War II. 
The Agreements used quantitative restrict j ons as the main control 
device, al though buffer stock operations also contributed to the 
control mechanism. Between 1931 and 1941 four buffer pools had been in 
operation, initially on a private basis but later on an official basis 
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as adjuncts to the Agreements . The objective of the first private 
buffer stock established in 1931 and operated in conjunction with the 
ITA, was the disposal of surplus stock and not price stab i lization . As 
a part of the second ITA, an official price-stabilizing buffer stock 
was set up in July 1934 and was operative through 1935 . Stocks 
exceeding s;ooo tons were obtained by a special 5 percent addition to 
the expor t quotas which were then at 40 percent of the standard . 
Another official buffer pool with 10,000 tons was established in mid-
1938 and the stocks were disposed of i n 1939 when the war scramble 
started. 
In the first two ITA ' s, an important feature was the conspicuous 
absence of consumer representation . It is therefore hardly surprising 
that the industrial consumers, especially the American manufacturer s, 
registered strong resentment to output restrictions a i med at raising 
prices . The largest consumers , the United States and Britain , were 
then allowed to participate in the Council discussions with no voting 
rights under the third and fourth schemes. 
Post-war Schemes 
The post- war tin era started of f with historically high demand and 
high prices . Production had been exceeding consumption since 1949, but 
the excess was absorbed by the U. S. strategic s tockpile. Under the 
Korean- war boom, tin prices rose sharply from an aver age of £606 per 
ton in 1949 to an average of £1 , 077 in 1951 . Even in 1953 the average 
price remained at £732 which was much higher than it had ever been 
before the Korean War . Yet, the future looked gloomy, s i nce the U. S. 
stockpiling was nearing saturation by 1953, and tin consumption 
appeared to have been permanently reduced by economizing processes 
devised during the war and immediate post-war years . 
potential "burdensome surplus " was threatening . 
In short, a 
The International Ti n Study Group (ITSG) was established as early 
as 1947 under the U. N. Havana Charter . The attempts by the ITSG to set 
up an international tin scheme were thwarted by the Korean- wa r boom and 
the U. S. attitude of "benevolent neutrality ." At last, in June 1954 , 
the f i rst post- war ITA was signed by all the major producers and 
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consumers with the conspicuous except i on of the United States, Japan 
and Germany. Membership now covered 88 percent of world production and 
37 percent of world consumption . Ratification by Indonesia was 
' however, delayed until February 1956 and the Agreement came into force 
only from July 1, 1956 
The Agreement appeared to depart radically from the pre-war 
schemes not only in terms of its objectives but also with respect to 
consumer interest and control methods. The objectives were briefly: 
(a) to eliminate excessi ve price fluctuations; 
(b) to secure long-run supply and demand equ5-librium; 
(c) to ensure adequate supplies at reasonable prices; 
( d) to avoid large-scale unemployment and underemployment 
in the ti.n industry; and 
( e) to promote economic production and prevent waste of 
tin deposits. 
Equal consumer representat5.on was provided in the sense that the 
producing and consuming countries were to have equal voting power --
each side having in the supervising International Tin Council 1,000 
votes to be allocated among members in proportion to their shares in 
production and consumption 4 As in the pre-war schemes , exports 
restrictions and buffer stock operations were the two methods of 
control, but unlike the pre-war arrangements, the buffer stock was 
assigned a key role. A buffer stock equivalent to 25,000 tons was 
established with contributions of tin and/or a cash equivalent from the 
producing countries. While metal contributions were not to exceed 
75 percent of the total, the producing countries were encouraged to pay 
100 percent cash at the floor price of £640 per ton (the market price 
on July 1, 1956 was around £750). 
The buffer stock was under the control of a manager subject to 
certain regulations. The official price range was fixed with £640 as 
the floor and £880 as the ceiling and was divided into three parts: 
the top third range (£800- 880), the middle range (£720- 800), and the 
lower third range (£640- 720). The buffer stock manager was obliged to 
sell tin when the price rose above the ceiling, to buy tin when the 
price fell below the floor, and not to buy or sell in the middle range 
575 
lJnless the Council decided otherwise by a weighted simple majo r ity 
vote. Export restrictions could be improved only after a minimum of 
10 ,ooo tons of tin had been accumulated in the buffer stock.
5 It was 
onlY in this sense that export restrictions played a secondary role in 
the mechanics of the first post-wa" ITA. The export quota was to be 
allocated among the producing member countries in proportion to their 
6 market shares. The penalty for a breach of the quota limits ranged 
from additional contributions to the buffer stock equivalent to the 
excess exports, to the loss of 50 percent of the country's share in the 
buffer stock. 
· The scheme was put to the test immediately after its birth. The 
Suez Crisis caused tin prices to overshoot the ceiling of £880, but the 
buffer stock was impotent to act as it had no metal to sell . In 1957 
the Council raised the floor price from £640 to £730. Huge buffer 
stock purchases were made in the second half of 1957 when the price 
fell to the new floor as a result of declining consumption and 
increasing Russian tin exports. 7 The second and a part of the third 
instalments of buffer stock contributions were called up, and a severe 
export restriction was j.mposed . The crisis repeated i tself in 
January 1958. To save the situation, the Council called up the 
·· emaining buffer stock instalments, appealed for voluntary contribu-
tions and tightened export control. Despite all these moves, the price 
broke the £730 floor plunging to £ 640 in September 1958, but soon 
8 retur ned to the floor level. Throughout 1959, the price remained 
fairly stable around £790 per ton. The metal buffer stock was reduced 
to 10,000 tons, and export controls were relaxed and finally removed in 
September 1960 . After March 1961, the price rose rapidly unchecked by 
the buffer stock sales . Stocks of tin i n the buffer stock were 
exhausted in June 1961, allowing the price to break the ceiling of 
880. The first post-war ITA expired on June 30, 1961. 
The second post-war ITA was operated provisionally from July 1961 
and definitively from February 1962 for a period of five years . There 
were only minor changes in the new scheme: (1) the U.S . and u . s.s.R. 
still declined to participate, although Japan and Mexico joined by late 
1962; (2) the floor and the ceiUng prices remained at £730 and £880, 
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··espect i. vely, al though they we!'e s_ubsequently "'aised a number of 
times; (3) quantitative controls and buffer stocks remained as the 
control weapons, although it was now poss i.ble to impose export restric~ 
tions if the buffer stock held 5,000 tons instead of 10,000 tons as 
previously; and (4) the maximum s i ze of the buffer stock was reduced 
from 25,000 tons to 20,000 tons, but the buffer stock manager was now 
empowered to borrow money to expand hJ s market operations under 
specifi ed circumstances . 
During the early 1960' s . world production and consumption of tin 
were generally stable with consumption exceeding production by about 
10,000 tons . Even the American release of about 32 000 tons of tin 
from the strategic stockpile9 between August 1962 and September 1964 
did not restrain the price from rising . The buffer stock was again 
powerless to prevent the price from breaking the ceiEng of £1,000 in 
October 1964 to reach a peak of £1,655. In November 1965 , the floor 
price was elevated to £1 , 000 and the ceHing price of £1,200 . During 
the greater part of the second post-war control period (1961-6) the 
buffer stock was not active, and when the second post-war agreement 
came to an end on June 30 , 1966, it accounted for a holding of 
£19 . 27 million entirely in cash . 
The third post- war agreement came into force provisionally in 
July 1966 and definitively in March 1967. Under the new scheme, a 
provision was made for a buffer stock of £20 million, equivalent to 
20,000 tons of tin metal at the floor price of £1,000 per ton, and for 
an overdraft not exceeding £10 million on commercial terms from a bank 
consortium in London, thus raising the resources of the buffer stock to 
£30 million . The buffer stock price i·ange was r aised at the beginning 
of the third agreement from £1, 000- 1, 200 to £1, 100- 1, 400 . In 
November 1967, following the sterling devaluation, the floor and the 
ceiling prices were increased by one-sixth to £1, 28 3 and £1, 633 
respectively. A third change in the official price range was made in 
1970, but not for currency reasons, the floor price being raised by 
7 percent and the ceiling price by 3 percent . In the process, the 
middle sector of the price range was narrowed down from 10 percent (of 
the floor price) in 1964 to less than 6 percent in 1970. 
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The third agreement had a relatively easier time . The highest 
surplus of production in any year was 7, 000 tons, and the biggest 
shor tage 5,000 tons . Export cont r ol was introduced rather strangely 
while the buffer stock was still selling, and was in operation during 
1968-69. The buffer stock manager was given (as in 1957-60) the 
authority to sell in the middle sector in order to prevent export 
control from raising the price too rapidly . It is also of relevance to 
note that Canada, United Kingdom and Japan expressed concern over the 
high level of t i n prices and emphas i zed the dangers of substitution by 
other metals . 
The fourth agreement was in operation for five years from 1971, 
with no change in the basic princ i ples of export control and buffer 
stock . A significant development was that the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) allowed its members for the first time to use their drawing 
rights to make the greater part of their contributions to the tin 
buffer stock, a facility which was promptly made use of by Bolivia, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. To make the buffer stock more 
palatable to the IMF, the new agreement introduced a major change in 
the buffer stock mechanism by permitting the excess cash in the buffer 
stock to be distributed even before the end of the agreement . The 
buffer stock manager was now obliged to sell at the market price when 
the market price was at or above the ceiling price, thus departing 
radically from the previous practice of selling only at the ceiling 
price . Another development of considerable significance was the 
consumer contribut i. ons to the buffer stock for the first time, amount-
ing to a total of 1.8 million by the Netherlands and France in 1972 . 
In July 1972, the Tin Council changed its price range from the 
sterling basis to a Malaysian dollar basis, when the pound sterling 
shifted from a fixed to a floating rate. This was effected merely to 
take advantage of the relative stabihty of the Malaysian dollar. 
There was a threat of a surplus in 1972 following increased tin 
production in Australia and Indonesia. Consequently, export controls 
were imposed in January 1973, not to reduce output but simply to 
prevent further increase in output. When the price of tin rose above 
the ceiling the September 1973, the Tin Council reacted by abandoning 
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t he export contr ols and shifti ng the price range of acco~odate the new 
market prices . It must, however, be pointed out that in 1973 tin 
prices reflected not demand and supply situations, nor production and 
consumption conditions , but simply the weakness of the pound sterling 
and the U.S . dollar . Apart from these, the story of the fourth post 
war tin scheme was not substantially different from that of its 
forerunner . 
There was a shar p tur naround ·n the tin market towards the end of 
the fourth agreement period and the buffer s tock disposed of 
16,809 tons of t i n in the second qua~ter of 1976, r educing the metal 
stock to 2 ,822 tons which was then transferred to the buffer stock of 
the fifth agreement . 
The fifth post-war internat ; onal tin agreement provisionally came 
into existence on July 1 , 1976 . The reluctance of Bolivia, the world's 
second largest tin producer , first to sign and later to ratify the 
agreement has pre-occupied the Council ever since . Bolivia has 
apparently demanded higher prices for tin to match i ts higher produc-
tion costs, as a condition for ratification of the agreement . The 
fifth agreement was to have entered definitively into force on 
December 31, 1976, which was subsequently postponed to June 30, 1977. 
It is of interest to note, however, that voluntary contributions to the 
buffer stock have been made by Belgium, Canada , Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom . 
The fifth tin agreement era started off with rising prices in 
July 1976, and the buffer stock having disposed of all its metal by 
mid- January 1977 was unable to keep the price within the official 
range . It has been estimated that there is presently a shortage of 
15, 000-20, 000 tons a year which would exert upward pressure on tin 
prices . 10 
Section 2 . 
The Character of Inter national Tin Control 
Inte ' national tin control schemes, especially the pre- war ones, 
suffered or enjoyed ambiguity of objectives. Even the post-war schemes 
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displayed their objectives only in rather general terms. Neverthe-
less, it had always been fairly obvious that the price objective was 
the most i mportant in all the tin agreements. It now appears in 
retrospect that the international tin control schemes have tended to 
adopt a price poUcy of opportunism or expediency; even the well-
defined ceiling and floor prices were of mere academic importance, as 
experience has repeatedly shown. 
Historically, international tin control had been construed as a 
weapon against "burdensome surplus" with which catastrophic price 
falls were usually associated. The impl i cit primary objective of tin 
control was to raise tin prices through output restrictions, although 
it had never been clear as to what level the prices were to be raised. 
In the absence of "burdensome surplus" international tin controls 
have been sustained mainly by the objective of price stabilization. 
The degree of price stability aimed at was given by the official buffer 
stock price range, although the price range itself was subject to 
frequent adjustments. Other objectives, spelled out in the preambles 
of international tin agreements, were not necessarily related to the 
declared price objective , In particular, the employment objective of 
preventing large unemployment and underemployment in the tin industry 
was not consistent with severe output restrictions which were designed 
to raise prices. 
There has been an unmistakeable shift of emphasis from price 
stabilization as a benefit to the producers and consumers of the 
commodity to price stabilization as a benefit to the producing 
countries' national economies. Commodity control is also increasingly 
looked upon as a powerful instrument of effective aid from the richer 
consuming countries to the poorer primary producing countries through 
commodity prices stabilized at the highest possible level . 
International tin control partook of the character of a pro-
ducers' cartel especially in the initial stages. "Equal" consumer 
representation was formally built into the post-war agreements in 
conformity with the U.N. Havana Charter but this did not change its 
basic orientation toward producers The accent on producing interests 
has remained because the consumer representation at the Tin Council has 
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often been influenced by international political considerations rather 
. . t t 11 than strictly guj.ded by consumer in eres s. 
A few examples suffice to illustrate the extent of producer-bias 
built into international tin control . First, the quota weapon was not 
double- edged in the sense that supply responses to quota variations 
have tended to be asymmetrical: the imposition or tightening of export 
restrictions would become almost i mmediately effective in raising 
prices during a surplus , whereas their removal or relaxation would be 
feeble in restraining price increases during a shortage, since the time 
required to recognize factors of production would delay supply respon-
ses to quota releases. Second, penalties for exceeding the quota were 
prescribed in the post- war agreements with no similar deterrent 
agai nst failure to fulfill the quotas. Third, the buffer stock 
provisions were heavily skewed in favor of producers in that the buffer 
stock operations were powerful in checking price falls and weak in 
controlling price increases . Ceilings were imposed on metal contri-
butions to the buffer stocks, but not on cash contributions . Indeed, 
an incentive to contribute cash rather than metal was present in the 
provision that cash contributions need be made at the official floor 
price and not at the ruling market price which was almost always 
higher . It is therefore hardly surpri.sing that cash contributions were 
the rule rather than the exception. The implications of this were 
detrimental to the consumers, since the buffer stock would have large 
cash reserves to mop up excess supply and little or no metal to meet 
excess demand especially in the initial phase. Fourth , quota cuts were 
permissible whenever metal in the buffer stock reached a certain 
stipulated level (10,000 tons in the first post- war scheme , and 
5,000 tons in the subsequent schemes) -- a provision which the produ-
cing interests have not failed to take advantage of; but there was no 
similar built- in formula for relaxing quotas . In summary, the objec-
tive of protectjng consuming interests by ensuring "adequate supplies 
to tin at reasonable prices at all times" has remained dubious , not 
only because the boncept of "reasonable" prices is too nebulous to be 
of any practical significance, but also because no effective measures 
have been prescribed to reduce production costs and to improve the 
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overall efficiency of the tin industr y . 
The Effects of Tin Control 
The performance of the control agreements may be gauged against 
two basic criteria : the size of surpluses and the degree of stability . 
The first criterion evolves from the role of international tin controls 
as a weapon against "burdensome surplus , " while the second criterion 
stems from their role as a stabilization device . 
Judged by the first criterion, international tin control schemes 
generally appear to have been fairly successful . Severe export 
restrictions and appropriate buffer stock measures had helped to 
alleviate situations of excess supply in world markets, thereby 
enabling the price of tin to recover from depressed levels , The above 
overall statement, however, needs some qualification with respect to 
the performance of individual schemes . The first ITA must be given 
credit for fighting the crisis and raising the price of tin from the 
dismally low level of 1930 , but the subsequent pre-war tin contr ol 
schemes had relatively easy times , for tin consumption began to recover 
from 1934 onwards, culminating in the general raw materials boom of 
1936-37 . The third pre- war ITA, however , experienced some difficult 
times as a result of the mild American recess i on before the outbreak of 
World War II, but managed to prevent prices from falling too low by 
means of tight export controls . 
The post- war tin agreements were indeed overly successful , for 
they transformed potential burdensome surplus situations into what may 
be termed as actual acute burdensome defi cit situations . The post-
Korean- War history of tin has been largely one of lagging production 
and expanding consumption . Indeed , tin has suffered almost as much 
from shortages as from surpluses . During 1901- 1976, ther e was excess 
production of tin in 39 years and excess consumption of it i n 36 years 
(Table 1 and Figure 1) . 
According to the second standa- d, that is the stabi lity criter-
ion, the performance of the tin control schemes have not been all that 
impressive . It, however, cannot be denied that tin prices have been 
relatively stable under the control schemes , compared with control 
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TABLE 1 
EXCESS PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF TIN 
IN NUMBER OF YEARS, 1901-76 
-
Period (inclusive) Production EAcess Con~urnption Excess 
-
1901-12 3 9 
1913-20 7 1 
1921-31 7 4 
1932-35 0 4 
1936-41 6 0 
1942-47 2 4 
1948-57 10 0 
1958-66 0 9 
1967-76 ~ 5 
Total 1901-76 39 36 
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free periods . But, post-war tin agreements have displayed an inabil tty 
to contain prices within the ruling official price range . Although 
they have succeeded in preventing prices from breaking the floors , they 
have failed in preventing prices from breaking the ceilings, 
(Figure 2) Instead of actively reacting to price increases , they have 
in fact reacted passively by adjusting the official price range to 
follow the new market price . During the period of the first four 
international tin agreements, the official price range was changed 
thirteen times; once in the first agreement, three times in the second 
agreement , three times in the third agreement and six times in the 
fourth agreement, as shown in Figure 2 . 
A comparison of the extent of osc ~ llations in day-to-day prices 
and in year-to-year average prices would suggest that the price range 
was relatively smaller during control years than during control-free 
years. This impression is especially valid if we exclude the 1964-65 
period when speculation about U. S. strategic stockpile releases had 
destabilizing effects on tin prices . The post-war agreements appear to 
have been more successful than the pre- war agreements in smoothing out 
short- term price fluctuations (Table 2) . 
Ironi cally tin controls have tended to destabil i ze output, em-
ployment and export proceeds. There is evidence to show that quota 
variations under the tin control schemes have made output and employ-
ment in the Malaysian tin industry rather volatile . Furthermore, 
because the elasticity of demand for tin exceeds unity over the 
business cycle, export controls have rendered Malaysia ' s tin export 
proceeds r ather unstable, with price stability being more than offset 
by export volume instability. 12 Any reduction of price instability 
achieved by tin control has been overwhelmed by excessive fluctuations 
in the export volume, causing export proceeds to be extremely volatile , 
especially since movements in price and quantity have tended to be 
rather additive . 
The long- term implications of t i n control have not received much 
attention in the current literature . And, it i s not certain to what 
extent the substitution of other non-ferrous metals for t in, espe-
cially in. the manufacture of foil and collapsible tubes, and the 
economication of tin in the steel industry made possible by the 
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FIGURE 2 
TIN PRICES 1956-76 
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TABLE 2 
SHORT-TERM PRICE MOVEllENTS IN TIN, 1924-72 
Highest Lowest --...---Highest Lowest 
Period 
Character of Dally Dally Range Ninual Annual R<tige 
Period Price Price % Price Price • ,. 
£ £ £ £ 
192.\-30 Free of control 321.1 1~.5 207 291.2 1+2.0 105 
1931-39 Controlled J11.3 100.3 210 ~2.3 118.5 1~ 
1950-55 Free of control 1,620.0 566.0 187 1,077.0 719.0 50 
1956-00 Controlled 890.0 ~o.o 39 797.0 735.0 11 
1961-65 Controlled 1, 715.0 779.0 120 1,+13.0 797.0 n 
1966-72 C-Oatro 11 ed 1.e~.o 1,180.0 +1 1,554-.0 1,228.0 27 
Source: II. Fox. Tin - The \lorking of a C-Ommodlty Agree:llent, London 1974, Table 15, p. 390. 
Note: Prices In £ iier 1 ong ton. 
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electrolytic process, could be legitimately attributed to tin control . 
The hj gh prices of tin r elative to the prices of other metals13 must 
have been largely responsible . It is nevertheless certain that the tin 
mining industry, under "'..nternational control, has suffered from a lack 
of a sense of urgency as to the importance not only of expanding tin 
consumption, but also of improving tin production efficiency . 
Mechanics of Tin Control 
Quant i tative control and buffer stock inte vention represent the 
two important methods of tin control often used in complementary 
fash i on so tha t they would reinforce each other to produce maximum 
effects . Thus, buffer stock purchases are often supplemented by quota 
reductions, while buffer stock sales are frequently accompanied by 
quota increases . 
Quantitative control is a powerful i ns trument , because changes in 
physical supplies could significantly affect market prices, demand 
being notoriously inelasti c in the short run . Nevertheless, there are 
sound theor eti cal objections to quant i t a tive control . 14 First , quant i -
tative control does not provide an equally effective two-way mechanism 
of price control , not only because the supply response to quota 
releases is not as rapid as the supply response to quota cuts , but also 
because the control mechanism vi r tually ceases to function once unre-
stricted production is resumed . Second , quota restr i ctions tend to 
freeze the exi sti ng pattern of product i. on and introduce an undes i rable 
rigidity into production and trade , thus obstructing movements toward 
a more efficient resource allocation . Thi rd, output restricti ons tend 
to raise unit costs , which calls for higher prices . Finally , it gives 
rise to enormous economic waste by preserving high- cost obsolescent 
capacity and by sti fling technical progress . 
Quantita t i ve control is also beset with many practi cal di fficul -
ties . The task of determining the size of the overall quota which 
would equate supply and demand at the long- run equilibrium pri ce is 
formidable , not to mention the problem of estimating the long- run 
equilibrium price i tself . There is also the problem of distribut i on of 
the quota among member countries, for historical shares in a base 
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period sca~cely reflect differences in costs and g1•owth potentials 
The extent of quota misallocation in the past is demonstrated by the 
fact that the low-cost producer, Malays i a, often had to adopt the 
practice of producing the e.ntire quota at the beginning of each quarter 
and then freezing its tin mining industry for the rest of the per iod, 
while the high-cost producer, Bolivia, was unable to meet its export 
quotas . Periodi c negotiat 5. ons or built-in formulas for the redistri-
bution of quota would help remedy initial misallocation. The process, 
however, is, one of bargaining and counter bargaining which is analy-
tically indeterminate . The point to stress here is that there is a 
high risk of costly errors in quota adjustments with serious implica-
tions for consumers and low-cost producers . 
The main drawback of the quantitative control method is that it 
magnifies the usual sequence of events whereby a surplus leads to 
export restriction retrenchment of productive capacity and a seeming 
equilibrium between supply and demand whi ch finally develops into a 
shortage as supply responds only with a time lag to an improvement in 
demand . Even though export control might reduce the amplitude of price 
fluctuations significantly, it tends to accentuate fluctuations in 
export proceeds since quota cuts invariably coincide with low prices 
and quota releases with high prices . 
In contrast, the mai n advantage of the buffer stock method of 
control lies in the speed with which it reacts to market changes 
without disruptive adjustments in productive capaci ty . Buffer-stock 
operations can effectively control prices within the prescribed ceil-
ing and floor so long as suffi cient cash to buy and adequate metal to 
sell are held, and provided the official price range does not deviate 
too far from the long- run equilibrium price . Unlike quantitative 
control, the buffer stock method interferes only minimally with the 
free market forces which guide resource allocation . 
Despite these merits, the buffer stock methoct of control is 
confronted with several practical difficulties, as the tin experience 
has clearly shown . It is extremely di fficult to determine the basic 
price range that reflects long-term supply and demand relationships . 
Besides, the buffer- stock operations might generate destabiliz .i.ng 
589 
speculation if doubts arise as to the buffer stock s ability to defend 
the ceiling or the floor of the price range. However, the most vexing 
aspect of the buffer stock method appears to be financing costs : the 
greater the degree of price stability desired, the larger the resources 
required to protect the ceiling and the floor. 
It is fairly obvious that both producers and consumers prefer 
stable prices. And, it is not difficult to understand that both 
consumers and low-cost producers also prefer buffer stock operations 
to export control. The producing countries, regardless of whether they 
are high-cost or low-cost, must also prefer the buffer stock method to 
the quota method since the former tends to stabilize both prices and 
export proceeds whereas the latter tends to stabili ze prices at the 
risk of fluctuations in export proceeds. This obviously calls for a 
larger buffer stock which 1°equires resources of a magnitude that 
producing countries themselves cannot supply. This leads us to the 
question of contributions by the consumer countries . Why is it that 
consumer countries have been so reluctant to contribute to the buffer 
stock? 
The producer-bias inherent in international tin control, to which 
references have already been made, partly explains the consumer atti-
tude. But, we need to look more closely at the buffer stock operations 
by the Tin Council, even at the risk of some repitition. 
There are reasons to believe that the consumer countries have been 
disenchanted with the incongruity of the tin buffer stock mechanism 
which has been much more powerful in defending the price floor than the 
price ceiling. The price floor was broken only once (for a few days in 
September 1958), whereas the ceilings have been broken several times 
with the entire price range being adjusted upward to reflect market 
prices . 
The official price range consists of three sectors . The buffer 
stock manager is obliged to buy until his funds are exhausted whenever 
the price falls below the floor and to sell whenever the price rises 
above the ceiling; he may buy in the lower sector and sell in the upper 
sector using his own discretion, but not in the middle sector unless 
the Council decides otherwise. The Council had permitted buffer stock 
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operations in the middle sector in December 1957, March 1969 and 
January 1973, following the enforcement of expor t controls. 
In practice, there has been a tendency to buy fairly soon in the 
higher bracket of the lower range so as to peg the price well above the 
floor . There has also been a tendency to behave like a pure speculator 
in the upper range by holding back metal and not selling it until the 
ceiling is broken, in a profit-maximizing manner . High-cost producers 
such as Bolivia have asked for buffer stock operations in the middle 
sector . For, the higher the bracket within which the buffer stock 
manager operates the higher he would tend to peg the price. Both 
producers and consumers have no doubt regarded the buffer stock as a 
price stabilizing device. But, by price stability the producers meant 
a guaranteed floor price which would keep shifting upward over time, 
whereas to the consumers it meant an assurance that prices will be 
maintained not too far above the floor which will not be subject to 
frequent adjustments in an upward direction. Herein perhaps lies the 
main conflict of interest between producers and consumers in so far as 
the buffer stock is concerned. 
It would then follow from the preceding analysis that a reduction, 
if not a complete elimination, of the "producer- bias" together with 
appropriate structural changes in the buffer stock machinery would 
induce greater consumer participation and involvement in the interna-
tional tin buffer stock . In this respect, a number of suggestions 
would seem to be in order . First, a certain amount of metal contribu-
tion to the buffer stock may be made compulsory in order to ensure that 
the buffer stock will have metal to sell. Indeed, producers may be 
asked to contribute only metal and consumers only cash. Alternatively, 
a ceiling may be imposed on cash contributions, penalizing cash 
contributions in excess of this ceiling in such a way that they are 
subject to the provision that such contributions must be at the 
official ceiling price, and not at the rul i ng market price, and never 
at the official floor price . Second, just as the buffer stock manager 
could borrow cash on commercial terms to defend the floor price, 
provision may also be made to borrow metal either from the producers or 
from other sources, such as the U. S. strategic stockpile, in order to 
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enable the buffer stock to effectively defend the ceiEng pri ce . 
Third, the buffer stock operations may be streamlined to ensure that 
theY do not under any c :~ rcumstance partake of the character of a large 
scale speculator motivated by profit considerations . 
A more radical suggest i on would be to set up two buf fer stocks 
side by side within the international tin agreement , one financed and 
managed by the producers and the othe ·' by the consumers , so that the 
problem of conflicting interests could be to a large extent resolved. 
This does not of course imply a measure of confrontat i on between 
consumers and producer countries , as both buffer stocks will be subject 
to coordination and supervision by the Tin Council allowing at the same 
time a certain degree of flexibility which contributing members would 
like to have . 
The twin buffer stock proposal might not be novel after all . It 
is of relevance to note that the U. S. strategic stockpile has de facto 
behaved like another buffer stock at times, by timing its sales in such 
a way as to restrain price increases when the market was strong and to 
support when the market was weak . This is not meant to overlook the 
fact that the U. S. strategic stockpile is also noted for its high-
handed actions almost tantamount to economic blackmail . Also , there is 
no denying that the U. S. strategic stockpile disposal threats have 
caused highly destabilizing speculation to the detr iment of the tin 
industry . Seen in this light, the U. S. strategic stockpile could only 
be described as a very crude form of a buffer stock . 
The point to emphasize here , however , is that the U. S. strategic 
stockpile can be used to stabilize prices . But, obviously , it cannot 
be expected to play the buffer stock role . Nevertheless, the surplus 
in the U. S. strategic stockpile could be used to set up a consumer 
buffer stock . This would not only provide the necessary metal re-
sources Tor defending the official ceiling , but also defuse the 
dynamite in the strategic stockpile through an orderly disposal of the 
surplus under the direct superviison and control of the International 
Tin Council. 
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Economic Aid and Price Suppor t 
International commodity control is now caught up in the quest i.on 
of economic aid to underdeveloped countries . International sympathy 
for primary producers and internati onal sentiment in favor of poorer 
developing countries are largely responsible for this. The question 
is : If inter national commodity control could secure stable prices, why 
not stabilize prices at a level which will give the producing countries 
bigger export earnings? To put it differently, commodity control is 
increasingly envisaged as a vehicle of transferring income form the 
richer consuming countries to the poorer producing countries via 
commodity prices stabilized above the long- run competitive equilibrium 
level . The issue is in fact as old as commodity control itself, for it 
has always subtly aimed at securing high commodity prices . The 
International Coffee Agreement of 1962 was the first to aim expressly 
at price support and others may follow suit . 
Price support through commodity control appears to be an inef-
ficient means of raising aid and transferring income from the richer 
consume ,.., s to the poo,..,er produce"'s of pr i.mary products . This may be 
demonstrated with the help of a simple model 
In Figur e 3, a hypothetical consuming country's domestic goods 
and import goods of a primary product are measured along the vertical 
and horizontal axes , respectively. AL represents t he price 1 ne for 
the primary product under l a issez-faire, and the point P1 ma ks the 
tangency be tween AL and. the community indifference curve I
3
• Given 
free trade, the consuming country would pay AC for OH of the primary 
import . Let us assume that commodity control rais ·~ s the price of the 
primary product so that the price line shifts from AL to AJ . The new 
"equilibrium" point would be at P2 on the community indi fference curve 
I 1 ; the i mport volume will fall by FH and the import bi ll will increase 
by CD. In other words, the hypothetical primary exporting country's 
export earnings will increase by CD as a result of commodity control. 
The new income line BK, drawn parallel to AL passes through the point 
P2 , showing that the price increase has r educed the real income by AB. 
The income line BK is tangent to the ind i fference curve I
2 
at point P
3
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The consumers would of course prefer to slide along the l i ne BK unt i l 
they reach the equl lib ium at P whe r e they could stay on a hi gher 
ind fference curve compared with the s '. tuation at P 
2
• In othe " words 
the consumers would prefer a cash transfer of a sum of AB to the price 
increase. 
The exporting country would also prE:fe r the direct transfer of AB 
to the indirect transfer of CD, since the former is greater than the 
latter . It ma y however be pointed out that the indirect transfer CD 
releases more resources (equivalent to FG) from export production 
compared with the direct transfer. The choice would then be between DE 
of foreign exchange and additional resources equivalent to FG . A 
country with acute foreign exchange p ·oblems would prefer the former to 
the latter, and a low-cost producing country might also prefer DE to 
output rest r i c tion FG, although it would seem to make better sens e for 
the producers to restrict output and raise prices -since tin is a 
wasting asset. The direct transfer of AB implies that the volume of 
trade will be reduced only by GH, with BE accruing to the exporting 
country as export proceeds and AB as di rect a .d . The total flow of 
foreign exchange including the income transfer (AE = AB + BE) is now 
greater than that under the price support (AB) . Clearly, AE exceeds AD 
by DE . From the viewpoint of welfare, the direct transfer (AB) is 
super ior to the ind~rect transfer ( CD), as it hurts the consumers less 
badly (consumers are on a hi gher indifference curve), channels larger 
funds than the price suppo r· t . (AB exceeds CD by DE), and avoids the 
undesir_able effects of quantitative restrictions associated with price 
support. It must however be mentioned that price manipulations by 
commodity control could yield a second best optimum in a situation 
where prices are already distorted. 
In spite of all this, it may be pointed out, in view of the 
growing resentment in both the donor and the recipient countries to 
financial aid, that aid in the fo ;~m of high prices might be politically 
feasible, for it conceals financial and real costs of raising funds and 
avoids polit ~. cal and economic strings to which the recipient countries 
are hypersensitive . It may be that pure direct financial aid is 
politically difficult to effect; by the same token, international 
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romroodity controls openly a med at securing artificially high prices 
are by no means politically easy to devise, either. 
There are strong objections to commodity control as an instrument 
of aid on grounds of equity. The incidence of indirect taxation 
involved in the price support is bor ne by the final consumer many of 
. 15 
whom, even in the rich countries, may be very poo1· ; to this extent 
the progressivity of the tax is ambiguous. In a0.dition, the incidence 
of indirect taxation does not fall on the rich countries only, since an 
increasing share of the import trade in primary commodities is 
accounted for by the developing countries, most of who are poorer than 
some· of the producers; to this extent price support would imply 
regressive transfer payments, although the regressiveness may be over-
come by an intricate system of multiple exchange rates. 
Commodity control i s also inequitable in the distribution of 
funds raised through high commodity prices. Such distribution would be 
based upon the degree of export earnings fostability for a given 
commodity weighted by the country shares of the world trade in that 
commodity. This seems hardly just '. fiable on either economic or ethical 
grounds, as it will not reflect differences in per capita income or 
absorpti ve capacity among the recipients. 
There i s also the danger of transfer payments leakage. Since a 
significant share of primary production in the underdeveloped world is 
under foreign ownersh.i_p and control, a substantial proportion of 
economic aid via price support may leak out of the recipient countries 
in the form of larger profi t remittances. In theory, such leakages can 
be prevented by efficient export and income taxation. In practice, 
however, any increase in the tax rate is likely to be extremely tardy 
and the governments are likely to encounter strong resistence from 
pressure groups against tax increases -
A conclusion of considerable importance to be drawn from the 
present analysis is that international commodity control j_s not the 
best means of transferring resources from the rich consuming countries 
to the poor producing countries via excessively high commodity prices. 
It appears that it would make better sense if international commodity 
control pursues its traditional objective of stabilizing prices by 
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eliminating short-term fluctuations than if it were t o attempt Price 
support by seeking prices significantly above the long- run free market 
equilibrium level 
FOOTNOTES 
1world production increased from 125,000 tons to 193 , 000 tons 
between 1922 and 1929, nearly half the increase being accounted for by 
Malaysia . 
2Thailand joined the scheme in July 1931 
3Belgian Congo, for examp1le, was allocated 4, 500 tons in 1934 
while its standard tonnage in 1929 was just over 1,000 tons . 
4Each member country was given five initial votes in addition to 
the votes allocated on the basis of consumption and production. Much 
of the decision-making, such as regula t ·on of exports required only a 
simple majority of both producers and consumers, whereas for the 
elction of the Chai rman , for instance, a two thirds majority of both 
sides was required 
5Export restriction might also be imposed if the Counci l deci ded 
by a weighted majority vote that 10,000 tons of tin was likely to be 
held before the end of the current control period . 
6Quota percentage allocation as of July 1956 included : Malaysia, 
39 . 07; Indonesia 22 . 94; Bolivia, 22 . 94 ; Belgian Congo and Ruanda-
Urundi, 9.31; and Nigeria, 5.75 . See ITSG 1956 Statistical Yearbook. 
7 The Russian tin expor· ts jumped f r om 500 tons in 1956 to about 
9,000 tons in 1957 and to about 18,000 tons in 1958. 
8Import quotas were imposed by Britai n, Holland and Denmark on 
Russian tin and were removed only in 1959 after the USSR had given 
assurance to limit its tin exports below the 1957 level . 
9The United States strategic stockpile stood at 349,000 tons, of 
which 164 , 000 tons were declared surplus . 
lOThe States of Malaysia Chamber of Mines the President's Address 
at the 66th Annual General Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 26 May 1977 . 
11Rowe, J.W . F. , Primary Commodities i n International Trade, 
Oxford 1965, p . 186 
12 Mohamed Ariff, Export Trade and the West Malaysian Economy, 
University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1972, pp . 144-45. 
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l3Ti n often sells at prices 3-4 times the prices of copper, six 
times the price of aluminum and 10- 12 t i.mes the price of zinc and lea d . 
14Mason, E. S . , Controlling World Trade : Cartels and Commodity 
!&'eements, New York, 1946, pp . 225- 27 ; United Nations, Commodity 
Trade and Economic Development, 1953, paragraphs 2- 7 ; Rowe, J . W. F., 
E.£. .cit . , pp ; 184- 98 . 
15 MacBean, A. I., Expo~t Instability and Economic Development , 
London , 1966, p . 302 . 
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INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY CONTROL -- THE TIN EXPERIENCE 
A COMMENT 
Laurence L. C. Chau 
Tin is a classical example of a mineral commodity surrounded with 
problems of fluctuating prices, unstable demand, income disparity 
between producing and consuming nations, and differential impacts of 
instability to producers and consumers . And it also provides an 
excellent case study of the worki ng of an international regulation 
scheme . In 1972, 87 percent of tin exports came from developing 
countries and 88 percent of such exports went to developed countries. 
When the market was free, the price of tin fluctuated widely ; in 1920 , 
the price per ton ranged from £195 to £419, and between 1947 and 1953, 
the price went up from £382 to £1620 . And volume of trade tends to move 
with prices, amplifying the fluctuation of export earnings . The 
situation is highly disruptive for the few countries which depend 
heavily on tin for their export earnings . Consequent ly , it also has 
the most long- standing tradition of well - or ganized commodity agree 
ments , dating back to the early 1920 ' s. 
Mohamed Ariff has wri tten a lucid and well-balanced paper on the 
performance and problems of the tin control schemes . In Section 1 he 
distilled the essential elements of the eight international tin agree-
ments that dated back to 1931, thus setting the stage of his discussion 
of Section 2, in which he evaluates the performance of these schemes . 
This is followed in Section 3 by recommendations to improve the working 
of the scheme. The paper concludes with an evaluation of the effec-
tiveness of commodity schemes as means for international income trans-
fers . Throughout, there is a well- proportioned presentation of fac t s , 
statistics, analysis and opinions making the paper both informative 
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and stimulative . Particularly, Ariff's judgment is not tainted by the 
fact that he comes from the major tin producing country . 
To start, we can evaluate the effectiveness of tin control schemes 
in terms of their stated objectives . The first is to balance produc 
tion and con:;mmption. The autho"' refers to this as the removal of 
burdensome surplus . This would imply that, in the absence of control 
there wj_ ll be a tendency toward excess supply, a thesis he has not 
elaborated. In this aspect, they were successful. In the broader 
context of balancing production and consumption, the postwar schemes 
were less than successful in a number of years . But the disequilibria 
were results of extraordinary cirumstances leading to violent shifts 
of demand or supply . 
Turning to the most i mportant professed objective of the tin 
agreements, price stabilization, performance has been mixed . 
Generally, the Tin Council was more effective i n s temming downward 
movements of prices, as in 1956-61 . It was completely ineffective 
during the 1961- 66 shortage, for the simple reason that it had no 
buffer stock to do the work. For 1966- 71, on the other hand, balance 
of consumption and supply was achieved with relatively minor inter-
vention from the Council. In short, in spite of its long history, the 
international tin agreement has not had an extended period of normalcy, 
in which both the demand and the supply conditions were free from 
political disturbance, to test the potency of such exercises in 
stabilizing price . 
Closely related to price stability is stabilization of export 
earnings. In more than one place, Ariff pointed out that tin controls 
have destabilized export proceeds. This conclusion is difficult to 
understand . It the demand for tin is, as the author puts it, 
"notoriously inelastic in the short run, " price stabilization should 
also stabilize revenue . For example, as total revenue can be increased 
by charging a higher price, the total earning of all exporters as a 
whole can be raised by restrictive measures at the time of depressed 
demand . 1 This should help to stabilize the export revenues of 
Malaysia, unless the author can argue that output and export were 
restricted in a way particularly detrimental to the interest of 
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Malaysia. 
The author pointed out that the primary objective of tin control 
was to raise prices through output restrictions. Though he did not say 
how successfully this objective was achieved by post-war agreements, 
repeated references have been made to "producer bias" in his 
description of the control mechanism. 
As a matter of record, for over 70 years the price of tin has 
risen more than prices of other non-ferrous metals . Some evidence is 
presented in the paper by Magee and Robins in these Proceedings . 
Two sources of production inefficiency have been pointed out, 
Sheltered markets and high prices have reduced incentives to increase 
~roduction effic i ency and to reduce cost . Secondly, under 
quantitative control the assignment of quota perpetuates high cost 
producers, raising the total cost of production . The first point is 
perhaps unfair . R & D are not the responsibility of an international 
marketing association . As to incentives, since cost reduction bene-
fits directly the producer, there is no theoretical reason why more 
stable or higher prices should reduce the incentive for improving 
production efficiency . 
With regard to the second source of inefficiency, it is true that 
under any practical quantitative restriction and allocation of output, 
marginal costs of producing countries are likely to be different , so 
that total cost of production is not minimized. But such inefficiency 
can be circumvented by making the export quota marketable among 
nations, or, as suggested in Pinera's paper, by separating the world 
price from the revenues received by producers in different countries. 
Secondly and more important, it is unlikely that, in the absence of 
commodity agreement, production is distributed in a way such that 
marinal cost is equalized among all producers. As an oligopolistic 
industry, prices may well be pegged at a level above marginal cost . 
This leads to the problem of determining the long-run equilibrium 
price . The author writes as if there is an objective long-run 
equilibrium price, though difficult to determine. I am inclined to 
think that such a long-run price is not only impractical for policy 
guidance in the sense that our knowledge of it cannot keep up with its 
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propensity to change, but that it is subjective . As an exhaustible 
resource, the price of a mineral should include a resource or user's 
cost in addition to the marginal cost of production . The optimal size 
of such a user ' s cost, which determines the rate of exploi ta ti on , 
depends on future demand and supply and the discount rate of future 
income . The former is obviously subjective; the latter is not only 
subjective, but it also differs from nation to nation and from time to 
time . 
If a long- run equilibrium price cannot be determined objectively, 
then the question of how to relate to it becomes an empty question. 
The ground for economic moralization becomes very uncertain . Pricing 
becomes largely a distributive problem , a problem of charging what the 
market can bear, a balancing of benefit and cost , in which political 
and other considerations have a role to play . Once more , economics 
becomes political economy . 
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INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY CONTROL -- THE TIN EXPERIENCE 
A COMMENT 
Kenji Takeuchi 
Recently there has been a resurgence of interest in international 
commodity agreements as a vehicle for improving the relations between 
developing and developed countries . In this context, it is quite 
appropriate for us to review the experience of international control of 
the tin market, because tin is one of the few commodities with a long 
history of international efforts to control the world market . 
I would like to congratulate Mohamed Ariff for his excellent 
review of international tin agreements. In my view, Ariff has five 
important conclusions regarding the operations of various inter-
national tin control schemes instituted since 1921: 
(1) Throughout the history of international tin control, there 
has always been strong producer-bias. 
(2) International Tin Agreements have been successful in reducing 
potential burdensome surpluses. 
(3) International Tin Agreements have also been successful in 
reducing price fluctuations. 
( 4) International Tin Agreements have not been successful in 
stabilizing export earnings, output or employment. 
(5) International commodity agreements are not the most efficient 
means of economic resource transfers from developed to 
developing countries . 
While I accept some of his general conclusions, I feel that Ariff is 
somewhat unfair in some respects, and I would like to focus my 
discussions on these aspects . 
First, Ariff argues that there has always been a strong producer-
bias throughout the history of international tin agreements. While 
this may be true, I feel that his evaluation of this point is too one-
603 
sided. International tin schemes in the pre-war period were admittedly 
producer-dominated schemes . However, it is important to recall that 
the main objective at that time was to alleviate the problem of 
burdensome surplus . Therefore, with such a producer-biased objective, 
the pre-war schemes had to be producer- biased . I would like to point 
out, however, that since consumers were interested in maintaining the 
good health of the world tin industry, even the producer-dominated 
schemes served the long- term interest of consumers, in so far as these 
schemes were successful in salvaging the world tin industry . Further-
more, in those days, the tin industry in Malaysia and Indonesia was 
under the colonial control of the British and the Dutch . 
Ari ff argues that the influence of consuming countries in the 
post-war schemes and agreements has been minimal. I hope that he is 
not accusing producing countries, because I feel that the lack of 
consumer influence has been entirely due to the fault of consuming 
countries . Some major consuming countries simply stayed out of these 
agreements until recently by their own choice . The largest consumer, 
the United States , became a member only in 1976 . For twenty years (or 
in four successive agreements) the U. S. stubbornly stayed out of the 
tin agreements . Also consuming countries did not make financ i al 
contributions for the buffer stock until recently. If there had been 
fully matching contributions from consumers, the consumer members 
would have had greater influence in steering the operations of the 
agreements . 
Second, Ariff contends that the Tin Agreements have been over-
successful in avoiding potential burdensome surplus, implying that the 
tin producers have restricted supply excessively in collus i ve, quasi-
cartel fashion . Recently, in the context of the review of the price 
range for the international tin buffer stock, some representatives of 
consuming countries complained that major producing countries have not 
been expanding their tin production fast enough despite the fact that 
the price has been quite high . In my judgment, however, supply in 
Malaysia, Thailand , and Bolivia have not been expanding mainly because 
of internal political problems that have nothing to do with the 
international tin agreement . In other words, the supply in these 
countries would not be expanding any faster even if there were no tin 
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agreement. If anything, I would tend to argue that the supply has been 
lagging partly because the price has not been high enough to provide 
adequate incentives for output expansion. 
Third, Ariff concludes that, while the tin agreement have been 
generally successful in reducing overall price fluctuations, they have 
not been so successful in depending the ceiling prices as in defending 
the floor prices . I agree with that observation. However, I would 
like to argue that, if larger financial resources had been available by 
way of consumer contributions, the Tin Council would have been more 
successful in defending the ceiling prices. 
Fourth, Ariff concludes that, in the case of Malaysia, the 
operation of the tin agreements have destabilized the export earnings 
from tin. I have not had a chance to examine the evidence he has on 
this subject, but, on a priori grounds, the opposite should be the 
case . If market stability in the world tin market is stemming more 
from demand shifts rather than from supply shifts, and if the supply 
elasticity is less than unity, the operation of a buffer stock and 
export quotas should reduce the instability in export revenues . 
On the whole, considering the handicaps that have fettered the 
successive tin agreements, I believe the post-war agreements have 
worked fairly well. What we should do is to try to improve the 
existing framework rather than to try to dismantle it . Fortunately, 
the consuming countries have finally decided to make financial contri-
butions for the tin buffer stock under the current fifth agreement, 
having realized that the enlargement of the financial resources for the 
buffer stock would enable the ITC better to defend the ceiling price 
and that it would really benefit the consumers . Thus, under the 
provision of voluntary contributions, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, the Netherlands, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States 
have promised to contribute toward the buffer stock . The Federal 
Republic of Germany has not yet come around to joining the above 
countries . We hope that other consuming countries will soon decide to 
make their voluntary contributions . 
At the same time, I would like to express my hope that the 
Bolivian government restrains its rather short- sighted attitudes. 
After all, those of us who believe that international commodity 
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agreements can be useful if conceived and operated sensibly would like 
to be able to cite the experience of tin as a successful example . In 
the same vein, we hope that Malaysia will promptly review its tin 
taxation policy in order to make sure that the Malaysian tin industry 
is given enough incentive to expand production promptly in response to 
rising demand . 
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INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY CONTROL -- THE TIN EXPERIENCE 
A COMMENT 
Sirman Widiatmo 
First, my compliments to Mohamed Ariff for his thorough analysis 
of the tin agreements. The historical sketch may be brief, but there 
is no omission, every nuance is meticulously reflected. 
However, as one of the negotiators and indeed one of the operators 
of the last three agreements, in addition to being a market operator 
for the last 20 years, I wish to make several comments. I may help by 
updating Ariff's assessment with the latest developments. 
I must submit that I do not subscribe to the statements of Ariff 
as follows: "There has been an unmistakable shift in emphasis from 
price stabilization as a benefit to the producers and consumers of the 
commodity to price stabilization as a benefit to the producing 
countries' national economies •.. Commodity control is also increasingly 
looked upon as a powerful instrument of effective aid from the richer 
consuming countries to the poorer primary producing countries through 
commodity prices stabilized at the highest possible level." 
On the contrary, the post war tin agreements have evolved into a 
more and more genuine and equal partnership between producers and 
consumers. Successive post-war agreements contained new concepts, 
introduced by members in their endeavor to achieve the objectives of 
the agreement. Ariff seemed to concentrate on two instruments of the 
Agreement, that is buffer stock and export control. There are three 
instruments to attain the objectives: 
a) Appropriate price ranges, which should correct structural 
maladjustments in the production of tin. This instrument 
is geared towards long-term supply and demand 
equilibrium. By definition, the price range should be 
revised either upwards or downwards. As a corrective 
measure, one ought to fix the price range generously in 
time of shortage in order to induce investment, and in 
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time of surplus the inducement ought to be dismantled . 
The idea of a higher range to attract investment and a 
lower range to contract production is to me a more natural 
way to correct the maladjustme~ t between supply and 
demand rather than export control. 
b) Buffer stock scheme 
This mechanism is not geared towards solving the problems 
of surplus or shortage. Its function is to reduce 
excessive price fluctuations. It i s only meant to 
cushion the effects of violent price oscillations by 
straddling the long-term price trend. However, a large 
enough buffer stock would obviously help overcome longer-
term supply-demand problems. 
c) Export control 
This i nstrument is only to complement the buffer stock 
scheme . Ariff indicated that the buffer stock manager 
(BSM) must have accumulated at least 10,000 tons before 
export control can be restored . In addition to this, the 
BSM must be convinced that he will not have sufficient 
cash to absorb an apparent surplus. The imposition of the 
above two pre-conditions are not a clever at tempt to 
elevate the role of export controls above that of the 
buffer stock. Export control, which inevitably will lead 
to production control, is harmful to both consumers and 
producers . Therefore, export control is by design only a 
tool of last resort . 
Export control need not be imposed. For example, the last two 
export controls would not have been necessary if the buffer stock were 
large enough. With a buffer stock of 40,000 tons, the BSM would have 
the capacity to syphon off the production surplus , thus avoiding 
retrenchment of production capacity and subsequent supply shortage. 
You may recall that the last two export controls were imposed when 
buffer stock holdings were 11 , 000 tons and 19 , 000 tons respectively . 
I am, of course, very appreciative for the suggestion to improve 
the functioning of the agreement . On the first suggestion , I would 
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like to ask whether it is the intention to have both cash and metal 
contribution be paid in at the entry into force of the Agreement and 
lock up the huge funds for future operation of the buffer stock . It 
would be very costly . Or is it the intention that producers should be 
ready with metal when tin is short and consumers with cash in t ime of 
oversupply? Well, to contribute cash is no problem, but to contribute 
metal would aggravate the shortage . 
The second suggestion is to borrow metal to defend the ceiling, 
If it were to be from the producers, it would hardly be possible . They 
would need the metal themselves. 
On the twin buffer stock . I would think that it will not be 
workable, because it again i s dependent upon the statistical position 
of supply and demand at the entry into force of the Agreement . Only 
the USA has tin stockpiled and one would have to assume that the US 
government is willing to subsidize DC members and the willingness of 
the DC members to accept such a subsidy . If I am to make a suggestion, 
it would be to enlarge the buffer stock and to adopt a more rational 
and systematic approach to the price range . 
With respect to economic aid I would like to reiterate, that the 
tin agreement, unlike some other commodity agreements, is a forum of 
partnership with mutual benefit and equal rights and obligations . We 
do not look at the International Tin Agreement as a device to transfer 
resources from DCs to LDCs . I wish to emphasize that the tin agreement 
is pursuing its objective of stabil i zing prices by eliminating short-
term price fluctuations . 
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INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY CONTROL -- THE TIN EXPERIENCE 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Stabilization of price and redistributing income to tin producers 
by maintaining the price above a free- market level were the two most 
di scussed topics . 
Two papers by participants from resource-ri ch developing 
countries (those by Ariff and Pinera) view commodity agreements as not 
the way to achieve income redistribution . While the need for redistri-
bution is generally agreed, acceptable ways to achieve it have been 
difficult to devise . 
Both donors and recipients are concerned with the way and amount 
of aid given, and the use of commodity prices as a vehicle was raised 
in this context. This may not be economically the bes t s olution, 
especially as it will involve resource- poor developing countries sub-
sidizing resource-rich ones. Any solution will have to be politically 
acceptable, and if economists do not consider non-optimal, but politi-
cally feasible, approaches, they are abdicating to pol i tical 
scientists . 
Tin is something of a special case as a mineral since it is 
generally produced by small, indigenous firms , with little foreign 
involvement in mining . Ariff noted that s i nce in Malaysia the mines 
each have had a share of the country ' s quota , and they can fill it 
without working continuously through the year , there have been some 
real inefficiencies . An open market for quota shares somewhat miti 
gates . this . 
A producer bias in the tin agreement was generally r ecognized, 
although in the 1930s maintaining of the industry was no doubt benefi-
cial to consumers as well. The question of who specifically has 
benefitted from the presumed higher prices was raised . Any benefits to 
the producers seem to have been dissipated in inefficiencies . 
One manifestation of the bias is that the ceiling price is not 
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defined vigorously while the floor is . However, most of the breaches 
have been the result of exogenous factors including the Vietnam War and 
post-oil-embargo commodity speculation. The hope was expressed that 
such noise in the system was not being factored into long-term output 
plans . 
Internal political problems have had an impact on output : one 
example is the land tenure issue in Malaysia hindering new development. 
These really need to be resolved before overall stabilization can be 
achieved. 
The ITC has not been good at predicti ng demand, and otherwise 
implementing goals . There is not even an economist on the staff, 
Stabilization has not been achieved by the ITC indeed tin was 
more unstable than other nonferrous metals . Quite simply the ITC 
quickly has run out of tin or money, so it has paid to speculate 
against the agreement . 
Stockpiles are of two types: strategic (for protection against 
emergencies), and specifically to try to stabilize prices . Ariff's 
proposals for stockpiling were questioned - - particularly as regards 
to buying tin in a rising market, as it is obviously counterproductive 
if the goal is to restrain prices . Whether the U.S . government would 
contribute from its strategic reserve is also problematic . Whether the 
U. S. Congress will agree with the Carter Administration proposals on 
releasing stocks is an open question . 
The impact China and the Soviet Union might have on the market was 
raised . Ariff noted the Soviets had in the past cooperated when 
pressured, as in 1957. China was not expected to be a large factor in 
supply . 
The present high price of tin is leading to reworking tailings 
from old mines rather than to new openings. This reflects producer 
doubt on prices continuing to be high enough to justify new i nvestment, 
and also on political and environmental issues . 
In his reply to comments, Ari ff stressed his feeling that export 
earnings had been destabilized by the ITC because of the use of quotas, 
which cause quantity to fall when prices decline . Also , inefficiency 
has resulted from the price floor, since there is little incentive to 
control costs closely . 
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AN ORGANIZATION FOR PACIFIC TRADE, AID AND DEVELOPMENT: 
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE RESOURCE TRADE* 
Peter Drysdale 
In the past decade or so the rate of economic growth in the 
countries around the Pacific Ocean, their rapidly expanding trade, 
investment, and commercial relations, the need to put the great power 
relations in the area on a new footing, and the emergence of the 
European Economic Community have generated speculation about the 
possibility of establishing some form of regional economic association 
among the nations of the "Pacific Community. 111 The ideas that have been 
canvassed had their initial interest partly because of the expansion of 
the European Community and were partly built on the foundat ion of 
growing regional economic interdependence induced by rapid heavy 
industrialization in Japan. At the centre was a vast new trade in raw 
materials, reciprocal trade in manufactured goods and facilitating 
investment flows . The threat to world market access which the European 
Community posed in the first half of the last decade was supplanted in 
the first half of th i s decade by the risk of economic conflict between 
suppliers of raw materials and consumers of raw materials and the risk 
of conflict among major industrial t~ading nations over competition 
intensified by a period of unusually prolonged and general recession in 
the focus of interest in Pacific approaches to foreign economic policy . 
Of under lying significance to all these changes, however, "is the 
*I am grateful to James Horne for research assistance and con-
tribution to the argument of this paper . The paper also owes much 
to Ross Garnaut, on development assistance policies, and Charlotte 
Williams, on the politics of Pacific economic co-operation. The 
interpretations are, of course, my own . 
612 
evident need to find a fitting place within the international power 
structure for an increasingly important Japan . 112 
The aim of this paper is simply to review the nature and origins 
of the proposal for regional association in the form of an Organization 
for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development and, with that perspective, to 
ask what positive role, if any, such an organization might play in 
securing the i nterests of both consumers and suppliers in the resource 
goods trade . It concludes that, alongside the earlier the arguments, 
the characteristics of the resource trade problem add special weight to 
the case for this form of regional association . The first section of 
the paper establishes the ' mportance of economic i nterdependence in 
the Asian Pacific region . The next section reviews the various 
proposals that have been put forward for strengthening economic inte-
gration in the Pacific and the origins of the proposal for establishing 
an Organization for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development . The paper goes 
on to explore the importance of the resource trade in the Pacific 
region and the intensification of concern about resource security as a 
major regional as well as international economic policy issue . The key 
role played by developing country resource suppliers within the region 
and the external funding of resource developments leads to a discussion 
of the effectiveness of development assistance and private investment 
flows in their financing and efficient location . The complex problem 
of energy security is also examined as a case specially representative 
of the interest of Pacific countries in policy co- ordination within a 
regional framework . Finally , an agenda for action towards policy 
initiatives within the framework of a regional organization is laid 
out. It gives stress to the issues of resource and energy security 
within the region but notes that these issues must be dealt with in a 
context of wider trading, investment, and development interests that 
will recommend action on a number of fronts at the same time . 
The term "Pacific Community" is used variously to refer to at 
least two major groups of countries: one, the five Pacific advanced 
industrial countries comprising the United States, Japan, Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada; the other, a wider group including these five 
countries as well as the developing countries of East Asia, Southeas t 
Asia, and the rest of the Western Pacific . It sometimes includes the 
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countries of Latin America, China, and the U.S.S.R . The f i rst group is 
conveniently called the Pacific Five and the second the Pacific Basin 
nations. 3 Here, among the latter countries, the focus of discussion is 
on Western Pacific Countries, and China, the Soviet Union and Latin 
America are introduced separately. 
1. Perspectives 
The idea of a community associated in some form of Pacific 
regional organization began to emerge in the mid-sixties, principally 
in business and academic circles, but later tentatively from official 
quarters; and there are good reasons for it . The principal reason for 
interest in the area as such and the most evident regional link is the 
spectacular increase in economic power in the region, and, more 
strikingly, the growth in trade among Pacific countries themselves . 
Within the Asian Pacific community, Australia and Japan were 
developing a bilateral economic relationship of considerable inter 
national significance . The post-war Australia-Japan relationship grew 
out of commercial policy initiatives in the middle fifties . In their 
subsequent reactions to the changing international environment both 
countries moved towards closer involvement with each other . No better 
illustration is there of this than in their response to the emergence 
of the European Economic Community and the problems of global market 
access in the middle sixti es. 
Austral i a's response to the damaging effects of the European 
Common Agricultural Policy on the prospects for Australian economic 
growth based on the expansion of traditional markets for agricultural 
exports was to intensify the development of new markets in Japan, the 
Pacific, and Asia . 4 Japan's r esponse t o the emergence of a 
discriminatory bloc within Western Europe was to encourage closer 
economic relations with its major Pacific trading partners and pursue a 
commercial diplomacy designed to counter the effects of intensi 
fication of European protectionism by developing an alignment of 
interests within the Paci fic economic community. 5 These policy 
responses were in part a product of the established trading intensity 
between Australia and Japan and their Pacific neighbors . But they were 
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also destined to bring the two countries even closer together, as new 
trades were developed in the minerals area, the like of which the world 
6 had never known before . 
Australia's burgeoning trade with Japan, Asia and the Pacific was 
nonetheless only one element in an extensive, if not fully integrated, 
matrix of commercial relations among Asian Pacific countries __ 
Australia with Japan, the United States, and the South Western Pacific; 
the United States with Japan; New Zealand with Australia and the United 
States; and, at the center, Japan with virtually the whole region. 7 The 
development of the Asian Pacific economic community has , of course, to 
~e seen in the context of a peri od of unprecedented growth in inter-
national exchange, a process to which Japan , through her rapid rise to 
great economic power status, contributed significantly . But in this 
era of expansion, economic interchange in the Pacific grew deeper and 
wider as rapidly as it did almost anywhere else in the world . 
The vigorous growth of trade among Asian Pacific countries has 
occurred without the framework of special institutional arrangements 
such as those which encouraged the growth of transactions within the 
European Economic Community, or even across the Atlantic, among the 
original OECD countries . Trade among the Pacific Five grew steadily 
from slightly over 10 percent to slightly over 13 percent of total 
world trade between 1960 and 1970 . 
stabilized and began to fall . In 
In 1974 and 1975 this share 
1974 it was slightly below 
12 percent . This reflects the impact of the rise in the price of oil 
on relative trade shares, an effect that has already begun to reverse, 
especially in the wider Pacific Basin region. From 1965 to 1970 trade 
within the Asian Pacific region, including Latin America, grew at a 
rate of 14.8 percent . 8 This growth rose to 25.4 percent per annum from 
1970 to 1974 and has generally been faster than world trade growth. 
During this period United States trade with the region grew at a 
faster rate than with the EEC . United States exports to the Asian 
Pacific region grew at a rate of 18 . 1 percent during 1970 to 1975, and 
imports by 15 . 3 percent . The comparable figures relating to the EEC 
were 15 percent and 12 . 1 percent respectively . United States trade 
with Pacific Basin countries reached a peak relative share between 1970 
and 1975 , as did the general share of intra- regional trade . The share 
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of United States exports going to the Pacific Basin, excluding Latin 
America, fell from 42 percent in 1970 and 39 percent in 1975. Imports 
followed the same trend, falling from 52 percent to 48 percent over the 
same period. The figures for the latter year reflect the impact of the 
oil price regime established by OPEC. 
A variety of other economic factors link the Pacific Basin 
countries. - One is foreign investment. Japan is now the largest 
foreign investor in the Western Pacific. In 1975, Japan had supplied 
33.6 percent of accumulated investment in the region of approximately 
$US 10 billion. The rate of growth of Japanese investment was also 
very rapid . Japanese investors have directed their efforts to two 
areas. They have extended, and are continuing to extend, their 
involvement in the manufacturing of electrical machinery, textiles and 
sundry goods . Since 1973 there has been a shift towards intermediate 
goods lines such as petrochemicals (South Korea, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong), metal processing, and transportation machinery (especially 
in Singapore). Also Japanese investment has been strong in resource-
oriented developments - such as forestry and mining, and associated 
resource processing industries (for example, aluminum refining in 
Indonesia). Japanese industry is rapidly going multinational . If 
Latin America is included, the Pacific Basin presently accounts for 
65 percent of total Japanese investment abroad. Joint investment 
projects are a part of this growth. The Bluff Aluminum Smelter in New 
Zealand, using Japanese, American and European capital, New Zealand 
hydroelectric power and Australian bauxite, 9 the proposed Pilbara 
complex in Western Australia using Australian, American, European and 
Japanese capital, and the possibilities of joint American-Japanese 
involvement in the development of Siberian resources are all examples 
of this. 
American investment, though small relative to United States in-
vestment elsewhere, is of great importance to the region . Until 
tl th U . t d St t th . f . . t lO Wh. 1 recen y, e ni e a es was e premier oreign inves or. i e 
this position is now occupied by Japan, American investment in the 
region is considerable, accounting for approximately one quarter of 
the accumulated investment to the end of 1975 . In South Korea and 
Taiwan, American direct investment is strong in light manufacturing 
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industries, particularly in the form of "international sourcing" for 
multinational companies. A notable example of American investment is 
the establishment by the American automobile industry of regional 
chains of manufacturing and assembly plants around the Pacific in order 
to compete against the Japanese car manufacturers for the growing 
market there . 
The distances of the Pacific Ocean have been largely overcome by 
technological advances in satellite communication and in air and 
marine transport. The use of jumbo jets, and innovations such as 
containerized shipping and bulk freighters are of crucial importance 
to an area which for the greater part of its commerce and travel must 
cross vast areas of sea. Trans-Pacific tourism and air traffic, 
although considerably smaller than that across the Atlantic, has grown 
more rapidly and according to 1973 forecasts was expected to exceed 
quite substantially world rates of growth in travel and tourism . 
Growth in trade, investment and transport has led to a cor-
responding increase in multinational banking activity in the Pacific 
Basin. According to one report , American banks in Asia (except Japan) 
as of June 1974 had more than $6 billion out on loan . The region is one 
of the fastest growing areas for multinational banking and one that 
might become the "economic and political action field of the world that 
the Atlantic was in the 1950's and 1960's ." While this optimistic 
prediction might now be modified in the light of the increase of oil 
prices in late 1973 and early 1974, it and the figures quoted earlier 
are striking evidence of the rapid economic growth and regional 
interaction of the Pacific Basin and the expansion of involvement and 
interest of American business and industry there . 
Relations between the Pacific developed and developing countri es 
are also close, not only through economic links such as investment and 
trade (where regional, especially Japanese, dependence on the develop-
ing countries is extensive) but also through the flows of development 
assistance . The United States , although more deeply engaged i n aid 
programs in South Asia , has nevertheless given large quantities of 
assistance to South Korea , Taiwan and Thai land as well as the Philip-
pines and Indonesia, principally in support of diminishing but still 
significant security commitments. Developments in American relations 
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with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, during the reconstruction stage i n 
those states, and the response of the ASEAN group of countries to the 
new security situation in Southeast Asia will be crucial determinants 
of regional stability and prosperity. 11 Japanese aid, which mirrors 
closely that country's economic interests, is heavily concentrated in 
the Asian Pacific area. Both the Japanese government and the private 
sector have been also very active in sponsoring regional conferences 
. nd organizations in fields such as agriculture, fisheries, pro-
ductivity and economic development generally . The United States and 
Japan are the moving forces behind the Asian Development Bank . 
Australia and New Zealand have focussed their aid efforts in Southeast 
Asia and the South Pacific, with a large Australian aid program to 
N G . f t t t . t 12 C d. . d t A . d Papua ew uinea, a ormer rus erri ory. ana ian ai o sia an 
the Pacific has so far been limited, since its aid program is substan-
tially directed towards he "most seriously affected" states 
(primarily in Africa and the Carribean). 
In the background, aside from the positive and specific unifying 
factors already mentioned, there is a much more general but neverthe 
less common feeling of frustration with the trade policies of the EEC. 
All the Pacific Five have an interest in an open international trade 
and financial system and all have suffered in varying degrees from 
European trade restrictions. There is some annoyance also at the 
tendency of the EEC to expand through widening membership and "associ-
ation" with neighboring developing countries in return for reciprocal 
favorable treatment and t ade preferences. 
~. Proposal fo~ a Regional Organizat i on 
It is not surpri sing that the idea of a formal Pacific association 
was first articulated by the business, political, and intellectual 
leadersh i p in Japan. No nation is more central to the substantial 
number of interests that have come to be shared by the countries of the 
Pacific Basin than is Japan . In the mid-sixties, the concept of a 
burgeoning Asian Pacific community of nations became a commonplace in 
the rhetoric of Japanese men of stature as they talked of world 
affairs . 13 The idea of a formal Pacific association was first espoused 
by the Japanese at an official level when in 1967 the then Foreign 
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Minister, Takeo Miki, outlined his ideas for an "Asian Pacific pol ' cy" 
based on an "awareness of common principles," regional cooperation in 
Asia, cooperation among the advanced nations in the Pacific area and 
more extensive aid programs.
14 
Although there were no major policy 
initiatives while Miki was Foreign Minister, the Pacific Trade and 
Development Conference series was launched, wi th Foreign Ministry 
support, to consider Kojima's Pacific Free Trade Area proposa1, 15 and 
it has continued to involve a wider and wider group of policy-
interested economists in the discussion of regional foreign economic 
policy issues over the ensuing decade. 16 
While bilateral ties have continued to strengthen, 17 noth ' ng in 
the broad area of a Pacific Economic Organization has gained sufficient 
political support to translate into policy action, although there has 
been definite official interest shown in the proposals . 18 In addition, 
there have been non-official proposals. The most concrete step to date 
toward a regional economic organization has been undertaken by those 
with more immediate and practical interests. In 1967, businessmen, 
bankers and industrialists from the Pacific Five formed the Pacific 
Basin Economic Council (PBEC), a body designed to promote the study and 
discussion of issues raised in regional trade and investement and 
greater cooperation between public and private interests. It now has a 
membership of more than 400 major companies from the Pacific Five 
nations and from many developing countries of the Pacific Basin area. 
The American membership of this organization was initially drawn 
heavily from the Western States but now includes increasing numbers of 
larger Eastern and Mid-Western business and banks. The Private 
Investment Corporation for Asia (PICA), established to promote invest-
ment in Asia, arose out of PBEC meetings. Its capital and lendings 
are, however, quite small. At its Seventh General Meeting in Washing-
ton in 1974, PBEC proposed to adopt a revised covenant which allowed 
for the establishment of a Central Secretariat which now operates from 
the Stanford Research Institute. 
There has been considerable academic discussion of the concept of 
Pacific economic cooperation, principally emanating from this Confer-
ence series. It began with the proposal originally developed by Kojima 
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for a Paci fic Free Trade Area. 19 This proposal was developed in some 
detail and involved the removal of trade barriers among the Pacific 
Five as well as the extension of non- reciprocated tariff concessions to 
Asian Pacific developing countries. A preliminary was to be the 
adoption of three codes of behavior on trade and investment matters by 
participating countries. 
The Pacific Free Trade Area idea has proved both politically and 
economically unacceptable . Inside Japan, there were those who drew 
parallels between the Asian Pacific area proposals and the discredited 
Greater East Asia Co- prosperity Sphere of the inter-war and wartime 
period. In fact, of course, there were no such simple parallels. It 
is true that in Japanese attitudes towards relations with Asian and 
Pacific countries there is historically a discernible ambivalence 
between the nationalist-expansionist position and the internationalist 
position, Pan-As i anism incorporating large doses of the former as well 
as the latter. 20 But the Pacific Free Trade Area idea was motivated by 
an interest in straightening out increasingly important problems among 
the industr ial country equals of the Pacific region and i n cor r ecting a 
growing disparity in the development of their economic relations with 
neighboring countries . 21 The PAFTA proposals derived principally from 
a concern to maintain and extend Japan ' s links with the rest of the 
world, not to confine and restrict her economic partnerships to the 
region 
These react i ons in Japan had their counterpart outside Japan, in 
the response or lack of it in other countries, especially the smaller 
countries such as Australia , Canada , and New Zealand. 22 Ther e were 
fears of Japanese domination . The economic gains (wrongly conceived by 
Japanese proponents and foreign critics alike to be measured in countr y 
by country balance of trade movements) were seen as heavily weighted in 
Japan ' s favo r. And all this Japanese gain was to be achi eved at 
substantial adjustment cost for the smaller partners , or so it was 
argued . 23 
I was one, outside Japan , who thought that the focus of foreign 
economic policy interest which underlay the PAFTA proposal was a val ' d 
focus, and, even if over ambit i ous and of limited immediate policy 
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relevance, that it contained the seeds of a useful approach to 
important problems which were emerging in the growing economic and 
other relations among the diverse economies and societies of the Asian 
Pacific region . 24 The huge growth of trade, i nvestment, and ai d 
relations among the countries of the Asian Pacific region was spawning 
quite predictable policy problems and these problems were being 
managed less and less well within established bilateral arrangements 
or by individual countries unilaterally . In this context, the PAFTA 
proposal provided a useful framework for the evaluation of other ideas . 
The advocacy of an Organization for Pacific Trade, Aid and 
Development (OPTAD) grew out of the debate about the PAFTA idea . 25 
Whilst a free trade area was not likely to get off the ground 
successfully, there remained ample scope for institutional innovation 
and policy initiatives directed towards the broad objectives of ex-
tending and securi ng As ian Pacific economic co- operation . 
The OPTAD idea was f i rst rai sed at the 1968 Pacific Trade and 
Development Conference by Kiyoshi Kojima and myself . Kojima accepted 
the OPTAD idea as a vehicle for giving effect to hi s Pacific codes of 
international behavior : a code of good conduct in the field of t r ade 
policy; a code of overseas investment ; and a code of aid and trade 
policies towards associated devoloping countries in Asia and Latin 
America . Kojima "originally thought that OPTAD would be an i nter-· 
mediate step and would constitute a steering body to realize a Pacific 
Free Trade Area . (Now he looks) ••• to changes i n the present multi-
lateral approaches and negotiations through OPTAD, so as to give much 
closer attention and priority to the promotion of functional economic 
integration and development in the Pacific , Asian , and Latin American 
region . 11 26 I stressed the potential of OPTAD , even i f there were no 
comprehensive movement towards regional trade liberalization on a 
preferred or most favored nation basis , for encouraging trade expan-
sion and investment flows which would serve the development objective . 
OPTAD was importantly assigned the role of " ••• promoting and directing 
capital movement into less industrialized partners . 1127 The OPTAD pro-
posal was elaborated at the Second Pacific Trade and Development 
Conference and has been discussed quite widely , particularly in 
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28 Australia and Japan . It was endorsed recently in the Crawford-Okita 
Report to the Government of Australia and Japan on Australia, Japan and 
Western Pacific Economic Relations . 29 
The discussion of the OPTAD proposal over the years reveals four 
broad aims . First, it was conceived to provide a more effective 
safety-valve_ given the high established levels of interdependence , for 
the discussion of trade and economic grievances among Pacific 
countries in a rational and co- operative atmosphere calculated not to 
damage profitable national trading interests . Second, it a i med to 
provide a stimulus to aid and investment flows for the developing 
countries of Asia and a framework for a radical improvement in the 
quality and structure of their aid , investment and trade relations with 
developed countries in the Pacific . Third, it was to provide a forum 
for consultation and discussion about the longer- term developments in 
and economic transformation of the region . A final but absolutely 
fundamental consideration was the role envisaged for OPTAD in pro-
viding' a more secure framework of economic alliance among the countries 
of Asia and the Pacific, an alliance within which participants could 
feel free to develop closer economic integration in smaller groupings 
and through which participants could play a less suspect and more 
constructive role in the expansion of relations with China, the Soviet 
Union, and the Indochina states after Vietnam. 30 
The establishment of an Organization for Pacific Trade , Aid and 
Development which served these aims could effectively weld together 
the three major strands in relationships among Asian Pacific 
countries : the crucial economic links with Japan and the United 
States ; the political, diplomatic, and economic involvements with the 
developing nations, both non- communist and communist , in t he Western 
Pacific region; and the strategic interest in stable and constructive 
relationships among the super-powers in East Asia and the Pacific . 31 
It was envisaged that OPTAD should develop along the lines of the 
OECD in Europe, not as a regulatory agency but as a place where 
government-to-government consultations could take place . 32 There would 
be similarities with the OECD would essentially provide a forum for 
discussion of problems arising in the special context of Pacific 
economic interdependence and a framework for devising joint policy 
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approaches towards them as required. 
similarity would end there. 
Yet to a large extent the 
OPTAD was not conceived as a substitute for the OECD in the Asian 
Pacific region, or as an elaborate replication of it . The OECD is an 
nternational body which comprises all the major non-socialist de-
veloped states, including the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia 
and New Zealand from the Pacific region. Unlike the OECD, OPTAD would 
aim to involve participation from the North and South, although the 
major Pacific powers would certainly have to make the initial running. 
In its purposes it would serve the objectives of GATT and UNCTAD, for 
example, on the trade side. But OPTAD's focus , unlike the focus of 
these bodies, would not be on generalities but on the practicalities of 
implementation in a specific context. 
Setting up an Organization for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development 
did not imply the development of any elaborate new institutional 
arrangements. It was seen rather as involving a purposeful association 
among the regional powers in their seeking, as the occasion demanded, 
to take initiatives in areas of common pol i cy concern . Thus, OPTAD 
could provide the focus, a point of reference for thinking in "Pacific" 
terms and for building a practice of co ordination and co-operation in 
the Pacific. 33 Its foundation would have to flow from the highest 
policy commitments by the major regional powers to assisting regional 
development and building upon regional economic security, and firm 
policy undertakings on key aid, investment, and trade questions to 
serve those objectives. 
These issues could, it might be thought, be taken up unilaterally 
or bilaterally but progress in that context comes slow and late, 
especially where the overlap of third-country interests in the region, 
because of the nature and growth of regional interdependence, assumes 
such i mportance. An advantage of regional action over the unilateral 
or bilateral approach is, additionally, that it is usually easier for 
governments to gain political support for concessions if they are part 
of a multilateral undertaking when others are also seen to be doing 
their share and where it is well understood that the consequences of 
reneging are much wider than in most bilateral bargains . The 
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willingness of political parties and bureaucracies (reflecting as they 
do established and opposing domestic interests) to respond to the call 
for concess ons is greater when negotiations are not a bilateral test 
of strength with a single identifiable opponent, and to concede is an 
admission of defeat. 34 This seems particularly but not exclusively the 
case with Japanese negotiators (they were well matched in this respect 
by their Australian counterparts in the recent negotiation of the 
Treaty of Friendship between the two countries) who in one to one 
negotiations are extraordinarily tenacious but who compromise more 
readily in multilateral settings. 
The areas of interest to an association among the economic powers 
in the Pacific must include attempts to negotiate difficult resource 
supply and development issues, in which both Japan and the United 
States have such an exceptionally large stake. 35 If there is to be an 
effective resolution of interests among the nations of the Pacific, the 
resource security question has to be related to the broader regional 
development issues and improved arrangements for aid, investment flows 
and trade access, as well as the issue of relations with countries 
outside the region 
3. OPTAD and Resource Security 
The resource trade is at the nub of economic interdependence in 
the Asian Pacific region. Even the trade between Japan and the United 
States, the two industrial giants of the Pacific region, still has a 
large vertical component -- the exchange of primary goods for manufact-
ures. This contrasts markedly with the character of Western European 
economic integration . In 1974 some 53 percent of imports by the 
advanced Four from the Western Pacific area comprised raw materials. 36 
Significantly because of Japan's position, raw materials trade-depend-
ence is extremely high. In 1974 Japan alone accounted for around 
40 percent of world imports of basic ferrous and non-ferrous ores and 
concentrates. Japan and the United States together took 52 percent of 
world imports of minerals, excluding petroleum, and 37 percent of 
crude petroleum imports . 
The diversity of raw material resources, the scale of reserves 
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throughout the Pacific, and the economics of proximity37 dictate an 
extremely heavy concentration of raw material supplies within the 
region itself . The intensity of intra-Pacific trade in minerals is 
very much higher than it is even for commodity trade in general. 
Indeed, the Pacific Five, with little exception, obtain around half 
their basic mineral import requirements from among themselves . Crude 
petroleum alone is largely sourced outside the region. These five 
countries in turn each obtain upwards of 90 percent of their mineral 
import needs, excluding oil, from the wider Pacific Basin group, 
including the Latin American and Carribbean countries . Again, nearly 
70 percent of low-cost uranium reserves are located in the Pacific, the 
only major alternative supplier outside being South Africa . 38 If 
uranium is taken as an intermediate-term oil substitute in electricity 
generation, to a remarkable extent the resource supply problems of 
Pacific countries have a sharply regional focus . 
At the beginning of this decade, concerns about resource and food 
security emerged as a major issue because of: rapidly escalating oil 
prices and the success of the OPEC group of oil exporters in raising 
oil revenues from 1971, and particularly after October 1973; the 
experience of the commodity boom and shortages of 1973; the application 
of United States export controls on soy beans in order to avoid 
"unacceptable" domestic price rises; the scramble for sovereignty over 
sea resources; and the newly perceived bargaining power between the 
resource- rich developing countries and the resource-importing develop-
ed countries . 39 The OPEC arrangements for oil, the use of the oil 
embargo for purposes of political bargaining, and the expressed 
desires of other countries to move in the same direction all served to 
dramatize the issue of raw materials access. The industrial countries, 
and particularly Japan, were faced with a high degree of unce~tainty 
about their access to raw materials supplies for the first time in 
twenty years. 
The coincidence of the energy crisis with world food shortages had 
a profound effect on the Japanese outlook towards resource and food 
security. 40 Throughout the 1960's, Japan had profited from the 
generally favorable situation in the global supply of natural re 
sources in a buyer's market. The price of crude oil actually fell 
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between 1948 and 1970 and Japan's heavy industrialization program was 
favored by cheap energy supplies . By the end of the 1960's, the basic 
change which was taking place in the world supply and demand equation 
had become evident in oil bargaining power and the spectacular increase 
in world demand for raw materials around this time threatened future 
scarcities . The Club of Rome forecasts of long-term scarcity made 
these early concerns about esources shortage in Japan doubly 
plausible . There were those who anticipated the requirements of these 
changes for Japanese raw material import policy : " •.• Japan ' s depend-
ence on imports of raw materials, energy and food is so complete that 
policies attempting self-sufficiency i n any of the key items appear 
unrealistic . Diversifying sources of supply, economizing on the use of 
raw materials and energy, stepping up efforts for increased product i on 
from indigenous resources, and building up emergency stocks of energy 
and food - - all these are feasible and should be pursued with serious-
ness . But the basic character of heavy dependence for key items from 
4· 
overseas resources will not change ." ' The Japanese Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry held the view that the promotion of 
development import42 of overseas resources would be the central focus 
for future resources development policy . 43 Japanese firms were encour-
aged more actively to seek ownership and involvement in the development 
of foreign resources for supply to Japan . Not unexpectedly , the 
experience of these years induced a very similar response in the rest 
of resource-deficient East As i a, especially in South Korea . 
About half of Japan's raw material needs are drawn from developing 
countries, largely Pacific Basin countries . The concerns about re 
source security elevated foreign assistance directed towards the con-
cessional financing of resource developments to a new primacy in 
Japanese aid programs and Japanese aid programs are overwhelmingly 
concentrated in the Asian Pacific region, with the obvious exception of 
growing interest i n the Middle East . 44 In concess i onal financing 
activities, some governments and agencies are attracted simply by the 
prospect of making a large loan to advance a project that is likely to 
be well managed and very likely to yield a high economic return . Some 
see the provision of funds simply as promotion of exports of machinery 
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and materials . Others are keen to i.mprove the competitive pos i.tion of 
their national companies, or are vulnerable to pressure from those 
companies . These factors are all present in the Japanese program, but 
the main anxiety has become to increase world availabilities of 
resource-based commodities . 
4 . Foreign Assistance to Resource Developments 
It is still true, despite the fashion for rural development, that 
foreign governments and international agencies tend to provide conces-
sional funding for large resource developments more readily than for 
other activities . For example, the government of a developing country 
could fund seve r al times over a large power facility that was in part 
des i gned to serve a new oil field or nickel mine, but would have very 
great difficulty in marshalling overseas support for a program of 
small-scale village electrification that made similar demands on 
financial resources . At the same time as the availability of capital 
for resource developments from foreign official sources provides op 
portunities for strong income and revenue growth in recipient 
countries, it raises complex problems for economic policy- making and 
administration . It also raises the questions of effective national 
sovereignty over development priorities, and of its antithesis, "neo-
colonialism. "45 These issues are at the heart of the problems that have 
emerged in relations between developing country suppliers and indust 
rial country consumers of r aw materials . And the potential for 
conflict over resources is embedded in the structure of established 
approaches to these quest i ons. It is, incidentally, in this context - -
the context of managing the international political order --more than 
in the context of securing i ts own resource availabilities, although 
this is no longer an insignificant problem, that there has been some 
movement i n the posture of the United States towards resource- rich 
developing country interests. 
There are many mechanisms through which foreign governments and 
international agencies make funds available on concessional terms to 
resource investments in developing countries . The general effect of 
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the provision of these funds is to reduce the supply price of invest-
ment directly, or to reduce the opportunity cost to host governments of 
funds allocated to resource developments . 
One common mechanism is for funds to be made available to the host 
government for the financing of commitments that it enters in relation 
to resource investments . Infrast r ucture is sometimes made available 
directly as project aid . Some governments in industrial countries make 
concessional funds available to their national investors for mineral 
exploration and development . Loan funds are made available to the 
operators of a project for the purchase of equipment or for other 
purposes . Assistance in any of these forms may be tied to purchases of 
goods and services from the donor or lender, or untied. In addition, 
what evidence there i s suggests that the private international capital 
markets provide finance more readily to governments for resource 
development than for their general development programs, although 
access to private capital markets is far from adequate. 
The effective grant element in such funding and so the real effect 
on the supply price of capital or on the opportunity cost of finance to 
the home government, depends on the extent to which it is tied to 
purchases in the donor country, and on the extent to which the home 
country is a competitive suppl i er of goods and serv i ces requ i red by a 
resource project , including management services . 
Conflicts among the different motives of a donor country affect 
the terms upon which finance is made available. The conflict in Japan 
over time between the resource-trade expansion and the export 
promotion motives provides an interesting example . Japanese author i -
ties appear to have decided to let their interest in the expansion of 
overseas petroleum production override their interest in the promotion 
0f industrial exports . The only major c2ses of Japan making conces-
sional funds available to foreign governments on a completely untied 
basis in its bilateral programs involve loans for petroleum explora-
tion and development in Indonesia and Burma . Multilateral aid is a 
very small proportion of total aid flows from Japan . 
The effect of concessional funding of resource projects on 
returns to the recipient country depends on the particular way in which 
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it is made available as well, of course, as on the recipient country's 
ability to administer projects and taxation effectively . The pro 
vision of finance directly to national investors of the donor country 
reduces the supply price of investment from this source. It also 
reduces the supply price of i nvestment to the project if the particular 
recipients are competitive investors in the absence of assistance. 
However, if the assistance is requi red merely to make the recipients 
competitive with nationals of other countries, there may be no 
reduct i on in the supply price of investment to the project and no 
increase in profitability . 
The p- ovision of conce~s i onal funds t o the operators of a project 
independently of their nationality, as is usually the case with 
equipment loans, lowers the supply price of investment and increases 
profitability so long as the concessional element in financing exceeds 
any cost of tying . 
The direct provision of infrastructure lower s the supply price of 
investment and increases the amount of rent . The provision of 
concessional funds to the host government reduces the opportunity cost 
of purchasing equity or installing infrastructure, and so provides for 
potential i ncreases in taxable profits . Where concessional finance 
promotes a sub-marginal project, however, it may not contribute to 
profitability and may be di ssipated w~ thout significant benefit to the 
recipient country. 
The availability of concessional finance for ~'esource 
developments raises difficult problems of economic policy 
administration for developing countries. The major dilemmas are 
associated with difficulties in determining the true opportunity cost 
of public expenditure on resource projects that are f i nanced with 
foreign assistance . It is well established that aid is used most 
effectively in terms of the priorities of the recipient countries if it 
is untied and made available in support of the total development 
program of the rec i pient country . Aid for resource developments poses 
all of the usual problems of tied aid and project aid, although often 
in an extreme and pol i tically prominent form because of the scale and 
impact of the projects involved. Such aid may still appear better than 
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nothing. It is likely to be better than nothing, possibly much better, 
when its availability reduces the supply price of investment and 
increases government revenues from the mines . However, there are 
circumstances in which it can be worse than nothing, and it is always 
difficult for a recipient government to judge whether the alternative 
really is nothing rather than some less ·estrict ' ve fo rm of aid . 
There are three circumstances i n which the acceptance of a i d to 
resource projects might bring negative net benefits to a recipient 
country . The first is where the availability of concess i.onal funds 
from a particular source leads to the inefficient use of a valuable 
r esource . This will only occur where there is ?n inefficient admin i -
strative system within the host country, but unfortunately there are 
many examples of inefficient administrative systems in the developing 
world . The second circumstance is where the recipient government's 
financial commitments to a project exceed the conces ~ ional element i n 
the foreign funding , and where the taxation on the rents generated by 
the i.nvestment is less than this shortfall. The third circums tance is 
where the resource project, with effective concess i_ onal financing, 
itself is less than this shortfall . The third circumstance is where 
the resource project, with effective concessional financing, itself 
brings positive net benefits, but where the acceptance of aid that is 
specific to resource investments reduces the amount of aid from the 
same source that i s available fo r other higher priority purposes . It 
is always difficult for an aid recipient to identify the latter 
circumstance 1-n practice, and high orders of political judgment are 
required in the administration of policy in this area . Recipients of 
large quantities of concessional assistance are soon left with very 
little control over the directions of national development effort if 
the terms upon which aid is provided by all donors deterio- ate to the 
lowest common denominator among existing forms of aid . 
These are not insignificant problems for Pacific Basin developing 
countries in the receipt of foreign assistance for resource 
development projects. Indeed, they are problems quite endemic in the 
structure of concessional financial flows, not only resource develop-
ments but also for industrial development, under bilateral ass i stance 
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programs throughout ~he region. Specifically, the "development 
import" strategy which has been favored by Japanese policy-makers, 
embodies concessional financing to national i nvestors and pervasive 
aid tying in a way which may have serious costs to recipient countries 
and may corrode the stable long- term trade, investment and ass stance 
relationships between Japan and these countries as a whole . The 
effects of these practices in economic and pol i tical relations with 
recipient countries are increasingly well recognized by aid admini 
strators in Japan and alternative forms are being sought46 which aim to 
eliminate the weaknesses in policies which have the completely legiti-
mate aim of securing resource availabilities, but have tended to 
understate the recipient interests in what should and can be a mutually 
beneficial trade, aid and investment relationship . 
These problems i n relationships with Pacific Basin developing 
countries are not Japan's alone, although her resource security 
interest makes her prominent i.n the resource f.i.eld. The focus of 
American, Canadian, and Australian private and official interest in 
resource cevelopment ; n the Pacific Basin would seem to suggest 
powerful reasons for joint initiatives in their approach to develop 
ment assistance policy throughout the region. Critically these ini-
tiatives should involve commitment to procedures for more general and 
effective untying of development assistance flows and complementary 
measures for removing distortions in international capital markets 
which adversely a ffect the ;_nterests of developing country ,,.,aw 
materials producers, as well as the creation of an enlarged pool of 
funds for resource project financing . 
Within the OPTAD framework the Pacific Five could enter firmer 
commitments to generalized aid untying. However, institutional struc-
tures are such that it would be difficult to expect the generalized 
formal untying of concessional financial flows in the region very 
rapidly. In this event, a few relatively simple innovations in the 
systems within which aid is administered in recipient countries could 
remove the major distortions tha t are associated with project aid and 
tied aid, without requi~ing raidcal changes in the formal conditions 
that are usually applied to government-to-government assistance in the 
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financing of resource investments. Nonetheless, important changes may 
be required in some current pract ' ces. 
Government-to-government transactions would be very much more 
manageable if they first took the form of a commitment to provide a 
specified level of aid over a period of years. Secondly, the funds 
represented by this commitment would be made available to support a 
specified range of activities, including major resource investments 
where government expenditure on these activities survived a listing of 
the recipient's priori ties. The aid would be portable across the 
listed activities. Thirdly, the commitment could be drawn down 
selectively against purchases from sources to which the particular 
donor expected its aid to be tied. The Pacific Five could announce 
whatever direct aid untying was possible as a first step, and agree as 
a second step to enter arrangements under these principles with 
individual developing countries or groups of Pacific Basin developing 
countries such as the ASEAN group as they wished to participate in this 
effect5.ve untying measure. 47 
These measures could be built around the provi sion of a new and 
expanded pool of funds to finance resource projects, on both 
concessional and commercial terms, through a Pacifi c Resources Bank 
(PRB). The PRB would be a specialized lending institution which 
directed capital for major resource projects into both developing and 
developed countries around the Pacific Basin. It would serve some of 
the functions of the International Resource Bank which was put forward 
at Nai obi 48 but it would not have institutional association with the 
World Bank Group. It could evolve, for example, as a joint facility of 
national funding institutions. Apart from a financing function, it 
could also provide important "packaging" facilities for developing 
country borrowers seeking to initiate resource projects with a larger 
domestic capital component or commitment to the establishment of a 
Pacific Resources Bank by the Pacific Five could help to fill a real 
gap in the international capital market. 
632 
5. More Efficient Private Investment Flows 
There are four issues related to the efficiency with which the 
private market allocates investment into resource-based activities on 
the agenda for OPTAD. The first has been raised in the discussion of 
foreign official development assistance above, namely the difficulty 
that may arise in seeking an effici ent allocation of investment funds 
when concessional finance is provided directly to the national 
investors of donor countries . The second, also mentioned above, is the 
problem of developing country access to private international capital 
markets and loan funds on a commercial basis. The third is the problem 
of instability in commodity marekts and its effect on the supply of 
private and government funds for, and pol i cies towards, res ource 
projects in developing countries . And the fourth is the problem of 
myopia i n private i nvestment decision- making, induced by national 
institutions , associations and ties, that limits the efficient re-
location of mi nerals process5ng , smelting, and refining activities, 
and thereby the economization of resource and energy use throughout the 
region . These are major issues and deserve brief review here . 
There j s no s i mple expedient for managing problems assoc i ated 
with the provision by donor countries of finance to their own national 
investors without donor co-operation . In practice , a recipient 
government can do no more than insist that such transactions are not 
aid in any sense - - that they are simply a domestic transaction between 
the foreign company and its own government . The recipient government 
can then accept proposals on their competitive merits from all foreign 
investors that a r e i nteres ted in a project, without representation 
from foreign governments . There are potenti al threats to effect i ve 
national management in these types of a r rangement, and a hos t govern 
ment is wise to ins ist on full declaration of such transactions between 
a foreign investor and his home government . A regional or ganization 
could encourage th i s princi ple through the implementation of a code of 
foreign j nvestment whi ch i nsisted on declarat i on and provi ded no 
guar antees without it . In time, it may well turn out to be practical 
to ente r into a convention , akin to the Basle Convent i on on export 
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c~edits, which governed i nter- national competition through assistance 
of this kind , although that is not a crucial aspect of the problem from 
the viewpoint of the recipient country. 
The emergence of the Eurodollar market over the last decade and a 
half has contributed to the vast i.mprovement and Pxpansion in the 
~llocation of international loan capita1 . 49 The growth of this market 
(and the infant Asiandollar market) has circumvented many of the 
rigidities and restrictions on funding through foreign "national" 
capital markets and facilitated rapid adjustments in patterns of 
investment and trade , the size of which the world has rarely known . 
Moreover, access to commercial loan capital through these markets is 
more readily available for resource project investments than it is for 
most other porjects . Yet there remain problems of access to commercial 
capital markets for developing countries . These problems are not 
simply a function of fundamental credit risk but are also a function of 
the bias in lender perceptions wh i ch are a product of institutional 
experience , historical associations and business ties. These obser 
vations, of course , apply much more strongly to foreign "national" 
capital markets , capital flows to the developing world from which are 
largely confined to former colonies or countries and projects whi ch are 
assigned national priority by the lender country's government or 
offic i al lending agencies . On the one hand , projects in all but a very 
few Pacific Basin developing countries, including Latin America , have 
very limited direct access to foreign commercial markets , and then 
largely through the intermediation of national concessional lending 
institut~ ons or through the intermediation of large corporations of 
international repute . On the other hand , there is a need to diversify 
direct private investment interests in resource projects and a desire 
by some countries for an increased role for domestic equi ty . Both 
sides of the problem are particularly acute in the Pacif i c Basin 
region, and focus on the difficult position of Japan . Creative private 
financing through mul tina.tional consortia arrangements can sometimes 
offer a way out of the dilemma of reconciling limited channels of 
finance with the diversifi cation of financing objective . 50 But too 
often the only alternative seems the "development-import captive minen 
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51 approach. The Pacific Resources Bank, suggested above, could play a 
major role in breaking down these r i gidities in resource project 
financing. The Pacific Five could extend loan guar~ntees through the 
national institutional lenders, such as the Export- Import Banks 
Pacific Basin countries. 52 These guarantees would not have to cover an 
entire loan to serve the useful function of encouraging closer examin 
ation by investors of the projects and needs of developing countries in 
the Pacific Basin. 
The problem of instability in commodity markets has been around as 
a major international economic policy problem for a very long time. 
However, the concentration of resource and agr i.cultural commodity 
trade within the region gives this problem a particular Pacific 
dimension which may be amenable to amelioration through regional 
action. In this context, the Japanese initiative to consider a Pacific 
Basin Stabex-type arrangement deserves Pacific Five support although 
the direct national interests of other advanced Pacific countries are 
smaller than those of Japan . 53 Within the OPTAD framework, a Stabex-
type arrangement could help to ease the economic management problems of 
the smaller resource-rich states and thereby r educe the 
susceptibility, in private and public programs, to underinvestment in 
resource supply . 
The final problem concerns the efficacy of the private market in 
effecting efficient re-location of resource processing, smelting, and 
refining act i vi ties. The advantages of the re- location of resource-
intensive industries outside Japan and the United States from an energy 
and resource-saving viewpoint have been detailed many times in the 
Pacific Trade and Development Conference series. 54 Smith records again 
the strong interest of advanced-country resource suppliers, such as 
Australia, in a major transformation of resource industry spec .1- aliza-
tion within the region. 55 OPTAD was, from its very conception, seen as 
an important mechanism whereby to create the confident environment 
within which this transformation could take place more rapidly than it 
so far has. 56 This role is underlined in a perjod of uncertainty about 
the long-te--m investment climate. The importance of the secur'ty that 
could be provided by the OPTAD framework to Japanese policymakers and 
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husinessmen in planning a long-term industrial policy strategy aimed 
at significant re-location of processing, cannot be overstated. 57 To 
help overcome caution, the need to define a confident environment for 
new international specialization through energy and resource-saving 
industrial !e-location in the Asian-Pacific region is more powerful 
now than it has ever been. 
6. Energy Secu~ity 
The Pacific Five have managed their own high levels of economic 
interdependence less than disastrously although it is not perhaps 
sufficiently well understood how deep were the strains among even these 
countries during the years of the monetary, resource and oil crises. 
They will continue to have common if sometimes conflicting, interests 
in trade liberalization, rules for foreign investment, the control and 
use of ocean resources and other issues. But by far the most important 
issue in their relations over the next generation will be how to manage 
the adjustment to the era of high oil pri.ces and the supply and price 
of other energy sources, though each from quite different perspec 
tives. Undoubtedly one of the most serious and fundamental differences 
between Washington and Tokyo in the first half of this decade was the 
product of divergent perceptions of nat i onal and collective interest 
before and during the oil crisis, especially from the spring of 1973 . 58 
For the United States, energy is closely related to concerns 2bout 
national security. The Japanese concern about energy is primarily 
economic. In the case of oil, these concerns have to be seen in a 
global context, especially because it is largely Middle Eastern oil on 
which the United Stat·es seeks to reduce its dependence and on which 
Japan must continue to rely for primary energy supplies for the coming 
decade . These conditions will not change quickly . Assured oil 
supplies will remain vital to Japan for some time . While the fears in 
Japanese officialdom and among the community at large about the 
unavailability of oil supplies for significant periods in the coming 
decade might rightly be regarded as highly exaggerated, they are a 
critical factor in the Japanese response on a number of related issues ; 
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they will have to be accommodated. As Patrick observes: 
Japanese economic and American secu ity interests thus 
converge in having the United States develop its own energy 
reserves. Such · an American policy would increase world 
supplies; alternatively viewed, it would reduce American 
demand for Middle Eastern or other foreign oil ••.• This could 
leave Japan as the major buyer of Middle Eastern and perhaps 
other) oil, providing it strong bargaining power. However, 
this is not a possibility that Japanese yet regard as likely, 
nor oan their pol i cymakers operate on such an assumpt.i.on . In 
addition to the extent that American energy independence is 
achieved through extensive, a nd expensive research and 
development efforts which are economically premature, other 
countries will benefit in the long run . This technology will 
become available , and inevitably in substantial part at low 
cost . to ool.\39tri es able to use i t; Japan would be a prime 
beneficiary. 
Access to energy technology is the nub of current negotiati ons 
over the nature of the role to be played by nuclear energy. 
In April 1977, United States Presjdent Ca- ter, outlined a policy 
on nuclear energy which he hoped would be accepted internationally. 60 
The thrust of his proposal was to l .imit the sale of uranium to 
countries which wanted to reproces s it after use, and which we~e 
seeki ng to develop Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) . He saw this proposal 
as a major arm in limit i ng the threat of the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons . The proposal has three important impl j cations . 
First, preventing "tails" from being reprocessed would lead to 
increased demand for unenriched uranium . This may force prices up 
depending on the supply response under reduced prol i fe r ation risk, but 
more importantly it would imply a continuing reliance on foreign supply 
sources by Japan in particular . Second, it would protect United States 
interests, i. n the structure of the proposal, in so far as the United 
States has relat i vely abundant uranium reserves as well as alternative 
domestic energy sources . Japan does not and continues to discount the 
steaming coal option heavily for environmental reasons. However, 
there is also the possibility that the Europeans and Japanese could 
tur n to the Soviet Union for supplies of enriched uranium and these 
risks for the United States have to be considered . Third, the proposal 
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could be interpreted as a defense of the United States strategic 
position as it aims to keep nuclear weapons within the hands of the 
present number of nuclear weapons states . 
The Japanese and Europeans, particularly the French, have not 
welcomed the specific restrictions on reprocessing contained in the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977. The Japanese suggest that a 
more appropriate way to handle the uranium issue is not to prevent 
reprocessing or stifle the development of FBRs . but to look to ways of 
improving safeguards . 61 In the event the United States and Japan 
effectively put their conflict over this issue on the back- burner by 
agreeing to proceed with the "experimental development" of Japanese 
facilities at Takai Mura over the next two years. This had the effect 
of resolving at least temporari.ly the ocnflict between the United 
States and Japan, but the Japanese will now be confronted by the 
specific restrictions on r eprocessing contained in the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1977. 
In its commitment to uranium export, the Australian government 
faces the dilemma of interest in the economic return from uranium and 
growing conce r n among the electorate about the proliferation and 
environmental issues. 64 The Government's support for the non-prolifer-
ation objectives of the United States as well as its appeal to a "moral 
responsibility1165 to mine and export uranium, can be interpreted as an 
attempt to accommodate both elements in public opinion . The Canadian 
dilemma is not dissimilar, although it has different expression, 
involves less concern about environmental questions, and has its 
origins in experience with the administration of safeguards and a broad 
consensus on the proliferation question . 
The negotiation of these issues encapsulate in extreme and 
sensitive form the very real interests at stake for the Pacific Five in 
regional co- operation and the potential for political and economic 
conflict if there is any solution which does not involve a commitment 
which is commonly acknowledged . In these affairs bilateral 
bargaining, or even arms-length quadrilateral bargaining , seems less 
likely to produce such common commitments than might be achieved within 
a framework like that which could be provided by OPTAD . Through an 
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Energy Consultative Group in such an organization, the Pacific Five, 
working from the assumption of providing mutual energy security, could 
advance economic and political strategies for effecting the energy 
transformation . Th ~ s would not preclude or hamper the pursuit of 
mutual interests elsewhere, in the Middle East , with Europe, and with 
the Soviet Union . Indeed, the capacity to provide a measure of energy 
security within the Pacific Five, not only on the basis of uranium 
supplies but also on the basis of coal supplies, could be used 
construct vely in the pursuit of regional objectives elsewhere . 
~ Agenda for Action 
In the resource trade field the coincidence of regional interests 
is remarkably strong . Approaching the resolution of these interests 
through a regional association like OPTAD has much to commend it . My 
"eview of the sort of role that OPTAD might play in strengthening 
resource trade security suggests in itself an impressive agenda for 
act:i.on . And a whole "'ange of i .. ssues in other fields, discussed 
elsewhere , 66 are not included ~ere . Yet OPTAD, as I see it, would not 
set out to define the nature of growth in regional relations from the 
beginning . Unlike PAFTA, which had qu:ite specific objectives, OPTAD 
could be seen as a more realistic expression of political realities . 
It seeks to take advantage of ex i sting institutional arrangements, 
building ties at the highest level . In contrast to the OECD , which 
serves the interests of the North Atlantic community and the more 
general interests of developed countries, OPTAD would serve different 
aspects of interests of some of those states (the Pacific Five) , as 
well as bringing less developed countries into a more active process of 
consultation . Compared with Europe, the Pacifi c Basin countries have a 
huge potential for development , since the region encompasses a diver-
sity of young resour ce- rich countries and growing industrial 
economies . Economic development is therefore a pr j.mary objective and 
remains so even in the depths of the worst recession in industrial 
economies since the 1930s . By contrast, stabilization and protection 
of the present international order appear to dominate the interests of 
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Europe and the Atlantic . Trilateral interests need to be built on the 
strength and vigor of the Pacific, not as an appendage of the Atlantic 
community. 
The pur pose of OPTAD, then, would certainly not be to duplicate 
the functions of the OECD, or the functions of other existing 
international bodies. The bureaucracy which accompanies the OECD is 
extensive and in many ways cumbersome. What is required in the Pacific 
is, if it must be called an organization, a loose organization whose 
two main bodies would be a council (similar to the OECD council, and 
made up of Heads of State and senior bureaucrats) which met from time 
to time, and a skeleton secretariat which fulfilled organization 
requirements, serviced ad hoc Task Forces initiated by the Council, and 
commissioned small research projects. Task Forces might be appointed 
on specific problems as the need arose . The framework envisaged for 
OPTAD reflects the fact that many of the problem areas -- particularly 
in economic relations -- have a significant political component . 
Discussion and bargaining do not require sophisticated support 
apparatus . Participation would require commitments and 
responsibilities in the conduct of various facets of foreign economic 
relations and could be comprehensive or limited . 
Discussions of the OPTAD proposal have tended to focus on its 
function as a way of promoting trade liberalization and it has been 
conceived of as part of a move toward world free trade . This emphasis 
tends to obscure the much more important role OPTAD could play in other 
fields which have been stressed here . In the present climate and the 
context of growth and change that characterizes the Pacific Basin 
region, low-key consultation and the creation of confidence in an OPTAD 
would be very valuable. 
An agenda for action might include the following issues 
identified in the argument above : 
1 . Energy security : Commitments to underpinning ener gy security and 
consultation on energy policy issues by the Pacific Five i n the 
form of an Energy Consultative Group . 
2 . Resource security : Access to markets and raw materials under 
stable long- term arrangements . 
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3. Resource development: Commitments to the effective unty j ng of 
development finance generally, under arrangements with individual 
states, or under arrangements with groups like the ASEAN group, and 
improved access to capital markets through the establishment of a 
Pacific Resources Bank or in other ways. 
4 . Commodity market stabilization: Commitments through the introduc-
tion o~ a Stabex arrangement to insulate against variable export 
earnings in developing countries . 
5. Trade re-structuring: 
industrial re- location . 
Promotion of resource and energy-saving 
In this field and the field of resource 
development, developing R code for foreign i nvestment that 
encouraged formulae for non-bi lateral investment ties is crucial. 
Clearly, a whole range of other issues such as trade access for 
industrial goods; agricultural market access and access to fisheries 
resources; arrangements to cover access to ocean r esource; the 
development of a regional approach towards Europe; and the approach 
towards Indo-China, China and the Soviet Union, would also be on the 
negotiating table, but sensibly not all at once . This kind of agenda 
is formidable but provides much upon which to build the practice of 
Pacific Consultation and co-ordination. 
There have probably been few more opportune times for Australia 
Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the United States to take the lead i n 
the establishment of OPTAD, perhaps through a Heads of State meeting 
and hence to a Task Force review, in the regional context of their 
commitment to the development objectives. From this could flow 
initiatives consistent with their own interests in economic and 
resource security as well as with developing country interests, in a 
more equitable deal on aid, investment, and trade matters. In par ticu-
lar, the problems with ASEAN have given Australia and Japan both more 
r· eason and more freedom to move in this direction . And for its part , 
the United States, with new leadership, seems l i kely to have every 
incentive to join in a constructive endeavor towards that part of the 
developing world in Asia and the Pacific, and its other Pacific 
partners, both to provide witness of its good intentions as well as to 
strengthen its own economic security . 
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AN ORGANIZATION FOR PACIFIC TRADE, AID AND DEVELOPMENT : 
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE RESOURCE TRADE 
A COMMENT 
Saburo Okita 
As I am closely assoc i ated with the work of Professor K. Kojima 
and Professor P. Drysdale the OPTAD ideas are very close to my heart . 
At the Seventh Pacific Trade and Development Conference held in 
Auckland, New Zealand,I personally questioned a delegate from Fiji 
as to the reason why they joined the Lome Convention . The answer was 
simply that there was no such arrangement in the Pacific area . Ther e 
is a kind of vacuum that exists in this part of the world . 
Turning to the Japanese point of view about OPTAD, recent 
developments i n the world affairs will have to be taken into con-
sj_deration . First , the holding of t he summit conferences among the 
major industrialized countries has strengthened Japan's horizontal 
relations with North America and Europe and this has made the leaders 
become more aware of Japan's global involvement and responsibility . 
Second, the invitation from the ASEAN Heads of States' meeting held 
in Kuala Lumpur recently to leaders of the three Pacific developed 
countries, that is, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, may become a 
precedent for the new formula of their participation in the affairs 
of developing countries in the Pacific region. At least Japan would 
prefer a low posture to strong leadership coming from the Pacific 
Five developed countries. 
The above two new developments may somewhat weaken Japanese 
interest in setting up a body of the OPTAD type although there are 
problems such as the position of non-ASEAN developing countries in 
the region . On the other hand, the energy problem is a very keen 
issue for Japan . With the prospect of a possible future shortage of 
oil, Japan will have to depend more on imported coal and uranium, the 
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s upply of which is expected mostly from Australia, the United States 
and Canada. If a beginning is to be made in terms of energy 
problems , Japan may feel 8.ttracted to the i dea of regional 
cooperation. 
At any rate, there should first be an agreement among the 
governments of the Pacific Five to initiate a task force studying the 
overall feasibility and validity of OPTAD in parallel with the task 
forces on specifi c issues enumerated at the end of Drysdale's paper. 
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AN ORGANIZATION FOR PACIFIC TRADE, AID AND DEVELOPMENT: 
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE RESOURCE TRADE 
A COMMENT 
Seiji Naya 
Some years ago, at one of the Conference series, Professor 
Kojima in his bold proposal argued for the establishment of a Pacific 
Free Trade Area (in short PAFTA) with the twin objectives of provid-
ing a stimulus for trade among Pacific countries and at the same time 
r ssist:!.ng As i an developing countries more effectively. Many ele -
ments of Kojima's proposal on PAFTA are incorporated, discarded and 
refined and additional political- economic r eality i s added. In 
Peter Drysdale's imaginative think piece he calls for the establish-
ment of a loose fo rm of consultati ve organization, namely the 
Organization for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development. Drysdale 
brings together skillfully various economic and political forces in 
this region and elsewhere, particularly Europe . After my quick 
glance at it, I felt a fuller comprehensi on will require more time . 
And for other reasons, the three discussants decided to form a cartel 
and share this rich pie of the proposal . 
My cartel share is to focus on a few implications his proposal 
has on developing Asian Pacifi c countries. At the outset, I must 
mention I am skipping questions of how effective, how costly and how 
possible it is to set up such an organization. Since it is a loose 
f orm of non-treaty binding organizat i on it may not be very effec-
tive. But I do endorse his proposal. One is impressed with 
Drysdale's strong emphasis on developing countries; about half of 
his essay touches upon trade, investment and aid problems of these 
countries. As Drysdale states, one important aim is to provide a 
stimulus to aid investment flows for those countries and to provide a 
framework and structure of their aid . trade and investment relations 
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with Pacific DCs. 
Among economic forces affecting these developing countries, the 
role of Japan and the U.S. are by far the most important although 
signs of increasing ties between other DCs and developing countries 
have become more visible . In recent years, Japan has replaced the 
U.S. as the most dominant country in trade and investment areas . 
It is well known that Japanese economic cooperation has been 
largely commercially motivated, closely tied to its export expansion 
and imports of raw material. But considerable improvements have been 
made in recent years that have somewhat changed the image of Japan. 
In fact, Japan has emerged as the peacemaker of ASEAN cooperation by 
tying its $1 billion aid package for the five Asian industrial 
projects . To what extent DCs in the Pacific can pull togethe•' their 
resources in aiding ASEAN projects is difficult to say. But I do 
worry about a political reaction against Japan as she increases her 
dominant position. 
The"'e is one area in which the OPTAD can be extremely useful. 
This relates to national rules and regulations covering foreign 
investment . They vary widely among count· ·ies and there is a tendency 
for Asian countries to compete in attracting foreign investment . The 
OPTAD can give a framework in which differences in these regulations 
can be discussed and possibly ha··monized. 
Another useful area of the OPTAD type of consultation is trade 
liberalization. Like other developing countries, developing Pacific 
Asian countries have not been full participants in the process of 
tariff reduction and trade liberalization that has taken place under 
the GATT. Although tariff cuts exchanged by DCs were extended to 
them, these cuts relate largely to those traded by DCs. The result 
is that tariffs of developing Asian countries remain very high and 
are often highly distorted . It is extremely difficult to dismantle 
and rationalize their tariff structure -- this is true for such 
expansion-oriented countries as Korea as Wontack Hong presented and 
is even more true for other countries. The difference in the tariff 
level has been one of the stumbling blocks against the progress of 
intra-ASEAN trade liberalization. For example, the difference in 
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tariffs between Indonesia and Singapore is enormous. OPTAD may be 
useful if such tariff harmonization is directly connected with the 
opening up of DC's market for their poor neighbors . 
Wontack expressed his worry about rising sentiments of import 
protection in the Pacific DCs -- a lot has been said on this in 
various studies and at previous conferences . 
Time does not allow me to touch on others. But there is one 
area Drysdale omits totally . This is a possibility of useful joint 
research through the framework of OPTAD . It might well be useful to 
set up task forces or other mechanisms under OPTAD to encourage joint 
policy- ori ented research on topics related to trade, aid, and devel-
opment in the region , especially in light of the needs of i ts 
developing countries . 
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AN ORGANIZATION FOR PACIFIC TRADE, AID AND DEVELOPMENT: 
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE RESOURCE TRADE 
A COMMENT 
Hugh Patrick 
This is both a very useful and a very stimulating paper. It 
provides an excellent overview of the evolving considerations of 
institutional development at the government level to enhance infor-
mation flows, negotiation, and cooperation among the nations of the 
Pacific, and outlines the role of an OPTAD and a Pacific Resources 
Bank as desirable regional institutional innovations. The paper is 
stimulating in bringing to the fo e consideration not only of 
institutions but also of at least two areas which have not been 
~dequately treated at this Conference: the developed country gov-
ernmental concessional financing and the private international capi-
tal market financing of mineral resource projects; and the potential 
role of uranium, in various forms, in the long-run solution of energy 
needs of the region (and indeed the world) , 
As is his wont, Drysdale has, near the end of this Conference, 
raised new, important issues, thereby underlining the ongoing need 
for future Pacific Trade and Development Conferences. And because 
these and other issues of trade, aid and investment will become 
increasingly important in the Pacific region context, it is not 
simply make-work, or a justification for continuation of the Confer-
ence series simply because the momentum exists. As anyone who has 
organized one of these Conferences well knows, the extreme simpli-
city of our institutional structure, its bare bones quality (the 
budget for the International Steering Committee is zero), and the 
specific funding needs for each conference i n turn, attest to the 
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commitment of all at this Conference to seek rational policy opti.ons 
and good solutions to the economic issues confounding our countries 
in their relationships with each other . 
Why should the United States be willing to participate in an 
OPTAD or similar regional institutional approach, rather than con 
t i nuing to rely on a globa.l approach to economic issues on the one 
hand, and on direct bilateral relationships on the other hand? Isn't 
OPTAD, or something similar, a second- best solution for which there 
are other, better, second- best solutions? Surely these must be among 
the questions U. S. policymakers must be asking themselves . 
I see both positive and defensive reasons for an American 
involvement in a Pacific regional organization along the lines 
Drysdale and others have suggested . On the positive side, first the 
United States must become increasingly aware of the economic impor-
tance to it of the Pacific region , and willing to face the economic 
issues that come up in a Pacific context . Incidentally, absolute 
increases in the burgeoning economic relationship are probably more 
important than the changing relative shares i n American global 
trade , aid and investment . Second , the future major issues for 
American policy in the Asian- Paci fic region will derive from econ-
omic bases rather than geo- polit i cal and military security problems . 
Th i rd, there may be advantages in starting small by suing a regional 
approach to some global issues ; moreover , the sorts of relatively 
simple, informal, consultative channels proposed by Drysdale appear 
effective ways to obtain information and present views , as well as 
seeking solutions to specific ~egional problems . Fourth, even 
within the context of global problems, the approaches and interests 
of the Asian developing nations are different from those of Latin 
America or Afri ca - - as has to clearly come out in this as in earlier 
Conferences , and Japan and Australia are different from the nations 
of Europe . Fifth , there are definite advantages in moving from the 
bilateral to the multilateral context in dealing with other impor-
tant nati ons on many issues . For example , it is probably beneficial 
to place the multi lateral component of the United States- Japan 
relationship also in a regional Pacific context rather than that of 
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the United States-Japan ~elationship also in a regional Pacific 
context rather than that of the OECD in order not to isolate Japan, 
and to provide Japan the greater weight and importance it has ea ,ned . 
There are more defensive reasons for the United States not to 
stay out of any regional organization that may develop . It always 
can be viewed as a potential counterforce should the European 
Community become increasingly inward-looking . Moreover, should 
others join together -- say Australia, Japan and the ASEAN nations 
it is important for the United States (and other nations as well, as 
Wontack Hong noted for South Korea) to know what is going on , to be 
in on the action, and to try to shape developments in light of one 's 
own nat i onal interests . 
The nature of the membership in OPTAD will certainly affect its 
results . If it comprises only the Pacific Five -- to use Drysdale ' s 
phrase or indeed only the core three of Australia, Japan and the 
United States, it could usefully meet their needs as economically 
developed nations to formulate common pos i tions vis-a-vis the rest 
of the ' ndustrial world and also t he developing Asian-Pacific 
countries. However, as Seiji Naya has implied in his comments , it 
would be very unfortunate, perhaps disastrous, for the American, 
Australian, and Japanese rela tionships wi th the developing Pacific 
nations, encouraging confrontation and conflict rather than 
r;ooperation and compromise. It i s essential that the developing 
nations of the Asia-Pacific have an integral role in OPTAD . 
It is interesting that Drysdale neve r mentions the As i an Devel-
opment Bank, much less suggests that it take on the functions 
envisaged for OPTAD. There are probably several very good reasons 
why the ADB is not the proper vehicle . As a development bank, it has 
its own particular mandate and banker's point of view. As a UN 
organization, it may not be an appropriate locus for regional 
consultation among national governments . And it has its own internal 
institut ; onal problems. (Similar comments apply even more to ESCAP.) 
Drysdale' s discussion of the financing of natural resource 
projects is particularly interesting. This topic has arisen from 
time to time in our discussions but only tangentially. The capital 
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requirements for most minerals projects are immense, and apparently 
of a nature that financing can combine large reliance on long- term 
internati onal debt as well as equity . Accordingly , the degree to 
which private and public international capital markets are seg 
mented, and how efficient those capital markets are , becomes of great 
practical importance . 
Drysdale first treats concessional aid funding of resource 
projects in LDCs mainly in terms of bilateral programs of the 
2conomically- advanced countries . He does not consider the inter-
national lending agencies in any detail . He importantly stresses 
there are segmented aid markets, not only with national tying but 
also preference to natural resource projects, and these have serious 
distorting effects . Of course, a sophisticated and efficient LDC 
government could make such resource project aid tangible to other 
social uses by reallocating the additional rents derived from the 
project - - if such governments exist . Moreover, distortions induced 
by tied concessionary aid are likely also to distort the private 
capital market fund i ng of specific projects, as Drysdale emphasizes. 
I did not fully understand the discussion concerning the effect 
of concessional aid on increas i. ng rents . If concessional aid simply 
reduces the private cost of projects that would be undertaken anyway, 
the rent is of course larger in the same amount . Will the host 
government be able to capture this rent i n full? However, if 
concessional aid increases the number of projects beyond what would 
otherwise occur , then national and world supply increases more and 
global price and rents decrease . 
Drysdale worries that the LDCs do not have adequate access to 
private capital markets on a commercial basis, for resource or indeed 
for other projects . We need further study on how efficient the 
international capital market really is. Certainly it is much more 
efficient than earlier, ' n part because it has been forced to 
intermediate the OPEC petrodollar surpluses, with recycling supplies 
greater than funds demand in the industrial nations. It appears the 
international capital market has behaved quite rationally and effi-
ciently . It has taken considerable risk and lent large amounts to 
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rl eveloping countries, not necessarily to those with large natural 
resources (though that helps) but to those which demonstrate good 
economic management capability and lesser political risk - - such as 
South Korea or Mexico. Our problem is perhaps an excessive amount of 
risk absorption in LDC loans by American banks, and not enough by 
those in other advanced countries, especially Japan. I am sure 
American banks would be delighted to lend more Eurodollars to 
Japanese banks to relend to developing Pacific countries. 
Yet the international capital market is not per fect. The sheer 
lumpiness of resource projects may require higher interest rates 
because of the amounts involved, even though the borrowers may be 
very large companies or governments. I would like to learn more on 
this matter from those here who have empirical experience. Moreover, 
the capital market may be segmented or biased. Are higher interest 
rates charged on resource projects than on electric power or 
manufacturing projects of the same size and life span? How important 
are specific developed country ties with certain LDCs -- through 
history, current alliances, or whatever in resulting in more 
favorable private capital market treatment (perhaps because of 
implicit government guarantees)? My guess is that ex-colonial 
relationships may not count for a great deal in private financial 
preferential arrangements among Pacific nations, though that again 
is an empirical question; does one think immediately of the UK and 
Malaysia or Singapore, the Phi lippines and the United States, or 
Papua New Guinea and Australia? Does it matter in which countries 
foreign banks operate, and under what conditions? These clearly are 
questions that must be addressed, in the future if not here. 
Let me end on two minor comments. First, I disagree with 
Drysdale's suggestion that the oil crisis has been the most important 
problem in Japan-U.S . relations. From an American perspective, the 
Japanese trade and balance of payments surplus and U. S. deficit of 
1971-2 was an even more severe problem, which I hope will not be 
equally severe in 1977 and 1978. Second, the uranium cartel somewhat 
dispels the belief that economically- advanced country governments 
will never engage in export embargoes, price-fixing, or cartelized 
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price increases . Let us hope such action will apply only to the 
military- strategic arena . But uranium too i s a complex subject , 
worthy of further di scussion on another occasion . 
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AN ORGANIZATION FOR PACIFIC TRADE, AID AND DEVELOPMENT : 
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE RESOURCE TRADE 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The OPTAD proposal was welcomed by almost all participants, 
though some expressed partial reservations . Further suggestions 
were made on the usefulness of such an organization. Its objectives 
should be broader than just solution of resource trade problems , 
which are the major concerns of the larger nations, and include 
attention to the trade and investment problems peculiar to the 
smaller nations . It might also be devoted to development of alterna-
tive energy technologies . The goal of trade restructuring was 
probably unrealistic for a loose OECD- type. organization , and a 
stronger organization , along the lines of a common market might be 
needed . The research goals could perhaps be equally well fulfilled 
by existing international, national , or private institutions . The 
newly proposed Pacific Resources Bank is a potentially useful means 
to handle riskier investments . 
Patrick ' s r~marks on capital market inefficiencies were 
.discussed . One participant thought that distortions in private 
investment could partly be linked to public investment flows which 
took the form of bilateral concessionary aid . Others cited evidence 
which indicated that U. S. investors , unlike the Japanese, did not 
appear to take advantage of incentives in promoted investment areas . 
The U. S . viewpoint on OPTAD was considered . It was acknowledged 
that improved economic relations in the Pacific, except with Japan , 
were not high on t.he U. S. government's priority list , but OPT AD 
seemed a good means to begin conversion of a U. S. geopolitical-
military perspective to an economic perspective . There may be some 
conflict between global and regional goals . For example, Latin 
America, Africa, and even Europe, might view U. S. participation in 
OPTAD as some form of attention lapse or even discrimination . On the 
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other hand, global and regional interests were not necessari ly 
r:onfHcting . The i mplications of OPTAD for U. S. indust r y we r e also 
wondered about. 
Patrick ' s excl usion of New Zealand and Canada from the "Pacific 
Three" did not go unnoticed. The New Zealand viewpoint was that some 
24 small nations are members of the regi onal community, and have 
legitimate claims to membership in OPTAD . The Canadian viewpoint was 
that the U. S . expressed no more i nte est i n the r egion than did 
Canada . Canada actually has t wo advantages in membersh i p over the 
U. S.: first , the Canadian economy is smaller and hence more flexi-
ble, and second , any dilution of the Canadian- American relationship 
is a strong political incenti ve . Another parti cipant remarked that 
the potential of general Asian- Paci fic development is great, and a 
narrow focus on Japanese relat i ons is short- sighted of either the 
U. S. or Canada . 
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Table A-7. Lead Mine Production in the Pacific Rim 
(1000 tons of contained lead) 
~ 1965 1970 1974 1975 
Unit2d Stat2s 225.5 273 .2 524.9 615.8 575.4 
Car..ada 186.6 264.7 351.0 301.4 352.5 
Mexico 190.7 169.7 176.6 218.0 179.4 
Peru 131.2 154.3 155 . 0 185.6 166.5 
Japan 46. 3 54.9 64.3 44.2 50 .6 
Korea n . ..:::, 4.3 16.1 8.0 9.9 
Thailand c..a. 7.4 1. 9 3.6 3.6 
Australia 313.l 367.9 449.9 375.3 408.6 
Philippines 0.1 1.3 3.4 
Sources: World Metal Statistics. 
Metallgesellscha£ t 
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Table A-8. Refined Lead Production in the Pacific Rim 
(1000 tons) 
1960 1965 
!Jait:ed S tat:es 481.2 533.2 
Canada 143.8 169.2 
Me.xi co 166.7 172.4 
Peru 74.l 86.8 
Japan 74.2. 108.6 
Australia* 192.9 196.4 
Korea 
Sources: World :-:etal Statistics 
Metallgesellschaf t 
* Primary lead only_. 
1970 1974 
729.5 751.3 
185.6 126.4 
180.3 201.9 
72.2 80.6 
208.6 227 .9 
180.1 224.8 
J.O 4.6 
1975 
751.3 
171.5 
175.4 
71.0 
194. 2 
189.8 
5.7 
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Table A-10. Slab Zinc Production in the Pacific Rim (1000 tons) 
1960 1965 
United States* 787.l 978.0 
Canada*~ 236. 7 325.2 
Mexico 52.9 62.7 
?eri..1 32.4 61.3 
Japan 181.0 376.0 
Australia 119.4 198.7 
Korea 
Sources: World ~etal Statistics. 
Metallgesellscha£t. 
* including distilled secondary zinc. 
** primary metal cnly. 
1970 1974 1975 
871.9 574.9 "-49. 9 
417 .9 426 . 3 426.9 
84.6 133.4 149 .0 
68.7 70.7 63.7 
676.0 850.8 698 .4 
257.5 283.8 201. 3 
8.0 11.5 20.9 
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Table A~ll. Slab Zinc Exports of the Pacific Rim Countries 
(1000 tons) 
1965 1970 1974 1975 
Japan 55.2 52.6 115 .9 52.8 
Canada 239.7 318.8 295 .4 247.2 
Mexico 25 .9 35.9 73.6 86.3 
Peru 56.5 65.3 65.9 57 .8 
U.S.A. 5.4 0.9 17 .5 8.1 
Australia 88.4 145.0 161.6 117. 7 
Source: World Metal Statistics. 
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Table A-12. Japan's Imports and Exports of Slab Zinc (1000 tons) 
1960 1965 1970 1974 1975 
Imports 26 . l 7 . 0 21.9 23.8 22 . 2 
of which from 
U.S . 9 . 9 
Canada 6 .1 0 . 25 7.9 0.1 
Australia 3 .1 2. 2 4 . 7 0 . 4 0 . 3 
North Korea 1.5 6. 7 11.5 18 .0 
Netherlands 3 . 5 0.2 
Exoorts 5 . 9 55.2 52.6 115.9 52 . 8 
of which to 
India 5 . 9 7.7 0 . 2 S. 4 2.2 
Taiwan 3. 7 S. 4 3.4 6.1 
Indonesia 1.8 3.4 4 . 6 
Philippines 3.8 4.3 2.0 5 .5 
Thailand . 3 1.0 3.6 5.2 
U.S.A. 13.9 27 . 2 50. 7 l. 7 
South Korea 4 . 8 6 . 4 12.9 2. 9 
Source: World ~etal Statistics. 
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Table A-13. Destination of Canadian Zinc Exports in Recent 
Years (1000 tons) 
1970 1972 1975 
Ores and concentrates, total 809 . 2 695.l 718.l 
(zinc content), 
or which 3el6ium 171.3 172.9 229. 7 
Ger.nany 31.8 107.8 100.8 
Japan 135.4 136 .3 180.2 
U.S.A. 307.4 137 .8 86.l 
Slab zinc, total 318.8 370.4 247 .2 
of which Ind..:.a. 26 .2 10.9 1.2 
U.K. 86.3 78 . .3 56.4 
U.S.A. 110.l 247.6 161.6 
Source: Statistics Canada. 
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Table A~l4. Lead Exports by Pacific 
1960 1965 
Australia 
Refined lead 127.3 159 . 1 
Concentrates (lead 
content) 75.9 110.0 
Lead Bullion 50.5 70.4 
·Peru 
Refined lead 59.7 85 . 4 
Concentrates (lead 
content) 57.9 61.4 
Mexico 
Refined lead 131.6 96.7 
Canada 
Refined lead 87.5 117 .1 
Concentrates (lead 
content) 46.6 96 . 9 
Japan 
Refined lead 0.06 8 . 5 
United S t:a. t:es 
R.ef:Lo.ed lead 1.8 7.7 
Sources: World ~etal Statisti~s 
Metallgesellschaft 
* 1974 figure. 
Rim Countries (1000 tons) 
1970 1975 
158.9 lli .2 
82.8 44.6 
165 . 6 142 . 4 
65.8 62.7 
90.5 n .a. 
77 . 6 108. 7* 
138 . 6 109 .9 
150 . 5 211 . 9 
5 . 6 39 .5 
4 . 8 16.0 
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Table A-15 . Destination of Canadian and Australian Lead 
Exports in Recent Years 
CANADA 
Ores & concentrates, 
(lead cont ent) total 
of which oelgium 
Gerrr".ny 
Japan 
U. S.A . 
Refined lead, total 
of which to India 
U. K. 
U. S.A. 
AUSTRALV. 
Ores & concentrates, total 
(lead content) 
of which to 
Japan 
U.K. 
U. S.A. 
Lead bullion, total 
of which to 
U.K . 
Netherlands 
Refined lead, total 
of which to 
India 
Ne'M Zealand 
U.K. 
U. S.A. 
Source: World ~etal Statistics. 
150 . 5 
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69 . 9 
37.2 
138.6 
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50.9 
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82.3 
16 . 7 
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8.9 
18.9 
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23 . 7 
127 . 8 
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19.J 
145.0 
116 .5 
15.3 
139 .5 
22~2 
7.2 
40 . 4 
45 . 9 
1975 
211.9 
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Table A-31 
Product.ion of ':i::.pla :e 
(metric tons ) 
1972 1973 
t. 
U.S.A. a. 4,049,300 4, 79 7 ,500 
E. l,l3l,70G :!., 238, JOO 
U.K.. !!. JJ,500 42, 700 
E. 
Japan E. 1 , 732, 000 l,907,000 
E. 851,500 846,500 
France ::!. 26,800 16,000 
E. ilJ,400 749' 700 
Ge=y a. 26,800 31,500 
E. 
Canad.a a. 483,700 552, 600 
E. 413' 900 436' 000 
Netherla:ids ::.. 29,800 i;' 000 
E. . J25, 200 360,100 
lta.ly !!. 5,400 7,400 
:::. 2.'34, 700 305, 400 
Australis 5. l5, JOO 
E. 
Belgium a. 295,300 287' 7"()0 
::. 
Bra:il. E. 237 ,200 2.'38,600 
Others 1,707,000 .l, 84C, 600 
liorlC. 12, 313' 300 lJ, 690, 500 
* ExclwC~~g ?rociuc:~=~ ~~ Soc~alis: Coun:=ias. 
Source: ":be :~ce=::i.a~~onz: :~~ Counc~:. 
!974 !.975 
5,034,300 3,765,500 
:!.,097,700 962, JOO 
34,700 18,400 
2,016,000 1,560,000 
972,700 730,600 
U., 200 10,300 
875,600 724' 500 
36 ,000 27,000 
585,JOO 449 ,100 
460, 200 386,400 
15,SIJC 
453,400 340, 200 
1,500 
340,900 266 ':!.00 
354 '900 286,200 
254, 200 277,500 
2,072,400 2,141,700 
~4,619,800 :.1.,945,900 
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